CS 453 / 698: Software and Systems Security

Module: Secure System Design Principles Lecture: compartmentalization / sandboxing

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Fall 2024





- 2 Resource isolation: the virtual memory example
- 3 A high-level overview of sandboxing
- 4 Virtualization and emulation
- 5 Container technology
- In-process sandboxing





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- OS makes resources available to entities **if** required by them and **when** permitted by some policy (and availability).
 - What is a resource?
 - What is an entity?
 - How does an entity request for a resource?
 - How does a policy get specified?
 - How is the policy enforced?



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Q: What if I am the only user on this OS (e.g., my phone)?

A: Even for a single-user OS, protecting the user is a good thing because of user mistakes, malware, or resource over-consumption.



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A: Virtual memory

- The OS provides a separate, private, and virtual address space for each process hence the name virtual memory.
- The virtual memory of a process holds the code, data, stack, and heap for the program that is running in that process.
- The running process see only virtual addresses, e.g.,
 - program counter and stack pointer hold virtual addresses of the next instruction and the stack
 - pointers to variables are virtual addresses
 - jump/call instructions refer to virtual addresses
- Each process is isolated in its virtual memory, and cannot access other process' virtual memories.

Intro Isolation Overview Virt/Emu Container In-process Address translation Oddependence Oddependence Oddependence Oddependence Oddependence

Each virtual memory is mapped to some part of physical memory.

Since virtual memory is not real, when a process tries to access (load or store) a virtual address, the virtual address is translated (mapped) to its corresponding physical address, and the load or store is performed in physical memory.

Q: Who performs address translation?

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A: In modern computing architectures, address translation is usually performed by hardware, typically by a component named Memory Managment Unit (MMU) or Memory Protection Unit (MPU), using information provided by the OS.

This includes address translation for program counter (PC), as PC also contains virtual address only, hence, each instruction execution requires at least one address translation.



How is address translation done?

- Direct mapping
- Segmentation
- Paging
-

For details, please refer to relevant lectures on virtual memory in course CS 350.



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What	What is sandboxing?							

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 What is sandboxing?

Sandboxing is a security mechanism for isolating vulnerable / untrusted code from its hosting platform, usually in an effort to confine the potential damage.

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What	damage?				

Intro	Isolation	Overview	Virt/Emu	Container	In-process
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What	damage?				

- Corrupt in-application data
- Corrupt memory
- Corrupt local filesystem
- Corrupt other processes
- Gain root privilege
- Spread into other network-connected computers
-

- The ladder of separation
 - Physical separation
 - e.g., Airgap, RF-shield rooms
 - Hardware isolation
 - e.g., AWS dedicated instances
 - Whole-system virtualization
 - e.g., Full (VMware ESXi) / Para (Xen)
 - Whole-system emulation
 - e.g., QEMU (+ KVM) emulation, Android emulator
 - Partial system resources emulation
 - e.g., Docker, Landlock, Jail
 - In-process application sandboxes
 - e.g., Chrome Sandbox, capabilities, seccomp
 - In-thread application sandboxes
 - e.g., hardware-assisted solutions like CHERI

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
Figure: Airgapped computers in the 2016 DARPA CGC event


Based on AWS documentation

Dedicated Instances are Amazon EC2 instances that run in a virtual private cloud (VPC) on hardware that's dedicated to a single customer. Dedicated Instances that belong to different AWS accounts are physically isolated at a hardware level, even if those accounts are linked to a single payer account.




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
Trap accesses to hardware resources into the Virtual Machine Manager (VMM), possibly via binary translation.



Instrument the guest kernel with hypercalls to interact with VMM.







Whole-system emulation attempts to run the entire stack in user-space, including the emulation of hardware devices.

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What i	s a conta	ainer?			



 $\label{eq:Figure: A cargo ship. Credits / Trademark: Tech Vision$


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 What does a container sees itself?




Figure: A single-container ship. Credits / Trademark: MarineTraffic






A containerized application has a delusion that it is the only application running on the platform (other than the dependencies).





Q: What does a containerized application need to run?





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- memory
- filesystem
- networking
- threading / scheduling
- process management
- inter-process communications

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Control groups (cgroups) is a Linux kernel feature that limits, accounts for, and isolates the resource usage of a collection of processes.

Intro Isolation Overview Virt/Emu Container In-process Docker on Linux — control groups (cgroups)

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- OPU
- block I/O
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- device drivers ...

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- network
- device drivers ...
- some exotic use cases, such as
 - huge pages (an efficient way of memory allocation)
 - RDMA (for faster memory accesses)

-

Intro Isolation Overview Virt/Emu Container In-process Docker on Linux — control groups (cgroups)

cgroups also allows to group processes for batch operations such as:

- freezer (conceptually similar to a mass-SIGSTOP/SIGCONT)
- perf_event (gather performance statistics on these processes)
- cpuset (limit or pin processes to specific CPUs)
- Limit number of pids (i.e., processes) in the group

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When a process is created, it is placed in its parent's cgroups





While cgroups limits how much a process can use, ns limits what a process can see (and hence make use of).

Docker on Linux — namespaces (ns)

Overview

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Virt/Emu

Container

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These namespaces are typically available in modern Linux kernels:

- pid: only "see" processes in the same PID namespace
- net: networking interfaces
- mnt: root fs, private mounts (/tmp), masking /proc, /sys, etc
- uts: hostname

Isolation

- ipc: ns-specific IPC semaphores, message queues, shared memory
- user: allows UID/GID mapping (e.g., UID 0 \rightarrow 99 to 1000 \rightarrow 1099)
- time: allows slower/faster clock or an offset to the clock

n-process

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Each process belongs to one namespace of each type. A new process can re-use none / all / some of the namespaces of its parent

n-process



- \$ sudo unshare --uts
 - create new uts namespace while inheriting everything else.
- \$ hostname
 - > system76-pc
- \$ hostname cs489
- \$ hostname
 - > cs489

In another shell, check that the hostname remains:

- \$ hostname
 - > system76-pc



While Docker generally considers it a mechanism for fast container launch, the overlay filesystem concept itself is a very powerful sandboxing mechanism.






Figure: An illustration of the OverlayFS. Credits / Trademark: Datalight






Figure: An illustration of the OverlayFS. Credits / Trademark: Docker

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 Why would a program sandbox itself?



The most common reason is to deal with untrusted code, e.g.,

- Javascript received from website
- Macros carried in documents (*e.g.*, Excel or PDF)
- Language runtime running untrusted application code



In traditional UNIX, many operations are possible when you have UID = 0 (root):

- changing file ownership, accessing all files, ...
- setting up network interfaces, mounting filesystems ...
- binding to a port below 1024 ...
- load and unload kernel modules ...

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But why would a web server has accesses to kernel modules or the ability to mount / unmount filesystems?



Capabilities are per-process flags to allow privileged operations individually (which used to be granted to root as a package).

Intro Isolation Overview Virt/Emu Container In-process Case study: Linux capabilities

Capabilities are per-process flags to allow privileged operations individually (which used to be granted to root as a package).

- CAP_CHOWN: arbitrarily change file ownership and permissions.
- CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE: arbitrarily bypass file ownership and permissions.
- CAP_NET_ADMIN: configure network interfaces, iptables rules, etc.
- CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE: bind a port below 1024.
- CAP_SYS_MODULE: load or unload kernel modules.

• ...

See man capabilities for the full list and more details.



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In a more verbose way, I know exactly what my sub-process should do, can I achieve principle of least privilege?



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Enter seccomp, that prevent execution of certain system calls by an application, through a customizable filter.



The Linux kernel exposes a large number of system calls (\approx 400), while most program only need a small subset to function. — The practicality argument.

In addition, the most common way of making an impact on the host platform is via system calls. — The effectiveness argument.



Only permit the following system calls: read(), write(), _exit(), sigreturn(). Any other system calls leads to SIGKILL.

- NOTE: open() not included.

Designed to sandbox untrusted code that is compute-intensive.



Allows filtering based on system call number and argument values (pointers are not dereferenced).

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Steps to use BPF filter:

- Construct filter in BPF rules
- Install filter using seccomp() or prctl()
- exec() new program or invoke function in dynamically loaded shared libraries (a.k.a., plug-ins).

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Once install, every system call triggers execution of filter.



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Seccomp: from BPF to eBPF

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In essence, eBPF allows arbitrarily complex checks to be performed quickly and safely.

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