

The following example illustrates the difficulties that may occur when eliminating weakly dominated strategies.

		Agent 2	
		L	R
Agent 1	T	1, 1	0, 0
	M	1, 1	2, 1
	B	0, 0	2, 1

The actions that survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies can depend on the order in which the actions are eliminated.

For example,  $T$  can be eliminated since it is weakly dominated by  $M$ , and then  $L$  can be eliminated since it is weakly dominated by  $R$ . Now, agent 2 will choose action  $R$ , which will result in a payoff of  $(2, 1)$  for which ever action agent 1 selects.

On the other hand, action  $B$  could have been eliminated first since it is weakly dominated by  $M$ , and then  $R$  could have been eliminated since it is weakly dominated by  $L$ . Now, the payoff is  $(1, 1)$  for which ever action agent 1 selects.