

TrInc: Small Trusted Hardware for Large Distributed Systems



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Outline

- TrInc and Trust in Distributed Systems
- Equivocation and TrInc
- TrInc Components
- How does TrInc achieve its goal?
- Case Study using TrInc
- Miscellaneous

Background

- Distributed systems rely heavily on messages to communicate
- These messages need to be trusted for security purposes
- Byzantine faults
- Handling Byzantine faults is costly

What is TrInc?

- Stands for **T**rusted **I**ncrementer
- TrInc is simple hardware that provides trust to a distributed system
- It does this through uniquely attesting messages to reduce tampering
- Can significantly increase system security at each distributed component
- Applies to Peer-to-Peer systems as well

Equivocation and TrInc

- Definition: “making conflicting statements to others”
- Selfish or malicious intents, not just Byzantine faults
- TrInc provides trust by removing ability to equivocate
- TrInc Goals:
 - Remove ability to equivocate
 - Reduce message overhead
 - Reduce number of non-faulty participants needed

TrInc Components

- Unique Identity
- Incrementer
- Cryptographic functions and keys
- Incrementer Counter (Meta-counter)
- Attestation
- Queue

How does it work?

- For every new message:
 - Assign a new value to the Incrementer for that message
 - Value must be greater than previous number
 - Create an attestation to send along with message
- The attestation is encrypted
- Typically, the value of Incrementer should represent the progression of attested data
- Value of Incrementer does not decrease, so cannot assume value used in previous messages

How does it work?

- New Incrementers can be issued, with unique id
 - Can attest to multiple things
 - Allows processes to use their own Incrementer
- Queue is used to recover from power failures
 - Contains the last few message attestations

How does TrInc achieve its goal?

- It prevents equivocation by ensuring message attestations are always distinct
 - The counter never assumes previous values
 - Every counter has unique id
 - Every TrInc has unique id
- Reduce message overhead
 - Attested messages need not be verified like in the Byzantine Generals Problem
 - From $O(n^2)$ to $O(1)$

Case Study: BitTorrent

- BitTorrent is a Peer-to-Peer network that distributes the work of downloading large files
 - Peers trade pieces of the file with each other
 - Maintain list of pieces downloaded in a Bitfield
 - Peers want pieces they don't have
- Equivocation: Under-reporting of pieces to increase interest
- Under-reporting is done to increase download speeds

Case Study: BitTorrent

- TrInc can attest to Bitfield and to the most recent piece received
- Bitfield can only increase, natural fit for Incrementer
- Peer can't under-report

Miscellaneous

- TrInc is independent from the system's inner state
 - TrInc can be inserted using a USB
 - Or included in computer hardware
- In order for TrInc to work, the receiver must also have a TrInc in use
- The manufacturer knows the private key for every TrInc Identity

Conclusion

- TrInc is hardware that increases trust in distributed systems
- TrInc reduces message overhead
- TrInc use unique attestations and encryption to prevent equivocation
- TrInc can be used in P2P systems like BitTorrent to prevent under-reporting

Questions?

- How does TrInc reduce number of non-faulty participants needed in Byzantine fault tolerance to $2n+1$ from $3n+1$?
- Can we really trust the manufacturer with the private key?