CS 886  Multiagent Systems

Speakers Form

Background Reading

• Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991.


• Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995.


• Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, 1994.

Introductory Papers

• [JFLPSW01] N. Jennings, P. Faratin, A. R. Lomuscio, S. Parsons, C. Sierra and M. Wooldridge (2001) "Automated negotiation: prospects, methods and challenges" Int. J. of Group Decision and Negotiation 10 (2) 199-215.


• [DPJ03] R. K. Dash, D. C. Parkes and N. R. Jennings (2003) "Computational Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms" IEEE Intelligent Systems 18 (6) 40-47.

Papers for Presentation

• [BBD+03] D Billings, N Burch, A Davidson, R Holte, J Schaeffer, T Schauenberg and D Szafron, Approximating game-theoretic optimal strategies for full-scale poker, Proceedings of IJCAI 2003 (Jorgen Braseth)


• [BSS04] C Boutilier, T Sandholm, and R Shields, Eliciting bid taker non-price preferences in (combinatorial) auctions, In 19th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-04), San Jose, CA, July 2004, pp 204-211 (Jie Zhang)


• [BV02] M Bowling and M Veloso, Multiagent learning using a variable learning rate, Artificial Intelligence Journal, 136:215-250, 2002. (Claus Spitzer)


• [BS05] F Brandt and T Sandholm, Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy. In Proceedings of the 4th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS),2005 (Greg Hines)


• [FPSS05] J Feigenbaum, C Papadimitrious, R Sami, and S Shenker, A BGP-based Mechanism for Lowest-Cost Routing, Distributed Computing 18 (2005), pp. 61-72. (Reid Kerr)


• [GPMB04] Y Gal, A Pfeffer, F Marzo and B Grosz, Learning social preferences in games, Proceedings of AAAI 2004. (Luke Zielinski)


• [GH03] A Greenwald and K Hall, Correlated Q-Learning, Proceedings of ICML, 2003. (Mohamed Soliman)


• [HB00] L Hunsberger and B Grosz, A combinatorial auction for collaborative planning, In the proceedings of ICMAS-2000. (Anton Andryeyev)


• [IS05] S Ieong and Y Shoham, Marginal Contribution Nets: A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games. Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), 2005. (Nimalan Mahendran)


• [KKO04] S Kakade, M Kearns and L Ortiz, Graphical economics, Proceedings of COLT 2004 (Christina Boucher)


• [KM03] D Koller and B Milch, Multiagent influence diagrams for representing and solving games, Games and Economic Behavior, 45(1), p 181-221. (Mirza Beg)


• [LMK+05] M Lagoudakis, E Markakis, D Kempe, P Keskinocak, A Kleywegt, S Koenig, C Tovey, A Meyerson, and S Jain, Auction-based multi-robot routing, Proceedings of the International Conference on Robotics: Science and Systems (ROBOTICS), 2005. (Jianan Wang)


• [LOS02] D Lehmann, L O'Callaghan, and Y Shoham, Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions, Journal of the ACM, 49(5), 2002. (Wahid Koleilat)


• [L94] M Littman, Markov games as a framework for multiagent reinforcement learning, Proceedings of ICML, July 1994 (Chao Li)


• [MSTY05] P Modi, W Shen, and M Tambe, M Yokoo, ADOPT: Asynchronous Distributed Contraint Optimization with Quality Guarantees, Artificial Intelligence Journal, 2005. (David Loker)


• [MT04] D Monderer and M Tennenholtz, K-implementation, Journal of Artificial Intelligence, 21(2004), p 37-62. (Chao Li)


• [P04] D Parkes, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions, To appear in Combinatorial Auctions by P Cramton, Y Shoham and R Steinberg (eds.).(Joel)


• [PT02] D Pynadath and M Tambe, The communicative multiagent team decision problem: Analyzing teamwork theories and models, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 16 (2002), pp 389-423.


• [RT02] T Roughgarden and E Tardos, How bad is selfish routing?, Journal of the ACM 49(2), p 236-259, 2002. (Jazmin Romero)


• [S02] T Sandholm, Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions, Artificial Intelligence, 135, pp. 1-54, 2002. (A Veraskouski)


• [SB05] T Sandholm and C Boutilier, Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions, Chapter 10 of the book Combinatorial Auctions, editors Cramton, Shoham and Steinberg, MIT Press, 2005. (Mario Vodopivec)


• [YSM04] M Yokoo, Y Sakurai, and S Matsubara, The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in Internet auctions, Games and Economic Behavior, 46, pp. 174-188, 2004. (Yunqi Zhang)


• [ZSDT02] R Zlot, T Stentz, B Dias and S Thayer, Multi-robot exploration controlled by a market economy, IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA), 2002 (Xiaoting Sun)