CS 453 / 698: Software and Systems Security

Module: Hardware Security

Lecture: security features, enablers, and accelerators

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Fall 2024

Outline

Motivation

Q: What can hardware do for software and system security?

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

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A: There are generally two views on hardware-assisted security:

- Hardware runs at an even higher privilege level such that a malicious or compromised kernel cannot temper with — e.g., TPMs or TEEs (next lecture)
- Hardware can accelerate security mechanisms that are conventionally enforced by kernel, compiler, or even the developers manually — e.g., CHERI (this lecture)

Categorization of hardware-assisted security



Adapted from survey paper A Comprehensive Survey of Hardware-Assisted Security: From The Edge to The Cloud

Outline

Recap on CFI

Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a classic example of runtime reference monitor in software security.

CFI is also sometimes referred to as program shepherding

> *monitoring control flow transfers during program execution to enforce a security policy — from a paper in USENIX Security'02.*

Basic ideas of CFI

```
1  void f1();
2  void f2();
3  void f3();
4  void f4(int, int);
5
6  void foo(int usr) {
7    void (*func)();
8
9    if (usr == MAGIC)
10     func = f1;
11   else
12     func = f2;
13
14   // forward edge CFI check
15   CHECK_CFI_FORWARD(func);
16   func();
17
18   // backward edge CFI check
19   CHECK_CFI_BACKWARD();
20 }
```

Option 1: allow all functions

- `f1`, `f2`, `f3`, `f4`, `foo`, `printf`, `system`, ...

Option 2: allowed only functions defined in the current module

- `f1`, `f2`, `f3`, `f4`, `foo`

Option 3: allow functions with type signature `void (*)()`

- `f1`, `f2`, `f3`

Option 4: allow functions whose address are taken (e.g., assigned)

- `f1`, `f2`

Example: Microsoft Control-flow Guard (CFG)

CFG implements **coarse-grained control-flow integrity** for indirect calls

Compile time

```
void Foo(...) {
   // SomeFunc is address-taken
   // and may be called indirectly
   Object->FuncPtr = SomeFunc;
}
```

Metadata is automatically added to the image which identifies functions that may be called indirectly

```
void Bar(...) {
   // Compiler-inserted check to
   // verify call target is valid
   _guard_check_icall(Object->FuncPtr);
   Object->FuncPtr(xyz);
}
```

A lightweight check is inserted prior to indirect calls which will verify that the call target is valid at runtime

Runtime

Process Start
- Map valid call target data

Image Load
- Update valid call target data with metadata from PE image

Indirect Call
- Perform O(1) validity check
- Terminate process if invalid target
- Jmp if target is valid

CFG is a deterministic mitigation, its security is not dependent on keeping secrets.

For C/C++ code, CFG requires no source code changes.

```
ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget:
00007ffb`4e100e10 4c8b1d59e50d00  mov     r11,qword ptr
[ntdll!LdrSystemDllInitBlock+0xb0]
00007ffb`4e100e17 4c8bd0          mov     r10,rax
00007ffb`4e100e1a 49c1ea09        shr     r10,9
00007ffb`4e100e1e 4f8b1cd3        mov     r11,qword ptr [r11+r10*8]
00007ffb`4e100e22 4c8bd0          mov     r10,rax
00007ffb`4e100e25 49c1ea03        shr     r10,3
00007ffb`4e100e29 a80f            test    al,0Fh
00007ffb`4e100e2b 7509            jne     ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget+0x26
ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget+0x1d:
00007ffb`4e100e2d 4d0fa3d3        bt      r11,r10
00007ffb`4e100e31 7303            jae     ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget+0x26
ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget+0x23:
00007ffb`4e100e33 48ffe0          jmp     rax
```

Illustration taken from Microsoft Talk: The Evolution of CFI Attacks and Defenses

Example: Microsoft Return-flow Guard (RFG)

RFG was our compatible, ABI compliant, performant software shadow stack

Compile Time

NOP's added to the prolog & epilog of all functions

Metadata added to the image to locate the prolog and epilog NOP bytes

Runtime

Process Start

- 1TB shadow stack region created
- Region cannot be queried
- A/V's in region are fatal
- FS segment points to the shadow stack of the current thread

Image Load

- If process enables RFG: patch NOP's with RFG prolog/epilog

Function Calls

- Prolog: Push return address to shadow stack
- Epilog: Fast fail if return address on stack and shadow stack are mismatched



RFG relies on a secret: the shadow stack's virtual address

Illustration taken from Microsoft Talk: The Evolution of CFI Attacks and Defenses

RFG deployment experience

Secrets are bad!

AnC attack (a side-channel attack) could successfully leak where shadow stacks are mapped.

Back-edge protection: shadow stack



Copyright: Intel

CET: shadow stack

- For every regular stack CET adds a shadow stack region, which is indexed via a new register `%ssp`.
- Regular memory stores (executed from any ring) are not allowed in shadow stack region

When enabled,

- Each time a `call` instruction gets executed, in addition to the return address being pushed onto the regular stack, a copy of it is also pushed (automatically) onto the shadow stack.
- Each time a `ret` instruction gets executed, the return addresses pointed by `%rsp` and `%ssp` are (automatically) popped from the two stacks, and their values are compared together.

CET: Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT)

CET introduces a new (4-byte) instruction, i.e., `endbr`, which becomes the **only** allowed target of indirect `call`/`jmp` instructions.

In other words, forward-edge transfers via (indirect) `call` or `jmp` instructions are pinned to code locations that are "marked" with an `endbr`; else, an exception (`#CP`) is raised.

IBT example

```
1 void main() {
2     int (*f) {};
3     f = foo;
4     f();
5 }
6
7 int foo() {
8     return 0;
9 }
```

```
1  <main>:
2  movq    $0x4004fb, -8(%rbp)
3  mov     -8(%rbp), %rdx
4  call    *%rdx
5  :
6  retq
7
8  <foo>:
9  endbr64
10 :
11 mov     rax, 0
12 :
13 retq
```

IBT example

```
1  void main() {
2      int (*f) {};
3      int (*g) {};
4      f = foo;
5      g = bar;
6      f();
7      g();
8  }
9
10 int foo() {
11     return 0;
12 }
13
14 int bar() {
15     return 1;
16 }
```

```
1  <main>:
2  movq    $0x4004fb, -16(%rbp)
3  mov     -16(%rbp), %rdx
4  call    *%rdx
5  mov     -8(%rbp), %rdx
6  call    *%rdx
7  :
8  retq
9
10 <foo>:
11 endbr64
12 :
13 mov     rax, 0
14 :
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17 <bar>:
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21 :
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```

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Goal: ensures pointers in memory remain unchanged.

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- Perfect code pointer integrity implies control-flow integrity (CFI).



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

- Data pointer integrity is also important (e.g., against data-only attacks and data-oriented programming) and can be (partially) achieved via Pointer Authentication.

Overview

Available since Armv8.3-A instruction set architecture (ISA) when the processor executes in 64-bit Arm state (AArch64)



PA consists of a set of instructions for creating and authenticating pointer authentication codes (PACs).

PAC details

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  - A pointer value
  - A 64-bit context value (modifier)
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- PAC essentially a key-ed message authentication code (MAC) where the MAC algorithm can be implementation defined
  - by default, it is QARMA
- Instructions hide the algorithm details (sign + authenticate)

Example: PA-based return address signing

Deployed as `-msign-return-address` in GCC and LLVM/Clang



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Brief history

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- 2013-07: Intel introduces MPX in its ISA manual
- 2015-02: Linux kernel adds support to MPX in its 3.19 release
- 2015-04: GCC adds support to MPX in its 5.0 release
- 2015-08: MPX becomes available in Skylake microarchitecture
- 2018-06: An important paper Intel MPX Explained: A Cross-layer Analysis of the Intel MPX System Stack was published.
- 2019-??: Intel removes MPX from its ISA manual
- 2019-05: GCC drops support for MPX in its 9.1 release
- 2020-03: Linux kernel drops support for MPX in its 5.6 release

How does MPX work?

```
1 struct obj { char buf[100]; int len }
2 obj* a[10];      total = 0;
3 for (i=0; i<M; i++) { total += a[i]->len; }
```

How does MPX work?

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```
1 for (i=0; i<M; i++):
2   ai = a + i                // Pointer arithmetic on a
3   objptr = load ai          // Pointer to obj at a[i]
4   lenptr = objptr + 100     // Pointer to obj.len
5   len = load lenptr
6   total += len              // Total length of all objs
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```
1 a_b = bndmk a, a+79
2 for (i=0; i<M; i++):
3   ai = a + i
4   bndcl a_b, ai             // Lower-bound check of a[i]
5   bndcu a_b, ai+7           // Upper-bound check of a[i]
6   objptr = load ai
7   objptr_b = bndldx ai      // Bounds for pointer at a[i]
8   lenptr = objptr + 100
9   bndcl objptr_b, lenptr    // Lower-bound check of obj.len
10  bndcu objptr_b, lenptr+3  // Upper-bound check of obj.len
11  len = load lenptr
12  total += len
```

Recap: spatial safety

At any point of time during the program execution,
for any object in memory, we know its
`(object_id, size [int], alive [bool])`

At the same time, for each memory access, we know:

- Memory read: `(object_id, offset [int], length [int])`
- Memory write: `(object_id, offset [int], length [int], _)`

It is a violation of spatial safety if:

- `offset + length >= size` or
- `offset < 0`

Supporting MPX

Adopting Intel MPX requires modifications at each level of the hardware-software stack:

- At the hardware level,
- At the kernel level:
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  - new runtime libraries for initialization/finalization routines, debug information, and bridges to other non-MPX-protected libraries.
- At the application level,
  - manual change of troublesome C coding patterns
  - multithreading issues
  - interaction with other ISA extensions (e.g., TSX and SGX).

What do we gain?

Approach	Detects	RIPE bugs	Other bugs	Broken	Perf (×)
Native: no protection	–	**64** (34)	**6** (3)	**0** (0)	**1.00** (1.00)
MPX security levels:					
L1: only-writes and no narrowing of bounds	inter-object overwrites	**14** (14)	**3** (0)	**3** (5)	**1.29** (1.18)
L2: no narrowing of bounds	+ inter-object overreads	**14** (14)	**3** (0)	**2** (8)	**2.39** (1.46)
L3: only-writes and narrowing of bounds	all overwrites*	**14** (0)	**2** (0)	**4** (7)	**1.30** (1.19)
L4: narrowing of bounds (default)	+ all overreads*	**14** (0)	**0** (0)	**4** (9)	**2.52** (1.47)
L5: + `fchkp-first-field-has-own-bounds` *	+ all overreads	**0** (–)	**0** (–)	**6** (–)	**2.52** (–)
L6: + `BNDPRESERVE=1` (protect all code)	all overflows in all code	**0** (0)	**0** (0)	**34** (29)	–
AddressSanitizer	inter-object overflows	**12**	**3**	**0**	**1.55**

* except intra-object overwrites & overreads through the first field of struct, level 5 removes this limitation (only relevant for GCC version)

Evaluation results available on this website

Lessons learned

- New MPX instructions are not as fast as expected
  - The average overhead of 20-50% is not significantly better than ASan
- The supporting infrastructure is not mature enough
  - MPX transformation in compilers might be buggy
  - Other libraries needs to have MPX-enabled
- MPX provides no temporal protection
  - ASan has partial support
- MPX does not support multithreading transparently
  - Both false positives and false negatives if the application does not conform to C11 memory model or if the compiler does not update bounds in atomic primitives
- MPX is not compatible with some C idioms
  - e.g., using a struct field (usually the first field of struct) to access other fields of the struct
  - custom memory management, e.g., arbitrary type casts and in-pointer bit twiddling

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Introduced into the Armv8.5-A instruction set architecture (ISA) as Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) in 2018.

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- As a hardware accelerator for detecting memory errors

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MTE implements a "lock-and-key" scheme for memory access:

- Two types of tags:
  - Every aligned 16 bytes of memory have a 4-bit tag stored separately, i.e., not addressable (the "lock")
  - Every pointer has a 4-bit tag stored in the top byte (the "key")
- `LD`/`ST` instructions check both tags, raise exception on mismatch
- New instructions are introduced to manipulate the tags

MTE illustration



Source: article Delivering enhanced security through Memory Tagging Extension

Detecting heap overflow

```
char *p = new char[20]; // 0xa007ffffffff1240
```

Detecting heap overflow

```
char *p = new char[20]; // 0xa007ffffffff1240
```


```
p[32] = ... // heap-buffer-overflow
```


≠


Detecting use-after-free

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char *p = new char[20]; // 0xa007ffffffff1240
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Detecting use-after-free

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char *p = new char[20]; // 0xa007ffffffff1240
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```
delete [] p;  // Memory is retagged ■ ⇒ ■
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```


```
delete [] p;  // Memory is retagged ■ ⇒ ■
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```
p[0] = ...  // heap-use-after-free ■ ≠ ■
```

Adoption in practice

- LLVM MemTagSanitizer detects a similar class of errors as AddressSanitizer or HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizer, but with **much** lower overhead.



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

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- In Android 12, the kernel and userspace heap memory allocator can augment each allocation with metadata, based on this article.

Outline

Re-defining pointers

A pointer is not only an N-bit value representing a memory address, rather, it is a capability granting certain permissions to access a restrictive range in the memory address space.

CHERI memory capability



A "pointer", or rather, a memory capability, in the view of the CHERI Morello architecture (source of image: Pawel Zalewski's blog post).

CHERI basic idea

```
#include <stdio.h>
int x=1;
int secret_key = 4091;
int main() {
  int *p = &x;
  p = p+1;
  int y = *p;
  printf("%d\n",y);
}
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

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

Q: What will happen?

CHERI software stack

Completely re-vamped software stack:

- Compilers: *custom-made* Clang/LLVM
- Operating systems: *hand-tuned* FreeBSD, FreeRTOS
- Applications: *ported* WebKit, OpenSSH, and PostgreSQL

Outline

Overview

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

An abstract view of the authenticated boot process

Requirements for the root-of-trust (RoT) component

- Boot process is guaranteed to start from the RoT component
- The cryptographic key is non-readable, non-writable at any privilege level
  - The only way to use the key is to verify the signature via special hardware instructions.
- The RoT component, upon booting, must first measure the code content of the first stage bootloader and validate the measurement with the signature.

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Usually, the RoT component is encapsulated in a hardware module named Hardware Security Module (HSM).

⟨ End ⟩