

CS 489 / 698: Software and Systems Security

**Module 5: Non-technical Aspects of Security**  
administering security

Meng Xu (*University of Waterloo*)

Winter 2024

# Outline


- 1 Security planning
- 2 Risk analysis
- 3 Closing remarks

# Security planning



# Fire!

**Top OTT Service by Average bits/s** | **Internet Traffic served by Facebook**  
 Oct 04, 2021 06:00 to Oct 05, 2021 00:00 (18h) | **Global outage 4-Oct-2021**



*silent night, holy night, all is calm, all is bright ...*

**Q:** What should you do as Facebook employee at 16:00 UTC?

## Goals of security planning

A **security plan** is a document that explains

- what the security goals are
- how they are to be met
- how they'll **stay** met

Employees can use this document to inform their actions

# Goals of security planning

A **security plan** is a document that explains

- what the security goals are
- how they are to be met
- how they'll **stay** met

Employees can use this document to inform their actions

**Analogy:** Go to a construction site and ask the manager-in-charge, what is your safety plan here?

## Contents of a security plan

A security plan is both a description of the current state of the security of an organization, as well as a plan for improvement.

# Contents of a security plan

A security plan is both a description of the current state of the security of an organization, as well as a plan for improvement.

Usually, a security plan has seven parts:

- Policy: high-level goals and priorities
- Current state: risk analysis, anticipation of new situations
- Requirements: **what** are the security and privacy needs
- Recommended controls: **how** to provide those needs
- Accountability: **who** is responsible for what
- Timetable: **when** the elements of the plan will be performed
- Continuing attention: how often the plan should be updated



## Who develops the security plan?

Who performs the security analysis, makes recommendations, and writes the security plan?

## Who develops the security plan?

Who performs the security analysis, makes recommendations, and writes the security plan?

The **security planning team** should have representation from a number of different constituencies:

- Upper management / CTO / CIO (setting policy)
- IT (hardware group, sysadmins)
- Systems and application programmers, DB admins
- Data entry personnel
- Physical security personnel
- Representative users
- External consulting / advisory board

# Business continuity plans

The Business Continuity Plan (BCP) is another kind of security plan, with a sheer focus on **availability**

It aims to lay down a way out for situations that are:

- Catastrophic: a large part (or all) of a computing capability is suddenly unavailable
- Long duration: the outage is expected to last for so long that business would suffer if left unattended

# Taking actions after planning

Writing the plan is far from enough!

**Before** something occurs, you need to:

- Acquire redundant equipment
- Arrange for regular data backups
- Stockpile supplies
- Train employees so that they know how to react
  - This may also involve **live testing** of the BCP

# Outline

- 1 Security planning
- 2 Risk analysis
- 3 Closing remarks

# Risk

**Definition:** A **risk** is a **potential problem** that a system or its users may experience

Risks have two important characteristics:

- Probability: what is the probability (between 0 and 1) that the risk will occur? (That is, the **risk** will turn into a **problem**)
- Impact: if the risk occurs, what harm will happen? This is usually measured in terms of money (cost to clean up, direct losses, PR damage to the company, etc.)

The **risk exposure** = **probability** × **impact**

# Motivations for risk analysis

- It is impossible to completely eliminate risk
  - No system is absolutely secure
  - The bug-free software is the software not-written

# Motivations for risk analysis

- It is impossible to completely eliminate risk
  - No system is absolutely secure
  - The bug-free software is the software not-written
- We perform risk analysis to determine if the benefits of some action outweigh the risks
  - If not, is there anything we can do to reduce the risk exposure, either by controlling the probability or reducing the impact?



# Motivations for risk analysis

- It is impossible to completely eliminate risk
  - No system is absolutely secure
  - The bug-free software is the software not-written
- We perform risk analysis to determine if the benefits of some action outweigh the risks
  - If not, is there anything we can do to reduce the risk exposure, either by controlling the probability or reducing the impact?
- As you can see, risk analysis is not specific to security and privacy issues
  - But bringing risk analysis to those issues is a relatively new, and extremely useful, phenomenon

# Procedures for risk analysis

A risk analysis usually comprises the following steps:

- Identify assets
- Determine vulnerabilities
- Estimate likelihood of exploitation
- Compute risk exposure
- Survey applicable controls
- Project savings due to control

# 1/ Identify assets

The main assets we would want to protect:

- Hardware
- Software
- Data

# 1/ Identify assets

The main assets we would want to protect:

- Hardware
- Software
- Data

What else?

# 1/ Identify assets

The main assets we would want to protect:

- Hardware
- Software
- Data
  
- Documentation
- Procedures
- Reputation

## 2/ Determine vulnerabilities

This step is where you apply the knowledge obtained in this course

- Also called **threat modeling**
- “Think like an attacker” and be very creative, even outlandish
- Come up with as many attacks on your own systems as you can, both technical and non-technical, against assets identified before
- Confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy, etc.

### 3/ Estimate likelihood of exploitation

This is the hardest step, and there are experts trained in doing it — this is called *actuarial science*

- It's difficult to estimate the probability of each risk
  - Especially if it's so unlikely that it's never happened before
  - Otherwise, **frequency analysis** can be useful
- Take into account existing controls and their own effectiveness

### 3/ Estimate likelihood of exploitation

This is the hardest step, and there are experts trained in doing it — this is called *actuarial science*

- It's difficult to estimate the probability of each risk
  - Especially if it's so unlikely that it's never happened before
  - Otherwise, **frequency analysis** can be useful
- Take into account existing controls and their own effectiveness

**Q:** What is the chance that a buffer overflow bug can cause arbitrary code execution? With stack canaries? With ASLR?



## 4/ Compute risk exposure

Identify the impact of the risk is also a tricky step (even though estimates are usually good enough)

Some examples include:

- Legal obligations to conserve confidentiality or integrity
- Penalties for failing to provide a service
- Could release of data cause harm to a person?
- Value of keeping data out of competitor's hands
- Cost of delaying or outsourcing data processing if your systems are unavailable

## 5/ Survey applicable controls

- For each risk, think of different ways to control the vulnerability
  - Again, both technical and non-technical means
- Classify each control as to how well it protects against each vulnerability
  - Note that a control that protects against one vulnerability might make another one worse!
  - Also watch out for interactions among different controls

## 6/ Project savings due to control

- The expected cost of not controlling the risk is just the risk exposure, as computed earlier
- For each control, the cost of the control is its direct cost (e.g., buying the network monitoring equipment, training, etc.), plus the exposure of the **controlled risk**
  - Most controls aren't perfect: even with the control, there will still be a (smaller, hopefully) probability of a problem
- Savings = Risk exposure – Cost of control – New risk exposure

## 6/ Project savings due to control

- The expected cost of not controlling the risk is just the risk exposure, as computed earlier
- For each control, the cost of the control is its direct cost (e.g., buying the network monitoring equipment, training, etc.), plus the exposure of the **controlled risk**
  - Most controls aren't perfect: even with the control, there will still be a (smaller, hopefully) probability of a problem
- Savings = Risk exposure – Cost of control – New risk exposure

**Q:** If savings = 0, should we apply the control?

# A concrete example

	No exploit	Exploited
<b>Data breach (1% chance)</b>	\$0	\$10,000
<b>With control mechanisms</b>	\$100	\$100

## A concrete example

	No exploit	Exploited
<b>Data breach (1% chance)</b>	\$0	\$10,000
<b>With control mechanisms</b>	\$100	\$100

**Q:** What is the saving here?

## A concrete example

	No exploit	Exploited
Data breach (1% chance)	\$0	\$10,000
With control mechanisms	\$100	\$100

**Q:** What is the saving here?

**A:**  $10,000 \times 0.01 - 100 = 0$

## A concrete example

	No exploit	Exploited
Data breach (1% chance)	\$0	\$10,000
With control mechanisms	\$100	\$100

**Q:** What is the saving here?

**A:**  $10,000 \times 0.01 - 100 = 0$

**Q:** Do you want to use this control mechanism?



## A concrete example

	No exploit	Exploited
Data breach (1% chance)	\$0	\$10,000
With control mechanisms	\$100	\$100

**Q:** What is the saving here?

**A:**  $10,000 \times 0.01 - 100 = 0$

**Q:** Do you want to use this control mechanism?

**A:** Yes assuming **risk aversion**

## A concrete example

	No exploit	Exploited
Data breach (1% chance)	\$0	\$10,000
With control mechanisms	\$100	\$100

**Q:** What is the saving here?

**A:**  $10,000 \times 0.01 - 100 = 0$

**Q:** Do you want to use this control mechanism?

**A:** Yes assuming **risk aversion**

**Q:** What does this remind you?

# Cybersecurity insurance

	No exploit	Exploited
Data breach (1% chance)	\$0	\$10,000
With <b>insurance cost</b>	\$100	\$100

# Cybersecurity insurance

Cyber insurance products may cover the following first-party and post-breach expenses:

- Privacy attorney
- IT forensic investigation
- Compliance with state notification laws
- Credit monitoring for breached individuals
- Public relation firm to manage the crisis
- Regulatory fines
- Class action lawsuits resulting from the breach

## Cybersecurity insurance

*Frankly, I don't think we or anybody else really knows what they're doing when writing cyber. People who say they have a firm grasp on the risk are kidding themselves.*

— Warren Buffet, 2018

# Outline

- 1 Security planning
- 2 Risk analysis
- 3 Closing remarks

# Physical security

All the firewalls in the world won't help you defend against an attacker who **physically** steals your laptop off your desk

See [databreaches.net](https://databreaches.net) for **many** examples of personal information being lost in incidents just like this

We need to protect the physical machines, as well as the software and data on those machines.

# Physical threats

There are two major classes of physical threats:

- Nature, e.g.:
  - Fire
  - Flood
  - Blackouts
- Human, e.g.:
  - Vandals
  - Thieves
  - Targeted attackers



# Vandals

Some human attacks aren't actually after the data

**Example:** Sir George Williams University (later Concordia University) “Computer Centre Incident” of 1969 — the largest student uprising in Canadian history



# Vandals

Some human attacks aren't actually after the data

**Example:** Sir George Williams University (later Concordia University) "Computer Centre Incident" of 1969 — the largest student uprising in Canadian history



**Q:** How would you control this kind of threat?

# Thieves

Q: What are most thefts after?

- Hardware?
- Software?
- Data?

# Thieves

**Q:** What are most thefts after?

- Hardware?
- Software?
- Data?

**Q:** How do we secure a hardware?

**A:** Guards, lockdown equipments, Apple AirTag?

# Targeted attackers

What if the thieves are actually targeting you?

Now what are they most likely to be after?

- Hardware?
- Software?
- Data?

〈 End 〉