- Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991.
- Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, 1994.
Classics for the Curious
- [Nash 51] John Nash, Jr., Non-cooperative games, Annals of Mathematics, 54, 286-295, 1951.
- [GL 77] Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont, Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods, Econometrica 45, pp. 427--438, 1977.
- [Vickrey 61], William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance, 16, 8-37, 1961.
- [ATY 00] Arne Andersson, Mattias Tenhunen and Fredrik Ygge, Integer Programming for Combinatorial Auction Winner Determination, In ICMAS 2000, Boston, MA, 2000
- [BGNT04] Michael Benisch, Amy Greenwald, Victor Naroditskiy, Michael Tschantz, A stochastic programming approach to scheduling in TAC SCM, In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-04), New York, May 2004.
- [BSS 04] Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm and Rob Shields, Eliciting bid taker non-price preferences in (combinatorial) auctions, In 19th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-04), San Jose, CA, July 2004, pp 204-211
- [CS 02] Wolfran Conen and Tuomas Sandholm, Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions, In 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-02), Edmonton, Alberta, July 2002, pp 367-372.
- [CS04], Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm, Self-Interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions, In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, (EC-04), New York, May 2004.
- [Dellarocas 01] Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Analyzing the economic efficiency of eBay-like online reputation mechanisms, In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-01),, Tampa, Florida, 2001.
- [FLSC 04] Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Ion Stoica, and John Chuang, Robusty incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks, In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-04), New York, May 2004.
- [GR04] Joshua Goodman and Robert Rounthwaite, Stopping outgoing spam, In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-04), New York, May 2004.
- [GHK+ 04] Andrew
Goldberg, Jason Hartline, Anna Karlin, Andrew Wright, and Michael Saks,
Competitive Auctions, extended version of Competitive Auctions and
Digital Goods which appeared in SODA 2001.
- [JF 04] Radu Jurca and Boi Faltings, "CONFESS": Eliciting Honest Feedback without Independent Verification Authorities, In Sixth International Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC VI), New York, 2004.
- [LP 04] Sebastian Lahaie and David Parkes, Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation, In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-04), New York, May 2004.
- [Larson 04] Kate Larson, Mechanism Design for Computationally Limited Agents, PhD Thesis, Carnegie Mellon University, August 2004.
- [LOS 02] Daniel Lehmann, Liadan O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham, Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions, Journal of the ACM, 49(5), 2002.
- [LvAW04] Thede Loder, Marshall van Alystyne and Rick Walsh, An economic solution to the spam problem, In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-04), New York, May 2004.
- [MG-M 04] Sergio Marti and Hector Garcia-Molina, Limited reputation sharing in P2P systems, In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-04), New York, May 2004.
- [NR 00] Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen, Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-00), Minneapolis, MN, 2000.
- [Nisan 04] Noam Nisan, Bidding Languages, To appear in Combinatorial Auctions by P Cramton, Y Shohan, and R Steinberg (eds.) forthcoming 2004.
- [NS 04] Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal, The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting Lindahl prices, Summary of full paper to appear in Journal of Economic Theory.
- [Parkes 01] David
Parkes, Chapter 2, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving
Economic and Computational Efficiency, PhD Thesis, University of
Pennsylvania, May 2001
- [Parkes 04] David Parkes, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions, To appear in Combinatorial Auctions by P Cramton, Y Shoham and R Steinberg (eds.), forthcoming 2004
- [Porter 04] Ryan Porter, Mechanism Design for Online Real-Time Scheduling, In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-04),, New York, 2004.
- [RZFK00] Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser, Eric Friedman and Ko Kuwabara, Reputation Systems, Communications of the ACM,43(1), pp. 45-48, 2000.
- [RPH 98] Michael Rothkopf, Aleksander Pekec and Ronald Harstad, Computationally Manageable Combinatorial Auctions, Management Science, 44, pp- 1131-1147, 1998.
- [Sandolm 02] Tuomas Sandholm, Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions, Artificial Intelligence, 135, pp. 1-54, 2002.
- [SS 03] Tuomas Sandholm and Subash Suri, BOB: Improved Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations, Artificial Intelligence, 145, pp. 33-58, 2003.
- [Sandholm 03] Tuomas Sandholm, Automated mechanism design: A new application area for search algorithms, In International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP-03), 2003.
- [PS03] David Pardoe and Peter Stone, TacTex03 - A supply chain management agent, SIGecomm Exchanges: Special Issue on Trading Agent Design and Analysis 4(3):19-28, Winter 2004.
- [VS03] Ioannis Vetsikas and Bart Selman, A principled study of design tradeoffs for autonomous trading agents, In Second International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 03), Melbourne, July 2003
- [WWW+ 01] Michael Wellman, William Walsh, Peter Wurman and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason, Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling, Games and Economic Behavior, 35, pp. 271-303, 2001.
- [Wolfstetter 94] Elmar Wolfstetter, Auctions: An Introduction, Humboldt University, 1994.
- [YSM 04] Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai and Shiego Matsubara, The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in Internet auctions, Games and Economic Behavior, 46, pp. 174--188, 2004.