Lecture 12: Applications of LP Duality

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Overview

- Game Theory Minimax Theorems
- Learning Theory Boosting
- Combinatorics Bipartite Matching
- Conclusion
- Acknowledgements

- Two players (Alice and Bob)
- Each player has a (finite) set of strategies $S_A = \{1, \ldots, m\}$ and $S_B = \{1, \ldots, n\}$


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- Example: battle of the sexes game

Setup:

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	Football	Opera
Football	(2,1)	(0,0)
Opera	(0,0)	(1,2)

Table: Battle of the sexes payoff matrices

m = n = 2



z B

Nash Equilibrium


Assuming players are rational, i.e. want to maximize their payoffs, we have:

Definition (Nash Equilibrium)

A strategy profile (i, j) is called a Nash equilibrium if the strategy played by each player is optimal, given the strategy of the other player. That is:

$$I A_{ij} \ge A_{kj} \text{ for all } k \in S_A$$

 $B_{ij} \geq B_{i\ell} \text{ for all } \ell \in S_B$



Nash Equilibrium


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
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A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over a set of pure strategies S. If Alice's strategies are $S_A = \{1, ..., n\}$, her mixed strategies are:

$$\Delta_A := \{ x \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid x \ge 0 \text{ and } \|x\|_1 = 1 \}$$

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$$P_{A}[A plays i and] \qquad v_{A}(x, y) = \sum_{(i,j)\in S_{A}\times S_{B}} A_{ij}x_{i}y_{j} = \begin{bmatrix} x^{T}Ay \\ (i,j) \end{bmatrix}$$
$$= \chi_{i} \chi_{j} \qquad v_{B}(x, y) = \sum_{(i,j)\in S_{A}\times S_{B}} B_{ij}x_{i}y_{j} = \begin{bmatrix} x^{T}By \end{bmatrix}$$

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• $x^T Ay \ge z^T Ay$ for all $z \in \Delta_A \leftarrow A$ lice to incomplete to clubak • $x^T By \ge x^T Bw$ for all $w \in \Delta_B \succeq Bob$ 11 11 11

Conditioned on the fact that other player is playing X or y respectively

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	Jump left	Jump right
kick left	(-1,1)	(1,-1)
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Rol

Alice

No proce Nash equilibrium!

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Table: Penalty Kick

• Zero-Sum Game: payoff matrices satisfy A = -B

$$(A \dagger B = 0)$$

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Table: Penalty Kick

- Zero-Sum Game: payoff matrices satisfy A = -B
- No pure Nash Equilibrium!
- One mixed Nash equilibrium: x = y = (1/2, 1/2)

19/66

Theorem

In a zero-sum game, for any payoff matrix
$$A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$$
:

$$\max_{x \in \Delta_A} \min_{y \in \Delta_B} x^T A y = \min_{y \in \Delta_B} \max_{x \in \Delta_A} x^T A y$$

Alice tries meximite gain A
Bob tries to minimite his loss
$$A(=-B)$$


expected gain for Alice is $X^{T}Ay$

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$$\max_{x \in \Delta_A y \in \Delta_B} x^T A y = \min_{y \in \Delta_B x \in \Delta_A} x^T A y$$
For given $x \in \Delta_A$:

$$\min_{y \in \Delta_B} x^T A y = \min_{j \in S_B} (x^T A)_j$$
Alice need only think
about Bob's pure
 $y \in \Delta_B x^T A y = \min_{j \in S_B} (x^T A)_j$
Left hand side can be written as

$$\max_{x \in X} s$$
s.t. $s \leq (x^T A)_j$ for $j \in S_B$ once Alice plays \times Bob will

$$\sum_{i \in S_A} x_i = 1$$

$$\max_{x \geq 0} x \in \Delta_A$$

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22 / 66

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Bob playe

For given $x \in \Delta_A$:

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For given
$$y \in \Delta_B$$
:

$$\max_{x \in \Delta_A} x^T A y = \max_{i \in S_A} (A y)_i$$

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Left hand side can be written as

$$\begin{array}{ll} \max & s \\ \text{s.t.} & s \leq (x^{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{A})_j \quad \text{for } j \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{B}} \\ & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{A}}} x_i = 1 \\ & x \geq 0 \end{array}$$

Theorem

In a zero-sum game, for any payoff matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$:

$$\max_{x \in \Delta_A} \min_{y \in \Delta_B} x^T A y = \left(\min_{y \in \Delta_B} \max_{x \in \Delta_A} x^T A y \right)$$

For given $x \in \Delta_A$:

$$\min_{y \in \Delta_B} x^T A y = \min_{j \in S_B} (x^T A)_j$$

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For given
$$y \in \Delta_B$$
:

$$\max_{x\in\Delta_A} x^T A y = \max_{i\in S_A} (Ay)_i$$

Right hand side can be written as

min t
s.t.
$$t \ge (Ay)_i$$
 for $i \in S_A$

$$\sum_{j \in S_B} y_j = 1$$
 $y \ge 0$

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
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$$x \geq 0$$

min
$$t$$

s.t. $t \ge (Ay)_i$ for $i \in S_A$
$$\sum_{j \in S_B} y_j = 1$$
$$y \ge 0 \xrightarrow{\text{OP}_{i} + \text{E}_{i} + \text{E}_{i}} \xrightarrow{\text{OP}_{i}} 25/66$$



Proof of Duality
dual program:
max
$$u^{T}f_{1}$$

 $u = \begin{pmatrix} A \\ \vec{v} \end{pmatrix}$ $\vec{v} = \begin{pmatrix} v_{1} \\ \vdots \\ u_{n} \end{pmatrix}$
 $n + u^{T}B \leq (e_{1}-e_{1})^{T}$
 $(i_{1}-i_{1}v_{1}v_{1}v_{1}-v_{1}v_{2})$
 $(i_{1}-i_{1}v_{1}v_{1}v_{2}-v_{2}v_{2})$
 $(i_{2}-i_{1}v_{2}v_{2}-v_{2}v_{2})$
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 $b \leq (v^{T}A)_{j}$
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- Data is sampled from unknown distribution $q\in \Delta_\mathcal{X}$
- Weak learning assumption:

For any distribution $q \in \Delta_X$, there is a hypothesis $h \in \mathcal{H}$ which is wrong less than half the time.

$$\exists \gamma > 0, \ \forall \underline{q} \in \Delta_{\mathcal{X}}, \ \underline{\exists h \in \mathcal{H}}, \quad \Pr_{x \sim q}[h(x) \neq c(x)] \leq \frac{1 - \gamma}{2}$$

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• Surprisingly, weak learning assumption implies something much stronger: it is possible to *combine* classifiers in \mathcal{H} to construct a *classifier* that is *always right* (known as *strong learning*).

Boosting

Theorem

Let \mathcal{H} be a set of hypotheses satisfying weak learning assumption. Then there is distribution $p \in \Delta_{\mathcal{H}}$ such that the weighed majority classifier

$$c_{p}(x) := \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} p_{h} \cdot h(x) \ge 1/2 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

is always correct. That is, $c_p(x) = c(x)$ for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$

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Let
$$M \in \{-1,1\}^{m \times n}$$
, where $m = |\mathcal{X}|$ and $n = |\mathcal{H}|$.
 $M_{ij} = \begin{cases} +1, & \text{if classifier } h_j \text{ wrong on } x_j \\ -1, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Zero - Sum Some \mathcal{X} vs \mathcal{H}

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Weak learning:

$$\sum_{1 \leq i \leq n} q_j \cdot \delta_{h_j(x_i) \neq c(x_i)} \leq \frac{1 - \gamma}{2}$$

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 $\exists \chi > D \quad s.t \quad \forall q \in \Delta_{\mathcal{X}} \quad \exists h \in \mathcal{H} (h_j) \quad s.t \quad \exists f h_j \text{ is annys} \quad [f h_j \text{ being usens}] \quad \exists h \in \mathcal{H} (h_j) \quad s.t \quad h_j \text{ is annys} \quad [f h_j \text{ being usens}] \quad \exists h \in \mathcal{H} (h_j) \quad s.t \quad h_j \text{ is annys} \quad [f h_j h_j(x_i) \neq c(x_i) (mistalu) \\ \delta_{ij} = \delta_{h_j(x_i)} \neq ccx_i) \quad = \begin{cases} 1 & if h_j(x_i) \neq c(x_i) (mistalu) \\ 0 & 0 \cdot a_i \quad (correct) \\ 0 & 0 \quad (correct) \quad (correct) \\ 0 & 0 \quad (correct) \quad (correct) \quad (correct) \\ 0 & 0 \quad (correct) \quad$

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 $x_i ght$
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• Note that
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 $q^T M e_j \leq -\gamma \Rightarrow q^T M p \leq -\gamma$

for any $p \in \Delta_{\mathcal{H}}$. • By minimax, we have:

$$\max_{q \in \Delta_{\mathcal{X}}} \min_{p \in \Delta_{\mathcal{H}}} q^{T} M p = \min_{p \in \Delta_{\mathcal{H}}} \max_{q \in \Delta_{\mathcal{X}}} q^{T} M p \leq -\gamma$$

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 In particular, right hand side implies weighted classifier given by optimum solution p^{*} always correct.

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 $(p^*, q^*) \text{ optimum solution } \therefore \qquad q^T \mathcal{M} p^* \leq -\mathcal{T} \quad \forall \quad q \in \Lambda_{\mathcal{X}}$
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Proof of Correctness of Classifier

$$C_{pe}(x_{i}) = \int_{0}^{1} i \oint_{j=1}^{n} \int_{j=1}^{n} h_{j}(x_{i}) \ge \frac{1}{2} f(x)$$

$$O = H_{invalue} \int_{0}^{1} \int_{0}^{1} h_{j}(x_{i}) \ge \frac{1}{2} f(x)$$

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- Game Theory Minimax Theorems
- Learning Theory Boosting
- Combinatorics Bipartite Matching
- Conclusion
- Acknowledgements

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- Breakthrough result of [Fenner, Gurjar and Thierauf 2019]
- We will see just a piece of the proof

Bipartite Matching & Circulation

• Given an even cycle $C = (e_1, e_2, \dots, e_{2k})$, we say that the *circulation* of C is given by

$$circ(C) = |w(e_1) - w(e_2) + \ldots + w(e_{2k-1}) - w(e_{2k})|$$

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- Lemma: if we assign weights w(e_i) such that circ(C) ≠ 0 for each cycle C of the bipartite graph G, then we get that the minimum weight PM is unique!
- The approach of [Fenner, Gurjar and Thierauf 2019] is to construct a set of weights which make all circulations non-zero!
 - To do that, they iteratively construct a weight assignment that kills small cycles (i.e., make their circulation non-zero)
 - Once we have a bipartite graph with no cycles of length 2k, then in next iteration we kill cycles of length up to 4k
 - One can show that no cycles of length 2k then *few cycles* of length 4k

 similar to Karger's min cut lemma!

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(complementary slackness)

• Linear programs:

Primal

$$\begin{array}{ll} \min & \sum_{e \in E} w_e x_e \\ \text{s.t.} & x \geq 0 \\ & \sum_{e \in \delta(u)} x_e = 1 \\ & \text{for } u \in L \sqcup R \end{array}$$

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- Proof: LP duality! (complementary slackness)
 - Linear programs:

Primal

Dual

- $\begin{array}{lll} \min & \sum_{e \in E} w_e x_e & \max & \sum_{u \in L \sqcup R} y_u \\ \text{s.t.} & x \ge 0 & \text{s.t.} & y_u + y_v \le w_e \\ & \sum_{e \in \delta(u)} x_e = 1 & \text{for } e = \{u, v\} \in E \\ & \text{for } u \in L \sqcup R \end{array}$
- Complementary slackness says $x_e \neq 0$ in primal, where $e = \{u, v\}$ $\Rightarrow y_u + y_v = w_e$ in dual optimal.

Bipartite Matching - Dual

Bipartite Matching - Circulation

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Today: Linear Programming

- Linear Programming and Duality fundamental concepts, lots of applications!
 - Applications in Combinatorial Optimization (a lot of it happened here at UW!)
 - Applications in Game Theory (minimax theorem)
 - Applications in Learning Theory (boosting)
 - Applications in Parallel Computation/Derandomization (Perfect Matching)
 - many more

Acknowledgement

- Lecture based largely on:
 - Lectures 3-6 of Yarom Singer's Advanced Optimization class
 - [Schrijver 1986, Chapter 7]
 - Personal Communication with Rohit
- See Yarom's notes at https://people.seas.harvard.edu/ ~yaron/AM221-S16/schedule.html

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