Report from the Carter Center on the 1994 Mexican Elections
Table of Contents
SECTION PAGE
The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government 3
Executive Summary 4
PREFACE 6
INTRODUCTION 8
ELECTORAL REFORM ISSUES AND PROCESS 11
Part 1: Autonomy of the Federal Election Institute (IFE) 11
Views of the Actors 13
Part 2: Voter Registration and Voter Lists 15
The Padrsn 16
The Audits 17
A. External (McKinsey) Audit of the Padrsn 18
B. Party-Sponsored Audit of the Padrsn 20
Views of the Actors 20
Our Analysis 22
Part 3: The Problem of Media Bias 23
Views of the Actors 25
Part 4: Campaign Spending Limits 26
Views of the Actors 26
Part 5: Election Procedures 27
Views of the Actors 29
Part 6: National Observers 30
Views of the Actors 30
Part 7: International Observers 31
Views of the Actors 32
Part 8: Criminal Penalties; Creation of a Prosecutor's Office for Election
Fraud. 32
Views of the Actors 33
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35
First-Order Issues 35
Second-Order Issues 36
Recommendations: 38
CONCLUSION 40
APPENDICES 41
Appendix 1: List of Meetings 42
Appendix 2: Biographies of Delegation Members 44
The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government
The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government is an informal group
of 24 current and former heads of government from throughout the
Americas. The Council was established in November 1986 at a meeting
chaired by former U.S. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford on
"Reinforcing Democracy in the Americas" at The Carter Center. The
Council's goals are to reinforce democracy in the Americas, promote
multilateral efforts to resolve conflict in the hemisphere, and to
advance regional economic cooperation.
The Council has been a pioneer in mediating and observing elections.
It has observed elections in Panama (1989, 1994), Nicaragua
(1989-1990), the Dominican Republic (1990), Haiti (1987, 1990), Guyana
(1990-1992) , and Paraguay (1993). The elections in Nicaragua and
Haiti were the first free elections accepted by all parties in the
nations' histories, and in Guyana, the first such elections in 28
years. The Council has worked since the elections to help consolidate
democracy in Guyana and Nicaragua. In addition, the Council has a
long-standing project in Mexico. In July 1992, four members of the
Council sent representatives to witness the observation of elections
in two states in Mexico; in November 1992, the Council invited a
representative group of Mexicans to observe the U.S. presidential
election; and in September 1993, a Council group visited Mexico to
analyze the new Mexican electoral reforms.
The Council is based at the Latin American and Caribbean Program of
The Carter Center of Emory University. Dr. Robert Pastor, fellow at
The Carter Center, is Executive Secretary of the Council; Dr. David
Carroll is Associate Director; Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Senior Research
Associate; and Ms. Harriette Martin, Administrative Assistant.
COUNCIL OF FREELY ELECTED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
Jimmy Carter, former U.S. President, and Chairman of the Council
George Price, former Prime Minister of Belize, Vice-Chairman
Rafael Caldera, President of Venezuela (1969-1974, 1994-present)
John Compton, Prime Minister of St. Lucia (1987-present)
Luis Alberto Lacalle, President of Uruguay (1989-present)
P.J. Patterson, Prime Minister of Jamaica (1992-present)
Erskine Sandiford, Prime Minister of Barbados (1987-present)
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, President of Haiti (1991-present)
Razl Alfonsmn, former Argentine President (1983-1989)
Nicolas Ardito-Barletta, former Panamanian President (1984-1985)
Oscar Arias Sanchez, former Costa Rican President (1986-1990)
Patricio Aylwin Azocar, former President of Chile (1990-1994)
Fernando Belaunde Terry, former Peruvian President (1963-1968, 1980-1985)
Rodrigo Carazo, former Costa Rican President (1978-1982)
Vinicio Cerezo, former Guatemalan President (1986-1990)
Joseph Clark, former Canadian Prime Minister (1979-1980)
Gerald Ford, former U.S. President (1974-1977)
Osvaldo Hurtado, former Ecuadorean President (1981-1984)
Alfonso Lspez Michelsen, former Colombian President (1974-1978)
Michael Manley, former Jamaican Prime Minister (1972-1980, 1988-1992)
Carlos Andris Pirez, former Venezuelan President (1974-1979, 1989-1993)
Julio Maria Sanguinetti, former Uruguayan President (1985-1989)
Edward Seaga, former Jamaican Prime Minister (1980-1988)
Pierre Trudeau, former Canadian Prime Minister (1968-1979)
Executive Summary
The national elections on August 21, 1994 will be an important
milestone in Mexico's political opening. During the last four years,
the Mexican Congress approved a number of important reforms to the
electoral process. Yet the Mexican population remains highly skeptical
about the integrity of the elections. Opinion polls show that nearly
one-half of respondents expect fraud, and more than one half expect
post-electoral violence.
Substantial progress has been made in two historically controversial
areas: the voter registration list and the vote count. The Federal
Electoral Registry (RFE) has spent US$750 million to create a new
voter registration list and issue new photo-identity voter credentials
to ninety percent of the eligible voters. External audits
commissioned by the Federal Electoral Institute and by eight of the
nine political parties have declared the list to be reliable, but the
PRD has not approved the audit results. Our preliminary analysis of
the audit performed by the McKinsey consortium indicates that the
voters list can adequately serve as the basis for a clean election,
and that it represents a real achievement given the high degree of
mobility of voters and the large size and diversity of Mexico. The
opposition parties have identified two possible avenues for fraud
related to the list. The McKinsey audit addresses one of those issues:
the potential for padding the list with fantasmas or nonexistent
persons is small. However, the audit does not directly address the
second issue of the possible disfranchisement or exclusion of voters
who believe themselves to be registered and qualified.
Election day procedural changes, including private voting booths and
transparent ballot boxes, as well as the accreditation of independent
Mexican observers, improve the prospects for an accurate and
verifiable vote count.
The late invitation of foreign "visitors", however, severely limits
the potential role of international observers as a vehicle for
improving confidence in the process.
An uneven playing field which limits the ability of all political
parties to compete equitably remains of significant concern,
especially regarding continued bias in media coverage, the high cost
of advertising, campaign spending limits beyond the reach of any party
except the PRI, and great disparities in financial resources. The
greater independence of IFE's General Council is a marked improvement;
however, the change in the General Council's composition only two
months before the election leaves insufficient time for the new
General Council to exercise control over the electoral machinery at
the state and district levels and to ensure equitable conditions for a
free election.
The continued distrust of nearly half of the voters raises questions
about whether the elections will be meaningful. If a plurality of
voters believe their vote will not count and consequently do not vote
their conscience, then even the most procedurally immaculate election
will not reflect the will of the people. Accordingly, we recommend a
set of actions that can help to raise confidence in these elections.
The decision to invite foreign visitors came too late for the Council
of Freely Elected Heads of Government to organize an observer mission
similar to those we have fielded in other countries: a high-level
delegation that has the capacity to develop over time ties of trust
and respect with political leaders, to help overcome suspicion and
miscommunication, and to make a comprehensive and global assessment of
the entire electoral process.
Instead, we will send a small group which will coordinate with others
to report on the election day activities and the outcome.
Recommendations to build confidence in the August 21 elections:
1. Hold additional public debates among the major presidential
candidates.
Of all the factors affecting public confidence, the May 12 debate appears to
have had the most positive effect.
2. Leaders of the three major political parties should jointly film
public service announcements on the need to vote and the voting
process, and discuss ways to ensure the rapid dissemination of
election results and a smooth transition to the newly-elected
administration.
3. IFE should conduct an extensive civic education campaign to
explain the procedures and safeguards, and the location of each
casilla.
4. The final voters list should be posted by casilla at least ten days
before the election to allow voters to confirm both their inclusion on
the list and the location of their casilla. This should also help
political parties and observers determine if there is any systematic
exclusion of voters from the list.
5. Avoid exit polls, which are unreliable in a climate of suspicion
and which will create a negative atmosphere if the voters feel they
are being watched. Quick counts, however, are essential, but they
must be well coordinated and the public needs to be informed of their
significance.
6. Political parties should deploy party representatives to be
present in as many casillas as possible; parties should coordinate to
ensure that at least two parties are represented in each casilla.
7. National observers should undertake a mobile strategy on election
day to cover as many polling sites as possible, paying special
attention to polling sites where there are no opposition party
representatives. The United Nations should coordinate international
visitors.
8. The indelible ink should be guarded until election day and samples
tested publicly to ensure that it has not been tampered with. Party
representatives and observers should be especially vigilant to
determine if voters' fingers are properly inspected and inked.
9. TV Azteca should match Televisa's donation of free time to the
presidential candidates. Some of that time should be during
primetime.
10. Political parties should make public reports of revenues and
campaign expenditures before the election.PREFACE
This report is the third on the Mexican Electoral Process prepared for
the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, which has been
involved in Mexico during the last four years with issues related to
the electoral process and to the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Beginning in 1990, Mexican civic and political leaders have been
invited to participate in the Council's election-monitoring missions
in Haiti, Guyana, Paraguay and the United States. In the summer of
1992, the Council was invited by Mexican election-observer groups to
send a small team to witness their observation of the elections in the
states of Chihuahua and Michoacan and to report their findings. In
September 1993, a small team representing three members of the Council
visited Mexico to study the electoral reforms being discussed at that
time in the Mexican Congress. That team's report to the Council,
Electoral Reform in Mexico, was subsequently published and distributed
widely in Mexico and the United States. It was also translated into
Spanish and published in Este Pais in January 1994.
The 1993 report was controversial, but we are gratified by the
positive impact it seems to have had in Mexico. Many of the
recommendations in that report were implemented, including the
agreement to commission an external audit of the voter registration
list, the increased autonomy of IFE from political party influence,
greater access for national election observers, and the decision to
accredit international visitors to observe the elections.
In addition, national observer groups began to monitor IFE's decision-making
and television reporting to discern whether there is bias in the coverage.
This report seeks to put in context the latest round of electoral
reforms and to assess the views of the major actors regarding the
electoral rules and the playing field in the two months prior to the
August 21 elections. It is based on a trip by a six-member team June
13-18, 1994 led by Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Senior Research Associate of
the Carter Center and representative of Council member and former
U.S. president Jimmy Carter, and including Canadian Senator Peter
Stollery, representative of Council member and former Canadian prime
minister Pierre Trudeau; Mr. Joaquin Daly, representative of Council
member and former Peruvian president Fernando Belaunde Terry;
Mr. Harry Neufeld, Canadian elections expert; Dr. Vikram Chand, a
scholar of Mexico from Brown University; and Mr. Eric Bord, an
attorney and consultant to the Carter Center.
The report was drafted by Vikram Chand, Jennifer McCoy, Harry Neufeld,
and Eric Bord, and reviewed and edited by Jennifer McCoy, Eric Bord,
Joaquin Daly, Peter Stollery, and Robert Pastor.
The delegation wishes to thank all of the persons who gave of their
time and expertise in extensive meetings and telephone conversations
in Mexico City. (A list of persons with whom the delegation met is
provided in Appendix 1.) We also are grateful for the work of
Harriette Martin, Administrative Assistant; and the following Carter
Center interns who compiled extensive briefing material for the team:
J.J. Gorsuch, Cynthia Hewitt, Joanne O'Connor, Colleen Shea, Hannah
Temple, and Hewlett Summer Intern Alma Idiart.
It is our aim to present an objective and impartial record of the
changes in the Mexican electoral process for those interested persons
in the international community. The following sections describe the
most recent reforms of the Mexican electoral process and the views of
the major political parties and national observer groups. The
concluding sections give our analysis of the state of the Mexican
elections and recommendations to further improve it.
August 1, 1994
Atlanta, GA
INTRODUCTION
On August 21, 1994, Mexicans will elect a new President, 96 Senators
and 500 Deputies to the National Chamber of Deputies. On the same
day, six states and the Federal District (Mexico City) will hold state
and local elections. These elections will undoubtedly be the
most-watched in Mexican history and an important milestone in Mexico's
political opening. Following the controversy and lack of credibility
surrounding the 1988 elections, the government initiated two important
sets of electoral reforms. The first was the 1990 election code which
created a new election agency, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE),
a new voter registration list, and a photo-identity card. With
mounting pressure from opposition parties and citizen groups, and
questioned results in state elections held over the next three years,
a second round of negotiations to further reform the process began in
May 1993, and culminated in September with constitutional and
electoral code changes. These are analyzed in our 1993 report.
The traumatic events of the Chiapas rebellion on January 1, 1994 and
the assassination of the PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo
Colosio on March 23, 1994, spurred a new urgency toward a more open
and credible election process. This led to political accords among
the parties and further changes in the Constitution and election laws
between March and June 1994.
Credibility of the electoral process is the central issue for the 1994
elections. In June 1993, a poll of 1,400 persons conducted by Market
Opinion Research Institute (MORI) showed that the population was
evenly divided on the question "Do you think the 1994 elections will
be clean or dirty" with 34% answering "clean", 34% responding "dirty",
and 12% answering "so-so". Yet despite the changes in the rules and
the tremendous effort and financial resources spent by the election
authorities in the last year to ensure a clean process (US$750 million
on the voter registration list and credentials), the Mexican
population continues to doubt the credibility of the elections.
Opinion polls taken in late May and early June 1994 indicate that
almost one-half of the population expects fraud: a poll of 9,500
persons in twenty states conducted by the Civic Alliance, an umbrella
organization of approximately 400 Mexican NGOs, and published June 30,
showed that 47% expect fraud, while 28% do not. Likewise, weekly
polls conducted by Miguel Basaqez of MORI from February to May
indicated that 40-45% of respondents did not expect the vote to be
respected, compared with 25-35% who did. A poll of 2,200 people
published June 16, 1994 by the Mexico City newspaper Reforma showed
greater confidence with 50% responding that they expect clean
elections, yet 38% still responded that they do not. When asked who
they expected to carry out fraud, 32% responded the government, 24.5%
the PRI, and 13% the electoral authorities. (Civic Alliance, June 30).
The one event that appeared to increase confidence was the
unprecedented televised debate among the three main presidential
candidates (PRI, PAN, PRD) on May 12. The MORI polls showed a jump in
confidence in late May and early June, with opinion evenly divided
between those who did and did not have confidence in the prospects for
a clean election. Pollsters attribute the increase in confidence after
the debates to the perception that the PRI was committed to a true
competition for the first time, and that the PRI acknowledged the
legitimacy of its competitors by pitting its candidate against the
others. Similarly, a decline in confidence reported in MORI's June 26
poll may be a response to the attempted resignation of the Minister of
the Interior (see below), while a surge in confidence in the July 10
poll is attributed to President Salinas' declaration that he will
transfer power to whomever wins the election. The polls are
significant in that they indicate that public opinion is not fixed,
and that it may still be possible to increase confidence in the
elections with well-publicized reforms and demonstrations of the
government's commitment to a fair election.1
Even more alarming than the lack of confidence in the process is the
high degree of uneasiness and fear of violence among the populace
reflected in opinion polls. The June 30 Civic Alliance poll showed
that in the event of electoral fraud, 30% expect violence with
ungovernability and 35% expect violence with repression, while only
17% expect no violence. Similarly, in the June 16 Reforma poll, half
the respondents said that post-electoral violence is very probable.
Recent events underline the uncertainty and uneasiness surrounding the
elections. The rejection of the peace accords by the Zapatista rebels
on June 14 because of the lack of democratic guarantees left the
Chiapas problem dangerously unsettled. The June 15 resignation of the
Peace Commissioner, former Mexico City mayor Manuel Camacho Solis,
with an acrimonious letter criticizing PRI candidate Ernesto Zedillo,
raised more speculation about alternative scenarios for an interim
government in the wake of an unclear election.
Then, on June 24, Minister of Interior Jorge Carpizo, submitted his
resignation to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari out of concern that
some partisan elements were threatening the integrity of the
elections. President Salinas convinced Carpizo to withdraw his
resignation after lengthy conversations between the two and calls from
all three major parties for Carpizo to stay. In an ironic twist, this
event magnified the important issue of IFE's independence; despite the
work of the parties and government to increase the autonomy of IFE, it
was they who turned to the government minister historically in charge
of elections in order to ensure the integrity of the process.
In response to the tense climate, a diverse group of fifty
intellectuals and political leaders organized themselves out of
concern that the results of the election may be questioned. Calling
themselves the Grupo de San Angel, on June 29, they issued a public
declaration, "La Hora de la Democracia," in which they committed
themselves to work toward clean elections and to develop an agenda to
promote a post-electoral transition to democratic modernization.
The polls are significant in that they indicate that public opinion is
not fixed, and that it may still be possible to increase confidence in
the elections with well-publicized reforms and demonstrations of the
government's commitment to a fair election.
ELECTORAL REFORM ISSUES AND PROCESS
From March through June 1994, the Mexican Congress, with the support
of the PRI, PAN and part of the PRD, approved a number of important
reforms to the Constitution and election laws (COFIPE), and IFE
promulgated several significant administrative changes. The reforms
to the electoral code: enhance the autonomy of the Federal Election
Institute (IFE); create a special prosecutor's office to investigate
and punish violations of election law; impose stiff criminal penalties
for various sorts of election fraud; improve access for national
observers; and invite and accredit international visitors/observers.
These reforms represent an important advance beyond the election reforms
approved by the Mexican Congress between August 30 and September 15, 1993.
The new IFE guidelines address:
equitable access to the media;
campaign spending limits; and
new election day procedures.
In addition, IFE sponsored two audits of the voter registration list
(Padrsn), one by a consortium of external professional organizations,
and the other in collaboration with eight of the nine political
parties (the PRD chose not to participate).
This section will discuss each of these issues, including how they are
perceived by Mexico's major political parties and national observer
groups.
Part 1: Autonomy of the Federal Election Institute (IFE)
IFE is the organization charged with the management of federal
elections in Mexico. IFE is run by a director-general nominated by
the Minister of Interior and approved by a 2/3 vote of the General
Council. The General Council is responsible for setting policy for
IFE, and it is chaired by the Minister of the Interior
(Gobernacisn). IFE is divided administratively among six specialized
organs responsible for compiling the voter registration list,
organizing elections, supervising the Professional Electoral Service
(SPE), monitoring party finances and access to the media, and
approving coalitions among parties. IFE's six specialized organs are
staffed by members of the Professional Electoral Service (SPE). The
national structure of IFE is replicated at the state and district
levels with local councils (Consejos Locales) ruling on federal
elections in Mexico's 31 states and the Federal District, and district
Councils (Consejos Distritales) in Mexico's 300 single-member
districts ruling on election to the Chamber of Deputies. In addition,
each of IFE's six administrative organs has field offices at the state
levels in the local executive board and at the district level in the
district executive boards.
Prior to the latest round of reforms, the General Council consisted of
21 members with the right to vote, including one representative each
from the two largest parties in the Chamber of Deputies, one
representative each from the two largest parties in the Senate, six
Magistrate Councilors not linked to any party, and representatives of
political parties allocated according to a formula reflecting their
relative strength in the last federal elections for deputies. The
President of the General Council was permitted to vote but in practice
did so only to break a tie. The Magistrate Councilors - required by
law to be lawyers or judges - were appointed by the Mexican President
and approved by a 2/3 vote of the Chamber of Deputies. In 1993, the
government had one seat on the Council; the PRI had six; the PAN had
three; and the PRD two. In addition, each of three small parties had
one: the Popular Socialist Party (PPS), the Authentic Party of the
Mexican Revolution (PARM), and the Cardenista Front for National
Reconstruction (PFCRN).
Technically, the PRI and government together controlled only seven
seats in the General Council under the old system. Yet, the PAN and
PRD believed that the PRI/government could actually secure a majority
of the votes or even a 2/3 majority through the votes of some or all
of the six Magistrate Councilors and the three small parties.
Our own study of voting patterns in the General Council revealed that the
Magistrate Councilors would normally side with the PRI/government on
important issues; the small parties tended to vote similarly although not on
every important issue. (see our 1993 Report, pp. 23-28).
The latest round of reforms seeks to address this perception of bias
among the Magistrate Councilors and strengthen the autonomy of the
IFE. The Magistrate Councilors were replaced in early June 1994 by
six Citizen Councilors appointed through consensus by the three main
political parties, rather than at the behest of the President, and
approved by a 2/3 vote of the Chamber of Deputies. The requirement
that they be lawyers has been dropped, thus widening the potential
pool of candidates and reducing their ties to the judicial branch of
government. The Citizen Councilors must not have held any position of
leadership in a political party in the three years prior to their
designation. The new Citizen Councilors consist of a former
columnist, three academics respected for their independence, a former
public official, and a legal adviser to the corporate sector.
New Citizen Councilors
Santiago Creel Miranda, Academic
Miguel Angel Granados Chapa, Journalist
Josi Augustmn Ortmz Pinchetti, Lawyer and Political Analyst
Ricardo Pozas Horcasitas, Sociologist and Political Researcher
Josi Woldenberg Karakowsky, Sociologist and Political Analyst
Fernando Zertuche Mzqoz, Academic
The new reforms also give political parties the right to participate
in General Council deliberations but do not allow party
representatives to vote. The objective of this reform is to
depoliticize General Council decision-making processes by increasing
the relative weight of the Citizen Councilors who now control a
majority of the votes on the Council. The General Council will
henceforth consist of only 11 voting members including the six Citizen
Councilors, one representative each from the two largest parties in
the Chamber of Deputies, one representative each from the two largest
parties in the Senate, and the President. The President will have the
right to vote in all Council decisions, but may not break a tie.
However, the President has announced that he will not exercise his vote in
order to enhance his authority as an impartial arbiter of Council
proceedings. The new President of the General Council, Minister of Interior
Jorge Carpizo, is well known for his personal integrity and concern for
human rights; he served as President of Mexico's National Human Rights
Commission prior to his appointment as Minister of the Interior and President
of the General Council of IFE.
The initial deadline for submitting the names of such individuals
along with appropriate evidence was extended from March 5, 1994 to
June 14, 1994. However, the General Council President indicated on
June 18 that additional names could still be submitted after the June
14 deadline. By June 14 approximately 170 citizen councilors at the
district and state levels had been removed out of 1,992 councilors, or
about 8.5% or the total. In addition, approximately 234 members of
the Professional Electoral Service (SPE) at the state and district
levels were removed at the request of opposition political parties.
Polling station officials for election day in the approximately 97,000
casillas have already been chosen by two successive lotteries to
ensure their objectivity. In the first lottery, 15% of all citizens
from each electoral section were selected at random to participate in
a training course given by IFE to serve as polling station officials.
The lottery was held in the central headquarters of IFE in full view
of the press. A second lottery was held after the training course and
graduates of the course whose last name began with a randomly chosen
alphabetical letter were selected as officials for their sections.
Rank within the polling station was then determined by level of
education.
In addition, the Director-General of IFE, with the approval of 2/3 of
the General Council, appointed Dr. Juan Molinar, a well-regarded
independent critic and scholar of the Mexican electoral system, to
head the Office of Political Parties and Prerogatives which deals with
the public financing of political parties, media access, and the
registration of coalitions.
Views of the Actors
The PRI, PRD, and PAN all see the changes in the composition of the
General Council as very positive steps. The PRI believes that the
appointment of the new Citizen Councilors will add credibility to the
electoral process, thereby reducing the risk of a disputed outcome
later on. The two largest opposition parties - the PAN and the PRD -
see the new Citizen Councilors as objective, independent, and open to
their concerns. The Citizen Councilors themselves are aware that
their greatest strength is their moral authority. They have already
used their power of moral persuasion to criticize the electronic media
for covering the candidates in a partial and biased fashion (see
discussion below in Part 3), and there are preliminary indications
that this criticism is already having an impact. The Citizen
Councilors are also conscious of the possibility that the citizenry
may turn to them to resolve any post-election crisis because of their
moral credibility and nonpartisan image.
Both opposition parties and the Citizen Councilors, however, are
concerned about the problem of unrealistic expectations regarding the
ability of the Citizen Councilors to monitor and regulate the
performance of the electoral bureaucracy. They point out that while
all the Magistrate Councilors at the General Council have been
replaced, the rest of IFE as an institution remains largely intact.
Less than ten percent of the combined Citizen Councilors and electoral
officials at state and district levels have been removed, and five of
the six executive organs of IFE remain under the control of officials
appointed under the old rules, that is directly by the
director-general without the approval of the General Council. The
presence of the new Citizen Councilors at the apex of IFE thus does
not guarantee a transformation of IFE as a whole. In addition, the
new Citizen Councilors were appointed just two months before the
elections, thereby limiting their impact to the last phase of the
electoral process. The PRI, PRD, and PAN all see the changes in the
composition of the General Council as very positive steps.
The national election observer groups, particularly the Civic
Alliance, also view the changes in IFE as a positive step. But the
Civic Alliance criticizes opposition parties, particularly the PRD,
for not doing enough to identify biased Citizen Councilors and
officials at the state and district levels. In many cases, the PRD
submitted only the names of suspect councilors and officials without
any accompanying evidence. The Civic Alliance also claims that the
PRD and PAN had enough time to challenge corrupt officials,
particularly since the deadline was extended through June 14, 1994.
The PAN and PRD feel that it was very difficult to collect evidence
against suspect councilors and officials and that it would have been
better to dismiss all 1,992 Citizen Councilors at the state and
district levels en masse. The government responds that this would
have been impractical so late in the electoral process.Part 2: Voter
Registration and Voter Lists
The Government of Mexico chose to create a computerized Register of
Voters (Padrsn) at the time that a new electoral roll was prepared in
1991. Subsequently, the General Council of the IFE decided to enhance
the registration process by issuing each registrant an identity card
which incorporates the voter's signature, photograph, and fingerprint.
The photo-identity card features nine security measures and a magnetic
strip which could be employed for electronic voting in the
future.2Keeping a register of voters current in Mexico presents major
challenges.
Three measurements are traditionally used to evaluate the quality of a
voters list:
Completeness
Currency
Accuracy
Completeness addresses the question "Is everyone on the list that
should be on the list?". Not all who are qualified need necessarily
register. In most Western democracies it is generally accepted that
up to 10% of the eligible population does not wish to register and
therefore does not appear on the list. The Mexican government
estimates there are currently 50 million eligible voters, representing
an average increase of 1.6 million eligible voters per year since
1991. The IFE estimates that 95% of eligible citizens actually
registered to vote (47.5 million out of 50 million). Of these 47.5
million, slightly more than 95% (45 million) had collected their voter
credentials and will appear on the August 21 voter list. This
represents a completeness coverage of 90.25%.
Currency is a measure of the relative decay over time of register
information following its initial preparation, offset by maintenance
efforts. Knowing the currency answers the question, "Is the list up
to date?". The Registro Federal Electoral (RFE) estimates a national
mobility rate of approximately 6% annually, an adult death rate of
approximately .06% per year, and approximately 8% of the workforce
employed as migrant labor (however many have a permanent address they
regard as home even though they may reside there only periodically).
Given these factors, keeping a register of voters current in Mexico
presents major challenges.
The RFE estimates that since the photo-identity program began in
January 1993, it has received 13 million new applications for
registration, processed 2.4 million changes of address, made 1.4
million data corrections, and canceled 5.1 million outdated
registrations, mainly due to unreported changes of address or deaths.
The comprehensive audits of the list (discussed further below) provide
indications of the list's currency. In most Western democracies a
currency level of 85% is considered to be a high level of maintenance
if it is based on a voluntary system of change-of-address updates.
Accuracy measures both the substantive and cosmetic errors on the list
and addresses the question, "What percentage of the names and
addresses on the list are correct?" Substantive errors include the
registration of voters who do not exist, listing of voters at
nonexistent addresses, duplicate registrations, and assignment of
voters to the wrong voting section. Cosmetic errors, which would have
no real effect on the electoral process, include a misspelled name or
address, and the misrecording of gender or age information.
Though 100% accuracy is the goal, experience indicates that a 97%
accuracy rate is the best that can reasonably be expected because of
non-intentional human errors. A high rate of accuracy would,
therefore, still expect cosmetic inaccuracies in 2% of the entries and
substantive inaccuracies in 1% of the list. However, if an organized
campaign of collecting improper registrations at the source is
mounted, for motives of political bias or some other reason, the rate
of substantive error can be expected to increase markedly.
The Padrsn Our 1993 report provides an overview of the creation of the
Padrsn being prepared in anticipation of the August 21, 1994
elections. Since that report, a number of significant operational
improvements and legal reforms have been implemented. They include:
deletion of 5.1 million outdated registrations and photo-identity
cards that had not been picked up at the 7,000 registration offices
across the country; identification and deletion of approximately
100,000 duplicate registrations, 20,000 duplicated photo-identity
cards and the names of 30,000 persons sentenced for crimes. Many of
these records were identified through the use of computer searches for
similar sounding names and ranges of birth dates; enactment of laws
which make it a criminal offense to be in possession of more than one
photo-identity card;
legal access for representatives of political parties to the RFE's
archives of registration source documents and photographs, housed in
seventeen locations throughout the country;
agreement to attach an "addendum", if necessary, to each voting
precinct list showing the names of persons who appeal to the Federal
Electoral Tribunal and are ruled eligible to be included on the list
of eligible voters after the final list (Listado Nominal Definitiva)
is produced. Some 90,000 such administrative requests made by the
Tribunal had been processed by the RFE at the time of the delegation's
visit;
the funding of political parties for the purpose of undertaking a
national audit of the Padrsn and its sources; and
establishment of an Electoral Roll Technical Council, made up of ten
politically impartial professionals and experts, that has
responsibility to oversee the comprehensive multifaceted external
audits of the Padrsn and its preparation by independent national and
international firms.
Notwithstanding the efforts and expense (US$750 million) to which the
IFE has gone to assure the integrity of the registration process and
the vote, there remains widespread mistrust among the Mexican populace
regarding the electoral process in general (discussed in the
Introduction of this report), and specific questions of the Padrsn's
reliability among the opposition parties. Throughout the surrounding
controversy, RFE officials have been steadfast in their defense of the
Padrsn and the professionalism they have applied to its creation and
maintenance. They point to the positive results of audits taken in a
Selectivity Study in 1991, a National Verification in 1992, and 36
separate and methodologically diverse studies taken since the
photo-identity card issuance program began in November, 1992. The
Mexican voters roll is not perfect, they admit. However, they claim
to have studiously improved their processes as a result of suggestions
made during each of these investigations and argue that they have
produced a very reliable list in comparison to that of any other
nation.
On July 20, 1994, based on 38 separate studies including the two
audits discussed below, the IFE General Council approved the Padrsn
and nominal lists. PRD Senator Porfirio Muqoz Ledo was the only one
to vote against acceptance. (El Financiero, International Edition,
July 25-31, 1994).
The Audits
As a confidence-building measure, the IFE General Council agreed to
fund two separate audit processes at a cost of over US$11 million.
One audit was conducted by a consortium of national and international
professional organizations. The other was commissioned by the IFE
along with eight of the nine political parties (the PRD did not
participate). The audits were concluded on June 30, 1994, and the
results compiled and delivered to the IFE shortly thereafter. Results
and conclusions described in this section are based upon summaries
issued by the IFE in Press Releases dated July 8, 1994 and July 10,
1994 and a preliminary review of the external (McKinsey) audit.
We did not receive the political party audit in time to analyze its
conclusions. Neither did we receive the audits of the PRD, although we
repeatedly requested them in order to examine their criticisms of the Padrsn.
A. External (McKinsey) Audit of the Padrsn
One of the audits was performed by a consortium of eight (three
international, five national) Mexico based companies and involved
investigations of computing processes, adherence to legal procedures,
a sample check of 64,000 data base records and source documents
against interviews of voters in their homes to determine currency and
accuracy, and a resource usage evaluation that compared the number of
photo-identity cards manufactured and issued to the amount of material
used. This audit process was overseen by a Technical Council of ten
politically independent technicians (seven with PhDs) who were
responsible to the General Council of the RFE for: determining the
reliability of the Padrsn (registered voters) and Listado Nominal
Definitiva (registered voters with a photo-identity card); identifying
the causes of failures or inconsistencies that were found; and, making
suggestions to the IFE General Council of corrective measures.
The companies involved in the audit included:
Berumen y Asociados
Bufete de Consultorma Actuarial
Burs de Investigacisn de Mercados
Grupo de Asesores Unidos S.C.
A.C. Nielsen
McKinsey & Co.
Salles, Saenz y Co.
Systemhouse de Mixico
McKinsey & Co. acted as the coordinator of the other seven firms and
was responsible for integrating the audit results and producing the
final report. It is significant that the audit went much further than
simply testing the quality of the list; it was designed to investigate
areas of potential mismanagement and questionable or illegal practices
used in the process of list creation.
The principle findings of the external audit were:
The Padrsn is 97.42% reliable;
Processes utilized in producing and updating the Padrsn and
photo-identity cards were within all legal norms;
No extraneous or additional information is present in the information
systems; and,
The amount of material used in creating the photo-identity cards
reasonably corresponds with the number of cards issued. According to
the July 8 IFE press release, the Technical Council concluded that the
methodology used by the contracted firms complied with the criteria
and established norms that were promised in their bid. The Technical
Council further certified that the audit was performed in accordance
with scientific standards and generally accepted methods, and that the
results of the audit should be considered valid. The margin of error
was 0.5% with a 95% level of confidence at the national level.The
external auditors concluded that the size, structure, and composition
of the small level of inconsistencies should reassure those concerned
that the Padrsn is reliable and that there is nothing to suggest bias
or systematic violation of normal procedures.
The report of the audit indicates a reliability level for the Padrsn
of 97.42%. This figure attempts to combine elements of accuracy and
currency, and includes not only those cases where all of the
information coincided between the data base, source document, and the
citizens surveyed (78.70% of the cases), but also the following
categories: changes of residence where the person was known at the
original address and found at a new address by the surveyor (4.96%);
changes of residence where the person was known at the original
address but not found in the same vicinity by the surveyor (4.56%);
citizen reported the photo-identity card lost or stolen or the citizen
had moved temporarily (4.7%); the citizen had died (0.29%); and the
citizen had the credential but was not on the preliminary voters list
of April 30, 1994 used to draw the sample (4.25%) The RFE has made
assurances that inconsistencies in this last category were remedied in
the final updating of the voters list. Furthermore, to the extent
that there were inconsistencies, they were dispersed throughout the
country and not geographically centralized.
The cases that were counted as inconsistencies in this audit (2.37% of
the total), then, were only those cases in which either the address
was not found or the citizen was unknown at the address (1.9%);
citizens without credentials but listed as having them (0.3%);
citizens who had returned their credentials because of errors (0.07%);
and cases where the data coincided with the citizen interview, but the
source material was missing (0.1%).
The external auditors concluded that the size, structure, and
composition of the small level of inconsistencies should reassure
those concerned that the Padrsn is reliable and that there is nothing
to suggest bias or systematic violation of normal procedures. The
audit went on to conclude that the software programs, information
processes, and the data bases contain no extraneous programming or
information, and include only that which is proper and necessary for
the operation of those systems. In addition, the computerized data at
the regional computing centers and the data given to the parties
correspond.
With respect to the updating that was performed by the RFE, the audit
indicates that there were no irregularities and that all legal norms
were followed. In addition, the material used in processing the
photo-identity cards reasonably corresponds to the number that were
printed and distributed. The auditors also concluded that the actions
and activities of the RFE complied fully with all legal requirements
and all regulations and orders issued by the General Council of the
IFE and the National Commission of Oversight, a council comprised of
representatives from the nine political parties. Some questions were
raised regarding the vulnerability of the information systems to
tampering. Recommendations for immediate additional security measures
were made, and, according to press releases, have been implemented by
the IFE. Those suggestions include improved physical security and
hazard protection at computing centers and more rigid control over
access to the data base through the increased use of passwords.
B. Party-Sponsored Audit of the Padrsn
This audit was commissioned by all of the political parties except for
the PRD. Its results were accepted by seven of the nine parties, with
the PDM abstaining3 and the PRD voting against approval. Its
objective was to determine (a) the level of correspondence between
applications, receipts and data base records; and (b) the existence of
citizens at their reported address. The methodology employed included
a sample of 82,405 citizens throughout the 31 states and the federal
district. The margin of error was limited to 0.63% with a 98%
confidence level at the national level. These measures of accuracy
and currency should provide a reliable snapshot from which to
extrapolate to the entire population. The results of the
party-sponsored audit as reported in the IFE press release of July 8
appear to be consistent with the conclusions of the external audit:
the reliability of the Padrsn was measured at between 96.08% and
97.62%. However, we are unable to provide our own evaluation of the
party-sponsored audit because we had not received the audit itself at
the time of this writing.
According to IFE, the eight sponsoring parties agreed that the level
of reliability of the Padrsn is a consequence of the timely corrective
measures that were implemented by the RFE, specifically the removal of
duplications, searches for similar sounding names, changes of address
and changes of citizenship.
The PRD representative before the National Oversight Commission, Josi
Barberan Falcsn, asked that the PRD be furnished with the results of
the audit so that they could be reviewed by the PRD. According to the
RFE, the PRD was provided the results of the audit, but denied the
database for the audit on grounds of confidentiality.
Views of the Actors
The PRD refused to be part of the party-commissioned audit. It
continues to be extremely skeptical of all of the activities of the
RFE and claims that it has been given "no answers" and has "great
doubts" about the problems it has identified with voter registration.
The PRD claims that there is an error rate of 20% in the Padrsn.
Based on a survey in 45 electoral districts in four different states,
the PRD found that 9.5% of the names on the lists were "fantasmas" or
"ghosts" (nonexistent persons), while 11% of "real" citizens were
excluded from the lists. ("RFE Responds to PRD Arguments in May 30,
1994 Debate on the Padrsn" in Report of IFE General Council meetings
published June 10, 1994). The RFE vigorously denies the accuracy of
the PRD surveys and declares that it was able to find more than 90% of
the persons associated with ghost names within a three day period.
The RFE further suggests that the PRD is prone to extrapolate its
figures on a basis that has no statistical merit and lacks the
application of rigorous methodology. The RFE is concerned that the
PRD is trying to discredit the entire electoral process on the basis
of isolated registration errors.
The PAN and PRD are also concerned that the government may alter the
final voter registration list (Listado Nominal Definitiva) on the eve
of the elections by reducing the number of voters in areas where the
opposition has historically done well. Three agreements attempt to
address this concern. First, the General Council voted to post the
final list in the municipal city halls between August 10 and August 20
so that citizens can check it. (El Financiero, 21 July, 1994). Ten
days should be adequate time for this purpose.
Second, on election day representatives of the political parties at
the district level will each select at random their copies of the
Listado Nominal Definitiva, with the final remaining copy to be that
which is used by the officials at each voting site. (IFE Press
Release, July 8, 1994). This should ensure that a unique, tampered
list is not provided to polling station officials, but it will still
require that the political parties compare the official list with
their own randomly chosen copy, and with the Listado Nominal
Definitiva provided to the parties before election day. Third, the
Citizen Councilors proposed at the July 20 General Council meeting to
conduct a sample analysis of the final registration list used on
election day to ensure that it is identical to the lists received by
the political parties.
The PRD is concerned that the government may possess a secret software
program that might be activated to alter the voters list shortly
before the elections. The government strongly denies the existence of
a secret software program, and the external audit reportedly found no
extraneous programming or information.
One international group, the United Nations Electoral Assistance
Program, claims that one way to guard against alterations in the final
voter registration list is to introduce a system of tendered
balloting. Under such a system, voters could vote with their
credentials even if their names were not on the list. These votes
would then be sent to IFE, which would verify the validity of each of
the ballots in cooperation with the parties. This would enable IFE
and the observer groups to quantify the number of citizens whose names
should have appeared on the final registration list but did not;
verify if there was a pattern of bias in the exclusions in favor of
any given party; and allow those excluded to vote. The government,
the Citizen Councilors, and parties, however, are uncomfortable with
the system of tendered balloting because it permits people to vote who
are not on the final voter registration list, a traditional avenue of
fraud in Mexican elections.
Our Analysis
The Carter Center commissioned a voters list expert and a statistician
to review the information provided in the external (McKinsey) audit.
Our preliminary conclusion is that the Padrsn provides a good basis
for a free election, and is a real achievement in light of the
challenges faced by the RFE in compiling a list in a country as large
and diverse as Mexico.
Nevertheless, we find the conclusion that the Padrsn is 97.5% reliable
to the most optimistic interpretation of the data, and somewhat
confusing. This is due to the fact that the criteria measured by the
audit blends issues of accuracy and currency (as defined above). The
audit seeks to answer the following questions: a) do the addresses on
the list exist and are they located in the correct electoral section;
b) do the citizens on the list exist and are they in the correct
electoral section; c) what percentage of voters have received their
photo credential; and d) what is the level of consistency between the
source documents and the data bases? Of these, items (a), (b), and
(d) answer the question of how accurate the list is. Yet, the
inconsistencies identified in the audit combine issues of currency
(changes of residence and deaths) with issues of accuracy (does the
house or person exist). The result is a single percentage of
"consistency" or reliability that is difficult to interpret.
Our preliminary conclusion is that the Padrsn provides a good basis
for a free election, and is a real achievement in light of the
challenges faced by the RFE in compiling a list in a country as large
and diverse as Mexico.
The implications of these findings for discerning a pattern of bias or
potential avenues of fraud in the list are unclear. On the one hand,
the consistency rate of 78.7% indicated in the audit (where all of the
data matches between the citizen interviewed, the source documents,
and the computer database) is actually quite good since this reflects
all those cases which met both of the criteria of accuracy and
currency. In addition, the potential for padding the list with
invented persons (fantasmas) appears to be quite small: only 1.9% of
registered voters were not known at the address listed, some of which
could potentially be nonexistent persons.
On the other hand, several important questions are apparently not
answered by the data provided in the audit summary. First, among the
cases of changed addresses, how many people might be registered at
more than one address? (The RFE had an extensive system to check for
duplicate registrations by comparing similar sounding names within a
range of birthdates to combat this potential problem.)
Second, how many people are excluded from the list involuntarily?
This is an issue of coverage which is not addressed in the external
(McKinsey) audit. If 90% of the eligible voters are actually on the
list, were the remaining 10% disenfranchised involuntarily or did they
simply fail to register due to lack of interest? To answer this
question would require a survey that is drawn from the pool of
eligible voters and then checks them against the list (people-to-list
audit), in addition to the list-to-people audit that was carried out
by the McKinsey group. A people-to-list audit would attempt to
discern if there was a systematic bias either by geographic location
or political preference that could constitute one form of fraud: the
deliberate disfranchisement of people by excluding them from the list.
Other safeguards must protect against these two primary forms of fraud
in a voter's list. The available safeguards in this context are
vigilant use of indelible ink to prevent multiple voting, and the
review of the final voter's list to ensure that all registered voters
are in fact on the list and permitted to vote. The posting of the
lists in municipalities ten days before the election therefore
provides an important opportunity for voters to ensure that they are
correctly listed, or to submit appeals which could later be examined
to determine if there was a biased disfranchisement of voters.
Finally, we should note that, according to Dr. Carlos Almada, Director
of RFE, it is not an electoral crime to vote at one's old address if
that is the address on the credential and the list. Almada explained
that the political parties agreed that this would be permissible
because of the high mobility level of urban Mexican adults, the
significant number of migrant workers, and a tendency in some sectors
for voters to consider their ancestral village as home even though
they may reside elsewhere.
Part 3: The Problem of Media Bias
The 1993 electoral reforms directed IFE to arrange for radio and
television time for each of the parties to be paid for by the state
and additional time to be paid for by the parties, but did nothing to
address the problem of bias by the country's television stations in
favor of the official party. On January 27, 1994, all the country's
political parties and presidential candidates reached an Agreement for
Peace, Democracy, and Justice in which they agreed that equal access
to the media was a necessary precondition for fair elections.
A May 19 study of news coverage from January - April 1994 on 24 Horas
and Hechos by the Mexican Academy of Human Rights, one of the members
of Civic Alliance, found that the PRI enjoyed a 3:1 advantage in total
air time compared with the two strongest opposition parties, the PAN
and the PRD. The coverage of presidential candidates was even more
skewed with the PRI candidate receiving 3.5 times more coverage than
the PAN candidate and 6 times more coverage than the PRD candidate.
The Civic Alliance plans to continue monitoring newscasts for bias and
report its findings to the citizenry on a regular basis. A second
report based on content analysis of television coverage during June
1994 found a slight improvement in total air time given to
presidential candidates, but it was still skewed toward PRI,
particularly on Televisa where Zedillo received 36%, Cardenas 11%, and
Fernandez 8% of the coverage on 24 Horas.
The new General Council has taken three steps to remedy the issue of
media bias by radio and television stations. First, the General
Council has used its moral authority to formally exhort radio and
television stations to provide more equitable coverage of all
political parties, particularly in their newscasts. On June 18, it
reminded the owners of Mexico's radio and television stations that the
right to information and the free expression of ideas are part of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations to which
Mexico is a signatory. The General Council has also communicated the
concern of various citizen organizations and parties about the lack of
fairness and objectivity with regard to the coverage of the
presidential candidates. The June 1994 study by the Mexican Academy
of Human Rights found that when value judgments about candidates were
injected into stories on Televisa's 24 Horas, PRI candidate Zedillo
was praised at a disproportionate rate of 12:1 over his closest
rivals.
Second, the General Council established a commission to monitor the
country's radio and television news programs for biases in coverage
and report back to the General Council by June 30. The commission
will continue to provide regular reports on news coverage by the
electronic media to each ordinary session of the General Council, and
the General Council will continue to formulate recommendations to the
media to improve the fairness of its coverage of candidates and
parties. The first report, based on media monitoring from June 22-28,
1994 showed that the PRI received nearly as much radio and television
coverage as the eight opposition parties combined (Miami Herald, July
6, 1994), confirming the results of the Mexican Academy of Human
Rights.
Third, the General Council plans to provide approximately two million
U.S. dollars to political parties to purchase time on radio stations.
A portion of this money will be allocated according to the electoral
strength of each party as reflected in the previous federal elections
for deputies; the rest will be allocated equally among all parties.
According to press reports of July 8, 1994, Televisa, which has
approximately 90% of the viewing audience, announced it would invite
all nine presidential candidates to make three 15-minute political
broadcasts which would be shown repeatedly up to a week before the
elections. The programs will be shown at different times to ensure
they reach all audiences. This announcement follows a meeting between
Civic Alliance and President Salinas on Friday, July 8 in which Civic
Alliance accused Televisa and the smaller Television Azteca of
slanting their coverage in favor of the PRI candidate. Television
Azteca has not yet replied to the charges. Both the PAN and the PRD
welcomed the Televisa move and plan to record their programs shortly,
although the PRD said that it did not go far enough in ensuring
completely fair coverage.
In addition, the PRI, PAN, and PRD reached an agreement that the
government would suspend publicity for its two antipoverty programs,
the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) and PROCAMPO, during the
last three weeks of the campaign.
Views of the Actors
The PAN and the PRD support the steps that the General Council has
taken to encourage equitable access to the electronic media though
they note that the General Council's recommendations are not legally
binding on the owners of Mexico's radio and television stations. The
opposition parties are also pleased with the agreement to ban all
publicity for PRONASOL and PROCAMPO during the last three weeks of the
campaign because of the risk that the government might use such
publicity for partisan ends.
The PAN and PRD remain deeply concerned about the problem of bias in
the electronic media since the overwhelming majority of Mexicans
receive their information about the campaign from television
newscasts. The PAN and PRD feel that Mexico's two most important TV
news programs, 24 Horas of the Televisa Network and Hechos of the
Azteca Television Network, are biased in favor of the PRI. The PAN
and the PRD argue that the owners of Mexico radio and TV stations are
more likely to support the ruling PRI because they receive their
licenses from the government. In addition, the PAN argues that the
high rates for purchasing television slots in prime time
(approximately US$120,000 per minute) favor the PRI, which has access
to more financial resources than the PAN and the PRD. The PAN would
like the PRI to disclose publicly how much it has spent on advertising
in the electronic media to date. The PAN did concede that there has
been a slight improvement in the quality of coverage of the campaign,
particularly radio.
The PRI states that it cannot do anything about the bias in the
electronic media because they are in private hands. The PRI also
claims that it is the most important political force in the country
and hence the most newsworthy. The PRI stated that is had not released
any figures on advertising in the electronic media as of June 15
because it began purchasing spots on television only recently, and in
addition notes that it is under no legal obligation to release its
campaign expenditures until after the election. The government for its
part argues that it cannot regulate the content of newscasts without
seriously compromising the principle of free expression.
Part 4: Campaign Spending Limits
The 1993 electoral reforms provided for campaign spending limits for
the first time in Mexican electoral history but left it up to the
General Council to specify the limits as well as the formula and
criteria used to derive the limits. Prior to the change in
composition of the General Council, it set a limit of US$42 million
for the presidential race for each political party. To arrive at this
figure the General Council set a monetary value on each vote
multiplied by the number of registered voters, and adjusted for both
inflation and the duration of the campaign.
Campaign spending limits for Mexico's senate and federal deputy races
were approved by the local and district councils respectively. The
formulas used were the same as the one used for the presidential race
except that they take into account two additional factors:
geographical expanse and population density. The limits for senate
races range from a high of approximately nine million U.S. dollars in
the State of Mexico to a low of approximately US$426,000 in the State
of Baja California Sur. The limits for federal deputy races range
from a high of approximately US$653,000 in District VIII of the State
of Mexico to a low of approximately US$45,000 in District XIX, also in
the State of Mexico.
Views of the Actors
The PAN and the PRD feel that the limit of US$42 million per
presidential campaign is much too high. The PAN has stated that the
official limit is eight times more than what it plans to spend on the
presidential campaign. The opposition parties feel that the high
campaign spending limits give the ruling PRI an advantage since it has
greater access to resources.
The PAN and PRD are also worried that money used for the government's
social programs will be used to buy the vote for the official party,
particularly in rural areas. The PAN claims that the government is
planning to spend around US$4 billion in the two months preceding the
elections through PRONASOL and PROCAMPO. The government argues that
it cannot halt investment in public programs merely because of the
elections. It claims that the very fact that it is channeling funds
into poverty-stricken areas is a sign of its democratic responsiveness
and that all democratic governments use social programs to garner
political support. The government also claims that with a secret
ballot, just because a citizen happens to benefit from a public
program does not automatically mean that the same citizen is obliged
to vote for the ruling party. Finally, the government points out that
the latest reforms establish severe criminal penalties for public
servants who misuse public funds or programs to buy votes.
Part 5: Election Procedures
In response to complaints and proposals from the political parties,
IFE has enacted several changes in election day procedures. Through
an extended process of trial and error, IFE and the National School
for Biological Sciences at the National Polytechnic Institute in
Mexico City have developed an indelible ink that will not wash off for
at least three days after application. After depositing their ballots
in the ballot box, and before leaving the casilla, each voter will
have this ink applied to his or her thumb by a bottle with a roller
ball. In addition, their voter credentials will be stamped with a
small "V" in a marked area corresponding to the 1994 federal
elections, indicating that they have already voted in that election.
Members of our delegation tested this ink with chlorine bleach, hydrogen
peroxide, alcohol, acetone, saliva, Coca-Cola, urine, baking soda, and
various household detergents, and found that the government's claim that it
was indelible for at least three days was accurate. However, the
delegation's test of the voter credential stamp found it to be barely
legible, apparently due to the need to protect the laminated card from
perforation and oxidation.
Members of our delegation tested this ink with chlorine bleach,
hydrogen peroxide, alcohol, acetone, saliva, Coca-Cola, baking soda,
urine, and various household detergents, and found that the
government's claim that it was indelible for at least three days was
accurate.
Voting booths will be curtained off on all sides to provide for
greater secrecy at the time of voting and ballot boxes will be
transparent on three sides to prevent them from being stuffed with
ballots prior to the start of voting. In addition, every ballot has a
corresponding sequentially numbered perforated stub. After voting,
and before depositing the ballot in the box, the numbered stub will be
detached. This will enable election officials to monitor the exact
number of ballots delivered to each precinct and to confirm that the
number of reported votes corresponds to the number of validly cast
ballots. Polling stations will remain open from 8:00 a.m. until the
last person in line before 6:00 p.m. has voted.
Voters who are traveling on the day of their election and therefore
unable to vote in their own polling stations will have the right to
vote for president only in special polling stations. Only a voter
credential will be necessary to vote in these special polling
stations, which will have no voter registration list. Each district
will contain no more than five special stations with the right to
receive a maximum of 250 votes each. This translates into roughly
1,500 special polling stations nationwide and a total of 375,000
potential votes at these special stations. Unlike in past elections,
election results will be posted outside each polling station at the
end of the day, and each political party representative will receive a
legible copy.
The vote count begins with races for deputy, followed by senator and
then president. The count is not open to the public, but party
representatives, national observers, and accredited international
visitors may be present. Unlike in past elections, election results
will be posted outside each polling station at the end of the day, and
each political party representative will receive a legible copy.
Polling station officials will then deliver an electoral package to
the District Council and may be accompanied by party representatives.
The electoral package consists of the election results for that
station; all used, unused, and annulled ballots in separate envelopes;
a document attesting to the opening and closing of the station and any
incidents that occurred during the voting process, and any protests by
party representatives. Polling stations located within the main town
of the district must deliver their electoral packages immediately;
those located in smaller towns have 12 hours to do so; and those
located in rural areas up to 24 hours.
Though district council officials are obliged by law to read aloud the
results of each polling station as they arrive, the actual official
count will not begin until three days after the polls have opened: the
morning of Wednesday, August 24 (COFIPE, Article 246). This is
apparently to allow time for the casilla results to be delivered to
the district office and also a day for officials to rest.. District
officials will begin with the official count of the presidential
elections followed by the elections for federal deputy and
senator. The results of the presidential elections from the districts
will be transmitted to IFE headquarters in Mexico City, where the
complete result will be tabulated and issued. Results for senate
races will be forwarded to the 32 local councils, which must issue the
complete results for their respective states and the Federal District
within one week of the elections. The District Councils themselves
will declare the winners for the federal deputy races corresponding to
the country's 300 single-member districts. The Federal Election
Tribunal (TFE), composed of judges proposed by the Mexican President
and ratified by a 2/3 vote of the Chamber of Deputies, will rule on
any questions regarding the validity of the senate and federal deputy
elections. An Electoral College consisting of incoming federal
deputies will certify the results of the presidential elections on
November 1 when the new Chamber of Deputies is inaugurated. This
leaves the General Council of IFE with authority to announce official
results only for the Deputies elected by proportional representation
(plurinominal) in the five circumscriptions of the country (COFIPE,
Article 258).
Authoritative unofficial results, however, are expected much sooner.
Because the official results will take several days to tabulate, the
IFE is planning to do a quick count to generate representative results
on the night of the election. They will begin to announce the results
of the quick count once a statistically representative sample is
available. As actual results arrive they will be included with the
quick count announcements. IFE hopes to have authoritative results by
midnight on August 21. No one will be allowed to issue preliminary
results in the form of a quick count or an exit poll until the polls
have officially closed throughout the country. In addition to IFE,
Civic Alliance and Televisa, and perhaps three other groups in
addition to political parties are planning to conduct a quick count on
the day of elections.
Views of the Actors
The two main opposition parties, the PAN and the PRD, have a number of
concerns about election procedures. They are concerned that the
provisions of the law might not actually be implemented, particularly
in distant polling stations where the opposition may not be able to
post a representative. On the question of indelible ink, for example,
the opposition parties want to ensure that the ink is not diluted
prior to the start of voting. IFE responds that even if the ink is
tampered with prior to the start of voting, voters will still be
required to have their credentials stamped after voting, thus
preventing them from voting twice.
All actors favor quick counts in order to reduce uncertainty and
discourage fraud from occurring at the counting stage of the process.
IFE plans to conduct a quick count in cooperation with the political
parties. Close coordination will be necessary to keep secret the
identity of the sample sites in order to prevent distortions in the
voting pattern from occurring. How IFE plans to balance the challenge
of cooperating with the parties to choose the sample while preserving
secrecy at the same time is not yet clear. It will also be difficult
to choose a representative sample of voting stations given the lack of
reliable voting data from past elections. There is the further risk
of a war of words over the results of the different quick counts and
their respective methodologies that might generate confusion and
question the credibility of the electoral process.
The PRD and PAN are also concerned that the high number of polling
stations and their dispersed location will make it difficult to
monitor the electoral process and report results rapidly, particularly
in polling stations located in rural areas. They would like to see
the country's 97,000 polling stations compressed into 20,000 voting
centers. They claim that this could be done in such a way that the
vast majority of the citizenry would only be 3 to 4 kilometers away
from their polling stations. The matter was proposed to the IFE
General Council by Citizen Councilor Josi Woldenberg, and was
discussed at length during the Council's June 18, 1994 meeting. No
conclusion was reached, and the General Council unanimously requested
that the political parties study the feasibility of such a change.
The government believes that modifying the location of the polling
stations at this late date could generate confusion and discourage
voter turnout. If IFE recommends consolidation of polling stations,
formal action by the Chamber of Deputies to amend the Electoral Code
will be required.
Part 6: National Observers
The 1993 electoral reforms contained the first law on election
observation in Mexico. National observers were to be accredited by
IFE as individuals, not as organizations and were required to take a
training course given by IFE. The observer must not have been a member
of any political party in the three years prior to the election. The
law did not guarantee that national observers would be given access to
the voter registration list or other information prior to the
election. In our last report we noted that this was the most
restrictive observer law of which we were aware.In our last report, we
noted that this was the most restrictive observer law of which we were
aware. The 1994 reforms improve the picture for national observers
significantly. The 1994 reforms improve the picture for national
observers significantly. Both individuals and organizations can now be
accredited by IFE as national observers. IFE will accept training
given by the national observer groups as equivalent to its own
training course. Observers should not have had a leadership position
in a political party at the municipal, state, and national levels in
the last three years but may continue to be ordinary members of
political parties. In addition, the law guarantees observers the
right to whatever information they need for their work as long as it
is not confidential by law or beyond the technical and material
capacity of the authorities to provide. National observers will be
provided with badges to identify themselves on the day of the
election. They will be permitted to observe the opening of polling
stations, the voting process, the count, the placing of the results
outside the station, the closing of the station, and the reading of
the results of individual polling stations in the District Councils.
The national observers will have the right to submit a report on their
work to the General Council but their conclusions will have no legal
force. They are explicitly prohibited from declaring victory for any
political party or candidate.
Views of the Actors
The national observer groups seem satisfied with the latest changes to
the law on national observers. A variety of observer groups have
developed in response to the new law, among them Civic Alliance, an
umbrella group of 400 citizen groups; The National Employers
Confederation (COPARMEX), a voluntary association of Mexican
employers; and the National Union of Teachers (SNTE), a union of
public school teachers with ties to the ruling PRI. The Civic
Alliance has the most experience in monitoring elections in Mexico but
COPARMEX and SNTE have the advantages of a coherent nationwide
organizational structure that is already in place and could lend
itself to the task of election observation.
The crucial challenge facing the national observer groups is to
demonstrate their impartiality. The PAN, for example, is worried that
the Civic Alliance has pro-PRD leanings, though the PAN does
acknowledge that the Civic Alliance has grown more professional over
time. The PRI believes that the Civic Alliance is biased in favor of
the opposition generally. The Civic Alliance leaders respond that it
is a plural organization with members from all three national
political parties. They note that there are no party candidates or
leaders who hold leadership positions in the Civic Alliance. They
also add that it is natural to have a cluster of people with
opposition leanings within any civic organization that seeks the
democratization of a country. This was the pattern in other
democratizing countries like the Philippines and Chile. This,
however, does not mean that the organization is incapable of
impartiality.
The Civic Alliance would like to conduct three kinds of monitoring activity.
First, they want to conduct studies of the electoral process itself.
The Civic Alliance, as noted earlier, has already conducted a study of
bias in the electronic media and plans to continue monitoring the
media for the rest of the campaign. The organization would like to
conduct its own study of the voter registration list and is also
investigating the background of members of the SPE and Citizen
Councilors at the district and state levels to identify those
individuals who are likely to be biased. In addition, the Civic
Alliance is planning to conduct a quick-count on the day of the
election and monitor the vote in at least 5,000 polling stations with
the aid of 13,000 volunteers. Civic Alliance leaders, however,
complained of a severe shortage of funds that is hampering their work,
particularly their studies of the electoral process. They also noted
that they are battling against the clock with only two months
remaining for the elections.
Part 7: International Observers
The 1993 electoral laws said nothing about the role of international
observers. The 1994 reforms, however, empowered the General Council
to invite "foreign visitors" to observe the electoral process and
establish the guidelines under which foreign visitors were to operate.
On June 23, 1994, the General Council issued a set of guidelines
regarding foreign visitors.The following groups or individuals are
welcome to seek accreditation by the General Council as foreign
visitors:
representatives of international agencies;
regional or continental agencies;
legislative organs of other countries;
private institutions and nongovernmental organizations defending human
rights and/or working on electoral and political issues;
specialized groups providing electoral assistance; and
foreign personalities known for their contribution to peace and cooperation
in human rights and electoral matters.
. No observer group may be acting for monetary gain.
Political parties and national observer groups may choose to invite
various international observer groups if they wish, but IFE will not
issue any invitations to any group in particular. Organizations and
individuals seeking accreditation as foreign visitors by IFE have
until July 30, 1994 to do so and need to complete a prescribed form
for that purpose. This is the most bureaucratic process for
accreditation of which we are aware. Foreign visitors will have the
right to meet with the election authorities and the representatives of
political parties in order to obtain information and documents. The
General Council will assist foreign visitors to the extent that it is
necessary for them to do their task adequately as defined by the
law. International visitors will have the right to observe all phases
of the electoral process. They will be identified by badges. They
are expressly prohibited from interfering in political matters or
obstructing the work of the electoral authorities, parties, or
candidates, and are exhorted to conduct themselves in a "impartial,
serious, and responsible" manner. Violators of these restrictions will
have their observer credentials confiscated and will be reported to
the Ministry of the Interior for possible deportation.
International visitors will have the right to observe all phases of
the electoral process.
In addition, the government asked the United Nations Electoral
Assistance Unit to provide technical assistance to national observer
groups. The UN itself commented that it would not consider mounting a
formal observer mission given the late decision to invite foreign
visitors, the size of the country, and the fact that Mexico does not
meet the criteria established by the UN for countries to receive an
observer mission.
Views of the Actors
The PRI and PRD are enthusiastic about the presence of foreign
visitors. The PRI hopes that the presence of foreign visitors will
provide credibility to the electoral process and results. The PRD
believes that the presence of foreign visitors will discourage
election fraud and boost voter turnout. The PAN for its part has
adopted a welcoming attitude towards foreign visitors experienced in
election observation for the same reasons as the PRD. This represents
a change from the Council's last visit to Mexico in September, 1993
when the PRI and the PAN seemed ambivalent about the presence of
foreign observers and only the PRD was openly enthusiastic. Each of
the three main parties have issued invitations to foreign individuals,
including some members of the Council and its staff.
Part 8: Criminal Penalties; Creation of a Prosecutor's Office for Election
Fraud.
Unlike the 1993 electoral reforms, the new laws provide for stiff
criminal penalties for a gamut of election irregularities.
The new laws provide for a prison sentence of six months to three
years and a fine equivalent to 10 to 100 times the minimum wage for
the following electoral crimes:
proselytizing inside the polling station on election day;
violating the secrecy of the ballot;
interfering with the process of voting;
retaining voter credentials without just cause;
buying votes in exchange for money or promises of material reward;
voting with a false credential;
bringing citizens en masse to polling stations with the intention of
affecting their vote
removing or placing ballots into the ballot box illegally;
destroying or altering ballots;
obtaining promises of votes through threats, and
preventing the opening of polling stations by using violent means.
The new laws provide for imprisonment for two to six years and a fine
equivalent to 50 to 200 times the minimum wage for the following
additional crimes:
altering electoral results;
removing or destroying ballots and electoral documents;
opening or closing a polling station outside the set hours;
illegally changing the location of a polling station;
expelling political party representatives from the polling stations
without just cause, and
spreading rumors about the electoral process and results.
The new laws provide severe penalties of one to nine years in prison
and a fine equivalent to 200 to 400 times the minimum wage for public
servants who: use public resources to promote a given party; oblige
their employees to vote for a given political party, or make the
provision of public services conditional on voting for a party.
It is now also a crime subject to three to seven years imprisonment
and a fine equivalent to 70 to 200 times the minimum wage to: alter
the voter registration list, or illicitly issue a voter credential.
The new law also provides for the creation of an Electoral
Prosecutor's Office to investigate and punish electoral crimes. The
Electoral Prosecutor was to be appointed by the Attorney General after
the political parties reached a consensus on the candidate. Only one
month before the election, on July 19, the Electoral Prosecutor,
Ricardo Franco Guzman, was finally named. Electoral crimes committed
before the creation of the Electoral Prosecutor's Office may still be
brought before that office for resolution.
Views of the Actors
The PAN and the PRD applaud both the establishment of criminal
penalties for electoral crimes and the creation of an Electoral
Prosecutor's Office to prosecute them. In their view, the
establishment of criminal penalties deals a blow to the pervasive
culture of fraud that has enveloped Mexican elections. The fact that
election crimes will now be prosecuted by one single office makes it
easier to denounce election crimes and demand follow-up action. The
PAN and the PRD, however, lamented the fact that no one had been
appointed to the post of Electoral Prosecutor at the time of the
delegation visit. Both the PAN and PRD were waiting to submit some
complaints until the naming of the Electoral Prosecutor. The
government responds that two candidates whom all the parties had
already agreed on withdrew for medical reasons, slowing down the
process of appointment. PRD presidential candidate Cuauhtimoc
Cardenas commented on the new Electoral Prosecutor, "He does not
inspire confidence, and I doubt anyone believes he has good
intentions." (Unomasuno, July 18, 1994).
The PAN and the PRD applaud both the establishment of criminal
penalties for electoral crimes and the creation of an Electoral
Prosecutor's Office to prosecute them. In their view, the
establishment of criminal penalties deals a blow to the pervasive
culture of fraud that has enveloped Mexican elections.
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The political and electoral climate has changed markedly since our
visit in September 1993. New electoral reforms stimulated by civic
pressure, the rebellion in Chiapas, and the Colosio assassination have
led to a growing independence of electoral authorities and
improvements in electoral procedures. Yet the absence of a clear
front-runner in the presidential race, the climate of uneasiness in
the wake of a high-profile assassination and the Chiapas rebellion,
and the continued skepticism of the Mexican voters have produced a
fluid and potentially volatile atmosphere surrounding the upcoming
elections.
The two major opposition parties indicated that while the rules were now in
place for a free and fair election, they questioned whether the political
will exists to implement and enforce them. They questioned the ability of
the new IFE General Council to exert any real control over a hierarchy of
thousands of election officials in the time remaining before the election.
They pointed to continued bias in media coverage that favors the PRI,
the cost of advertising that makes it difficult for them to compete,
and vast disparities in financial resources among the parties. The
PRD in particular remained concerned about the reliability of the
voter registration list even after the results of the audits were
known . Therefore, neither the PRD nor the PAN were prepared in June
to say definitively that they could accept the election results.
In our 1993 report, we separated the electoral issues into first-order
issues necessary to have a meaningful election and second-order issues
desirable to have a good election. First-order issues include (1) the
political parties must have a chance to communicate their message to
the people free of intimidation; (2) eligible voters must have an
opportunity to register and cast their vote in a secret ballot
(implying a good registration list, but especially one that is not
politically biased); (3) the count must be fair and accurate; (4)
opposition poll-watchers and independent monitors should have complete
access to every stage of the vote and count; and (5) effective power
must be transferred to the winner.
Second-order electoral issues include (1) a fair, but not necessarily
equal, distribution of campaign resources; (2) equitable access to the
media; (3) an agreed-upon formula for distributing state resources to
the parties in a transparent way; and (4) an independent and impartial
election administration.
First-Order Issues
Our analysis of the electoral process as of June 1994 finds that there
has been substantial progress on some of the first-order issues,
particularly with regard to the technical aspects of the election.
The crucial issues in past Mexican elections have related to the voter
registration list and voting process and count. The Federal Electoral
Registry (RFE) has mounted an impressive and costly effort to purify
the voter's list and deliver new tamper-proof credentials to 90% of
the eligible voters. The coverage of the voter's list (the percentage
of eligible voters actually registered) is thus comparable to most
Western democracies. The reliability of the list also depends on two
other criteria, however: currency and accuracy. Our preliminary
conclusion is that the Padrsn provides a good basis for a free
election. Nevertheless, we find the conclusion that the Padrsn is
97.5% reliable to be the most optimistic interpretation of the data.
It is also confusing because it mixes the two criteria of currency and
accuracy.
The opposition parties have identified two possible avenues for fraud
related to the list. The McKinsey audit addresses one of those issues:
the potential for padding the list with fantasmas or nonexistent
persons is small. However, the audit does not directly address the
second issue of the possible disfranchisement or exclusion of voters
who believe themselves to be registered and qualified. Consequently,
other safeguards must be relied on to help protect against these
concerns: vigilant use of indelible ink to prevent multiple voting,
and the review of the final voter's list to ensure that all registered
voters are in fact on the list and permitted to vote.
The vote and vote count processes have been improved by the changes in
the election day procedures, including the ballot boxes, voting booth,
and ballot paper, as well as by the significant improvement in the
regulations of national observers and the decision to accredit foreign
visitors to observe the process. In addition, the designation of a
special prosecutor for electoral crimes and the new criminal code are
important steps toward ensuring a free and fair election. The late
decision to invite foreigners, however, makes impossible a traditional
observer mission capable of monitoring the entire process. Likewise,
the delay in naming the special prosecutor impedes the effectiveness
of this reform.
Second-Order Issues
Second-order issues have assumed greater importance in Mexico than in
many other transitional countries because of the tremendous power of
the ruling party and the difficulty of separating it from the state.
These issues determine how level the playing field is and remain of
real concern in the Mexican process. Continued problems of media
access and bias in coverage, campaign spending limits beyond the reach
of any party outside of the PRI, and great disparities in financial
resources all affect the ability of parties to compete fairly.
The greater independence of IFE's General Council is a marked
improvement; however, the ability of the General Council at the apex
to influence the actions of the rest of the pyramid of the electoral
machinery is severely limited. In most countries, the actual
independence of the electoral authorities from government control is
less important than impartiality in decision-making and behavior. In
Mexico, the long-term blurring of party and state, and the lack of
third-party mediators raises the independence of IFE almost to a
first-order issue. The fact that the political parties put their
faith in Council President and Interior Minister Jorge Carpizo is
understandable given his personal reputation, but it also reflects the
continued perception that the government does in fact control the
process.
In every country, the incumbent party has an advantage deriving from
it's control over state programs. On the other hand, the incumbent
party also has a liability in that voters can judge actual performance
and not just future promises. In the Mexican case, however, the
question of a level playing field is particularly acute given the
total hegemony of a single party over government resources and power
for such a long period of time. Not only does the PRI control
government decisions and resources, but its penetration of civil
society and close ties to the private electronic media give it
important additional sources of influence.
An uneven playing field can be detrimental rather than advantageous to
the ruling party in some cases. But in Mexico it reinforces the image
of the PRI as controlling the process, and discourages voters from
thinking that the election will matter or their votes will count.
This is expressed in the fears of intimidation of voters by employers,
trade union leaders, or government officials; fears of intimidation on
election day, such as the visible presence of the military in the
streets, that will curtail voter turnout; fears of locally-based fraud
and intimidation in isolated areas without observers; and fears of
post-election violence.
These fears all reflect the skepticism of the Mexican populace toward
the ruling party's commitment to competitive elections. They reflect
a prevalent view expressed to the delegation that certain elements of
the ruling party and privileged elite will go to almost any length to
prevent a defeat at the polls, and therefore a loss of power and
privilege. As one government official commented to the delegation,
people can say they believe in the electoral rules and procedures, but
then they turn around and say they expect fraud.
These attitudes raise a troubling question: beyond the issue of a free
and fair election, how meaningful is an election in which a plurality
of voters doubts that their votes will count? Will those voters who
lack confidence stay away from the polls or vote other than their true
choice because they believe their vote will not be respected? If that
is the case, even the most technically beautiful election will not
reflect the will of the people.
These attitudes raise a troubling question: beyond the issue of a free
and fair election, how meaningful is an election in which a plurality
of voters doubts that their votes will count? Will those voters who
lack confidence stay away from the polls or vote other than their true
choice because they believe their vote will not be respected?
We believe there has been substantial progress in creating the
conditions for a free and fair election. Nonetheless, the continued
distrust of nearly half of the voters raises questions about whether
the elections will be meaningful. The wait-and-see attitude of the
PAN and the highly suspicious attitude of the PRD further raises the
question of whether the results will be accepted by all the major
parties.
We recommend a set of actions that can help deal with the problem of
credibility.
Recommendations:
I. Improving Credibility
1. To build credibility, additional debates should be held involving
the three major presidential candidates. Of all the factors affecting
public confidence, the presidential candidates' debate appears to have
had the most positive effect.
2. The leaders of the three major political parties should reach out
to each other and toward the people to help build confidence in the
process by: (a) jointly filming public service announcements on the
need to vote and how to vote; (b) discussing ways to ensure that the
results will be announced soon after the election and that the
transition would be as smooth as possible.
3. IFE should conduct an extensive civic education campaign to explain
the procedures and safeguards, and identify the location of each
voting site, which in turn should help raise confidence in the
process.
II. First-Order Issues
4. The final voters list should be posted by casilla in the
ten days preceding the election to allow voters to confirm both their
inclusion on the list and the location of their casilla. This should
also help political parties and observers determine if there is any
systematic exclusion of voters from the list.
5. Ensure a rapid and efficient transmission and announcement
of unofficial results on election night. This will help greatly to
alleviate suspicion and maintain calm.
6. Quick counts, or parallel vote tabulations, are important
instruments to verify official results and to provide early
information about voting trends. We believe that exit polls, on the
other hand, should be avoided. They are unreliable in a climate of
suspicion and they will create a negative atmosphere if voters think
they are being watched.
7. We commend the political parties' efforts to organize party
representatives to be present in every casilla (voting site). To the
extent that this is not feasible for each party, we recommend a
coordinated strategy to ensure that there are at least two parties
represented in each casilla.
8. National observers should undertake a mobile strategy on
election day to cover as many casillas as possible, making a special
effort to have representation at every polling site where there are no
opposition pollwatchers.
9. International visitors should be publicly welcomed by
political party leaders to overcome an ambivalent and sometimes
antagonistic climate. The UN should coordinate international visitors
to the extent possible to ensure balanced coverage of the entire
country.
10. To offset lingering concerns about multiple voting, the
ink should be guarded until election day and samples tested publicly
immediately before distribution to ensure that it has not been
tampered with. A cleanser may be desirable to clean and dry fingers
before they are inked. Party representatives and observers should be
especially vigilant to determine if voters' fingers are properly
inspected and inked.
III. Second-Order Issues
11. The role of state and district officials is vital in
determining the electoral results. In the future, additional
district- and state-level Citizen Councilors should be replaced.
12. We commend IFE's analysis and publication of reports on
media coverage, but bias remains. The decision of Televisa to donate
45 minutes to each of the nine presidential candidates for political
broadcasts should be matched by TV Azteca and by radio. Some of that
donated time should be during primetime.
13. Political parties should make voluntary pubic reports of
revenues and campaign expenditures before the election even though the
law requires reporting only after the election.CONCLUSION
In our 1993 report, we concluded that Mexico has two roads available -
one leading to a new formula for dividing power, the other leading
toward full respect for the secret vote and acceptance of the
uncertain outcome that is a part of the democratic process. A
negotiated outcome would lead down the first road and could delay the
search for democracy.
The rules have been put in place for the second road -- a secure vote
-- but continued distrust of the process combined with an increased
focus on post-election negotiation detracts from a free election.
Those interested in post-election scenarios may want to contribute to
a political opening, but in fact, their perspective of negotiated
power-sharing arrangements or street protests represent a new
variation on an old theme of depriving the people of a chance to
choose their government in a secret vote. Unless confidence in the
electoral process is raised before August 21, the vote may be
technically clean, but will not necessarily represent a meaningful
election.
Because we have followed closely the electoral process for several
years and because the Council aims to promote democracy, peace, and
hemispheric cooperation, we want to be present for the August 21
elections. We will not field an election team like those we have sent
to other countries. Instead, we will send a small team that will
coordinate with others and will reinforce the efforts of Mexican
observer groups and all those working to make these the freest
elections in Mexican history, not tainted by manipulation or fraud,
and to reassure Mexican voters that the international community
supports their right to exercise their free choice through the ballot
box.
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: List of Meetings
Mexican Civic Monitoring Groups
Sergio Aguayo, Mexican Academy for Human Rights/ Civic Alliance
Gina Batista, ACUDE
Francisco Cano Escalante, ACUDE, Council for Democracy
Julio Faesler, Council for Democracy/ Civic Alliance
Clara Jusidman, ACUDE
Luz Rosales, Citizens Movement for Democracy
Citizen Councilors
Santiago Creel
Josi Agustmn Ortmz Pinchetti
Ricardo Pasos
Josi Woldenberg
Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD)
Amalia Garcia, Secretary of International Relations
Javier Gonzalez, Secretary of Electoral Affairs
Porfirio Muqoz Ledo, President of the PRD/ Senator
Ricardo Pascoe, Advisor to Cuauhtimoc Cardenas
Jeszs Zambrano, PRD Representative to the Federal Election Registry
National Action Party (PAN)
Felipe Caldersn Hinojosa, Secretary General of the PAN
Rodolfo Elizondo Torres, Secretary of Relations
Cecilia Romero Castillo, Adjunct Secretary General
Antonio Losano, Representative to IFE
Josi Lums Luege Tamargo, Director of RFE Relations
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Rodolfo Becerril Straffon, Chamber of Deputies; Senate Candidate
Enrique Berruga, Undersecretary for International Affairs
Emilio Cardenas
Mauricio Reyes
Federal Election Institute (IFE)
Carlos Almada, Executive Director, Federal Election Registry
Manuel Carrillo Poblano, Coordinator, International Relations
Juan Molinar Horcasitas, Director of Political Parties and Prerogatives
Arturo Nuqez Jimenez, Director General of IFE
Agustmn Ricoy Saldaqa, General Secretary, Federal Election Registry
Felipe Solms Acero, Director of Electoral Organization
Esteban Garcma I., Director, Regional Coordination
The Presidency
Ulises Beltran, Advisor to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
Beatriz Paredes R., Undersecretary for Political Development, Ministry of
Gobernacisn
Susana Torres, Director for Political Development
Emilio Robase, Advisor
Independent Analysts
Jorge Castaqeda G.
Miguel Basaqez, Este Pams/MORI
Federico Reyes Heroles, Este Pams
United Nations
Dong Huu Nguyen, Director, UN Office for Electoral Assistance - Mexico
Francesco Manca, Senior Technical Advisor
Araceli Santana, Senior Technical Advisor
COPARMEX
Marco Antonio Velazquez, Director General
Lorenzo PalaisAppendix 2: Biographies of Delegation Members
Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Senior Research Associate of the Carter Center of
Emory University's Latin American and Caribbean Program. Professor of
Political Science at Georgia State University. Led the Council's
September 1993 and June 1994 missions to assess Mexico's electoral
reforms, and directed Council's Nicaragua election office and has
observed election in Haiti, Guyana, Panama, and Suriname.
Hon. Peter Stollery, Representative of Council member former Canadian
prime minister Pierre Trudeau. Elected House of Commons 1972, 1974,
1979, 1980; Chairman, Government Caucus 1976-78; Appointed to Senate
of Canada by Prime Minister Trudeau, 1981; Founder and First Chairman,
Canada-Latin America Parliamentary Group.
Mr. Joaqumn Daly, representative of former Peruvian president Fernando
Belaunde Terry. Former official of the OAS, and electoral consultant
to The Carter Center. Participated in the Council mission to witness
Mexican observers in the July 1992 state elections in Michoacan and
Chihuahua, and in the Council's election observation mission in Panama
in 1994.
Dr. Vikram Chand, Watson Fellow in International Relations at Brown
University; specialist in Mexican politics and democratization.
Participated in Council mission to assess electoral reform in Mexico
in September 1993.
Mr. Harry Neufeld, Canadian management consultant in electoral systems
and information technology. Former Director of Information Technology
in Elections Canada. Participated in Council pre-election assessment
missions to Guyana in 1991.
Mr. Eric Bord, attorney and consultant to The Carter Center. Former
Assistant Director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program of The
Carter Center, and consultant to Carter Center programs in Conflict
Resolution and Global Development Cooperation. Participated in
Council election observations in Nicaragua and Guyana.
1 There is substantial controversy in Mexico over polling methodology
and sample size. We refer to these polls for the purpose of
illustrating and underscoring the problem of credibility in the 1994
elections, and with no intention to endorse any particular
methodology.
2 In Mexico, the Padrsn refers to the list of registered voters while
the Listado Nominal Definitiva refers to the list of those voters who
both registered and received a credential. It is the Listado Nominal
Definitiva that is used on election day.
3 The PDM later clarified that its abstention was "provisional"
pending the conclusion of its own independent study of the audit
results.