Cheriton School of Computer Science
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1
Office: DC 2124 (temporary office)
Phone: 519 888 4567 x30261 (temp. number)
Key Words: Artificial Intelligence, Multiagent Systems, Electronic Commerce, Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Automated Negotiation, Coalition Formation, Normative Models of Bounded Rationality, Resource Bounded Reasoning
I am interested in issues that arise in settings where self-interested agents interact. I work with ideas that lie in the intersection of artificial intelligence, game theory and microeconomics.
In particular, I am interested in understanding how computational limitations influence strategic behavior in multiagent systems, as well as developing approaches to overcome computational issues which arise in practical applications of mechanism design. Applications of my work range from electronic market design to incentive-based computing.