CS 458 / 658: Computer Security and Privacy Module 5 - Security and Privacy of Internet Applications Interactive Session - An introduction to blockchain technologies

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Winter 2022





- 2 Consensus: Proof-of-Work
- 3 Consensus: Proof-of-Stake





2 Consensus: Proof-of-Work

3 Consensus: Proof-of-Stake

What is a blockchain?


A blockchain is ... a chain of blocks!


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
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
$$\mathsf{Block} \ 1 \longrightarrow \mathsf{Block} \ 2 \longrightarrow \cdots \longrightarrow \mathsf{Block} \ \mathsf{N}$$


- What does chaining mean here?
 - Linked list? Some cryptographic construct?
- What goes into these blocks?
 - Anything? A fixed format? What makes a block valid?
- Who can put up a block?
 - A single entity? A group of people? Anyone with Internet access?
- How to ensure a same view of the chain?
 - Centralized? Distributed? How to resolve a dispute?














- A *header* that contains at least two critical values:
 - A cryptographic hash of the previous block header.
 - A cryptographic hash of the current block payload.
- A payload that contains application-specific information




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
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


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


- A *header* that contains at least two critical values:
 - A cryptographic hash of the previous block header.
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- A payload that contains application-specific information
- Q: Why this is a better chaining scheme?

What goes into the payload?




What goes into the payload?



Anything! Depending on how you plan to use this blockchain.


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



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
- Bitcoin blockchain: ledger
- Ethereum blockchain: state machine


Payload example: a ledger





















Imagine Alice goes to Bob's Pizzeria and orders a pizza, she has the following payment options:

• cash, debit card, credit card, e-transfer (e.g., Interac[®])


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


To the best of Bob's knowledge:

• It is hard for Alice to produce such a chain of blocks

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


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- It is hard for Alice to produce such a chain of blocks
- There does not exist a better chain of blocks as of now

Imagine Alice goes to Bob's Pizzeria and orders a pizza, she has the following payment options:

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To the best of Bob everyone's knowledge:

- It is hard for Alice to produce such a chain of blocks
- There does not exist a better chain of blocks as of now

Summary

Pay attention to two aspects when you design/analyze a blockchain:

- What goes into a block?
- How to ensure consensus?

Summary

Pay attention to two aspects when you design/analyze a blockchain:


- What goes into a block?
- How to ensure consensus?

In most blockchain systems, these two aspects are orthogonal.






2 Consensus: Proof-of-Work



PoW ○●○○○○○○○○○○


How hard it is to alter this chain?




This is the chain Alice shows Bob w.r.t her payment to Bob.

PoW ○●○○○○○○○○○○

How hard it is to alter this chain?




It is not hard at all for Alice to revert the payment to Bob!





PoW 00●000000000 PoS 00000000000<u>0000</u>


Increase the difficulty




Bob decides to make it harder for Alice to alter her payment








$$N = 0 \implies Hash(H \parallel N \parallel ... \parallel R) = 0x349c1a7e... imes$$




$$N = 0 \implies Hash(H \parallel N \parallel ... \parallel R) = 0x349c1a7e... imes$$

$$N = 1 \implies Hash(H \parallel N \parallel ... \parallel R) = 0x6ffde7bf... \times$$



$$N = 0 \implies Hash(H \parallel N \parallel ... \parallel R) = 0x349c1a7e... \times N = 1 \implies Hash(H \parallel N \parallel ... \parallel R) = 0x6ffde7bf... \times$$




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 0x349c1a7e... ×

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$$N = x \implies Hash(H \parallel N \parallel ... \parallel R) = 0x00._k.004f7fed1a$$

Mining for a valid hash



$$N = 0 \implies Hash(H \parallel N \parallel ... \parallel R) = 0x349c1a7e... \times$$

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
$$.....$$

$$N = x \implies Hash(H \parallel N \parallel ... \parallel R) = 0x00._k.004f7fed1a$$

$$\uparrow$$

Q: What is the chance of finding a valid N assuming an m-bit hash?

Mining for a valid hash



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
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Q: What is the chance of finding a valid N assuming an m-bit hash?

A:
$$\frac{2^{m-k}}{2^m}$$
, a larger $k \implies$ a higher difficulty of finding N

Mining for a valid hash



$$\mathsf{V} = \mathsf{0} \implies \mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{H} \parallel \mathsf{N} \parallel \dots \parallel \mathsf{R}) = \mathsf{0x349c1a7e...} \times$$


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
A:
$$\frac{2^{m-k}}{2^m}$$
, a larger $k \implies$ a higher difficulty of finding N i.e., expect 2^k hash operations to find a valid N on average.

How does mining deter alteration? - Case 1




PoW 0000●0000000 PoS 00000000000<u>0000</u>

How does mining deter alteration? - Case 1




Case 1: Alice re-mines block N and finds a new nonce such that the block header hash remains unchanged



PoW 0000●0000000 PoS 00000000000<u>0000</u>

How does mining deter alteration? - Case 1


Case 1: Alice re-mines block N and finds a new nonce such that the block header hash remains unchanged



Deterrent: This is extremely hard for a cryptographic hash function that has *preimage resistance* and *second-preimage resistance*.


PoW 00000●000000

How does mining deter alteration? - Case 2




PoW 00000●000000

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


Case 2: Alice re-mines the nonce for block N and stops there




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
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
Deterrent: longer chains are preferred over shorter chains.

PoW 000000●00000


How does mining deter alteration? - Case 3



How does mining deter alteration? - Case 3




Case 3: Alice re-mines all the nonces since block N



PoW 000000●00000

How does mining deter alteration? - Case 3

Case 3: Alice re-mines all the nonces since block N



Deterrent: If there are l blocks between and including block N and the chain head, Alice is expected to perform $l \times 2^k$ hash operations to build-up a equally competitive chain assuming the difficulty level k does not change.

There is a catch in the deterrent:

Alice mines slower than the rest of the participants combined.

$$\mathbf{P}: \quad \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} + 1 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N} + /$$

A:
$$\cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} + I$$

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$$\mathsf{P} \colon \cdots \to \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{\mathbb{N}+1} \cdots \to \mathbb{N}+/ \xrightarrow{\mathbb{N}+/+1} \to \cdots \to \mathbb{N}+/'$$

A: $\cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} + 1$

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$$\mathbf{P}: \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{\mathbb{N}+1} \cdots \xrightarrow{\mathbb{N}+l} \xrightarrow{\mathbb{N}+l+1} \cdots \xrightarrow{\mathbb{N}+l'}$$

 $\mathsf{A:} \quad \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{\mathsf{N+1}} \cdots \xrightarrow{\mathsf{N+l}} \xrightarrow{\mathsf{N+l+1}} \cdots \xrightarrow{\mathsf{N+l'}}$

There is a catch in the deterrent: Alice mines slower than the rest of the participants combined.

$$P: \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N+1} \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N+/} \rightarrow \mathbb{N+/+1} \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N+/'} \rightarrow \mathbb{N+/'+1} \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N+/''}$$
$$A: \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N+1} \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N+/} \rightarrow \mathbb{N+/+1} \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N+/'}$$

 \implies the public chain grows faster than Alice's chain.

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 $\mathsf{A:} \quad \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{\mathsf{N+1}} \cdots \xrightarrow{\mathsf{N+l}} \xrightarrow{\mathsf{N+l+1}} \cdots \xrightarrow{\mathsf{N+l'}}$

 \implies the public chain grows faster than Alice's chain.

Q: what if Alice mines faster?

There is a catch in the deterrent: Alice mines slower than the rest of the participants combined.

$\mathsf{P}: \cdots \to \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N} + 1 \to \cdots \to \mathbb{N} + / \to \mathbb{N} + / + 1 \to \cdots \to \mathbb{N} + / ' \to \mathbb{N} + / (\mathbb{N} + \mathbb{N} + \mathbb$


$\mathsf{A:} \quad \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{\mathbb{N}+1} \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N}+/ \xrightarrow{\mathbb{N}+/+1} \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow \mathbb{N}+/'$

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
- **Q**: what if Alice mines faster?
- A: Alice gets to rewrite the history.

Confirmation level

Recall that when we show a proof of payment, we need a few extra blocks after the block that hosts the ledger entry.




- ${\bf Q} :$ Why do we need these extra blocks even when
- 1) Alice does not control over 50% of computational power and
- 2) everyone else is honest and cooperative?




PoW 0000000000000000

Back to confirmation level




PoW 0000000000000000

Back to confirmation level



Back to confirmation level



To trigger a fork, Alice could

- Send two transactions in a short time window
- Send two transactions to separate halves of the network
- Pre-mine one block and only reveal it after the first transaction is sent to the network

Drawbacks of Proof-of-Work consensus

• Speed of confirmation

- E.g., a Bitcoin transaction takes on average 10 minutes to confirm
- Even worse, it is advised to wait for 6 confirmations, i.e., 1 hour.

• Vulnerable to 51% attacks

- In 2014, mining pool Ghash.io obtained 51% hash rate in Bitcoin
- Bitcoin Gold, was hit by such attacks twice in 2018 and 2020


Energy consumption

- Hashing itself is not useful
- And such useless operations are repeated across the fleet of nodes



- 1 An overview of blockchain design space
- 2 Consensus: Proof-of-Work
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
Block production as election



In a proof-of-work scheme,

- the chance of which node is elected to propose a new block is proportional to its hashing power
- collisions are allowed and are resolved by the longest chain rule

Block production as election




In a proof-of-stake scheme,

- the chance of which node is elected to propose a new block is proportional to its staked value
- collisions are not allowed by design, only the leader creates a block


PoS 000●000000000000

Transaction lifecycle in PoS




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Transaction lifecycle in PoS





PoS 000●000000000000


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
PoS 000●00000000000









PoS 000●00000000000



PoS 000●000000000000






Overview 000000000

The 51% attack in PoS

Q: What if the attacker controls \geq 50% of staked resources?



The 51% attack in PoS

- ${\bf Q}:$ What if the attacker controls \geq 50% of staked resources?
- A: The attacker can prove fraudulent transactions.

The 51% attack in PoS

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 \mathbf{Q} : Is 51% attack less likely in PoS compared with PoW?

The 51% attack in PoS


- ${\bf Q}:$ What if the attacker controls \geq 50% of staked resources?
- A: The attacker can prove fraudulent transactions.

- Q: Is 51% attack less likely in PoS compared with PoW?
- A: Yes, because in PoS, the attacker losses the weapon to future attacks, i.e., all the stake are gone, and is not easily recoverable!

PoS 0000000●0000000

Hard fork as a recovery of a 51% attack


To recover from a 51% attack, the only solution is to hard fork the blockchain in order to invalidate the fraudulent transactions added by the attackers.



PoS 0000000●0000000

Hard fork as a recovery of a 51% attack

To recover from a 51% attack, the only solution is to hard fork the blockchain in order to invalidate the fraudulent transactions added by the attackers.



NOTE: the forked chain can be shorter than the previous chain! \implies a higher level of social coordination is required

PoS 00000000●000000

Hard fork as a recovery of a 51% attack


In PoS, we do a hard fork to invalidate fraudulent transactions AND wipe out the attacker who controls \geq 50% of the staked resources.

In PoW, the hard fork can only invalidate transaction WHILE the $\geq 50\%$ computational power is still controlled by the attacker.

Chain validation

If Alice shows Bob, the Pizzeria owner, the following blockchain, why would Bob accept it? Why would Bob believe that

- It is hard for Alice to produce such a chain of blocks
- There does not exist a better chain of blocks as of now




Chain validation

This turns out to be an extremely complicated problem!

PoW 000000000000

Chain validation

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


- S Signature of the proposer of this block
- E Election packet that records how this proposer is elected

PoW 000000000000

Chain validation


This turns out to be an extremely complicated problem!



- *S* Signature of the proposer of this block
- E Election packet that records how this proposer is elected
- **Q**: What are the issues with this scheme?

The Nothing-at-Stake problem


Assuming Alice has some stake (e.g., 1%) and can be elected as a block proposer:



In one of her turn as a block proposer, Alice triggers a fork in the chain with an attempt to double-spend.

The Nothing-at-Stake problem


Assuming Alice has some stake (e.g., 1%) and can be elected as a block proposer:



The next block proposer, even honest, has no incentive to select which chain to converge on. The proposer has no idea which chain will survive in the future, the logical thing to do is to mine on both.

The Nothing-at-Stake problem


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The Nothing-at-Stake problem

Assuming Alice has some stake (e.g., 1%) and can be elected as a block proposer:



When its Alice's turn again, she only append a block to the chain that is more favorable to her. The other chain dies as a result. This is sometimes called the 1% attack.


The Nothing-at-Stake problem

Solution? There is no common solution. Different PoS chains adopt different mechanisms.

- The Slash protocol (Ethereum PoS candidate) has two rules:
- Penalize those who "equivocated" on a given block, i.e., voted on two different versions of it.
- Penalize those who voted on the wrong block, regardless of whether or not they double-voted.


Long-range attacks (the bootstraping problem)

Bob first joins the network, which chain should he accept?



Long-range attacks (the bootstraping problem)


Bob first joins the network, which chain should he accept?



Q: Why this is not a problem in PoW?

Long-range attacks (the bootstraping problem)

Bob first joins the network, which chain should he accept?



Q: Why this is not a problem in PoW?

A: Because it is computationally expensive to create a counterfeit chain in PoW. But it is easy (almost no cost) in the PoS case.

Long-range attacks (the bootstraping problem)

Solution? In short, there is no simple solutions.

- Casper (Ethereum's PoS protocol) depends on trusted nodes to broadcast the correct block hash.
- Peercoin, broadcasts the hash of the "legitimate" chain on a daily basis.
- Extremely complicated solutions have been proposed e.g., Ouroboros Genesis.