

CS 489 / 698: Software and Systems Security

Module 8: Defenses against Common Vulnerabilities compartmentalization / sandboxing

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Outline

- 1 Introduction to operating system security
- 2 Resource isolation: the virtual memory example
- 3 A high-level overview of sandboxing
- 4 Virtualization and emulation
- 5 Container technology
- 6 In-process sandboxing

OS security: what

Q: What security an operating system needs to provide?

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A: Resource sharing — An operating system (OS) allows different “entities” to access different resources in a **shared** way.

- OS makes resources available to entities **if** required by them and **when** permitted by some policy (and availability).
 - What is a resource?
 - What is an entity?
 - How does an entity request for a resource?
 - How does a policy get specified?
 - How is the policy enforced?

OS security: why

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A: Even for a single-user OS, protecting the user is a good thing because of user mistakes, malware, or resource over-consumption.

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Memory isolation

Goal: Prevent one program from corrupting other running programs, the operating system, and maybe itself.

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A: Virtual memory

Memory isolation

- The OS provides a **separate, private, and virtual** address space for **each process** — hence the name virtual memory.
- The virtual memory of a process holds the code, data, stack, and heap for the program that is running in that process.
- The running process see **only virtual addresses**, e.g.,
 - program counter and stack pointer hold **virtual addresses** of the next instruction and the stack
 - pointers to variables are **virtual addresses**
 - jump/call instructions refer to **virtual addresses**
- Each process is isolated in its virtual memory, and **cannot access** other process' virtual memories.

Address translation

Each **virtual memory** is mapped to some part of **physical memory**.

- Since virtual memory is not real, when a process tries to access (load or store) a virtual address, the virtual address is **translated (mapped)** to its corresponding physical address, and the load or store is performed in physical memory.

Q: Who performs address translation?

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Q: Who performs address translation?

A: In modern computing architectures, address translation is usually performed by hardware, typically by a component named **Memory Management Unit (MMU)** or **Memory Protection Unit (MPU)**, **using information provided by the OS**.

This includes address translation for program counter (PC), as PC also contains virtual address only, hence, each instruction execution requires at least one address translation.

How is address translation done?

- Direct mapping
- Segmentation
- Paging
-

For details, please refer to relevant lectures on virtual memory in course [CS 350](#).

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What is sandboxing?

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Sandboxing is a security mechanism for isolating **vulnerable / untrusted** code from its hosting platform, usually in an effort to confine the potential damage.

What damage?

What damage?

- Corrupt in-application data
- Corrupt memory
- Corrupt local filesystem
- Corrupt other processes
- Gain root privilege
- Spread into other network-connected computers
-

The ladder of separation

- Physical separation
 - e.g., Airgap, RF-shield rooms
- Hardware isolation
 - e.g., AWS dedicated instances
- Whole-system virtualization
 - e.g., Full (VMware ESXi) / Para (Xen)
- Whole-system emulation
 - e.g., QEMU (+ KVM) emulation, Android emulator
- Partial system resources emulation
 - e.g., Docker, Landlock, Jail
- In-process application sandboxes
 - e.g., Chrome Sandbox, capabilities, seccomp
- In-thread application sandboxes
 - e.g., hardware-assisted solutions like CHERI

Airgap demonstration



Figure: Airgapped computers in the 2016 DARPA CGC event

AWS dedicated instances


Based on [AWS documentation](#)

*Dedicated Instances are Amazon EC2 instances that run in a virtual private cloud (VPC) on hardware that's dedicated to a single customer. Dedicated Instances that belong to different AWS accounts are **physically isolated at a hardware level**, even if those accounts are linked to a single payer account.*


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x86 privilege levels




Full virtualization (bare-metal)




Trap accesses to hardware resources into the Virtual Machine Manager (VMM), possibly via [binary translation](#).

Paravirtualization



Instrument the guest kernel with [hypercalls](#) to interact with VMM.

Whole-system emulation



Whole-system emulation attempts to run the entire stack in user-space, including the [emulation of hardware devices](#).

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What is a container?




Figure: A cargo ship. Credits / Trademark: Tech Vision

What does a container sees itself?



Figure: A single-container ship. Credits / Trademark: MarineTraffic


Containerized application




A containerized application has a **delusion** that it is **the only** application running on the platform (other than the dependencies).

From the view of a containerized application

Q: What does a containerized application need to run?



From the view of a containerized application



Q: What does a containerized application need to run?

- memory
- filesystem
- networking
- threading / scheduling
- process management
- inter-process communications

Docker on Linux — control groups (cgroups)

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- *device drivers ...*

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- memory
- CPU
- block I/O
- network
- *device drivers ...*
- some exotic use cases, such as
 - huge pages (an efficient way of memory allocation)
 - RDMA (for faster memory accesses)
 -

Docker on Linux — control groups (cgroups)

cgroups also allows to group processes for batch operations such as:

- freezer (conceptually similar to a mass-SIGSTOP/SIGCONT)
- perf_event (gather performance statistics on these processes)
- cpuset (limit or pin processes to specific CPUs)
- Limit number of pids (i.e., processes) in the group

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When a process is created, it is placed in its parent's cgroups

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These namespaces are typically available in modern Linux kernels:

- pid: only “see” processes in the same PID namespace
- net: networking interfaces
- mnt: root fs, private mounts (/tmp), masking /proc, /sys, etc
- uts: hostname
- ipc: ns-specific IPC semaphores, message queues, shared memory
- user: allows UID/GID mapping (e.g., UID 0→99 to 1000→1099)
- time: allows slower/faster clock or an offset to the clock

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Each process belongs to one namespace of each type. **A new process can re-use none / all / some of the namespaces of its parent**

Docker on Linux — namespaces (ns)

```
$ sudo unshare --uts
- create new uts namespace while inheriting everything else.
$ hostname
> system76-pc
$ hostname cs489
$ hostname
> cs489
```

In another shell, check that the hostname remains:

```
$ hostname
> system76-pc
```


Docker on Linux — copy-on-write filesystem (OverlayFS)

While Docker generally considers it a mechanism for fast container launch, the [overlay filesystem](#) concept itself is a very powerful sandboxing mechanism.

Docker on Linux — copy-on-write filesystem (OverlayFS)




Figure: An illustration of the OverlayFS. Credits / Trademark: Datalight

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


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The most common reason is to deal with **untrusted code**, e.g.,

- Javascript received from website
- Macros carried in documents (e.g., Excel or PDF)
- Language runtime running untrusted application code

Case study: Linux capabilities

In traditional UNIX, many operations are possible when you have $UID = 0$ (root):

- changing file ownership, accessing all files, ...
- setting up network interfaces, mounting filesystems ...
- binding to a port below 1024 ...
- load and unload kernel modules ...
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But why would a web server has accesses to kernel modules or the ability to mount / unmount filesystems?

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- CAP_CHOWN: arbitrarily change file ownership and permissions.
- CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE: arbitrarily bypass file ownership and permissions.
- CAP_NET_ADMIN: configure network interfaces, iptables rules, etc.
- CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE: bind a port below 1024.
- CAP_SYS_MODULE: load or unload kernel modules.
- ...

See `man capabilities` for the full list and more details.

Case study: Seccomp

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Enter seccomp, that prevent execution of certain **system calls** by an application, through a **customizable filter**.

Why system calls?

The Linux kernel exposes a large number of system calls (≈ 400), while most programs only need a small subset to function. — The [practicality](#) argument.

In addition, the most common way of making an impact on the host platform is via system calls. — The [effectiveness](#) argument.

Seccomp: strict mode

Only permit the following system calls: `read()`, `write()`, `_exit()`, `sigreturn()`. Any other system calls leads to **SIGKILL**.

- NOTE: `open()` not included.

Designed to sandbox untrusted code that is compute-intensive.

Seccomp: BPF filter

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Steps to use BPF filter:

- 1 Construct filter in BPF rules
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Once install, **every system call triggers execution of filter.**

Seccomp: from BPF to eBPF

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In essence, eBPF allows **arbitrarily complex checks** to be performed quickly and safely.

〈 End 〉