Self, Identity, and Social Institutions

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PREFACE

The theory of self presented in this book proposes that the self is manifested cybernetically in the selection and enactment of identities within institutional constraints. Although there is continuity with previous work in ACT (affect control theory) (Heise 1979, 2006; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988), this new theory of self is also distinct from ACT. That is, ACT is a theory about identities and identity-processes (MacKinnon 1994), not a theory about self and self-processes. According to ACT, people confirm identities by selecting and enacting role-appropriate actions. According to the new theory of self presented in this book, people confirm their selves by selecting and enacting identities. This is the motivational principle of affect control applied to self-actualization as opposed to identity-confirmation. Although this new theory of self is articulated at a higher level of analysis and cybernetic control than ACT, it does not displace ACT. As a theory about identities and motivated action, ACT remains a systematic, integrated, and complete theory at its own level of analysis.

Yet, the theory of self proposed in this book grew out of work in ACT, and was anticipated some years ago by one of the authors of this book (MacKinnon 1994, pp. 60–63), albeit at a more intuitive level than presented here and employing a different terminology:

> The idea that people act to confirm cognitively and affectively salient identities is consistent with the notion of the self as a unified object in an individual's phenomenal field. A person can contemplate self and its constituent identities simultaneously. At times, he or she may consider the consequences for self-esteem of claiming and validating one or another identity through identity-confirming action. More often than not, a person preconsciously and automatically invokes identities, guided by affect control

processes monitoring the situation with respect to potential con-
sequences for overall self-esteem and constrained by the current
definition of the situation and the overall institutional context of
the social act. Looming in the background of the phenomenal
field in which the rehearsal of action takes place can be found the
unified self of the individual. Its cognitive meaning corresponds
to a person's biographical or global self-image, its affective mean-
ing to his or her customary level of self-esteem, and its conative
meaning to self-desires and aspirations. Unless an individual val-
ued or cathected self as an integrated object in this phenomenal
field, there would be little motivation to claim or validate partic-
ular identities. (1994, p. 62)

We began expanding these nascent insights in 2002. A first task was to
develop better knowledge about identities because so little was known
about their numbers and types, despite myriad publications on "identity
theory." So we conducted the census of contemporary identities that is
reported in this book. Our identity census led to a realization that iden-
tities are linked in systematic ways within a culture, so much so that the
body of interconnected identities can be construed as a cultural theory
of people—an idea that is elaborated in this book. Available knowl-
edge about major social institutions turned out to be inadequate for our
purposes, in lacking principled methods for determining what major
institutions exist in a society, and what identities or roles are associ-
ated with each institution. We parlayed insights from our discussion of
cultural theories of people into systematic procedures for identifying
institutions and their contents, and we report results from provisional
analyses in this book. Though the relation between identities and self
that MacKinnon (1994) postulated implicitly was cybernetic, we made
the cybernetic model explicit in this book, and linked the model to our
deepened conceptions of identities and institutions. Finally, we decided
that this book required reviews of existing literature on self, identities,
and social institutions, both to acknowledge our intellectual debts, and
to delineate where and how we have departed from past formulations.

Our book has benefited from University of Guelph Professor Stanley
Barrett's review of chapter one, from his discussions with MacKinnon
regarding counter-enlightenment (postmodernism), and from the elu-
cidation of contemporary anthropology in his 2002 book. We also
benefited from many useful suggestions received from the partici-
pants in a seminar offered by Heise at Indiana University in the fall of
2006, which used a draft of the book manuscript as a text. The seminar

participants—Sibyl Bedford, Ivan Furre, Inna Kouper, Abigail Sewell, Tanja Vuckovic, and Tabi White—read and critiqued an early draft of this book. Professor Herman Smith, University of Missouri—St. Louis, reviewed an early version of the book and made important suggestions. Attendees of the Networks and Complex Systems Colloquium, March 27, 2006, organized by Professor Katy Börner, Indiana University, provided useful comments and criticisms in response to Heise's presentation titled "Delineating Social Institutions from Semantic Networks of Role-Identities." Additional useful feedback was obtained at Heise's similar presentation in the Sociology Department Colloquium, Duke University, April 6, 2007. The ideas were presented again in Indiana University's Computational Linguistics Colloquium, February 6, 2009, a series organized by Markus Dickinson, and participants offered helpful suggestions, especially regarding future lexicographic research on institutions.

Introduction

> I hazard the guess that man will be ultimately known for a mere
> polity of multifarious, incongruous, and independent denizens.
>> Robert Louis Stevenson, *Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and*
>> *Mr Hyde*, 1886

Individuals seem to be losing their essence as they actualize the multiple social worlds of contemporary society—the worlds of commerce, medicine, religion, education, kinship, and so on, as well as the numerous informal worlds of hobbies, sports, and avocations. Who is the real woman or man when that individual consummates the self in a single day as a spouse, parent, home owner, commuter, customer, employee, co-worker, pedestrian, aerobics enthusiast, diner, Catholic, fan, friend, TV-watcher, voter, and lover, and maybe also aberrant possibilities like speeder or tightwad? The profusion of social worlds and situational identities so fragments and de-centers the individual that no self-essence seems to remain. The prevailing view of self and modernity, according to Giddens, is that "the self in modern society is frail, brittle, fractured, fragmented," that "just as the social world becomes contextualized and dispersed, so too does the self" (1991, pp. 169–170).

While social scientists have addressed consequences of social dispersion for the unity, stability, and authenticity of self (e.g., Baumeister 1987; Erickson 1995; Giddens 1991; Schooler 1990; Weigert 1990), Continental European philosophers of the late twentieth century (e.g., Foucault, Derrida, Leotard, and Baudrillard)[1] rejected the concept of a core, stable self as promoted in Western thought since the Enlightenment or before. Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century, the sociological concept of self was assailed on multiple fronts by the

Lyotard

counter-enlightenment, anti-essentialist view of human subjectiv-
ity promoted by Continental philosophers and by social scientists
embracing their ideas (e.g., Denzin 1988). The concept of a centered,
autonomous, and agentic self became "a mere shadow of what it used
to be" (Holstein and Gubrium 2000, p. 3), threatening to turn social
psychology into "a discipline without a subject" (Dowd 1991). And
although a number of scholars have worked to rescue the concept of
self (e.g., Callero 2003; Holstein and Gubrium 2000; Perinbanayagam
2000; Wiley 1994), its viability in modern times has yet to be fully
resolved.

Closely connected to their rejection of the sociological concept
of self, Continental European philosophers replaced Enlightenment
beliefs in objective reality with a radical form of constructionism that
dismisses not only the naïve realism of radical positivism but even the
sophisticated realism of modern science. "Meta-narratives" (Leotard
1984)—all-encompassing world views and explanatory accounts of the
natural, cultural, or metaphysical worlds of human experience—are
products of historically specific discourse, hence equally valid (Foucault
1984). Since all human experience can be likened to a "text" to be
interpreted or "deconstructed" in an infinite regress of alternative inter-
pretations, there is no deeper reality beyond symbolic representation
(Derrida 1976). And because human experience has been increasingly
mediated by modern technology, people live in a hyperreality, unable
to distinguish between symbolic representation and objective reality
(Baudrillard 1981, 1985). These counter-enlightenment views on real-
ity stand in sharp contrast to the classic sociological view of social
institutions and other social phenomena as "social facts" (Durkheim
1895/1964), or at least as an "obdurate" reality resisting the actions of
human beings (Blumer 1969; Hewitt 2003).

Lyotard

Argument of This Book

The underlying argument of this book has a *dialectical* structure,
wherein theories of self proposed by structural symbolic interactionists,
along with related assumptions about social reality, constitute the *thesis;*
counter-enlightenment views of human subjectivity and social reality,
the *antithesis*; and the theory of identities, selves, and social institutions
advanced in this book, a *synthesis* of the two opposing sets of ideas.

Structural symbolic interactionist theories of the self are epitomized
by the identity theories of Stryker (e.g., Stryker 1968, 1980; Stryker

and Serpe 1994) and Burke (e.g., Burke 1980, 1991, 1997, 2004; Burke and Reitzes 1991; Burke and Stets 1999).[2] According to the Stryker-Burke approach, the integration and stability of self in highly differentiated societies is based on a hierarchical structure of identity salience that remains rather stable as an individual moves from one social situation to another—much like a "personality variable" (Stryker and Serpe 1994). This trans-situational view of identity salience results in a static theory of self because it de-emphasizes the situational or institutional context that produces much of the variability, novelty, and fluidity in the manifestation of self. Besides ignoring the fluctuation of identities as self-conceptions across situations and over time, this view of identity salience fails to deal adequately with the problem of multiple identities—how the individual selects an identity to enact in a situation from situationally available identities, or from the hundreds of identities in any individual's repertoire of identities.

As the antithesis to the Stryker-Burke approach, the influence of counter-enlightenment ideas of Continental philosophers about human subjectivity and social reality led to the recognition of a number of issues regarding identities and selves that were not addressed adequately by structural symbolic interactionists.[3]

- Individuals in the contemporary world present themselves ephemerally in a multitude of identities, sometimes contradictory.
- Idiosyncratic biographies emerge as individuals fortuitously acquire birthright identities, obligatory institutional identities, and incidental identities.
- The concept of self emerges from discourses about identities, possessions, personal characteristics, and biographies; and discourses about signifiers of individuality vary from one situation to another.
- Identities and selves, being products of language, are inherently semiotic[4] in nature.

Structural symbolic interactionists often met counter-enlightenment ideas with contempt, and on the whole they have maintained that attitude over the years. To a large degree that is why the self and identity field has left them behind, to the point that about two-thirds of the research on self and identity now is being done by researchers heavily influenced by counter-enlightenment ideas. These researchers are concerned with constructionist, anti-essentialist views of self and reality, texts and narratives, hyperreality, subjection and voice, decentering,

and related themes (see Cerulo 1997 for an early review of this movement). This "new scholarship" on the self is "generally postmodern in orientation" and most of it "has not been influenced by symbolic interactionism" (Callero 2003, p. 114). In fact, this new scholarship "proves antithetical to traditional concerns" of symbolic interactionism and other social psychologies dealing with the individual self and its emergence from social interaction (Cerulo 1997, p. 385).

A synthesis of counter-enlightenment ideas and structural symbolic interactionism, the theory of identities, selves, and social institutions advanced in this book proposes that the self is manifested cybernetically in the selection and enactment of identities within social institutional constraints. This theory addresses issues raised by counter-enlightenment ideas without succumbing to their excesses. For example, we view identities, selves, and social institutions as socially constructed phenomena, but as discussed in chapter nine we subscribe to Berger and Luckmann's (1967) moderate form of constructionism rather than the radical constructionism of counter-enlightenment philosophers. And while we take seriously the alleged effect of social dispersion and contextualization on the integration and stability of self in modern times, we do not abandon the idea of a coherent and stable self.

In our perspective, active individuals employ a cultural "theory of people" to maintain an affectively coherent and stable self. We argue that habitual and obligatory circuiting through social institutions accounts for much of the seeming disorder in individuals' biographies, especially as individuals respond to imposed inauthentic identities by voluntarily seeking alleviating identities. Self-disintegration is sensed largely because contemporary society is so voluminous, and individual participation in society is so kaleidoscopic. Despite the seeming fragmentation, however, individual experience remains organized by the logic of social classifications, by expectations associated with the quintessential actions of roles and the maintenance of expressive order, and by the coalescence of social meanings within social institutions. The self category itself acquires unity and pragmatic meaningfulness as one among the many socially constructed categories an individual applies, maintains, and extends in everyday life.

We will deal with identities, selves, and social institutions as linguistic objectifications—social constructions originating in the historical, self-externalizing activities of human beings acting individually and in collaboration with others. Our linguistic-semantic approach assumes that individuals construct their selves largely from institutionally differentiated identities provided by a cultural theory of people. On the empirical side, we examine relations between identities'

linguistic meanings in order to grasp how identities represent social structure—including large-scale social institutions—and exert symbolic power.

Ontologically, we accept that the social world experienced by individuals is a collaborative human construction, so socially constructed cultural categories suffice as the reality that we consider. Cultural identities are of particular interest because identities elaborate into roles, they unite people in solidarity groups, and—as shown in this book— identities serve as the building blocks of self-development and self-realization, while providing individuals with incipient understanding of large-scale social structures.

Self-fragmentation in daily experience is overcome, we argue, by individuals' awareness of the logical, relational, and institutional structuring of identities that they themselves possess. Structuring of self-identities delineates self from others, registers past achievements, and allows the individual to anticipate life to come. In addition, self-fragmentation is abated by the affectivity of the socially constructed self. Maintaining and realizing a self-sentiment motivates the individual to participate socially. An individual's situational identity is chosen not only to complete a relational nexus, but also ideally to surrogate and actualize the self-sentiment. When inauthenticities are created by power plays of an institutional-relational nature, the individual later seeks out compensating identities that redeem the self.

Epistemologically, we take the position that the language that lay people use to build and communicate their phenomenological worlds is the primary depository of cultural constructions, and therefore social scientists can study language as one avenue to insights about phenomenological experience and intersubjectivity. Words in a language correspond to cultural categories, and we examine culture by accessing word meanings in standard sources assembled by lexicographers and ethnoscientists. Critical analysis of these sources also uncovers relations between knowledge and power.

Compared to counter-enlightenment scholars, who are limited to particularizing experience at a given moment and place because of the infinite regress of meanings, we study the construction of identities, selves, and social institutions on the basis of linguistically moored cultural meanings that are consensual enough to support the interpersonal bonding, social collaborations, and institutional functioning of everyday social life. This also contrasts us with symbolic interactionists, who study meanings of social phenomena through ethnographic research—a less particularized approach than that of counter-enlightenment scholars, but still situationally bounded.

Like counter-enlightenment scholars, we see some tyranny in language. For example, analyses in chapter three suggest that linguistically conveyed hierarchies of identities determine to some extent the kind of person an individual can become, and pre-determine life-course trajectories. But like symbolic interactionists, we subscribe to the idea that humans are reflexive, agentic beings, exercising choice and creativity in constructing individual selves and forging new cultural meanings.

Like counter-enlightenment scholars, we view social knowledge as a linguistic construction, and chapter four finds that even the largest units of social structure can be viewed as semantic extrapolations. But, like symbolic interactionists, we study linguistic constructions empirically, albeit lexicographically rather than ethnographically. Thus, to a degree, our approach offers some resolution to the confrontation between traditional realist thinking about self, identities and roles, and social institutions, and the counter-enlightenment view of social and individual phenomena as constituted by language and discourse.

In summary, the theory of identities, selves, and social institutions advanced in this book synthesizes ideas from the counter-enlightenment movement of the late twentieth century with structural symbolic interactionism. While we acknowledge the importance of counter-enlightenment ideas for raising issues concerning human subjectivity and social reality that had gone unnoticed too long, like structural symbolic interactionists we operate in a long tradition of scientific social psychology and unabashedly work on developing the theory of self, notwithstanding counter-enlightenment disparagement of such meta-narratives. We think that the theory that we offer has uncommon credence in discourses regarding the formation and social actions of individuals, and that the lexical data that we deploy so fit and support the theory that they add to the theory's persuasiveness.

The Domain

In the remainder of this chapter, we introduce the conceptual framework for this book and specify its domain, followed by an extensive discussion of the lexical methods of analysis and data sources employed in this book.

Figure 1.1 shows our orienting framework, and facilitates specifying the topics of concern in this book, as well as the limits of what we are attempting to elucidate.

Objectified Meanings   **Embodied Processes**

| Semantic Systems | Social Institutions | Organized Actions | **Macro-sociological** |

| Identities | Roles | Interpersonal Activities | **Macro-sociological** |

Should be Micro

| Me's | Selves | I-You Dialogues | **Individual** |

Figure 1.1 Schematic Diagram of Institutions, Roles, and Selves, Interrelated through Semiotic and Behavioral Functioning

Horizontally, the scheme distinguishes between semantic and processual aspects of society; vertically, among macro–sociological, micro–sociological, and individual levels of analysis. At the macro-level, social institutions meld networks of cultural meanings and organized performances. This accords with the idea that a social institution is the intersection of *cultural structure* and *social structure,* where cultural structure refers to patterns or regularities in members' shared beliefs and sentiments; and social structure to patterns or regularities in behavioral interaction among members of a society (e.g., House 1981; Merton 1957; Parsons and Shils 1951; Wallace 1983). At the micro-level, confluences of identities and interpersonal activities determine roles. Like the macro-sociological concept of social institution, the micro-sociological concept of role represents an intersection of cultural and social structure, as reflected in Sarbin's (1968, p. 546) statement that a role "connotes not only overt actions and performances but also covert expectations held by an observer, or by a group of observers." At the individual level, the combination of self-meanings (me's) and self-processes (I-you dialogues) constitute individual selves. The pronominal terms are drawn from Wiley's (1994) I–you–me semiotic model of the self, but here we separate me's

from I–you dialogues in order to emphasize our two-fold emphasis on meanings and processes.

Moving down the left-hand column of figure 1.1, the term "objectified meanings" corresponds to confluences of meaning within a society's theory of people at the macro-sociological level. At the micro-sociological level, "objectified meanings" relates to identities—the elementary categories of people within a culture. At the individual level of analysis, the term "me's" refers to cultural identities that have become internalized as part of an individual's self or to self-conceptualizations that have yet to generalize into cultural identities.

The right-hand column of the diagram deals with social processes, and implicitly with the embodiments that make such processes possible. At the macro-sociological level, various kinds of establishments and organized enterprises embody social institutions and yield collaborative productions, or macro-actions (Heise and Durig 1997), of varying scope. At the micro-sociological level, interpersonal activities, including face-to-face conversation and interpersonal behaviors, occur in formal or informal groups in which individuals are physically or electronically co-present. At the individual level, an I–you dialogue—a stream of consciousness related to self and others—is embodied in a conscious human.

The basic elements in our scheme interrelate in complex ways. First, processes at each level influence meanings at the same level, and at each level meanings influence processes. These relations are represented in figure 1.1 by block arrows, with meaning effects pointing rightward and process effects pointed leftward. Consider the macro-sociological level. Evolution of organizations and the actions they perform interrelates the meanings of relevant identities, actions, and settings. Yet in general existing systems of meaning shape organizations and their actions, as neo–institutionalists emphasize (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). At the micro-sociological level, creative performances can change the meanings of identities, although in general the meaning of an identity shapes the activities associated with it, as elaborated in affect control theory (Heise 2007). At the individual level, internal dialogue can create recognitions of self that add to or modify self-concepts, though in general self-dialogues speak in the voices of customary identities, created or adopted in the past.

Effects between levels constitute a second way that elements in our scheme interrelate. These effects are represented in figure 1.1 by the arrows between levels, a pair in each case to reflect that influences flow both up and down the hierarchy, and separate pairs on the left

and right because inter-level connections of meaning can be distinct from inter-level connections of embodied process. Consider the meaning connections starting with the topmost pair of arrows between the macro- and micro-sociological levels. Institutional systems of meaning are comprised largely of identities (as we show in chapter four), and that is reflected in the upward arrow. However, changes in systems of meaning associated with evolving organizational processes may change meanings of specific identities, as reflected in the downward arrow. Next consider the arrows connecting self-meanings (me's) with identity meanings. Every individual creates at least one unique identity (the individual's persona, discussed in chapter five), and such constructions are reflected by the upward arrow. On the other hand, most of an individual's self concept is comprised of pre-existing cultural identities (as also discussed in chapter five), and this is reflected by the downward arrow.

Now consider the embodied-process connections starting with the topmost pair of arrows between the macro- and micro-sociological levels. Organizational actions are constituted as social interactions that recur, interconnect, and diffuse, as reflected in the upward arrow. However, changing organizational ecologies and encounters between organizations can re-shape routine interactions, as reflected in the downward arrow. Internal dialogues motivate and shape an individual's participation in social interaction—the upward arrow between interactions and internal dialogues. On the other hand, social interaction is interpreted within and integrated into the individual's internal dialogue, and this is reflected by the downward arrow.

Looking at the symmetry in figure 1.1 one might suppose that the title of this book really should be "Self, Roles, and Social Institutions." However, we forego analysis of roles in this book because we ourselves and many of our colleagues have spent decades developing affect control theory (e.g., see MacKinnon 1994; Heise 2007)—a general framework that explains how identities generate roles. Our concern in this book is to explore how identities also are involved in the construction of selves and social institutions.

In conclusion, the domain of our theory of identities, selves, and social institutions depicted in figure 1.1 reflects all three "faces" of social psychology delineated by House (1977)—psychological social psychology, symbolic interactionism, and social structure and personality (or psychological sociology). Our attention to cognitive, affective, and motivational processes throughout this book coincides with the focus of psychological social psychology on individual psychological

processes. At the same time, our emphasis on meaning and interpretation, self and self-processes, and roles and social interaction locates us squarely in the symbolic interactionist tradition of sociological social psychology. However, as House points out, both symbolic interactionism and psychological social psychology "pay scant attention to macro-social structures and processes and how these affect and are affected by individual psychology and behavior" (1981, p. 525). Our focus on the reciprocal relation between macro-sociological and individual level objectified meanings and embodied processes illustrated in figure 1.1 addresses this deficit and locates our theory in the social structure and personality tradition of social psychology. Thus, the theory of identities, selves, and social institutions presented in this book is a rather complete social psychology, reflecting all three faces of the discipline as described by House.

Lexical Analysis

While we acknowledge the equal importance of meanings and processes in figure 1.1, we are not equally interested in both within this book. Rather, our focus is on the social construction of institutions and of individual selves from identities—from cultural meanings regarding people. This focus on semantics may seem to follow counter-enlightenment arguments about the primacy of representational systems over material factors in analyzing social phenomena and individual subjects. However, our preference to study self and society semantically is based on epistemological and methodological considerations, not ontological ones. We believe that cultural meanings offer an unexploited empirical handle on important social phenomena. Indeed, studying objectified meanings balances contemporary emphasis on process and helps correct a weakness of studies of process noted by Mazzarella (2004, p. 348): "By romanticizing the emergent and the immediate, this neo-vitalist position tends too briskly to dismiss given social formations as always already foreclosed."

We focus on meanings cataloged in lexicons, which is very different from ethnographies that study meanings through field observations or interviews. Kashima (2002, pp. 208–211) offered an insightful elucidation of the two standpoints in studies of meaning. One standpoint highlights the persistence of culture over time, focusing on an enduring system of meanings that organizes people's shared experiences. Another standpoint presents culture as continually produced and reproduced by

fluctuating and yet recurrent processes of meaning-making, conducted by concrete individuals in particular contexts. Extending Kashima's analysis, we identify three basic differences between our studies in this book and typical ethnographic studies.

Data and analyses. Our empirical bases are repositories of shared symbolic meanings—lexicons—and one of our key goals is to show the diversity and structuring of meanings in lexicons. Ethnographic data come from observations and interviews, including recordings, and a typical goal is to discover recurrent patterns in individuals' meaning-making activities.

Source of structure in human activity. We presuppose that widely shared meanings organize and structure people's instrumental and expressive actions across communities and over historical periods of time. Ethnographic studies typically assume that universal psychological mechanisms—e.g., capacity for syntactic thinking—structure interpretive processes and lead to recurrent discernable patterns within specific contexts.

Commonality versus particularity. We focus on similarities in individual activities associated with the shared meanings of identities, and gloss over idiosyncrasies of specific individuals and contexts, treating these as disturbances in general patterns. The ethnographic approach focuses on how an individual's creative interpretations both reproduce and change culture and social structure, while largely taking for granted commonalities across individuals and contexts.

The culture-as-system and culture-as-process standpoints (to use Kashima's terms) are complements rather than competitors, each beholding blind spots of the other standpoint. Our intention is to expand the empirical base of the culture-as-system standpoint.

Writings of some earlier social scientists hint at using lexicons as materials for social analysis. Though he did not pursue the approach himself, Vygotsky (1986, pp. 5, 6, 10–11) provided cogent rationales for studying lexicons of word meanings—both cognitive and affective. He identified word meanings as the elemental unit of verbal thought, and semantic analysis as the appropriate method of exploring verbal thought. The affective and intellectual unite in word meanings, Vygotsky noted, allowing a semantic analyst to trace paths between needs and impulses, thoughts, and behavior and activity.

Bourdieu (1991, p. 105) proposed that operations of naming are fundamental in social sciences, and words help generate social reality, including social structure, by structuring the perception that social agents have of the social world. Bourdieu (1991, p. 48) specifically

emphasized the importance of dictionaries for creating a standard language to stitch together elements of a large society. Words with definitions normalized in dictionaries provide a universal code for producing a privileged construction of reality, "functioning outside the constraints and without the assistance of the situation."

Such antecedents notwithstanding, we innovate in using dictionaries of various kinds as an empirical data source, and therefore we next consider some aspects of a lexical approach in social research. Our discussion focuses on the three different kinds of lexicons that we used.

WordNet

Development of the English-language WordNet lexical database (Fellbaum 1998; WordNet 2005) began in 1985 under the direction of cognitive scientist George A. Miller and in accord with psycholinguistic theory reviewed in Miller's textbook (1991). The project's website (WordNet 2005) characterizes the project as developing an online lexical reference system in which nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs are organized into synonym sets, and various kinds of relations link the synonym sets.

We focus on identities in this book, which are a subset of nouns. According to Miller (1998, p. 24): "The semantic relation that is most important in organizing nouns is…the relation of subordination (or class inclusion or subsumption), which in this context we will call *hyponymy*. For example, the noun *robin* is a hyponym (subordinate) of the noun *bird*, or, conversely, *bird* is a hypernym (superordinate) of *robin*. It is this semantic relation that organizes nouns into a lexical hierarchy."

Our chapter three employs WordNet to obtain the hyponyms of "human being" in order to provide a census of identities available in colloquial English and to explore their taxonomic organization. As will be seen, thousands of identities specify kinds of human that might be encountered in an English-speaking society, and the identities are organized in a flat, multi-fingered taxonomy.

Our application uses only a small part of the information available in WordNet—e.g., there is extensive lexical information regarding social settings and social behaviors. Moreover, additional WordNet databases have been developed in scores of different languages using a common set of methodological procedures, as discussed at the Global WordNet Association website (Pease 2005). Thus the work reported in this book

is only a first step in a general exploration of how social concepts are taxonomically organized in various languages.

Standard Dictionaries

Our chapter four extracts semantic networks from conventional dictionary definitions, and then delineates social institutions through analyses of those networks. We use WordNet's definitions of synonym sets as one basis for constructing semantic networks. In addition we use definitions from the *Cambridge International Dictionary of English* (Procter 1995), a dictionary designed for individuals learning English as a second language, which employs a limited vocabulary of 2,000 foundation words in each of its definitions.

In our application, an identity like physician is linked to each of the substantive concepts in the definitions of that identity from our two dictionaries (i.e., medical, doctor, skill, surgeon, licensing, and practitioner). The identities within the set of concepts (doctor, surgeon, and practioner) in turn are linked to substantive concepts in their definitions, and so on, thereby generating a semantic network of identities. Multivariate statistical methods are used to ascertain how the identities cluster in the semantic network in order to delineate the structures of major social institutions.

One might suppose that dictionary definitions simply are authoritative social constructions, devoid of any contact with an empirical base. However, dictionary definitions abstract meaning from actual usages in a corpus of written and spoken language used by the lexicographer. "Actual usage…provides documentation for the definition, which is really only an interpretive claim made by the lexicographer" (Landau 2001, p. 210). While corpora used in compiling dictionaries were small and unsystematic in the past, contemporary dictionary definitions like those in the Cambridge dictionary that we used are constructed with the aid of corpora of written texts consisting of hundreds of millions of words drawn from a variety of sources (Landau 2001, Chapter 6). Thus our analysis of social institutions indirectly has an empirical base in the language usage of individuals who write about different kinds of identities.

Lexicons of Affective Meanings

Our chapter six uses lexicons of affective meaning (Osgood 1962). Affective meaning varies along three axes: Evaluation, Potency, and

Activity—EPA (Osgood, May, and Miron 1975; Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957). The Evaluation dimension corresponds to the common notion of attitude. For example, physicians typically are evaluated positively, which is to say that people have a favorable attitude toward physicians. The Potency dimension relates to weakness versus powerfulness, and the Activity dimension relates to quiescence versus activation. A concept's profile on all three dimensions assesses the overall sentiment associated with the concept.

Several compilations of EPA profiles for 360 to 1,000 English words were assembled in the 1950s and 1960s. From the 1970s onward, lexicons of affective meanings became the province of researchers working on affect control theory, who typically measured sentiments for several thousand concepts. Affect control theory lexicons focus on nouns designating identities and on verbs designating interpersonal behaviors; some also give affective meanings of person modifiers (traits and emotions) and of nouns designating social settings.

In Chapter 6 we use EPA measurements to assess self-sentiments, and we relate the self-sentiments to various identities cataloged in affect control theory lexicons by measuring the distances between self and identities when both are represented in the three-dimensional space defined by Evaluation, Potency, and Activity axes. The basic idea is that individuals actualize their self-sentiments by embodying identities with similar sentiments.

Lexicons and Symbolic Power

According to Bourdieu (1991, p. 170), symbolic power is exercised by "constituting the given through utterances," thereby setting people's vision of the world, and subsequent action on the world. Such control obtains the equivalent of what might otherwise be obtained through force. He notes that ordinary taxonomies implicitly impose political systems of classification that exert symbolic power, even though these tend to be misrecognized as legitimate philosophical, religious, or legal systems of meaning. After first considering the main ways in which the lexicons that we use exert symbolic power, we state our rationale for using the lexicons in our studies, notwithstanding the symbolic power issue.

Conventional dictionaries like those used in chapter four declare meanings by fiat, largely in the voice of a dominating class. "Dictionaries act as a conservative force on the language because

they tend to overrepresent the volume of conservative speech and writing, which is that of the educated classes, and underrepresent the volume of speech and writing by and for people who are relatively uneducated" (Landau 2001, p. 207). One attempt to ameliorate the problem—*Webster's Third New International Dictionary*—generated reactionary responses by the classes whose symbolic power was threatened: "*NID3* was criticized because it dared to give—*boasted* about giving—some attention to the usages of the less well educated" (Ibid.). While this problem may dissipate in the future as dictionaries are based on social science methods, like the dictionary of American regional English (Cassidy and Hall 1985–1991–1996–2002), the matter still will remain an important consideration when using historic dictionaries as a source of data.

Lexicons of affective meanings like the ones used in chapter six generally are based on ratings of concepts by male and female college students. Heise (2001; 2010) argued that college students, who are chosen for their accessibility, actually are preferable to randomly selected raters from the general population in that respondents' averaged ratings are cultural measures, so the ideal respondents are those well acquainted with the dominant culture. Still, one may ask why the sentiments of middle-class students should be privileged in compiling lexicons of affective meanings, especially since analyses by Sewell and Heise (2007) suggest race differences in American sentiments are as substantial as cross–national differences.

A key argument supporting our mining of affective lexicons and standard dictionaries for empirical data is that knowledge and culture govern the design and functioning of various kinds of organizations (Jepperson 2002; Powell and DiMaggio 1991), and of society in general according to counter-enlightenment philosophers. Since individuals who officially maintain and apply the governing knowledge are largely college educated and middle-class, their culture is privileged in governing the preponderance of institutional processes within contemporary society. Thus working with lexicons cataloging middle-class meanings pragmatically recognizes the importance of middle-class culture in determining the operative society.

Another issue of symbolic power is our use of the English language, not just for our exposition, but also as the domain in which we conduct our empirical analyses. Thereby, our book contributes to a domination of English-language voices—especially those from North America—saturating the intellectual community with frameworks and ideologies. Two considerations moderate our contribution to such linguistic

imperialism. First, each type of lexicon that we use is available in multiple languages, and it is only a matter of time before our procedures are replicated multilingually. Second, with English having official status in 44 nations (Bhatt 2001, Table 1) and at least temporarily dominating technology and entertainments world-wide (Bhatt 2001, p. 544), our analyses of English meaning systems pragmatically reflect the importance of English within emerging global society.

Preview of Chapters

Subsequent chapters alternate between theory and empirical studies, with earlier chapters developing ideas that are explored in later chapters. Our final chapters tie ideas together, and compare our overall perspective with previous writings on selves, identities, and social institutions.

Chapter two posits that a language provides its speakers with a cultural theory of people, constituted particularly in a stock of identities, structured by an implicit system of logical implications, beginning with highly specific identities and proceeding upward to the most general identity of human being. A cultural theory of people also ties identities together relationally through paradigmatic actions that link one identity to another. The combination of implicational and relational ties creates a semantic network that conveys institutional structures. Learning the cultural theory of people provided in a society enables a person to navigate in everyday social life, discerning institutional contexts and defining situations that establish orientations with others in face-to-face interaction. The cultural theory of people also allows a person to anticipate the development of self by virtue of established career trajectories in different institutions.

Chapter three examines the approximately 9,000 commonplace identities available in English and finds that the implicational structure of the English-language theory of people is flat, with many branches, none going extremely deep. We examine the 9,000 identities sociologically and find that the English-language theory of people gives great flexibility to humans as economic beings, and also as members of other social institutions. In addition, more than 10 percent of identities relate to individuals' biological or physical features, and another 10 percent are stigmatizing labels. Less than 10 percent of the identities are trans-situational, fostering identification with others who are like oneself, as well as prejudicing one against those who are different. We find

that the English language provides almost no identities fostering class solidarity and class conflict.

In chapter four we show that the meanings of identities, by referencing one another, generate confluences of meaning that delineate various social institutions. We partition a semantic network of identities into standard social institutions as a validation of this idea. In the process we find that a number of institutions have partitioned into subinstitutions—kinship roles, for instance, divide into marriage, caregiving, and childhood clusters, and sexuality has partitioned away from marriage into a new incipient institution on its own. An exploratory analysis suggests that the semantic network approach to social institutions becomes even more definitive if social settings are analyzed along with identities.

A principal objective of this book is to provide a theory of self that is pertinent in contemporary society, and in chapter five we lay out our theory of cultural selves. We identify various objectifications of self, and then propose a dynamic model of the self-process interrelating these structural components. This model depicts self-process as a system of cybernetic feedback and control, incorporating both cognitive and affective processing in the construction and maintenance of self. An individual's self-sentiment unifies and stabilizes the self, and performance of identities expresses the self-sentiment.

Chapter six illustrates aspects of our theory of cultural selves and tests some hypotheses derived from the theory. We present empirical evidence that, even though selves change throughout the life cycle, self-sentiments are relatively stable from day to day and across institutional contexts, and people have an affinity for situational identities whose sentiments are consistent with self-sentiments. We also offer examples of the cybernetic process of enacting compensatory identities after an inauthentic identity has been experienced.

In chapter seven we compare our theory of self and identities with other related theories. In particular, we discuss how our work builds on and departs from the interactionist formulations of George Herbert Mead, George McCall and Jerry Simmons, Sheldon Stryker, Peter Burke, Robert Sidharthan Perinbanayagam, and Norbert Wiley. In addition we compare our work with the psychological frameworks of Henri Tajfel and John Turner. We conclude chapter seven with a discussion of two theories from psychology that focus on self-consistency and another that deals with self-regulation.

Our chapter eight compares the work reported in this book with our own previous work on affect control theory. Then we compare our

explanations of deviance, as presented in chapters five and six, with the somewhat analogous deviance theory of Howard Kaplan. In addition we examine how our investigations of social institutions relate to the writings on this topic by George Herbert Mead, Talcott Parsons, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Pierre Bourdieu, Tom Fararo and John Skvoretz, and Wolfgang Balzer.

Finally, in chapter nine, we expand our discussion of counter enlightenment views on human subjectivity and social reality introduced briefly in chapter one, discuss the reaction of interactionists to these views, and consider the extent to which this book has addressed the issues raised by counter-enlightenment ideas. In this connection, we compare the radical constructionism of postmodern thought with the more scientifically acceptable constructionism of Berger and Luckmann, and revisit the issue of self-fragmentation with which we introduced this book. We conclude this chapter with a retrospective summary of our book and a prospective discussion of possible avenues for future research.

Cultural Theories of People

Linguistic symbols turn environmental stimuli into objects of consciousness, according to George Herbert Mead (1934) and Berger and Luckmann (1966). Symmetry of symbol meanings between symbol-user and listeners enables individuals to communicate subjective experiences from one to another and fosters joint participation in an intersubjective world of socially constructed reality.

Linguistic symbols in addition classify physical and social experiences into sets based on perceived similarities and differences. Such classification plays an indispensable role in subjective worlds. On the one hand, to classify is to identify. Social classifications such as a male, a mother, an American, a French Canadian, an extrovert, and so on enable people to identify both themselves and others in social situations. On the other hand, as Perinbanayagam (2000, p. 114) observed, "the construction of identities, the schemes by which selves are identified and given particular characteristics, is an exercise in the logic of classification."

We propose the term "theory of people" for a society's stock of identities—its system of person classification. This system is part of a society's symbolic universe, and as Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 104) point out, "the theoretical character of symbolic universes is indubitable, no matter how unsystematic or illogical such a universe may seem to an 'unsympathetic' outsider." Classifications of people are symbolized by words for identities, and, as we show in this chapter and the next two, the classifications have logical and functional relations to one another, forming an organized body of knowledge. This body of knowledge allows a society's members on one hand to

identify each individual they encounter in that society and to make inferences about the individual's background and typical actions, and on the other hand to build a notion of self as a past, present, and future participant in society.

Berger and Luckmann (1966) propose that knowledge—including knowledge about kinds of people—is constructed during a dialectical process of externalizing, objectifying, and internalizing in which language is crucial. "Language builds up semantic fields or zones of meaning that are linguistically circumscribed. Vocabulary, grammar, and syntax are geared to the organization of these semantic fields" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 41). For example, the set of linguistic objectifications surrounding work, family, religion, and so on define semantic fields that order and provide meaning to routine activities in each of these areas of everyday life. Both the history of the society and the biographical experience of its members are "objectified, retained, and accumulated" (1966, p. 41) within such semantic fields of meaning, thereby becoming institutionalized in the cultural knowledge of a society.

Cultural knowledge, including a society's theory of people, is acquired by subsequent generations through socialization. The acquired knowledge includes "role-specific vocabularies...the internalization of semantic fields structuring routine interpretations and conduct within an institutional area," as well as "tacit understandings" and "evaluations and affective colorations of these semantic fields" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 138). Berger and Luckmann's reference to "evaluative and affective colorations" implies that socialization involves the internalization of the affective associations of cognitive meanings, as well as the denotative meanings of concepts. In this regard, our empirical approach to cultural theories of people (chapter three) and social institutions (chapter four) is based on the denotative meanings of social identities, including their relational meanings with other concepts, while our cultural theory of self (chapter five) involves both cognitive and affective aspects of identities in self-construction and self-actualization.

This chapter formulates a set of propositions about how a cultural theory of people organizes individuals' knowledge of society and how individuals utilize the theory. First we consider how characterizations of people, or identities, imply other characterizations and how a specific individual is related to a set of identities. Then we consider how meanings of identities interrelate and thereby create awareness of

large-scale social structures. Finally we consider how individuals learn their culture's theory of people and in the process become aware of some of their own potentials.

We concentrate in this book on the cultural theory of people provided by the English language around the turn of the 21st century, and our examples focus on the nations we know best, Canada and the United States. Different cultural theories of people can be found in contemporary industrialized societies having different languages, in industrialized societies at earlier times, and in non-industrialized societies, past and present. We believe that our generalizations about cultural theories of people largely apply in all these cases, though the universality of the generalizations is an issue for empirical investigation.

Classification and Identity

Every society partitions its population into categories along dimensions such as sex, age, kin, territory, culture, race, work, and material resources (Lofland 1969, p. 123). The dimensions of differentiation seem to be objective features of humans but are socially constructed and re-definable in principle. Though a population is more or less continuously distributed on any dimension, arbitrary categories create the experience of separated groups. "Categorization (a) partitions the multidimensional variability among human beings into discrete subsets, accompanied by (b) accentuation of perceived intracategory similarities and intercategory differences" (Brewer 2001, p. 20).

Classifications are lodged linguistically in words for kinds of people. "No society exists which does not in this sense classify its population— into fathers, priests, servants, doctors, rich men, wise men, great men, and so forth . . .; in short, every society gives such linguistic notice of the differential parts individuals are expected (or 'briefed') to play" (Nadel 1964, p. 20). Linguistic representations allow classifications to be passed from generation to generation and to be employed readily: "The common objectivations of everyday life are maintained primarily by linguistic signification. Everyday life is, above all, life with and by means of the language I share with my fellowmen" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 37).

We summarize these ideas in our first principle regarding cultural theories of people.

2.1: Linguistic Classification

Every society provides its populace with a classification system for categorizing and objectifying people; the system is a social construction actualized in and apprehended by language.

Classifications of people have been called *statuses* (Linton 1936; Merton 1957), *labels* (Lemert 1951; Becker 1963), *identities* (e.g., Goodenough 1965; Stryker 1968), and *role-identities* (McCall and Simmons 1966) or *roles/identities* (Burke 1980). *Identity* is the term with the widest contemporary usage, and we use that term to refer both to the categories in a cultural theory of people and to self-conceptualizations in terms of those categories. A helpful definition is provided by Vryan, Adler, and Adler (2003, p. 371): "Our identifications with socially constructed groups or categories of others and our positions within structured social arrangements constitute our *social identities.*"

In English, linguistic classifications of people take the form of nouns or of modifiers. For example, a paragraph above illustrates categories of people with the nouns: father, priest, servant, doctor, man; and also with the modifiers: rich, wise, great. We treat these forms as distinct systems of classification, continuing our past usages (Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988; MacKinnon 1994) in the following convention.

2.2: Identities versus Attributes

The term "identity" is used for nouns categorizing people, and the term "attribute" is used for adjectives categorizing people.

We focus on identities in this book, though we do examine identities that can be employed as attributes in chapter three, and analyses in chapter six employ identities composed from attributes (e.g., an honest person).

Our general thesis is that meanings of culturally recognized types of people are so systematically interrelated that those meanings constitute a theory of people. In developing this idea, we consider cognitive meanings based on entailment and on prototypical events or functions. Later, when we examine the self, we also will consider identity definitions in terms of the affective (or connotative) meanings that have been a focus in affect control theory (Heise 1979; 2007; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988; MacKinnon 1994).

Logical Hierarchy

Nouns in languages are organized by an implication structure (Miller 1998; 1991, Chapters 8 and 9), and since identities are a special case of nouns, they too are organized by an implication structure. Any identity logically implies another, and dictionaries report this aspect of meaning when they say things such as "oculist: a physician who treats diseases of the eyes" (American Heritage Editors 1995), allowing us to understand that the identity of oculist implies the identity of physician.

The most general category of human identity is associated with several labels that emphasize different senses in which humans can be understood—in English *human, individual, mortal, person, soul*. These synonyms are interchangeable labels for the category of "human being," so each one of them can be viewed as implying the others—a person is a mortal, a mortal is a human, etc.

Beyond the most general human identities are thousands of more specific identities, organized hierarchically into increasingly specific kinds, as we show in chapter three. Any specific identity implies more general ones and ultimately implies the general identity of *human*. For example, in traditional families a *grandfather* is a kind of *father* which is a kind of *husband* which is a kind of *man* which is a kind of *human*. Thus, language organizes identities into a logic tree branching out from *human* to increasingly specific identities.

Each sequence of implications is based on social constructions rather than on material entailments. Effective social control by a society's "pattern maintainers" (Parsons and Shils 1951) ordinarily ensures that any individual with a specific identity possesses the implied identities. However, the logical relations may turn cloudy during social change, as is happening currently in the United States and Canada with respect to *father* implying *husband*, or *mother* implying *wife*.

This perspective on identities has its first glimmerings in Durkheim and Mauss' 1903 speculations about the prehistoric origins of hierarchical classification systems. After reviewing kinship and territorial classifications of people in a number of cultures, they argued that human beings distinguishing types of humans was the elemental process that evolved into general logical systems (Durkheim and Mauss 1963, pp. 82–84). Our focus diverges from the Durkheim and Mauss concern with evolutionary origins of logic, but aligns with their view of humans as divisible into named categories, hierarchically arranged into taxonomic sequences, so that membership in one category entails

membership in others. Thus we call a fundamental principle in cultural theories of people the Durkheim–Mauss taxonomy axiom.

2.3: Durkheim-Mauss Taxonomy Axiom

A taxonomy rooted in the general concept of human organizes identities. This taxonomy names various sets of humans peopling the society, where each set may contain other named subsets.

The Durkheim–Mauss taxonomy axiom is illustrated schematically in figure 2.1. The arrows—which are read as "implies" or "is a kind of"—point from more specific identities to more general identities. Chains of arrows converge in more general identities—ultimately in the single identity of human (not shown), indicating that all identities name kinds of humans. Moving downward, a chain of arrows often branches outward into multiple chains, indicating that some identity embraces several more specific identities—e.g., parent embraces father and mother. Though not shown in figure 2.1, chains of arrows could diverge and re-converge, and this indicates that some identities simultaneously imply multiple general identities: e.g., mother is a kind of woman and also a kind of parent.

Figure 2.2 shows a different visual representation of the taxonomy in figure 2.1—a Venn diagram emphasizing Durkheim and Mauss' concern

Figure 2.1   A Fragment of an Identity Taxonomy

Figure 2.2   Set–Subset Representation of a Fragment of an Identity Taxonomy

with categories of humans. In this case we see that more general identities are more inclusive, applying to an equal or greater number of people than a set of more specific identities. Each identity partitions people into a separate class, and more specific identities partition the populations of more general identities. In other words, identities define sets and subsets of a human population.

Taxonomies

Werner and Fenton (1970, p. 549) observed that taxonomic relations take a number of verbal forms: *X* is a *Y*; *X* is a kind of *Y*; all *X* are *Y*. For example, in the United States taxonomy of kin, one can say: a mother is a parent, or a mother is a kind of parent, or all mothers are parents. "Is a kind of" is the commonest verbalization of the relation, and taxonomic relations sometimes are called AKO relations.

Taxonomic relations are transitive. For example, because a mother is a parent, and a mother-in-law is a kind of mother, we can infer that a mother–in–law is a parent—a logical conclusion through syllogistic reasoning. As Durkheim and Mauss (1963) emphasized, logical inference is possible because the taxonomy describes subsets: mothers are a subset of parents, and mothers–in–law are a subset of mothers, thus mothers–in–law must also be a subset of parents.

The inferences from taxonomic transitivity can be represented in symbolic logic.

Given: mother-in-law → mother → parent
Then: mother-in-law → parent

The arrows stand for "implies" in symbolic logic, and that is the appropriate reading when thinking of individuals in sets and subsets. On the

other hand, it is natural to read arrows as "is a kind of" when thinking of classifications in a taxonomy.

In a pure taxonomy, each element links to exactly one more general form, even though the element may link to multiple more specific forms. For example, ascertaining that a mother is a kind of parent eliminates the possibility of mothers being a subset of any group of people other than parents, while leaving open the possibility that specific kinds of mothers exist. However, as Werner and Fenton (1970, p. 558) observed: "Superficial investigation of natural languages seems to reveal that 'pure' paradigm-taxonomy fields are relatively rare." Werner and Fenton describe a more common form that combines taxonomies with typologies, calling it a "componential super-taxonomy" (herein, componential taxonomy). In a componential taxonomy, mother can be a kind of parent *and* a kind of woman, and the sex-typed adult identities— woman and man—form a typology distinguishing the different kinds of parent.

Relational Meanings

Two identities linked by logical implication are related. For example, oculist is related to physician because oculist implies physician, and physician is related to oculist by the same logical relation. In fact, the meaning of the physician identity derives in part from its relation to all its specific forms (anesthetist, cardiologist, gynecologist, psychiatrist, urologist, etc.), in that listing all specific forms is one way of defining a concept. Moreover, each of the medical-specialty identities is related to the others by their mutual logical relation with physician; for example, psychiatrist and urologist are related because both are kinds of physician.

Relations between identities also arise from their relations to actions. For example, a physician is someone licensed to practice medicine, and a patient is someone who receives medical treatment, so the two identities are related by their mutual connection to the practicing of medicine—physician as agent, patient as object. Similarly, a nurse is someone who cares for patients under the supervision of a physician, and this definition relates the identity of nurse to the identity of patient by a nurse's quintessential action of "caring for," while relating the identity of nurse to the identity of physician by a physician's normative action of "supervising." In a different kind of example, the identities of pedestrian and motorist are related because both are

defined in terms of the act of traveling, even though the definition of pedestrian does not allude to motorist or vice versa. Paradigmatic actions interrelate identities and also other kinds of event constituents—behaviors, settings, instruments, and material objects (Heise and Durig 1997).

We propose that relational meanings connect the identities in social institutions, providing a linguistic superstructure (Balzer 1990) that betokens the institution's constituent identities. The examples above relating to medicine illustrate the idea by showing that the identities of physician, various medical specialists, nurse, and patient all are connected by their relational meanings, and these (plus possibly others) are constituent identities of the contemporary social institution of medicine. Though not our central concern in this book, relational meanings also identify other kinds of constituents of social institutions: paradigmatic behaviors, settings, and objects.

2.4: Institutions and Semantic Networks

Semantic networks based on relational meanings of identities identify key interactants involved in a social institution. The relational meaning of an identity consists of its logical connections to other identities via implication and of its syntactic connection to other identities via paradigmatic actions. Syntactic connections also identify an institution's paradigmatic behaviors, settings, and objects.

Routines of a particular genre, conducted in certain types of settings by particular kinds of people, replicated across space and time, constitute an institution's material presence in a society. The semantic network reflects how key identities in the routines are linked to each other and to paradigmatic actions, settings, and instruments. Both the replicated routines and the semantic network can be present without a social institution being recognized as a component of the society's social structure. We speculate that a social institution emerges as a cultural construction when the semantic network is noticed, labeled, objectified, and maintained by individuals in a society. Before an institution is culturally constructed, the complex of role-activity might better be called a human ecology or an interaction order. Activity in ecological relations (e.g., litterer-scavenger) progresses more like Mead's (1934, p. 14) "conversation of gestures," wherein "a certain attitude in one individual…calls out a response in the other." Sparsely structured

interaction orders (e.g., crowds) embrace a multitude of local relationships that govern individuals' actions, but ordinarily these provide no uniform mindset throughout the assembly (McPhail 1991). We use the term *identity network* to embrace all such possibilities.

Collectivities

An interaction order of particular interest arises when individuals relate to one another in terms of the same identity, thereby defining themselves collectively. Cerulo (1997, p. 386) noted that "Collective identity is a concept grounded in classic sociological constructs: Durkheim's 'collective conscience,' Marx's 'class consciousness,' Weber's Verstehen, and Tonnies' Gemeinschaft. So rooted, the notion addresses the 'we-ness' of a group, stressing the similarities or shared attributes around which group members coalesce." Whereas studies of identities relating to division of labor and complementary relationships emphasize role-identities (e.g., McCall and Simmons 1978), studies of identities that foster identification with others who are like oneself, as well as prejudices against those who are unlike, emphasize collective identities (e.g., Tajfel 1981).

Those lower in a taxonomy of collective identities share attributes with those higher in the taxonomy, as well as sharing attributes specific to their own level. For example, all individuals named by the collective identities in the taxonomy Christian ← Protestant ← Baptist believe that Jesus was the Messiah, those named by the last two terms believe in the Bible as the source of revelation, and those named by the third term in addition believe in baptism of voluntary believers. Thus more specific collective identities provide more abundant bases for identification of individuals with one another. On the other hand, the most abstract collective identities define the largest groups of individuals, and even the most abstract of all—the human identity as a species—can become a basis for identification, as in the environmentalism movement (Castells 2004, p. 185).

Collective identities fuel contemporary social movements related to religious fundamentalism, nationalism, and anti-capitalism and anti-patriarchalism insurgencies. "We have experienced, in the past twenty-five years, the widespread surge of powerful expressions of collective identity that challenge globalization and cosmopolitanism on behalf of cultural singularity and people's control over their lives and environment" (Castells 2004, p. 2). According to Castells (2004, p. 11),

individuals in globalized society increasingly construct their selves[1] in terms of such identities of resistance. "For those social actors excluded from or resisting the individualization of identity [i.e., self] attached to life in the global networks of power and wealth, cultural communes of religious, national, or territorial foundation seem to provide the main alternative for the construction of meaning in our society" (Castells 2004, p. 68). Communes constituted in terms of collective identities and their associated values provide refuge and solidarity against an uncontrolled and hostile world.

Heise's (1998) analysis of empathic solidarity suggests why collective identities might have this appeal. Heise argued that solidarity emerges when multiple individuals have an identity that puts them in the same relationship with an outside figure, they experience the same event with regard to the outside figure resulting in the same emotions and the same impulses to action, and they are aware of their aligned feelings and motives thereby producing a sense of unified consciousness and alliance.

2.5: Collective Identities

Collective identities—classifications of individuals based on shared attributes rather than paradigmatic actions—foster solidarity among those having the identity, particularly when the identity is invoked in the context of resistance to others not sharing the attribute. Consequently collective identities serve as a mobilization resource for social movements.

Collective identities in social movements often are represented as historical classifications that retrieve an idealized past. However, as numerous authors have observed (e.g., Castells 2004; Holstein and Gubrium 2000; Woodward 2002), such an identity often is a contemporary construction, with individual members of the movement creatively elaborating specific meanings of the identity in order to meet personal needs and political demands.

Social Change

A society's theory of people is not ossified. Identities are invented and discarded, continuing identities change meanings, and genres of identities move in and out of vernacular usage.

Publishers release new editions of dictionaries every 10–15 years to keep up with the influx of new words and meanings into a language (Landau 2001, p. 397). This is because "800 or so new words come into the 'common or working vocabulary' of English every year, and…of these about 500 find their way into dictionaries of various sizes and types" (Landau 2001, p. 202).

For example, during the 1990s the following identities gained enough currency to be included in a revised edition of a standard dictionary for students of English (Oxford University Press).

control freak (a person who always wants to be in control of their own and others' lives, and to organize how things are done)

doula (a woman whose role is to provide emotional support to a woman who is giving birth)

spin doctor (a person whose job is to present information to the public about a politician, an organization, etc. in the way that seems most positive)

webmaster (a person who is responsible for particular pages of information on the World Wide Web)

Such neologisms correspond to changes in culture and society. In the case of webmaster, such a role was not even conceivable before the introduction of 1990s internet technology. In the other cases, the role-identities went unrecognized before the identity labels emerged, even if some individuals performed related activities. Having emerged, the new identities create new demands on individuals trying to understand situations, new opportunities (or pitfalls) for those trying to fashion their individuality, and new criteria for shaping relationships.

Meanwhile, a culture also sheds identities. We searched a nineteenth-century dictionary (Bartlett 1848) for some examples.

hoss (a man remarkable for his strength, courage, etc.).

nimshi (a foolish fellow, or one who habitually acts in a foolish manner; local in Connecticut).

scrouge (a bouncing fellow or girl. Tom, the engineer, was a roaring, tearing, bar state scrouge—could chaw up any specimen of the human race, any quantity of tobacco, and drink steam without flinching.—Robb, Squatter Life).

stag (in the New York courts, a stag is the technical name for a man who is always ready to aid in proving an alibi, of course "for a consideration").

None of these words other than stag appears in contemporary dictionaries that we checked (American Heritage Editors 1995; Oxford University Press; WordNet 1998), and stag appears in contemporary dictionaries with entirely different meanings. Nimshi is close to nincompoop in contemporary language, but in the other cases the concept of such a person is completely gone, notwithstanding our ability to visualize such people given the definitions.

Identities can appear and disappear through changes in the meanings of identity labels as well as through the birth and death of terms. For example, dictionaries define "chemist" as a person versed in chemistry but some dictionaries (e.g., Whitney 1889; Gove 1961) also indicate that a chemist is a synonym for alchemist, while tagging the alchemy meaning as obsolete. Others drop the alchemy meaning entirely—for instance, WordNet (1998) offers just the single definition: "a scientist who specializes in chemistry." Thus, the identity label "chemist" has been sustained across centuries, but the meaning of the identity has metamorphosed with changes in cultural metaphysics.

Social movements sometimes succeed in purposely changing the meanings of identities. A recent instance is the removal of male as a component feature of occupational names, abstractly in response to Foucault's (1978) position that discourses implement power, and practically to address hiring biases. The specific aims were to neutralize gender in explicitly marked identity labels such as chairman and spokesman (as opposed to chair and spokesperson), and to shear the implicit logical relation in traditional meanings of, for instance, soldier and doctor as kinds of man. Pauwels (1998) reviewed studies of the impact of linguistic reform efforts promoted by feminists, and concluded: "The response to the question whether there is evidence of the (successful) adoption of feminist alternatives to occupational nomenclature, can be cast in positive, yet cautious terms. It is clear that feminist linguistic proposals are having some impact on language use: they have not only caused instability in 'traditional' usage patterns but also have reached the status of tolerated use in some countries."

2.6: Identity Transmutation

With social change, new identity labels are invented, some old identity labels perish, and meanings of some persisting identity labels shift. Such linguistic modifications in the cultural theory

of people correspond to changes in role-taking, construction of selves, and relational domination and subservience through alter-casting.

Changes in a lexicon can be arresting when they are associated with political movements or are spotlighted in the mass media, giving the impression that seismic shifts in culture are occurring. However, such changes are small perturbations compared to the overall bulk of the available vocabulary in a society. Comparing the 800 or so new English words each year to the corpus of 450,000 to 700,000 English words in general use (Landau 2001, pp. 28–29) reveals that the rate of change is less than two tenths of 1 percent per year. Changes in culture, including the culture's theory of people, are better characterized as glacial rather than seismic.

Subcultural Elaboration

Cultural knowledge is socially distributed—that is, "possessed differently by different individuals and types of individuals" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p .45). Especially in industrialized societies, any individual acquires specific and detailed cultural knowledge in some fields—e.g., about the individual's own occupational identity and role—but only general and sketchy knowledge in other fields.

> Specialization is actually the key to the character of modern abstract systems. The knowledge incorporated in modern forms of expertise is in principle available to everyone, had they but the available resources, time and energy to acquire it. The fact that to be an expert in one or two small corners of modern knowledge systems is all that anyone can achieve means that abstract systems are opaque to the majority. Their opaque quality . . . comes from the very intensity of specialization that abstract systems both demand and foster. (Giddens 1991, p. 30)

Cultural theories of people in industrialized societies are more complex than those in pre-modern societies because of an increase in the sheer number of identities made available by new forms of social differentiation and new institutions, and because of more intricate relationships between identities resulting especially from increasing specialization. This is not to say that cultural theories of people in pre-modern societies are simplistic—indeed, ethnographic studies

of religious and kinship systems in such societies reveal substantial complexity—but the overall stock of knowledge and the degree of segmentation in the social distribution of knowledge is greater now than in earlier times.

Reflecting the social distribution of knowledge, vernacular English does not contain all identity-labels that are available in English. For example, the WordNet lexicon (2005), which we use in the next chapter as our basis for defining the English-language theory of people, contains just five terms for vagrants—tramp, hobo, bum, street person, and dosser (a homeless person in the United Kingdom). However, tramps themselves distinguish many more types, and the subcultural taxonomy continues to more specific levels as follows, according to Spradley and McCurdy (1972, p. 65).

Tramp
      Bindle stiff
      Rubber tramp
      Box car tramp
      Working stiff
            Harvest tramp
            Tramp miner
            Fruit tramp
            Construction tramp
            Sea tramp
      Airedale
      Ding
      Home guard tramp (a street person in colloquial English)
      Mission stiff
            Nose diver
            Professional nose diver

Most people do not know about these identity labels, but an individual entering tramp subculture (hobohemia) will learn the types quickly to understand conversations, to define others sensibly, and to plan the future. In fact, tramp subculture has a lexicon of more than 1,300 insider terms for kinds of people, settings, things, and actions—listed in "Hobo Terminology" (Grahamqckr 2001).

Specialized taxonomies of identities branch in a multitude of subcultural directions from the common core of identities. Scientific disciplines, hospitals, factories, hobbies, sports, as well as deviant communities—all have subcultures, all have individuals who are knowledgeable in the

subculture, and all have some individuals who make a point of passing their subcultural knowledge to others. Someone moving into one of these subcultures quickly learns the identities that are elaborated there, while people outside of the subculture stay mostly unaware of the identities within the subculture.

Anthropologists conducting studies of folk biological classifications have developed ideas about how knowledge moves in and out of the common core, as a domain of interest becomes more or less significant to most people. "[L]ow significance of a domain leads to a rise in the level of the classificatory hierarchy that is perceived as most basic or salient. Simultaneously this decreased significance is reflected in attrition or devolution of the taxonomic system. The more specific category distinctions, that is, the least inclusive levels of the taxonomy, are gradually lost" (Dougherty 1981, p. 176). Dougherty's generalization is based on cross-cultural comparisons of groups with more or less interest in plants—e.g., Mayans versus San Francisco suburbanites. Nevertheless we can extrapolate an interesting hypothesis about social change:

2.7: Identities from Subcultures

As a subculture's arena becomes of general interest, its elaborated taxonomy of identities enters the cultural theory of people. When an arena no longer is of general interest, the bottom of its taxonomy of identities eventually moves out of the cultural theory of people, perhaps being retained in a subculture.

We speculate, for example, that in America the subculture of medicine is becoming increasingly important as the immense "boomer" generation turns elderly and as more life-style matters are medicalized (eating, exercising, smoking, etc.). Consequently specialized medical identities have come into common use—such as anesthetist, pediatrician, cardiologist, dermatologist, gynecologist, neurologist, oncologist, ophthalmologist, radiologist, urologist. Speakers of English probably recognize most of these professional specialties and could give a one sentence description of the practitioner's role. In contrast, many of the 400-plus types of engineers recognized by the U.S. Census Bureau (2002) are well outside the common core of knowledge and probably are unfamiliar and indefinable for most people—e.g., adsorption, clamshell, cryogenics, echometer, hydrographic, logistics, reliability, topographical, or vibration engineers.

Substantial historical work would be required to confirm that when an arena loses significance for the general public, its identities disappear from the common core. However, speculatively, we suggest that the loss of hoss and scrouge (noted above) may be linked to the end of North American frontiers and the decline of frontier living as a matter of interest to the general public.

Identity Sets

The seven propositions above constitute our characterization of cultural theories of people. Now we examine how individuals use their culture's theory of people in their daily lives.

The identities provided by a cultural theory of people partition the society's population into many overlapping sets of individuals, rather than into exclusive sets. Every individual—even a newborn—is in multiple sets and has multiple identities. Merton (1957, pp. 369–370) presented this basic fact as follows: "Multiple roles refer to the complex of roles associated, not with a *single* social status, but with the *various* statuses (often, in differing institutional spheres) in which individuals find themselves—the roles, for example, connected with the distinct statuses of teacher, wife, mother, Catholic, Republican, and so on. We designate this complement of social statuses of an individual as his *status-set*."

Goodenough (1965, note 8), observing that Merton's usage of the word "status" confuses social position with social rights and duties, introduced the concept of *identity set*—"the sum of all the identities that a person has in social fact and in which he may legitimately choose to operate."

2.8: Identity Sets

Each individual possesses multiple identities. The aggregation of identities held by an individual is the individual's "identity set."

Merton (1957, p. 381) observed that one factor distinguishing individuals from one another is the size of their status/identity sets: "individual people differ in the number and complexity of statuses comprising their status-sets. Not everyone in a 'complex social structure' has the same complexity of status-sets." We return to this issue in chapter five.

Individuals acquire imperfect notions of each other's identity sets, a discerned identity set being smaller than the focal individual's actual identity set. The discerned identity set of a newly encountered person includes just a few identities that can be inferred from publicly presented clues. A bus driver, for example, publicly presents her age, sex, race–ethnicity, marital status (via a ring), and occupation (via a uniform or her position on the bus), leaving numerous specific identities unannounced, even during repeated encounters. Conversational interactions expand discerned identity sets, as others describe their interests and activities and directly proclaim some identities. However, even in continuing relationships, discerned identity sets remain smaller than actual identity sets, as revealed by the fact that discovery of other's identities continues to occur over years of association. Discerned identity sets of intimates might almost match actual identity sets, but even here the occurrence of surprises in an intimate relationship belies the notion that one partner has full knowledge of the other. The discerned identity set for the self presumably comes closest to matching an actual identity set, yet that match, too, is imperfect during periods of "identity crisis" when the individual is discovering what unexpected identities she or he has.

2.9: Discerned Identity Sets

An individual encountering another discerns part of the other's identity set from the other's accouterments, body styling, behavior, and from discourse specifically aimed at broadening discerned identity sets. A discerned identity set is carried forward to future encounters, and it expands as more is discovered about the other.

Discovering that another has a very specific identity conveys information about several identities in the individual's identity set because specific identities imply more general identities. For example, learning that a woman is a grandmother allows one to infer that she also is a mother who most likely engaged in the paradigmatic actions of a mother with offspring; and moreover in traditional society one also could infer that the mother was a wife who most likely engaged in the paradigmatic actions of a wife with a husband. Thus, learning about the one identity—grandmother—expands the discerned identity set for the woman by more than one identity, and allows one to surmise a fair portion of her biography within the family institution. Expanding

knowledge of another's identity set in this way expands potential ways of relating to the other.

Situations

An individual appears in different identities at different times and places—"As the individual leaves one encounter and enters another, he sensitively adjusts the 'presentation of self' in relation to whatever is demanded of a particular situation" (Giddens 1991, p. 190). Thus, an individual always presents a simplified self relative to that individual's sizable array of owned identities. The full complexity of the individual unfolds only over time as the individual moves from scene to scene.

2.10: Situations Select from Identity Sets

Only part of an individual's total identity set participates in any particular interaction; the engaged identities change as the individual moves from one situation to another.

Goodenough (1965) observed that individuals defining a social situation must select identities from their identity sets, and that omnipresent identities such as sex and age limit selection of specific identities. However, given the Durkheim-Mauss taxonomy axiom, these two considerations reduce to one, since an individual's omnipresent identities are the most general identities within the person's identity set, and their selective effect already is manifest in the identity set—e.g., a male will not be a mother. Thus the constraint is simply that each participant must present the self using an identity within that individual's identity set. In addition, Goodenough (1965) proposed that identities selected for a situation must relate to a legitimate occasion or culturally recognized reason for interaction, and that identities for different individuals must establish meaningful relationships for interaction. These considerations frequently reduce to participants selecting a relevant social institution for their interaction, since an institution imbues encounters with legitimacy, functionality, and meaningfulness.

The timing and physical location of a social assembly often determines which institution is regnant and thereby determines the definition of a situation (Woodward 1997, pp. 21–22). Identities bundled together in a social institution or incipient institution relate to one another, to quintessential behaviors, to paradigmatic places and things, and these relations are culturally recognized in the very meanings of the

identities. Therefore allotting identities to interactants from an institutional bundle gives a coherent theme to the interactants' collective activity by fostering reproduction of past relationships and activities.

Thus, within our theoretical framework and in typical circumstances, the problem of defining the situation reduces to a question of which institutional frame taps the identity sets of all present. A situation gets defined when some participant recognizes the institutional framework associated with the space-time setting and figures out how to instantiate that institutional framework by drawing from the discerned identity sets of everyone present. This usually is a process of discovery (Strauss 1959/1997, p. 49), and having found a solution, the discoverer ordinarily attempts to achieve consensus though discourse, by directives to others, or by uncontested preemption. The ensuing social construction of a defined situation provides a uniform basis for participants' identification of each other and behavior toward each other.

2.11: Situations Instantiate Institutions

A definition of the situation implements a social institution, if institutionally relevant identities from participants' discerned identity sets are invoked.

Each individual's identity set has subsets associated with different social institutions—e.g., the family subset, the medical subset, the commerce subset, etc. Thus the problem of defining a situation frequently can be viewed as finding an institution which provides non-empty institutional subsets for every participant. The problem is less likely to have just one solution when discerned identity sets are large (Smith-Lovin 2003), as in an encounter of two long-term intimates. However, attending to the physical setting as well as the discerned identity sets of present individuals can reduce the ambiguity involved in defining a situation because (as we show in chapter four) both identities and settings typify social institutions.

Selection of an appropriate institution is deduced from material cues at the scene. Salient cues often are provided by participants who already have adopted identities and literally are wearing those identities for others to see, predisposing the others to adopt identities from the same institution. For example, a physician's white coat and visible stethoscope, or a nurse's white dress and cap, deliver compelling signals that the situation is to be defined as medical. A priest's black robe and white clerical collar, or a nun's black habit and white headdress, signal

that religious identities are to prevail. Presence of two institutionally attired participants—both a doctor and nurse, or both a priest and nun—creates overwhelming pressure on others to frame the situation accordingly—as medical or as religious, and to take complementary identities.

Cultural classifications of places and times are within the meaning confluences that delineate social institutions, and accordingly settings also have cue value in defining situations. For example, individuals often ready a relevant identity on entering a hospital, as if expecting to be challenged for one. For many individuals, entering a church automatically invokes a religious identity with its accompanying feeling of reverence, even if no one else is present. Even if a setting alone does not invoke a particular framing, the setting cumulates with other cues. For example, consider the dominance of a medical definition of the situation when inside a hospital in the presence of a nurse, or of a religious framing when inside a church in the presence of a cleric.

Mead (1934, p. 185) observed that we can talk to nature and nature replies, in a manner resembling a social relationship. With respect to the problem of defining situations, the physical world is like a constant companion who changes identity as one moves through space and time. Each identity of the physical world—each setting—provides different cues regarding the appropriate framing of the immediate situation. One "negotiates" identity with the physical world by navigating to settings that support the situational framing that one desires.

2.12: Cues Elicit Situation Definitions

The more cues visible at a scene that relate to a particular institution, the more likely that participants will adopt identities from that institution. Visible cues notably include participants in uniform and the physical-temporal setting.

Our focus on institutions begs the question of how situations are defined when identities are subinstitutional in the sense of being in incipient institutions, human ecologies, interaction orders, or just isolated relations. Situations based on subinstitutional identity systems are not well-defined in the sense of being inter-subjective collaborative products of mind that offer participants a uniform outlook on happenings. Activity in ecological relations are like Mead's (1934, p. 14) "conversation of gestures." Sparsely structured interaction orders (e.g., crowds) embrace a multitude of local relationships that govern individuals' actions, but

ordinarily these provide no uniform mindset throughout the assembly (McPhail 1991). Thus, purposeful coordinating discourse is required initially to establish a shared definition of the situation in subinstitutional circumstances.

Having defined a situation that ensconces individuals into their operative identities, the individuals begin performing roles associated with those identities. According to affect control theory, individuals endeavor to maintain sentiments associated with cognitive categories, including their identities, and this provides the motivation for role performances (see MacKinnon 1994, Chapter 3). In affect control theory, roles are ubiquitously associated with all identities—even vague identities such as friend or Arab. Moreover, the content of roles is too amorphous to catalog because role behaviors are generated by immediate feelings concerning circumstances. Heise (2007, Chapter 7) provides detailed examples of how variations in circumstances—e.g., different interaction partners, or different prior events—can swing appropriate role behavior far from typical patterns.

Simultaneous Identities

Smith-Lovin (2003; 2002) noted that most identity theories assume that an individual will take only one identity throughout an encounter, and she argued that this is an over-simplification. Strauss (1959/1997, p. 75) took a similar position: "any man operating as an institutional representative may act during any interaction, or interactional phase, in several different institutional capacities: for instance, as a physician, an oculist, a chief of the clinic, an old-timer in the hospital, a member of the hospital board." At least some of the identity shifts mentioned by Strauss result from the fact that a specific identity (such as chief of the clinic) implies more general identities (such as physician), so actuating the specific identity implicitly presents the implied identities as well.

2.13: Entailed Identities

An individual recognized in terms of a specific identity is simultaneously present in terms of more abstract entailed identities.

A multiple-identity presence at a gathering can derive from more than identity entailments, however. Multiple institutional frames might

cover all participants in a setting and thereby enable coincident definitions of the situation. For example, mixed-age encounters often enable an alternative definition of the situation in terms of some kind of nurturance; mixed-sex encounters enable a sexuality definition. In addition, pairs of individuals within the gathering might be able to establish dyadic relationships in terms of subinstitutional identities, as when two old friends relate on individualistic terms.

We adopt some naming conventions for these conditions, borrowing terms introduced by others (Strauss 1959/1997; Smith-Lovin 2003).

2.14: Multiple-Relationship Gatherings

Gatherings are multi-structured when participants define the situation in terms of more than one social institution and thereby embody multiple institutions simultaneously. Gatherings are multiplex if participants relate to one another via multiple identities that are either institutional or subinstitutional.

Pescosolido and Rubin (2000) postulated that the social networks associated with different institutions were largely conterminous in pre-modern societies, often were overlapping in modern societies, but are nearly independent of one another in postmodern society. On the basis of this postulate, Smith-Lovin (2007) proposed that situations are less often multi-structured in the postmodern world, and therefore postmodern individuals are less burdened with managing conflicts among their various institutional roles. Being free to act inconsistently across situations, they do so, sometimes giving the impression that they have no principled core.

Nevertheless, some multi-structured situations continue to occur in the postmodern world, and in any case adopting a relatively specific situational identity always entails the more general identities that the specific identity implies. Thus many situations continue to be multiplex in postmodern times, even if individuals encounter such situations less often in postmodern society than in modern or pre-modern societies.

The question in multiplex gatherings is, How do participants decide which identities will provide operative control of their behaviors at the moment? Strauss (1959/1997, pp. 76–77) proposes that, when multiple identities for each individual are part of the overall definition of the situation, each identity is allowed to control interaction in sequence, one at a time. Presumably, each individual in a multi-structured situation

chooses the institutions whose self identity offers that individual the most self-fulfillment at the moment (as discussed in chapter five), and competing choices by different participants are resolved by turn-taking, by ritual, by fiat, by self-disclosure, etc.

institution

Smith-Lovin (2003; 2002) proposes a different possibility—that individuals enact multiple identities simultaneously, analogous to parallel processing in computers. Each identity governs an individual's selection of action, and the single action that is performed in the moment is the one best fitting all operative identities (or perhaps an action having multiple interpretations befitting different identities—e.g., scolding another, with a side-wink). Smith-Lovin argues that a parallel-processing formulation not only deals forthrightly with the issue of multiplex relationships but in addition explains the occurrence of mixed and composite emotions, noted so often in the emotions literature (e.g., Kemper 1978). That is, one experiences an interaction from the standpoint of each operative identity, and each experience gives rise to its own emotional responses. These emotions often will be concordant, but when they diverge because operative identities are very different, the result is a complex emotional composite.

2.15: Multiple-Relationship Interaction

Individuals in a multiplex gathering express their multiple identities through sequencing and through activity that is synchronized simultaneously with several identities.

More empirical research will have to be done before generalizations can be formulated regarding when simultaneous identities get expressed and under what conditions simultaneous identities get expressed sequentially or by synchronization.

Socialization

The cultural knowledge of a society, including its theory of people, is acquired by successive generations of a society through socialization. There are two leading theories of socialization in the social psychological literature: the *interactionist* approach, associated with Mead and symbolic interactionism; and the *interpretive* approach, originating in the work of various theorists in anthropology, psychology, and sociology (see Corsaro 2005 for a concise summary and references).

The interactionist approach views socialization as essentially a one-way process, wherein the child becomes socialized by internalizing the organized social attitudes of the pre-existing group or community to which he or she belongs. The approach is exemplified by Perinbanayagam's statement that "The actor, far from being an *immaculate conceiver,* is subject to a logico-linguistic socialization, which affects his or her interpretation of the world" (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 90). According to Mead (1934), a sense of self and the social world emerges and takes hold in a child's consciousness through a progressive abstraction from the roles and attitudes of specific others to those of a generalized other, and by a shift in identification from specific others to the generalized other. Mead maintains that these subjective accomplishments are coextensive with the acquisition of language. Following Mead, Berger and Luckmann (1966) assert that "Language constitutes both the most important content and the most important instrument of socialization" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 133), because it is through language that the internalization of cultural meanings takes place.

In the interpretive approach to socialization, the child is a discoverer of cultural knowledge rather than a mere recipient. Through the development of language, communication, and cognitive skills, children construct their social worlds in collaboration with adults and peers. They do not merely internalize adult culture; they become a part of it, and contribute to its reproduction by using it to interpret new experiences. Therefore, in contrast to the top-down model of socialization associated with the interactionist approach, the interpretive approach views childhood socialization as a creative process involving active, resourceful children as well as authoritative adults. Corsaro (2005, pp. 24–25) proposed that institutional fields, including the family, provide recurrent sites in which children produce and participate in peer cultures: children acquire their culture within social gatherings that are institutionally framed. This facilitates learning the performance and affective aspects of identities as well as gaining a sense of how identities are linked to one another. The interpretative approach to socialization, as compared to the interactionist approach, provides a clearer picture of human development by allowing for active authorities, but also for active subjects who constantly change themselves, rather than metamorphosing through stages.

Whatever the socialization process, learning a language is a primary means by which individuals learn their society's cultural theory of people. For example, learning the meaning of a word such as policeman

involves learning that a policeman is a kind of guardian, as well as a person who enforces laws and prevents crimes.

Individuals expand their vocabularies prodigiously as they grow through childhood and adolescence. Miller (1951, p. 150) estimated that a child finishing eighth grade knows approximately 30,000 root words, and by the end of high school the figure has increased to 50,000. Writing forty years later, Miller (1991, pp. 134–138) detailed the pitfalls in arriving at such numbers, but the estimates he reported based on more recent technology stayed about the same. In addition he estimated that superior high school graduates who do more reading might know as many as 120,000 lexical units. While individuals learn some words via reading and dictionary investigations (as Miller implies with his estimate for superior students), individuals mainly gain their understandings of concepts while socializing with other individuals. The meanings of a teacher, a policeman, a cleric, and such, grow out of encounters with such people, in the manners discussed by interactionist and interpretational writers on socialization.

2.16: Socialization via Language

Acquisition of language gives each individual a theory of people, which is to say, the conceptual resources to define and enact social situations with others, and to be aware of enduring social structures.

As mentioned previously, individuals in industrialized societies acquire specific and detailed cultural knowledge only in limited domains. Thus no individual in modern society acquires a complete theory of people. However, learning the colloquial core of their language allows individuals to define usual situations in terms of shared identities, thereby fostering intersubjectivity in social situations and organizing face-to-face interactions. In addition, awareness of the interrelations of identity meanings in the colloquial core of a language segues individuals from consciousness of immediate situations to knowledge of the enduring social structures inherent in social institutions.

Self Development

In chapters five and six we will examine in detail how individuals use cultural resources to construct and deploy a self. For now we

note some ways that acquiring a theory of people is related to self development.

Learning about identities allows youths to comprehend who they have become—to build discerned identity sets for themselves. Learning words for identities allows the individual to objectify emerging concepts of self for introspective analysis and for communication to others. These processes constitute a major challenge during adolescence, replete with bewilderment and traumas in discovering who one is (Erikson 1950).

Identity taxonomies that are implicit in identity meanings provide youths with substantial knowledge about what they might become in their society and offer plans for reaching fulfilling identities. This benefit of language acquisition—essentially a corollary of the Durkheim-Mauss taxonomy axiom—can be visualized through the diagram showing sets and subsets of individuals associated with hierarchical identities, in figure 2.2. The diagram shows that individuals who are in the set of people with a specific identity invariably are in the sets of people with the more general identities implied by the specific identity. Thus, having attained the specific identity means an individual has attained the more general identities as well. Viewed oppositely, implication structures among identities specify potential career sequences for identity acquisitions, as proposed by Heise (1990, p. 62): "On the one hand, a taxonomy of role identities is a body of knowledge about how people develop and become more and more differentiated (e.g., as members of a family). On the other hand, a taxonomy is a key component of the rule system for generating status transitions: it defines the sequence of status transitions that is necessary in order to attain a particular role. Thus, a taxonomy simultaneously operates as a means of understanding reality and as a means of creating reality."

Heise (1990) gives an example involving identities in the formal organization of the Catholic Church. Every pope is a cardinal, all cardinals are archbishops, all archbishops are bishops, all bishops are priests. This series of subsets defines the career line that a Catholic would have to follow in order to become a pope. As in many career structures, the status transitions in the Church are the prerogatives of others who advance selected individuals to more specific identities, and who maintain the implication structure among identities by making sure that promoted individuals have the proper credentials.

2.17: Identity Careers

Chains of implications among identities specify possible careers in which an individual may accumulate increasingly specific

identities. Authorities maintain the implication structure of identities by controlling credentials of individuals as they advance through these career lines.

Careers sometimes require that individuals relinquish identities as they acquire other identities, thereby maintaining a system of exclusionary classifications: e.g., in academia an individual stops being an assistant professor in order to start being an associate professor. The memberships of exclusionary identities are subsets of a population having a more abstract identity—e.g., assistant professors, associate professors, and full professors all are kinds of professor—but they are not subsets of one another, so their sequencing is not defined via identity taxonomies. In general, career lines involving identity accumulation are predictable from taxonomic identity implications, but not sequences involving identity losses.

Final Remarks

In this chapter we proposed that a society's language, and in particular the language's lexicon of identities, provides a theory of people. The identities are logically inter-related through chains of implication, and many identities also are functionally inter-related through paradigmatic actions of one identity toward another. We proposed that the interrelations between identities implicitly give individuals awareness of social institutions that structure activities in their society. Thus, as individuals learn their society's vocabulary of identities, they obtain knowledge about how their society works, and about how to participate in their society day to day.

We in addition explored some of the ways that individuals utilize their society's theory of people. The lexicon of identities allows individuals to apprehend others by building discerned identity sets that personalize others and convey their institutional biographies. Institutional clusters of identities enable individuals to define situations wherein they have roles to enact, and role expectations regarding others at the scene. Learning the identity lexicon as they learn their language allows youths to contemplate paths of development that are open to them and to embark on various institutional careers.

The essentials of a theory of people consist of a set of identities characterizing types of people, a taxonomic organization of the identities downward from the category of human, and some identity meanings

specifying functional activities among identities. Our next two chapters demonstrate how these features are effected in English—first we examine the size and organization of the identity vocabulary, and then how the identities are networked semantically into clusters corresponding to basic social institutions.

We believe that the notion of identities constituting a theory of people applies in the vast majority of language-culture systems recorded by anthropologists, though that is a matter to be examined empirically. With respect to the future, globalization might assure that identity-based theories of people apply universally. "The notion of a homogeneous, cohesive, geographically bounded local culture consisting of people who share a putative common ancestry is obsolete; cultures have now become multicultures, and the sheer repertoire of distinctive cultures...has shrunk. On the other hand, a new form of culture has swept the world. Whether due to the convergence of different cultures towards a common middle point, or the enormous clout of Americanization, cultural similarity has everywhere been on the rise; this to such an extent that some writers have speculated about an emerging global culture" (Barrett 2002, p. 1).

Thus if we successfully demonstrate in subsequent chapters that the idea of an identity-based theory of people applies in contemporary North American society, it most likely would be applicable for people around the world, within the emerging global society. The hypothesis of universality could be tested by replicating the procedures we present in this book within the dozens of contemporary languages besides English that are operative in global society.

CHAPTER THREE

Identities in Standard English

A customary methodology for studying personal identities—the Twenty Statements Test of Kuhn and McPartland (1954)—asks respondents to write twenty answers to the question "Who am I?" The number of identities (as opposed to attributes and other kinds of responses) named by American respondents typically is less than a dozen, even when the test provides more than twenty answer blanks (Schwirian 1964). In societies where collective identities are more important than individual attributes, a higher proportion of identities is named, but the average number of identities enumerated with this methodology still is less than two dozen (e.g., see Ma and Schoeneman 1997). Thus, traditional identity researchers presume—and affirm through objective empirical measurements—that individuals adopt a few dozen identities at most, mainly in the institutions of work, family, religion and leisure.

In contrast, many contemporary writers see contemporary individuals as inundated with diverse identifications arising from wide-ranging affiliations, excursions to local and remote places, electronic messaging with far-flung others, and busy meeting schedules in multiple social institutions. They view individuals as swamped by their identities, tumbling from one sense of self to another as they go through scores of identities—perhaps hundreds—while engaging in their daily, weekly, monthly, and annual rounds.

Our first goal in this chapter is to obtain information regarding this issue by assessing just how many identities are available to individuals who employ the English-language theory of people, and how the identities are organized. The position of traditional identity theorists would be strengthened if identities number in scores and are arranged in a few deep taxonomic lines, since it seems unlikely that individuals would

develop muddled selves from dealing with so few identities, organized so straightforwardly. However, finding that identities in English number in hundreds or thousands and that they are arranged in a multitude of short taxonomic lines strengthens the position that contemporary individuals are confronted by an overwhelming profusion of possible identifications. We examine this issue by counting identities in vernacular English and by counting taxonomic groups descending from the category of human being.

Having assembled the identities that are available in vernacular English, we sort them into social science classifications in order to characterize the English-language theory of people in terms of the kinds of human activities and conditions it emphasizes. Our content analysis addresses questions such as the following. Are most identities associated with formal institutions? What proportion of identities is associated with biological inheritance or physical appearance?

Contemporary theorists such as Castells (2004) have focused much of their attention on collectivity-identities relating to nationality, ethnicity, social class, community, gender, sexuality, and religion. Such identities—called "social identities" in psychological literature—foster identification with others in the same category and antipathy toward outsiders (Tajfel 1981). Collective identities sometimes have sudden changes in meaning, burgeoning (or dwindling) the number of individuals who adopt them. For example, the "Red Power" political movement so enhanced the identity of Indian in the United States that the population of self-identified native Americans grew from about half a million in 1960 to close to two million in 1990 (Nagel 1996, Table 2). Our final concern in this chapter is to distinguish collective identities from role-identities, to assess the relative numbers of each, and to assess what types of collective identities are prevalent.

We begin by describing our source of data in this chapter.

WordNet

Our survey of English nouns specifying identities uses WordNet (WordNet 1998; Fellbaum 1998), a recently developed computer-based dictionary and thesaurus, as a source of data. This English language database, freely available on the World Wide Web, organizes approximately 100,000 words—nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs—clustered into synonym sets that represent underlying lexical concepts. WordNet provides a brief definition for each synonym set.

The database links nouns taxonomically via two semantic relations: hyponymy (the focal concept embraces a narrower concept) and meronymy (the focal concept designates an entity that has a part designated by another concept). Our study relates to hyponymy only, and in particular this chapter focuses on the hyponyms of "human being." The taxonomy that branches down from "human being" consists of subtypes of people, including multi-word phrases (such as surrogate mother), familiar terms (such as mommy), and names of renown or mythical individuals (such as Virgin Mary).

WordNet contains identities not included in other dictionaries that we checked (Procter 1995; American Heritage Editors 1995), including some identities that are important in contemporary North American culture (e.g., temporary worker, wannabe). Indeed, WordNet leans toward superfluity, with 13 percent of its entries being spelling variations or esoteric entries that do not appear in the British National Corpus of 100 million words (Leech, Rayson, and Wilson 2001).

WordNet Limitations

By design WordNet is a non-componential, pure taxonomy of nouns, providing one and only one path of implications between each pair of terms. For example, there is exactly one path between stepmother and Virgin Mary: stepmother → stepparent → parent ← mother ← Virgin Mary. Thus the WordNet taxonomy foregoes the richness of a componential taxonomy, which would provide multiple paths between some terms—e.g., in addition to the previous path, stepmother → woman ← mother ← Virgin Mary. Such problems prevent WordNet from being used to address some questions—e.g., are more male than female identities available in English.

The WordNet taxonomy organizes taxonomic relations more or less conventionally, but the organization often is more complex than an alternative organization. For example, the WordNet path from grandfather to father is: grandfather → grandparent → forebear → ancestor ← progenitor ← genitor ← parent ← father. This is conventional to the extent that connecting grandfather and father via ancestor does match Werner and Fenton's analysis (1970, Figure 16). However, the long WordNet path is rococo compared to a possible alternative: grandfather → father (which yields grandfather → ancestor by transitivity). Though neither formulation has intrinsic validity, the view of a grandfather as a kind of father actually is substantiated by the WordNet

definition of grandfather—"the father of your father or mother," and it corresponds better with the subjective distance between the terms (Romney and D'Andrade 1964).

Our justification for employing WordNet as an empirical database despite such problems is that a census of identities has not been attempted before, and it is so invaluable in correcting common identity-theory misconceptions that it is warranted, notwithstanding some limitations of the methodology.

Identities in English

We employed the WordNet 1.6 database to obtain the full taxonomic expansion of the concept, human being (synonyms: person, individual, someone, somebody, mortal, human, soul). Since the expansion was too big to obtain in a single step, we first obtained the taxonomic expansion of human being in terms of concepts at the next level of specificity, then obtained the taxonomic expansions of each of those concepts, and combined all retrievals.

According to the WordNet database, the concept of human being encompasses 203 concepts of person at the next level of specificity (call it level two, with the root concept being level one). The full taxonomy of human being contains 5,501 concepts of people. Each of these concepts encompasses one or more identities, and many concepts have synonym sets with two or more identity labels. Moreover, each level-two concept encompasses more specific concepts, perhaps whole sub-taxonomies of them, and most of those concepts also have synonym sets with multiple entries.

Figure 3.1 shows the ten most elaborated concepts at level two. Entries in the left column of figure 3.1 are WordNet definitions of the kinds of people at level two, and the second column gives the synonym sets for the level-two concepts. Each of the synonyms corresponds to an English language identity label. The third column of figure 3.1 samples the taxonomy at levels three, four, etc. by providing an example from the synonym set at each level, with taxonomic relations shown by implication arrows. The branch shown may be one of several for the level-two concept on that row, chosen arbitrarily. Some branches from a level-two concept are longer than those shown in figure 3.1, though none goes further than level nine. (An example of taxonomic branching to level nine is: person ← worker ← employee ← workman ← laborer ← hired hand ← ranch hand ← cowboy ← bronco buster.)

Figure 3.1   Ten Most Augmented Kinds of Person in English (derived from WordNet online lexical database)

Concept of Person—A person who	Labels	Sample Labels for Sub-Kinds[a]	Number
works at a specific job	worker	employee ← workman ← laborer ← cleaner ← chimneysweep	1083
rules or guides or inspires others	leader	head ← administrator ← commissioner ← police commissioner	487
is a fully developed person	adult, grownup	professional ← educator ← academic ← professor ← assistant professor	412
does harm to others	bad person	wrongdoer ← criminal ← murderer ← assassin	399
is any non-European non-White person	person of color	Native American ← North American Indian ← squaw	386
communicates with others	communicator	writer ← journalist ← columnist ← newspaper columnist	354
for some reason is not wanted or welcome	unwelcome person, persona non grata	unpleasant person ← vulgarian ← slovenly person ← litterer	302
uses the mind creatively	intellectual, intellect	scientist ← physicist ← astronomer ← astrophysicist	255
is related by blood or marriage	relative, relation	kinswoman ← female sibling ← sister ← stepsister	254
grows or makes or invents things	creator	maker ← jewelry maker ← silversmith	251

Note: [a] The arrows (←) may be read left-to-right as "incorporates" or "includes."

The final column of figure 3.1 shows the total number of identity labels contained within the level-two concept of person on that row. Altogether, the ten most elaborated concepts of person shown in figure 3.1 yield a total of 4,183 nouns or noun phrases in English for identifying people. Summing over all level-two concepts yields a total of 9,199 identity labels.[1] Thus, almost half of all identities—45 percent—are contained within the ten level-two concepts shown in figure 3.1.

Our own superficial observations suggest that these findings may be characteristic of complex societies generally, regardless of the language spoken. That is, we conjecture that any complex society's theory of people contains thousands of identities organized in a flat taxonomy; the taxonomy has relatively few levels, with the root concept (a person) branching to scores of types, and further divisions often branching to a dozen or more subtypes. Our conjecture is testable: according to the Global WordNet Association (2002) lexical databases such as the one we used are under development for scores of different languages.

Sociological Classification

Next we precipitate the identities into standard social science categories in order to characterize the kinds of human activities and conditions emphasized by the English-language theory of people. Along the way we list instances of identities to emphasize their multitude and diversity.

In this section we italicize WordNet's definitions of level-two concepts.

Occupations

The most elaborated concept in figure 3.1 is *a person who works at a specific job* with 1,083 labels, mostly occupational titles (though a few are vernacular evaluations of workers engaged in disapproved activities, such as lackey and hatchet-man). The occupational labels mainly distinguish among different kinds of laborers (e.g., bellboy and coal-miner) but some also distinguish among different kinds of skilled workers (e.g., dental hygienist and chef), including military workers (e.g., quartermaster and Green Beret) and people holding official jobs (e.g., bailiff and ambassador).

Occupations are distributed over a number of other kinds of concepts, too. More than half of the identities under *a fully developed person* elaborate the concept of a professional. Some of the labels are derogations (such as quack and ambulance-chaser). The concept of *a person who rules or guides or inspires others* refers to spiritual leaders, lawmakers, politicians, and trainers. Approximately half of the labels that elaborate the concept of *a person who communicates with others* designate jobs such as broadcaster and negotiator.

About two thirds of the labels under *a person who grows or makes or invents things* are occupations in the categories of designers, builders, and producers (e.g., landscape-architect and lumberjack). The other labels refer mainly to kinds of artists, with about half of the references being to occupations such as cinematographer and engraver. About half of the labels for *a person who uses the mind creatively* are occupations in the categories of scholars and scientists. Most labels for *a person who speaks more than one language* also are scholarly occupations (e.g., linguist and sociolinguist). Labels identifying *a person who uses scientific knowledge to solve practical problems* mostly refer to engineers or related professions (e.g., computer-programmer and surveyor).

A person who invests capital in a business mostly designates kinds of businesspeople and occupations that deal with money. A few of the labels in this category—such as magnate and moneygrubber—interpret the activities of individuals working in this arena. A third of the labels referring to *a person who receives, invests or pays out money* are occupations (e.g., banker and financial-officer).

About half of the labels expanding the concept of *a person who performs skillfully* are occupations (e.g., theater-critic and psychotherapist). About 80 percent of the labels expanding the concept of *a person who tries to please or amuse* are occupational categories (e.g., film-star and jazz-musician). About half of the labels for *a person who fights (or is fighting)* are kinds of professional fighters (e.g., prizefighter and heavyweight).

Labels for *a person who adjudicates* mostly are occupations within the categories of judges and officials. Most of the labels for *a person who cares for persons or property* are occupations in the categories of custodians, fire-fighters, and law-officers.

Labels for *a person who does nothing* identify individuals whose occupational performance is denigrated—e.g., loafer and clock-watcher—as well as some kinds of individuals who are withdrawn from occupational activities—e.g., retiree and unemployed-person.

Some labels identify individuals with illegitimate occupations. About a third of the labels expanding *a person who does harm to others* designate illegal occupations—such as highjacker and pimp. Also among outlawed occupations are the forms of slavery under *a person who is owned by someone.* Additional illegal occupations such as prostitute and bookie appear under other concepts.

The occupational labels above tally to 3,395 types of person out of the total of 9,199. A few occupations were not counted because they were isolated in concepts unrelated to work. For example: *a person who enjoys taking risks* includes mercenary and venture-capitalist, and *a person who travels into little known regions* includes deep-sea-diver. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the count is conservative, and occupations constitute a very significant component of the identities available to individuals in English-speaking societies.

Occupation Labels versus Occupation Titles

The 3,395 occupational identities obtained from WordNet differ substantially from standard listings of job titles.

The number of occupational identities garnered via WordNet is far below the 31,000 occupation titles used in the U.S. Census 2000

(U.S. Census Bureau 2002) because census titles are more particularized and exhaustive than occupational labels in the WordNet dataset. For example, census titles include 487 different kinds of "inspector"—particularized to eggs, locomotives, police, water, etc.—whereas the WordNet dataset mentions inspector just twice, once in a general reference to a kind of expert investigator and once as a kind of law officer. Some census occupational titles—e.g., aurist, immunochemist, marbleizer, subprior—are not mentioned at all in the WordNet dataset.

From numbers alone one might suppose the WordNet set of occupations is more detailed than the 834 jobs defined in the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) System (U.S. Department of Labor). However, in fact, the WordNet set of occupations does not reference many SOC jobs, such as nuclear engineer, microbiologist, hydrologist, slot key person, telemarketer, painter of transportation equipment, or the SOC's 54 different kinds of teachers. On the other hand, WordNet is more specific regarding jobs that are not core parts of government bureaucracy (e.g., entertainment and religion).

Clearly, vernacular language foregoes many technical distinctions made in official classifications. That is because vernacular language truncates the bottoms of taxonomies that extend into scientific or administrative subcultures,[2] as we propounded in Proposition 2.7 of chapter two. On the other hand, vernacular language includes denigrating names for occupational roles and recognizes outlawed occupations that are excluded from official classifications.

Economy

Besides identifying kinds of workers, colloquial English provides labels for individuals who take on other roles in the economic system. Labels for *a person who possesses great material wealth* identify especially privileged property holders; labels for *a person who owns something* refer to more general kinds of property owners including homeowners and landowners. Derogations of property owners—e.g., hoarder and tightwad—are provided by the labels for *a person who accumulates things and hides them away for future use*, and some of the labels for *a person who suffers misfortune* refer to kinds of poor people such as paupers or vagrants.

Some labels refer to participants in economic transactions. Most of the labels for *a person who gets something* refer to economic personages such as heir and freeloader. Labels for *a person who holds assets in trust for a beneficiary* and for *a person who wagers money on the outcome of*

games or sporting events identify economic personages. Some of the labels for *a person who uses goods or services* refer to customers or prodigals.

Altogether we found 165 identities in the economic sector that are not related to work.

Political

We included the paid jobs of elected officials—such as mayor, governor, and senator—under occupations, but English contains additional identities for individuals who participate in political activities and ideological conflicts. Political labels occur under *a person who rules or commands* and also under *a person who makes plan*s. Labels for *a person who accepts the leadership of another* are political, and many of these are derogatory. All of the labels for *a person who owes allegiance to a nation* are relevant to this category. Labels for conservatives, centrists, liberals, war mongers, and pacifists occur under *a fully developed person*.

Most of the identities for a person who pleads for a cause or idea and for a person who disputes and is good at or enjoys controversy are used in political contexts. Also relevant are the identities for a person who dissents from some established policy and for a person who offers opposition.

Almost all of the identities for *a person who is of equal standing with another in a group* arise in political contexts, though some of the terms arise in other contexts as well. About a third of the words for *a person who holds no title* have political connotations.

All together, 487 non-occupational identities are available to classify and evaluate individuals who relate to governing in one way or another.

Kinship

Kinship identities appear in WordNet as the labels for *a person who is related by blood or marriage.* About two-thirds of the 254 labels refer to ancestors, including parents, stepparents, and grandparents; to offspring, including special terms for infants (e.g., newborn) plus some derogatory terms (e.g., bastard and momma's boy); and to spouses—wives (e.g., housewife and golf-widow), husbands (e.g., family-man and cuckold), and newlyweds (e.g., bride and honeymooner). About a tenth of the labels apply to siblings and another tenth to various kinds of collateral

relatives. The remaining labels identify kinds of in-laws, and refer to general categories of kin (e.g., blood-relation).

Kinship identities form the core of pre-industrial social structures. "Among simple, non-literate societies, kinship constitutes the major social institution. That is, the roles that make up the social organization of the society are primarily kinship roles" (D'Andrade 1995, p. 19). Our census of identities indicates that kinship identities are not nearly so important in the English-language theory of people.

Religion

The WordNet database lists religion-related identities under several concepts. Amongst the labels for *a person who manifests devotion to a deity* are Christian identities—both Protestant (e.g., Episcopalian and Mormon) and Catholic (e.g., abbess and pontiff), plus labels for Muslims (e.g., Shiite and Imam), and for Hindus (e.g., swami and Hare-Krishna). Other identities in this category refer to religious abstinence (e.g., puritan and celibate), to religious excursions (e.g., pilgrim and missionary), and to distinctive theistic attitudes (e.g., pantheist and devil-worshiper).

WordNet provides a separate nine-entry category for *belonging to the worldwide group descended from the ancient Israelites*. Some other kinds of religious identities (e.g., Lutheran and Satanist) are labels within the category of *a person who accepts the leadership of another.*

Identities for someone *who does not manifest devotion to a deity* relate to beliefs (e.g., agnostic and atheist) and to relations with religious authority (e.g., blasphemer and infidel). Pagan devotees of the supernatural (e.g., sorceress and diviner) appear under the concept of *a person who practices the occult arts.*

Summing all these instances, we find that WordNet categories contain a total of 265 religious identities.

Social science enterprises often treat religious identity with a multiple-choice question—e.g., the RELIG question in the General Social Survey (NORC 1972) is: "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?" Even when the answer is probed, the number of specified options remains limited to about 40. Consequently survey results suggest that religion contributes little to diversifying people (however fervent those differentiations might be). However, the WordNet census provides a different perspective, suggesting that in the English-language theory of

people religion actually is about as consequential as kinship as a way of partitioning people into types.

Biosocial

We aggregate identities relating to sex and age into a single biosocial classification. Race-related distinctions appear under Ethnicity below. Identities based on bodily features other than sex, age, or race are collected in the Corporal section below.

Sex and age distinctions are paramount in four WordNet classifications. Female identities appear within the classification of *the sex that can have babies*. Some of these are references to female children (e.g., girl-scout and schoolgirl), and the rest are labels for diverse kinds of women, ranging from heroine to battle-ax, from nymph to crone, from broad to lady, from bimbo to wonder-woman.

Male identities appear under *the sex that cannot have babies*. Some refer to male children (e.g., altar-boy and plowboy), and the rest are labels for adult males, some of which subtly relate to matters of courtship—e.g., bachelor, clotheshorse, eunuch, geezer, gent, hunk, womanizer.

With regard to age, WordNet expands *a youthful person* to labels such as kid and brat. Some of the labels within *a fully developed person* specify old people—e.g., elder and codger.

The above identities tally to 466. However, that is less than the actual number of identities that involve sex or age distinctions. Many labels for relatives distinguish sex and age (Goodenough 1965), but these are not included in the tally. In addition, a noun with female marking such as assemblywoman or authoress often is given in conjunction with an identity that commonly is interpreted as male.

The WordNet database does not foster a correct estimate of the number of biosocial identities because it does not use a componential taxonomy. For example, WordNet classifies father as a kind of parent, not as a parent and a male. Thus, we cannot trace downward from male or female or young or old to every identity that entails the feature.

Ethnicity

Seven level-two categories in the WordNet taxonomy of identities contain labels for individuals with a specific ethnic, racial, or geographic background.

A native or inhabitant of Europe includes nationalities such as Italian and Pole, tribal identifiers such as Saxon and Celt, and some identities based on location such as Cockney and Sicilian. *A native or inhabitant of Africa* similarly refers to nationalities (e.g., Egyptian and South African) and to tribes and ethnicities (e.g., Bantu and Afrikaner).

The concept of *a person who lives in a particular place* mainly contains references to kinds of people living in the United States (e.g., Californian and Hoosier) and to people living on specific continents or islands (e.g., Australian and Trinidadian). The category also includes some general identity labels such as islander and villager. About half of the entries under *a person who was born in a particular place* refer to non-U.S. Americans (e.g., Canadian and Brazilian) and most of the rest refer to kinds of individuals associated with the former Soviet Union (e.g., Georgian and Muscovite).

About half of the labels under *any non-European non-White person* refer to Amerindians—either speakers of a particular kind of language (e.g., Algonquian or Sioux) or members of tribes within the language families (e.g., Cheyenne and Osage). The remaining labels are terms for Asian nationalities such as Cambodian and Iranian, including specific group identifiers such as Sikh or Yakut, and references to non–African Blacks.

Identities under *a member of the Caucasoid race* include references to Semites (e.g., Arab and Saudi), plus expressions for a Caucasian (e.g., Aryan and white-trash). *A person whose ancestors belonged to two or more races* has eight labels (e.g., Mulatto and half-breed).

The tally for all these types together is 868. About half (432) are racial labels.

These are large numbers. For a standard of comparison consider Ghana where nearly every setting is polyethnic and often multilingual, and yet the culture provides just 23 categories for non-Africans and 113 categories of Africans, identified in terms of nation, city, and tribal origins (Sanjek 1977). Thus, individuals in English-speaking societies receive a relatively elaborate conceptual apparatus for distinguishing individuals on the basis of ethnicity and race.

Corporal

Some identities are assigned on the basis of an individual's bodily characteristics, aside from sex, age, or race. Labels are available for *a person who is below average size*—e.g., midget and runt—and for *a large*

person—e.g., fatso and giant. Some additional terms relating to size—such as goliath and monster—are listed for *a person who is unusual*, a category that also includes the identities of albino and transsexual.

WordNet divides *someone with [color] hair* into three concepts containing the labels: redhead and carrot top, blonde, and brunette. In addition there are terms for *a person whose head is bald* (e.g., baldy).

A person who suffers misfortune contains a few labels referring to physical disfigurements such as amputee and hunchback. *A person who has some handicap that interferes with normal functions* has multiple labels referring to people with physical disabilities, such as paraplegic and mute.

Identities relating to corporal features tally to 83.

Leisure

Identities corresponding to avocations occur in several WordNet categories. Most of the labels expanding *a person who participates in competitions* name people who play specific games (such as baseball-player, hockey-player) or refer to roles in a particular sport (pitcher, goalie) or to general classifications of competitors (contestant, most-valuable-player). *A person who projects something through the air* adds more terms for throwers, mainly kinds of pitchers. Some additional kinds of sportspersons—e.g., mountaineer and parachutist—are found in the concept of *a person who enjoys taking risks*—and a few more—e.g., scuba-diver and spelunker—come in the category of *a person who travels into little known regions (especially for some scientific purpose).*

Most of the identities for *a person who changes location* identify avocational travelers such as tourist and cyclist.

Labels for *a person who becomes aware through the senses* mainly focus on kinds of viewers, including moviegoer and voyeur. A secondary focus is kinds of hearers, including auditor and eavesdropper. Labels for *a person who pursues a study or sport as a pastime* identify hobbyists such as bird-watchers and stamp-collectors. Most of the labels for *a person who uses goods or services* identify devotees of specific pleasures, many of which have negative connotations—e.g., drunkard and whoremonger.

The total number of leisure identities in these categories is 522, making leisure one of the larger realms of individual differentiation. This corresponds to the importance attributed to leisure in contemporary writings on the self—for example, "[A lifestyle activity constitutes] a more or less integrated set of practices which an individual embraces, not only because such practices fulfill utilitarian needs, but because they

give material form to a particular narrative of self identity" (Giddens 1991, p. 81).

Sexualities

English offers a fair number of labels for individuals practicing different forms of sexuality. Most of the labels for *a person who enjoys sensuality* are variations on being a bisexual, hedonist, or wanton. The labels for *a person who has a sexual attraction to persons of the same sex* provide ways of referring to gay men and lesbians, many derogatory, and the labels for *someone having a sexual orientation to persons of the opposite sex* also are sexual identities. Some of the words for *a person who does harm to others* refer to perverts, libertines, or sexual aggressors.

Overall, these categories yield 108 identities relating to sexuality. Large as it is, it is a low number given the expectations fostered by Foucault, who refers to a "thousand aberrant sexualities" and who claims that societal authorities "strew reality with them and incorporate them into the individual" (Foucault 1978, pp. 44–45). Foucault's thousand aberrant sexualities must be the preoccupations of specialists in psychiatry, law, and morality rather than the lay public. Lay persons with their vernacular language do not have anywhere near that level of discrimination in the realm of sexualities.

Stigma

WordNet provides a number of categories that solely contain stigmatized identities.

The labels expanding the concept of *a person who for some reason is not wanted or welcome* mainly identify various kinds of bores, faultfinders, grouches, snobs, upstarts, spoilsports, troublemakers, and scoundrels. Among the labels are vernacular terms such as creep and scum-bag, and indecent labels such as asshole and mother-fucker.

Some of the labels for *a person who does harm to others* identify stigmatized people aside from those in illegal occupations, already considered in the Occupations section above. There are identities for assailants and lawbreakers (e.g., rapist and recidivist), for political offenders (e.g., deserter and war-criminal), for cheats (e.g., imposter and liar), and for debauchees and perverts (e.g., nymphomaniac and sadomasochist). Most of the labels for *a person who causes the death of a person or animal* also

are relevant here, referring to murderers such as assassin and poisoner. Labels for *a person who belongs to early stage of civilization* (e.g., primitive and savage) often are used metaphorically as stigmatizing labels.

English provides a plenitude of disparaging identifiers for *a person who lacks intelligence or common sense*—e.g., dimwit, dolt, dumbbell, idiot, jackass, and scatterbrain. Labels for *a person who is tricked or swindled* include identities such as laughingstock and easy-mark. Several disparaging labels identify *a person who has poor motor coordination* (e.g., butterfingers and oaf), and also *a person who shows fear or timidity* (e.g., coward and wallflower). Many of the identities for *a person who is unusual* are denigrating—e.g., crackpot and jerk.

The above groups contain 801 identities. Numerous other stigmatized identities are scattered among other kinds of identity, and we have mentioned some of these in our examples. Lacking a componential taxonomy with each stigmatized identity classified as a kind of disparaged person, we cannot count the entire set. Even so it is clear that stigma is one of the more important bases for distinguishing people.

Esteemed

Just as the meanings of stigmatized identities contain a component of negative affect, another set of identities relate to positive affect. *A person who loves or is loved* has labels for admirers and sweethearts. Labels for *a person who is known well and regarded with affection and trust* refer to different kinds of friends such as buddy and confidant. Labels for *a person who is good to other people* refer to benefactors of various kinds (e.g., donor and humanitarian), and secondarily to virtuous people (e.g., saint and square-shooter). Most of the labels for *a person who acts and gets things done* connote admiration (e.g., powerhouse and self-starter).

The combined number of identities in these classes is 171. Thus resources for distinguishing people in an emotionally positive way constitute less than a fourth of the lexical resources for stigmatizing.

Other

Residual identities left over from the above classifications number 1,527. These are identities too far from the classification criteria to be included in our tallies. Also left over are some general types of identities that we chose not to treat separately.

Labels related to social institutions that we did not consider apart from the Occupations class include education identities in the categories of *a person who learns* (e.g., undergraduate and quick-study) and *a person who lacks technical training*—e.g., trainees and incompetents; legal identities in the category of *a person who is involved in legal proceedings* (e.g., plaintiff and accused); and identities related to organizations in the category of *a person who requires professional services* (e.g., client and outpatient) and in the category of *a person who requests or seeks something such as assistance or employment or admission* (e.g., petitioner and job-candidate). The total number of residual labels of these types is 153.

Thirty-seven residual labels relate to characteristics of an individual in the categories of *a person who pursues independent thought or action* (e.g., loner and nudist), *a person who can read and write* (e.g., reader and diarist), and *a person you are acquainted with* (e.g., bunkmate and classmate).

Overview

In our presentation above we aggregated WordNet categories into sociologically relevant classes, named some example identities, and reported counts. Now we examine the relative contribution of the classes and identify the most elaborate bases for partitioning the population into contrasting groups. We address these issues with figure 3.2 which displays the proportions of each class graphically.

A caveat before beginning: our counts and percentages are approximations rather than exact figures because of the ambiguities in classifying particular labels into categories. However, we are confident that replications of our work will come to the same general conclusions as we do, even if the specific numbers differ.

Figure 3.2 shows that well over a third of all commonplace identities denote occupations. Thus, the primary basis for partitioning the population derives from the societal division of labor. Some additional identities signify statuses associated with economic matters. Adding these to the occupations gives two-fifths of all identities that a person learns in English-speaking societies being concerned with individuals' relationships to work and wealth.

Other social institutions also make notable contributions to the pool of received identities in English: several percent of all identities are in the political realm, another few percent are religious, and a few percent more are kinship identities. Aggregated together, about half of all identities are associated with social institutions related to economy, politics,

Figure 3.2 Varieties of Identities in English

religion, and kinship. Some identities of other social institutions such as medicine, education, and law, which were incorporated into the Other class in our analysis, can be added to the institutional aggregation solidifying the estimate of half of all identities being associated with social institutions.

Another array of identities relates to biological characteristics. The identities based on sex and age distinctions that we collected in the Biosocial category and the identities based on bodily features in the Corporal category together constitute about one-sixteenth of all identities. However, identities related to biology actually are more ubiquitous than this. Most kinship identities are defined in terms of sex, age, and biological relationships; and half of the terms in the Ethnicity category relate to racial attributions. Altogether, we estimate that about one-eighth of all identities partition people in terms of biological considerations.

Finally we observe that at least one-tenth of all identities are defined centrally by their association with positive or negative affect—the classes of Esteemed and Stigmatized identities in figure 3.2—and most of these identities are infused with negative affect. The percent of affectively laden identities actually is a few points higher than shown

in figure 3.2 because a few stigmatized identities are present in many different classes. Thus the English-language theory of people provides ample opportunities to label individuals on the basis of evaluative judgments about them.

Collective Identities

In this section we first parlay a distinction between role-identities and collective identities developed by Thoits and Virshup (1997) into a linguistically based criterion for distinguishing collective identities. Then we offer an estimate of the proportion of collective identities among all identities and describe the main domains of collective identities.

Thoits and Virshup (1997, p. 123) distinguished between collective identities and role identities with a crucial insight: collective identities involve trans-situational attributes that individuals carry with them into situationally specific role identities. As Rosenberg (1979, p.9) noted, situationally specific role-identities typically are represented linguistically by nouns, and trans-situational characteristics typically are represented linguistically by adjectives.

Combining these ideas, we propose that collective identities are characterized by a distinctive linguistic feature. Labels for collective identities operate either as nouns denoting a set of people, or as adjectives that combine with other identity nouns in order to specify a combination identity. Collectivity labels normally appear in noun form denoting members of sets of people—e.g., a male, a Muslim. However, the same words can be employed adjectivally to distinguish subsets of individuals within the occupants of other identities—e.g., male workers or Muslim workers. Labels for situationally specific role identities do not have this linguistic pliability—e.g., one cannot cogently refer to golfer workers, husband workers, voter workers, etc.

We use this linguistic detail as a means of distinguishing collective identities from other identities. Specifically, a collective identity is an identity whose verbal label operates either as a noun specifying a kind of person, or as a modifier that combines with another identity noun to particularize a kind of person.

A first question is whether the noun-adjective linguistic criterion detects identities that typically are mentioned as examples of collective identities—e.g., "nationality, ethnicity, social class, community, gender, sexuality" (Woodward 1997, p. 1). Religious identities, such as Muslim, also are prime instances of the type. We sampled identities

from the WordNet corpus within these typical arenas of collective identities, and then assessed whether those nouns also appear in WordNet's list of adjectives. Nouns that also serve as adjectives are probable collective identities, according to our linguistic criterion.

The linguistic criterion categorized 17 out of 19 identities associated with nationality, ethnicity, and community as being collective identities. It categorized capitalist as a collective identity related to social class, but not landlord, property owner, or worker. The linguistic criterion categorized five out of nine gender and sexuality identities as being collective identities. It categorized five out of six religion-related identities as collective identities. Overall, the linguistic criterion detects collective identities reasonably well, especially considering that a portion of the identities it fails to categorize as collective identities in fact may not be, even though they are identities within standard domains of collective identities.

Of course, the linguistic criterion must be applied to specific cases with consideration of word meanings, not just syntactic forms. For example, the "party" identity, referring to a person involved in legal proceedings, has an adjective form, suggesting it is a collective identity. However, the adjective form does not relate to the legal sense of the word, only to senses involving politics and festivities. Since the legal sense of the word lacks an adjective form, the legal identity of "party" actually is not a collective identity.

Domains of Collectivity

The intersection of WordNet's list of adjectives with our total list of nouns designating kinds of human being contains 872 identity labels, or 9 percent of the total number of identities. Some labels that should be in the list are missing, such as Arab, which WordNet erroneously fails to list as an adjective, though other dictionaries that we checked do include an adjective form of Arab. On the other hand, some of the 872 labels are exotic (e.g., analphabetic), or are not actually collective identities (e.g., party, as discussed above), so 9 percent is a plausible estimate of the incidence of collective identities among all identities.

Almost a third of the 872 collective identities relate to nationality, ethnicity, and community. Some examples are American, Iraqi, Hispanic, Semite, Parisian, and Cockney. This reflects the predominance of ethnicity in research on collective identities, as reported in Howard's (2000) review of identity research.

Unexpectedly, 10 percent of the collective identities relate to arts and knowledge. Examples of arts-related identities are baritone, romanticist, impressionist, highbrow, and virtuoso. Knowledge-related collective identities include academic, amateur, dilettante, expert, intellectual, rationalist, and visionary.

Another fairly large group of collective identities—also with 10 percent of the total—relates to deviance and stigma. Some examples are criminal, fugitive, braggart, lush, rowdy, and stick-in-the-mud. These instances of collective identities seem counter-intuitive if one is viewing such identities as a basis of association and mobilization, but Goffman (1963, pp. 23–24) addressed this issue: "The members of a particular stigma category will have a tendency to come together into small social groups whose members all derive from the category, these groups themselves being subject to over-arching organization to varying degrees. And one also finds that when one member of the category happens to come into contact with another, both may be disposed to modify their treatment of each other by virtue of believing that they each belong to the same 'group'."

About 8 percent of collective identities relate to religion and philosophy. Examples of religion-based collective identities are agnostic, Buddhist, Franciscan, Episcopalian, fundamentalist, Mormon, and pagan. Philosophy-based collective identities include Aristotelian, existentialist, and fatalist.

An equally large category of collective identities relates to individuals' biological features. Some of these are related to age: for example, adolescent, adult, elder, and nonagenarian. Others are related to gender, such as co-ed, female, and male. Several define collectivities in terms of complexion and race: Black, blond, brunette, and White. Some of these identities designate body size, such as giant, roly-poly, lightweight, and midget. Still others relate to ailments and disabilities: for example, deaf-mute, diabetic, epileptic, paraplegic, spastic, and convalescent. Howard (2000) noted that "gender identities have been explored more extensively than other social identities" (2000, p. 378), that attention to identities based on disabilities is relatively recent, and that "identities based on age have received little explicit attention from social psychologists" (p. 380).

Politics is the domain for 7 percent of the collective identities. Collective identities of this type include activist, fascist, liberal, Republican, and terrorist. Interestingly, Democrat does not have an adjective usage and therefore is not a collective identity by our criterion. This suggests that Republicans have an edge over Democrats in

being able to induce political identification and mobilization within their constituency, since Republican is a collective identity.

A category of traits and dispositions constitutes 6 percent of the collective identities. Some examples are extrovert, hypochondriac, individualist, neurotic, and recluse. We included sexual preferences in this category: gay, heterosexual, Lesbian, libertine, transvestite, and wanton. Howard's (2000) review of identity research found substantial work on sexual identities.

5 percent of collective identities are marked by high regard. These include champion, darling, knockout, notable, Olympian, star, and sweetheart.

3 percent of collective identities relate to social class, including bourgeois, capitalist, derelict, insolvent, nouveau-riche, patrician, proletarian, spendthrift, vagabond, and vagrant. Howard (2000, p. 379) noted "a lack of attention to class in any regard" among researchers working on collective identities. Our results suggest that the lack of research might reflect the paucity of social class identities. Only the middle class has its own collective identity—bourgeois—and the word rarely is used to label individuals. The other collective identities are related to class position only obliquely. Notably, no cross-situational identity is available to unite the working class away from work settings, not even "proletariat" or "worker" since these words cannot modify identities adopted in other settings. Thus the rallying phrase, "workers of the world, unite" has no support in the linguistic resources provided by English—a striking example of symbolic power supplanting police force for the suppression of class conflict.

The remaining 13 percent constitute a residual category. Several of these identities relate to diaspora (e.g., Gilroy 1997): migrant, transient, itinerant, and peripatetic. Another group within the residual identities relates to the military: e.g., AWOL, captive, corporal, mercenary, noncombatant, and veteran. Others in the residual set are hard to classify. Some of them, such as resident and superior, have multiple equivocal meanings that make them into questionable instances of collective identities, and others such as domestic and Federal may not be collective identities under close scrutiny, such as we gave to the identity of "party" above.

Conclusions

The empirical work in this chapter relates to a number of theoretical propositions in chapter two. Proposition 2.1 (linguistic classification)

postulates that every society provides its populace with a classification system for categorizing and objectifying people. Results in this chapter commence verification of this proposition by demonstrating that one language, English, does indeed contain such a system. A tacit contention in Proposition 2.1 is that societies differ in their systems of classification, and our content analysis of identities in English revealed an occupation-dominated system as opposed to the family-dominated systems of pre-industrial societies (D'Andrade 1995, p. 19).

Proposition 2.3 (Durkheim-Mauss taxonomy axiom) claims that identities are organized in a taxonomy rooted in the general concept of human. Results in this chapter indicate that English does contain such a taxonomy: many of the identities naming sets of humans encompass additional identities naming subsets of humans. Since individuals who learn English implicitly learn the taxonomy of identities, they acquire the taxonomic component of their society's theory of people, as proposed in Proposition 2.16 (socialization via language). Thereby they have rudimentary knowledge of possible careers in various institutions, as specified in Proposition 2.17 (identity careers). The taxonomy also allows them to understand how enactment of a specific identity simultaneously gives them presence in terms of more abstract entailed identities, as discussed in Proposition 2.13 (entailed identities). The second-to-last column of figure 3.1 shows diverse examples of the kinds of entailments considered in Proposition 2.13.

Comparing occupational identities in vernacular English with occupational titles in official listings revealed that institutional and technological subcultures extend the taxonomy of identities far beyond the vernacular theory of people, thereby providing rich potential for expanding the theory of people when an institution or technology becomes of general interest, as discussed in Proposition 2.7 (identities from subcultures). Proposition 2.5 (collective identities) asserts that identities based on shared attributes foster solidarity among individuals having the attribute, and our linguistically based analyses corroborated many standard domains of identity-based solidarity, suggested some domains that have gone unstudied, and revealed a paucity of collective identities in English that might evoke solidarity within social classes.

In general, our results revealed that thousands more identities are defined in English than have been reckoned by traditional identity researchers. In fact, the number of identities involved in North American lives is three or four orders of magnitude greater than the number of identities typically propounded in traditional identity theories. Moreover the level-two concepts of person are numerous,

reflecting the fact that the identity taxonomy is fairly flat, branching to many identity tokens at each level, with less than ten hierarchy levels evident in the common culture. These findings support counter-enlightenment arguments about the overwhelming complexity of identifications confronting a contemporary individual, and undermine traditional conceptions of identity processes.

Perhaps some traditional identity theories really were theories of the salience of social institutions, focusing on aggregate concepts such as work role, family role, and leisure role. Nonetheless, our results suggest that about half of all identities are not embedded in social institutions at all. Thus, a focus on institutions inevitably neglects some identity processes—for example, the deployment of affectively infused identities such as hero and fool, or of body-based identities such as baldy, runt, and lady.

With so many identities available in contemporary society, and such an intricate taxonomic structure, youths trying to envisage future trajectories through the identity realm have to consider scores of substantive zones, deciding which are pertinent for them, which will receive some of their commitment, and how deep their commitment will be in terms of seeking, acquiring, and actualizing identities within that zone (or in terms of evading identities in that zone). This challenge gives new significance to the identity crisis proposed by Erikson (1950). Creating an organized self out of the confusion of so much identity potential is a considerable undertaking that must benefit from curiosity, intellect, energy, and diligence.

Work-related identities in the English-language theory of people include both legal and illegal occupations. In contrast, scientific classifications distinguish many technical jobs while ignoring the underworld division of labor. Our comparison of the two kinds of job inventories illuminated scientific inattentiveness to deviant forms of labor, and a corresponding censored view of social stratification, in which illegal workers are lopped off the bottom. In recognizing deviant labor, the English-language theory of people provides a more realistic, even if less elaborate, delineation of the occupational system, especially given that crime is an integrated part of the global economy (Castells 2000b, Chapter 3).

We introduced a linguistic technique for detecting collective identities. As expected, we found that most collective identities relate to nationality, ethnicity, community, gender, age, sexuality, and religion. However, our approach led to some surprises. We found clusters of collective identities in the fields of mental work and military operations,

thereby suggesting two relatively unexplored areas of collective solidarity based on identity processes. Notwithstanding social science perorations on the solidarity and mobilizability of social classes, we found only feeble identity resources for accomplishing collectivization within classes. Moreover, despite contemporary emphasis on collective identities (e.g., Castells 2004; Woodward 1997), we found that collective identities constitute only a small fraction of all identities, suggesting that identity processing in everyday life involves far more than identification with collectivities.

Sensitized by Bourdieu and Wacquant's (1992, pp. 244–245) caution concerning operational definitions, we offer two caveats regarding our census of identities. First, by studying names for people, our study helps sanctify a conception of agentive beings based on individual humans, slighting consideration of other possible kinds of agents, such as supernatural entities, and corporations. Second, by associating identities with nouns denoting kinds of people, our study naturalizes a naming approach to identities, notwithstanding contention within social science about the very nature of identity. Nevertheless, this work constitutes a step in the kind of social science that Bourdieu (1991, p. 105) called for—one that attends to "the part played by words in the construction of social reality." Moreover, our pragmatic operationalization of identity as the list of nouns referring to humans resulted in fresh perspectives regarding a number of issues related to identity theories and to social science generally.

Language and Social Institutions

Social institutions arose in chapter two as an aspect of cultural theories of people, and they arise again in chapter five as constrictions on self-actualization. Since social institutions are a key part of our arguments, we examine social institutions in detail in this chapter, substantiating our proposal in chapter two that social institutions are implicit in the meanings of social identities, and that knowledge of identities thereby provides an individual with practical knowledge of the macro-sociological structure of society which the individual uses for defining self and others in various situations. In the course of doing this we clarify the nature of social institutions, and provide a method for discovering what social institutions exist in a society and what identities are aligned with each.

"Social institution" has multiple references in social science—to habitual actions like hand-shakes (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 54), to organizations grounded in cognitive or rational systems (Hechter, Opp, and Wippler 1990; Jepperson 2002), and to the largest units of social structure (Parsons and Shils 1951). Our concern in this book follows the Parsons and Shils (1951, p. 39) definition: "an *institution* will be said to be a complex of institutionalized role integrates which is of strategic significance in the social system in question. The institution should be considered a higher order unit of social structure than the role, and indeed it is made up of a plurality of interdependent role-patterns."

Sociological overviews of specific societies often proceed by discussing each social institution in turn, as Williams (2000) did in his synopsis of American society. Despite the popularity of the concept, however, no principled method exists for determining the number and

composition of a society's social institutions. Parsons' approach of infer-ring institutions from societal needs was applied only at very abstract levels and relied on his speculations about what societal needs exist. Network structuralism is equally abstract and abstruse, exemplified by White's statement that "institutions emerge when disciplines from dis-tinct network-populations crisscross according to stories of regular pat-terns" (1992, p. 116). Symbolic interactionists embraced the concept in a recent handbook (Reynolds and Herman-Kinney 2003), but social institutions were treated as interaction arenas where individuals create and exchange meanings, rather than as cultural constructions resulting from the creation and exchange of meanings.

We adopt a semiotic approach, viewing social institutions as "seman-tic fields or zones of meaning" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 41), and as "conceptually organized meaning-systems" associated with "fields of identity"—e.g., family, therapy, and so on (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 133, note 11). In this perspective, social institutions are implicit in meanings of role identities and can be studied empirically by analyz-ing the meanings of identities in a society's theory of people, under the assumption that the meanings link identities in the same institution to each other and to actions and objects relevant to the institution, generating confluences of meaning. Discerning an institution through its confluence of meanings actually is more practical than trying to abstract it from field observations because an institution's embodied identities, performed actions, settings, and instruments are widely dis-persed geographically and temporally.

In this chapter we assemble lexical data on the meanings of some identities, analyze the data as a semantic network, and show that clus-ters of identity concepts within the network correspond to the role compositions of social institutions. We also provide a provisional dem-onstration that the meanings of settings are part of the meaning conflu-ences underlying institutions.

Analyzing Meaning

Dictionary definitions articulate culture-wide meanings implicit in common word usages (Landau 2001), so we employ dictionary defi-nitions of identities as an accessible and commonsense body of data describing the cultural understandings that individuals have about identities. The dictionary definitions come from two sources—the *Cambridge International Dictionary of English* (Procter 1995)—*CIDE*, and

the computerized corpus that we used in the prior chapter, the *WordNet Online Lexical Database* (WordNet 2005)—*WOLD*.

Designed for learners of English as a foreign language, *CIDE* defines every word in terms of a corpus of 2,000 foundation words. Thereby each concept links to no more than 2,000 other concepts. We employed the CD-ROM version of *CIDE*, and copied and pasted definitions from *CIDE* to work files.

CIDE overlooks some identities of interest in studies of everyday social life—e.g., do-nothing, temporary worker, sawbones—and occasionally some of its definitions seem scanty—e.g., chum is defined merely as a friend. For this reason, we supplemented *CIDE* definitions with definitions from *WOLD*.

WOLD provides a brief definition for the concept underlying each of its synonym sets. *WOLD* definitions generally are sparser than *CIDE* definitions and sometimes recondite, but *WOLD* does offer definitions for most of the identities that *CIDE* misses, and occasionally *WOLD* fills out scanty definitions in *CIDE*—e.g., in *WOLD* a chum is a close friend who accompanies his buddies in their activities.

Occasionally neither dictionary defined an identity explicitly but instead merely referred to the key behavior or idea exemplified by those with the identity. In such cases, we incorporated the definition of the key behavior or idea. For example, a coach was defined laconically in *CIDE* as the noun form of coaching, so we incorporated the definition of coaching as the definition of coach.

Sample of Identities

We focus on the social institutions of business and work, education, law and corrections, marriage and family, medicine, politics and government, and religion. These institutional areas are plausible constituents of societal organization in North America. In addition we tentatively treat sexuality as a possible institution on the basis of work by Foucault (1978).

We selected 300 identities from the corpus of 500 identities that Heise (2001) assembled to enable simulations of everyday social interactions within a variety of social institutions. Our selection of 300 includes all identities that seem related to the focal institutional areas for this analysis: 79 marriage and family identities, 65 identities related to work and business, 33 identities related to sexuality, 30 related to law and corrections, 27 that are education related, 26 that are medicine

related, 21 that are religion related, and 19 identities from politics and government.

Coding

We retrieved *CIDE* and *WOLD* definitions of each identity, and coded the concatenated definitions into a set of concepts linked to that identity according to the following rules.

- Eliminate references to human, person, or people since such concepts are implicit in all identities.
- Eliminate function words—articles, pronouns, conjunctions.
- Eliminate quantifiers such as frequently, very, particular, long, etc.
- Eliminate evaluations such as good, offensive, excess, etc.
- Eliminate indefinite references to time or place such as year, occasion, location.
- Eliminate negations. For example, "not knowing whether a god exists" gets reduced to "knowing," "god," "exists." The reasoning is that negation establishes a link between concepts, albeit one with a special attribute.
- Re-form inflections of verbs and verb-based nouns into gerunds to provide a standard form independent of what appears in definitions. For example, studies becomes studying, employment becomes employing.
- Convert plural nouns to singular in order to use a standard form.
- List each component of a non-idiomatic multi-word identity. For example, devil worshipper has devil and worshipper in its list of definitional concepts. However, girl-Friday is an idiom, so girl and Friday are not in its definition list.
- To standardize forms and achieve maximum comparability across definitions, perform the following conversions when sensible:
  - adverbs to adjectives (e.g., unkindly to unkind),
  - adjectives to root nouns (e.g., skilled to skill, emotional to emotion),
  - ideological nouns to identity nouns (e.g., feminism to feminist).

As a result of these operations, each identity was associated with a set of concept references, beginning with the identity being defined and continuing with the standard forms of all concepts mentioned in the

concatenated definitions. For example, guest is defined in the dictionaries as: (*CIDE*) a person who is staying with you, or a person whom you have invited to a social occasion, such as a party or a meal; (*WOLD*) a visitor to whom hospitality is extended. From these definitions, we derived the set of concept references for guest: guest staying inviting social party meal visitor hospitality extending.

The reformulation of dictionary definitions into a set of concepts transforms an identity's meaning into a position within a semantic network. That is, an identity is a concept whose concept set relates it to other concepts. Aggregating multiple identities and their concept sets creates a web of relations among concepts.

Meaning Iterations

Our hypothesis is that social institutions correspond to clusters of identities whose meanings converge on a shared set of concepts depicting identities, behaviors, settings, and other items. However, the confluence of meanings might not be directly evident with published dictionary definitions, especially laconic definitions. For example, *CIDE* defines sibling as a brother or sister. We have to know that brother and sister in turn are defined as individuals with the same parents as other individuals, and that a parent is defined as a mother or father, in order to appreciate that the meaning of sibling relates to nuclear-family identities and converges with their meanings.

Everyday use of dictionaries often involves looking up words that a definition contains in order to deepen understanding. We expand concept sets in just this way in order to augment an identity's presence in the semantic network, making it easier to detect confluences of meaning.

We adopt the following terminology. A span-1 concept set includes only concepts derived directly from a word's dictionary definitions. A span-2 concept set contains concepts from the dictionary definitions, plus the span-1 concept sets for each of the concepts in the dictionary definitions. A span-3 concept set contains concepts in the span-2 definition, plus the span-2 concept sets for each of the concepts in the span-2 definition. And so on, each expansion to a higher span representing one iteration. To illustrate (using just *WOLD* definitions for simplicity), the span-1 concept set for sibling consists of sibling, brother, sister. The span-2 concept set consists of sibling, brother, sister, male, female, parent. The span-3 concept set consists of sibling, brother,

sister, male, female, parent, sex, baby, mother, father, begetting, birth, nurturing, raising, child.

In this exploratory study, we limit iterations to just identities in our corpus of identities. Thus the iterations indicated for sibling in the prior paragraph occur in our methodology, but a span-4 expansion would augment the concept set only by including the span-3 concept set for child, ignoring the concepts of begetting, birth, nurturing, or raising since those concepts are not identities. While we expand definitions only through identity concepts, the other concepts remain as part of the definition, contributing to each identity's semantic network.[1]

Of the 300 identities we consider, only one—evangelist—had a span-4 concept set differing from its span-3 concept set.

Confluence Analyses

Since network analyses (Wasserman and Faust 1994) depend on various kinds of multivariate statistical procedures, we converted the expanded definitions of identities into a data matrix. Each of 300 columns represents an identity and each of 928 rows represents an element appearing in at least one identity's concept set. Cells in the table contain ones or zeros, depending on whether the expanded concept set for the column identity contained the row concept or not. The identity, devil worshipper, had the most linkages: 58 ones in its column. However, in every column most of the entries were zeroes representing non-linkages— from 870 for devil worshipper to 926 for do-nothing, newlywed, and purchaser.

We computed correlations[2] to measure similarities between columns, and factor analyzed the correlations into principal components, retaining twelve components.[3] The huge table of factor loadings of 300 identities on 12 rotated components is too large to display. Instead as we discuss each component in the sections below, we list associated identities in footnotes, ordered from most associated to least, and separated into those with loadings of 0.5 or more, and those with loadings of 0.2 to 0.5.

We computed component scores for each of the 928 concepts used to define identities. A concept received a high positive score on a component if it is involved in the expanded meanings of many identities associated with the component, and a negative score if the concept is involved in defining other components but not the focal one. We

use these scores to identify concepts that caused identities to bundle into a specific component. Verbs with large scores are of particular interest because they define activities that are characteristic within an institutional domain.

Family and Marriage

Our analysis included 79 identities related to marriage and family. These do not coalesce into a single bundle, but instead partition into three components. However, the first two components discussed below correlate highly (0.68) and the first correlates somewhat with the third as well (0.21).

Caregiving

Major activities that contribute to this component[4] are begetting, nurturing, and raising children. The identities loading on this component mainly designate parents, grandparents, siblings, and collateral relatives. Blood relatives are central, but in-laws and step-relations appear, too, and even foster-relations, and babysitter. The bundle of related identities includes some stigmatized identities: illegitimate child, orphan, and deadbeat dad.

Essentially this bundle identifies caregivers, plus those involved in breakdowns of care giving. Our presumption in assigning this name to the component is that grandparents, siblings, and collateral relatives all are members of the familial care-giving unit, so any of them may be called on for care-giving help.

The recipients of caregiving—child, daughter, son, granddaughter, grandson, baby, etc.—mostly have low factor loadings on this component. The exceptions—little sister and brother, foster child, niece, and nephew—arise mainly because of flukes in dictionary definitions and in our provisional coding system: little sister and brother are defined as young siblings, putting them into a caretaker category; foster child is defined in terms of who is "raising" the child so the child seems to be caregiving in our codes; and niece and nephew are defined as offspring of siblings.

Childhood

The identities associated with this component[5] are largely dissociated from actions of marrying, begetting, nurturing, or raising children.

Rather this component collects the identities of pre-puberty children—infant, child, daughter, son, girl, boy, schoolgirl, schoolboy—and of those who orient toward children—schoolteacher, pediatrician, homemaker, family man. Identities in the caregiver component attach to this component with low factor loadings.

The childhood bundle includes stigmatized identities for children, such as truant, and stigmatized identities for those whose activities bear negatively upon children, such as child molester and abortionist.

Overall, this component defines the social world of childhood. Adults legitimately enter the childhood world as caregivers or in professional roles.

Marriage

This component[6] is defined in part by the signature action of marrying. Committing adultery and divorcing are defining activities also. Definitions of identities on this component are notably free of mention of sexual attraction or homosexuality.

The identities in this bundle include spouse, husband, and wife, plus (at low factor loadings) house husband, family man, and in-law, step-relative, and half-relative identities. Wedding-related identities include bride, bridegroom, and honeymooner, plus newlywed, bridesmaid, best man, fiancée, and fiancé at low factor loadings.

Being unmarried is represented in the identities of bachelor and spinster (this with a low factor loading), along with the identities derived from having been a spouse formerly—widow, widower, ex-wife, ex-husband. The action of divorcing brings in divorce lawyer, divorcée, and divorcé (with a low factor loading).

Five identities are associated with the action of committing adultery—adulteress, adulterer, mistress, hussy and slut. (WOLD defines hussy and slut as adulteresses. *CIDE* and other dictionaries we checked do not make this association.) Additional identities—nymphomaniac, skirt chaser, prostitute, bisexual, gigolo, lady-killer, whore, flirt—appear in this cluster with low factor loadings because the component is partly defined in terms of men, women, and sexuality.

Collateral relatives—niece, nephew, cousin, aunt, uncle—appear in this component with low factor loadings because aunt and uncle are partly defined in terms of husbands and wives, e.g., "the wife of someone's uncle."

Sexuality

Identities associated with this component[7] are defined in terms of sexual attraction to men or women, or by an individual's modes of engaging in sexual activities and obtaining sexual pleasure. The identities are dissociated from the act of marrying. However, overall this component correlates somewhat (0.27) with the Marriage component above.

The identity of heterosexual characterizes cross-sex attraction. More specific identities for a heterosexual woman include some for a woman who is sexually ravenous— nymphomaniac—and some for a woman who is indiscriminate in her male sexual partners—slut and hussy, both with low factor loadings. Specific heterosexual identities for men include some defined in terms of the man's sexual attractiveness to women—lady-killer and stud (with a low factor loading)—and others defined in terms of the male's sexual ravenousness—lecher and, with low factor loadings, skirt chaser. Deviant heterosexuality is represented in the identities of adulteress and adulterer, both having low factor loadings on this component.

Identities involving same-sex attraction—homosexual, gay, bisexual—are central for this component. These include homosexual identities that are defined in the dictionaries as female such as lesbian and dyke, and those that are defined as male such as queer.

Some identities on this component indicate variants of sexual relationship—for example, flirt and tease (with a low factor loading) label those who initiate and then truncate sexual encounters. The identities of pickup and intimate (both with low factor loadings) mark different depths of relationship between sexual partners. The identity of swinger (with a low factor loading) relates to multiple sexual relationships.

Manners of obtaining sexual pleasure are marked in several identities with low factor loadings: voyeur for someone who is aroused by observing sexual activities, and sadist and masochist for those who find sexual pleasure in administration of pain.

This component includes identities for those who engage in sexual relationships for money or material gain—prostitute and whore and, with low factor loadings, hooker, mistress, gigolo, call girl. Those who arrange exchanges of sex for money also fit here—pimp (with a low factor loading). The identity of rapist (low factor loading) designates someone who obtains sexual partners through coercion and violence.

The medical identity of gynecologist has a low factor loading on this component because it is partly defined in terms of treatment of a woman's sexual organs.

Medicine

Mainly, this component[8] assembles medical practitioners who have been licensed to treat or to perform operations on people who are ill, injured, or hurt.

The focus of activity—patient—is a central identity. Invalids also are associated with the component, at a low factor loading.

Core identities aside from patient include MDs: physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, doctor, gynecologist, pediatrician. Abortionist aligns with a low factor loading. Derisive interpretations of MDs also align on the component: sawbones, shrink, quack.

Attendants of patients add to the bundle: nurse, registered nurse, head nurse, practical nurse. Probationer is among the attendants in that *WOLD* defines probationer as a nurse in training.

Trainee and instructor align in this cluster with low factor loadings. That is because the meanings of both of these identities link to job and skills, which are among the key concepts defining identities in medicine.

Education

Focal activities for this component[9] are enrolling in universities, colleges, and other schools in order to study and learn. The component also relates to teaching and training at an educational institution.

The component includes multiple identities for the attendees of schools: student, university student, undergraduate, and coed. It also includes the derisive label of grind for individuals with excessive commitment to studying, and the identity of scholar for individuals with admirable commitment to studying. The component in addition includes identities for advanced participants in education: graduate student, student teacher, and intern.

With low factor loadings, the component includes the identity of alumnus for those who complete school, and the identity of dropout for those who do not.

Educator identities aligned with this component are lecturer and tutor and, with low factor loadings, professor, schoolteacher, teacher, and scholar.

Religion

Identities related to religion partitioned into two components.

Ecclesiastic

This component[10] consists of identities for those who preach religious doctrine—preacher, evangelist—and for those who conduct rites in churches: clergyman, priest, priestess, minister, pastor, rabbi. Types of Christians—protestant and catholic—align on the component with low factor loadings.

Because *WOLD* defines clergyman as a "spiritual leader," this component aligns religious identities with non-religious authorities and managers: leader and strike-leader and, with low factor loadings: demagogue, matriarch, principal, executive, businessman, businesswoman. The identities of yes-man and subordinate also come in with low factor loadings because both are defined in terms of relations to leaders.

Divinity

This component[11] assembles identities that involve some kind of relationship with the Judeo-Christian God.

God is the central identity of the component. Also included is the identity of God's supernatural antagonist—the Devil—and the identity of Devil worshiper. Other rejecters of God also are included in this component: pagan, atheist, and agnostic.

Jew and rabbi have low factor loadings on this component because of their definitions in terms of spiritual beliefs.

Enemy and foe come in with low factor loadings because of the Devil being defined as the enemy of God.

Business and Work

Business and work identities partitioned into two components.

Work

This component[12] deals with people who are working at a job in a business, office, organization, company, etc. Aside from working, the actions of hiring, employing, controlling, and paying are defining

activities for this component. Definitions of the identities notably lack reference to buying.

Managerial identities in this component include employer, boss, foreman, and, at low factor loadings, manager, manageress, and small businessman. Immediate aides of managers also are part of the component: secretary and, at low factor loadings: girl-Friday, office boy, receptionist, assistant, and the derisive label, yes-man.

Identities for those who work include general terms—worker, employee, workman—and terms emphasizing worker interrelations: work mate, co-worker, and colleague (this at a low factor loading), including trade-union-related identities: strike-breaker, union member (with a low factor loading). Worker identities that are differentiated either generically or substantively are part of the component—skilled worker, temporary worker, and, at low factor loadings, laborer, scientist, librarian.

The component includes identities related to socialization into work activities: apprentice, intern, instructor, trainee (all with low factor loadings). The component also has disvalued identities for those whose work performance is deficient: clock watcher, do-nothing and, at low factor loadings, loafer and malingerer.

Finally, identities for those who are separated from the work world also appear in this component: retiree and unemployed person (both with low factor loadings).

Commerce

This component[13] involves selling, buying, and paying for goods and services in shops, stores, restaurants, etc. The identities notably are dissociated from responsibility in business.

The component includes identities for those buying: customer and, with low factor loadings, shopper and purchaser. The identity of a shopper who foregoes paying—shoplifter—also is on this component, with a low factor loading.

The component includes identities for those selling: saleslady, salesman, salesclerk and, with low factor loadings, shop clerk, shopkeeper, and merchant. In addition there are identities for individuals who convey purchases: server, plus waitress and waiter with low factor loadings. The occupational nature of these roles is reflected in the identities of employer and employee appearing on this component with low factor loadings.

The sellers of sexual services also appear on this component: hooker, call girl, and pimp, plus gigolo with a low factor loading.

Taxpayer aligns on the component with a low factor loading because taxpayers *pay* taxes.

Law and Corrections

Law and corrections identities partitioned into two components.

Law

This component[14] focuses on professionals who are authorized to practice law—advising people on legal matters, conducting lawsuits, and speaking for clients in courts. Legal professionals who officially represent the state in addition may be authorized to accuse people of crimes.

The component includes general identities for legal professionals—lawyer and attorney—and identities for some specialized types such as defense attorney and divorce lawyer. The derisive identity of mouthpiece also loads on this component.

The component includes identities for lawyers who practice as officials of the state: prosecuting attorney, district attorney, public defender, and judge (with a low factor loading).

Identities for courtroom participants who are not legal professionals also load on this component with low factor loadings—defendant most centrally. Foreman comes in because CIDE specifically links the meaning of foreman to juries in courts of law. Similarly sheriff aligns on this component because *CIDE* partly defines sheriff as an official who carries out orders of courts of law.

With low factor loadings, the component includes identities for those who have been convicted of crimes in courts of law— felon, criminal, crook. Stool-pigeon comes in because that identity is defined as a type of criminal.

Police

This component[15] relates to members of police forces, especially those wearing uniforms, who patrol, investigate and discover.

The central identity is police officer, joined by the informal term for the identity, cop. Special types include detective, state trooper, patrolman, plainclothesman, and nark. Probationer aligns on this component with a low factor loading, having been defined by *CIDE* with specific reference to neophyte police officers.

Several related identities have low factor loadings on this component. The identity of vigilante refers to a law enforcer who bypasses police. The identities of stool-pigeon and informer refer to individuals who give information to police.

The definition of police officer as a male or female member of a police force resulted in male, female, and member being key definitional concepts for this component. That in turn led to a variety of anomalous identities joining the component with low factor loadings: catholic, relative, insider, teammate, businesswoman, citizen, enemy, foe, best man, fiancée, professor, protestant.

Politics and Government

No component emerged to represent a social institution of politics and government. Of the 19 identities that were supposed to converge into such a component, 13 identities instead loaded on no factor at all (bureaucrat, conservative, executioner, hatemonger, liberal, lobbyist, patriot, politician, protester, right-winger, terrorist, traitor, voter), and six had factor loadings of 0.2 or more on other components: leader, demagogue, foe, enemy, taxpayer, citizen.

To test again whether a political component of meaning exists in identities, we constructed an improved set of political identities by going outside of the Heise (2001) corpus of identities. To the original 19 identities, we added the identities of alderman, candidate, governor, legislator, mayor, president, representative, and senator; we also added head, because this identity was referenced often in other definitions. We dropped enemy and foe from the list, because these two identities are not specifically political. Then we factor analyzed meanings for the emended set of political identities. Two components are interpretable.

The first component in the analysis collected the identities of head, leader, governor, mayor, president, and demagogue. The political identities in this set are defined in terms of head or leader, so this might be called an *executive* component. Because the identities in this component do not include reciprocal role-identities, the component does not seem to identify a social institution. However, maybe analyses of specific political units such as a city would correct this problem by adding other executive-branch identities to the component—e.g., in a city: assessor, auditor, recorder, treasurer, etc. That remains to be seen in future research.

The second component collects the identities of senator, politician, representative, candidate, lobbyist, legislator, conservative, alderman,

and voter (and citizen is just below our cutoff factor loading of 0.20). This *legislative* component seems related to the institution of U.S. electoral politics.

Ten identities remain unaligned with any component in this emended analysis: bureaucrat, executioner, hatemonger, liberal, patriot, protester, right winger, taxpayer, terrorist, and traitor.

We conclude that political institutions most likely can be isolated by analyzing the meanings of political identities, even though we did not succeed in doing that in our main analysis.

Settings

Settings are nouns categorizing places or times at which social interaction occurs, and they are organized by kind-of relations, just as identities are—e.g., a prom is a kind of dance, which is a kind of party. Thus settings parallel identities in that each constitutes a cultural classification system relating to social interaction, consisting of hierarchically organized nouns.

We added settings to identities in our semantic-factoring procedure in order to see if meaning confluences characterizing social institutions encompass the meanings of settings. Since identities are our major concern in this book, the analyses of settings are exploratory, dealing with just two institutional areas—medicine and religion—and incorporating only settings in the 300-setting corpus developed by Heise (2001).

Medicine

We brought the following medicine-related settings into analyses: ambulance, asylum, clinic, hospital, mental hospital, operating room, and sanatorium. We coded definitions of these settings from *CIDE* and *WOLD* using the same procedures as were used for analyzing identities, and added the data to the codes for physician, surgeon, sawbones, nurse, psychiatrist, shrink, doctor, quack, registered nurse, head nurse, practical nurse, pediatrician, patient, gynecologist, abortionist, intern, invalid, convalescent, healer, sick person, schizophrenic, psychotic, paranoid, mental case, psychopath, and neurotic. We iterated definitions through both identities and settings, and factor analyzed the data matrix for the combined settings and identities.

A single component dominated results when settings were added to the analysis, so settings did not cause splintering of the medicine

component. Moreover, the addition of settings produced only minor changes in the loadings of identities on the medicine component.

All of the medical settings had high loadings on the medicine component, indicating that they are within the confluence of meaning corresponding to the medical institution. In fact, the setting of hospital showed up as a central feature of the medical institution, along with the identities of nurse, surgeon, and physician.

Religion

We brought eleven religion-related settings into analyses: cathedral, chapel, Christmas, church, Easter, funeral, mass, prayer, sermon, Sunday school, and wedding. We combined the *CIDE* and *WOLD* definitions of these settings and of the identities: agnostic, atheist, born-again Christian, Catholic, clergyman, devil, devil worshiper, evangelist, God, Jew, minister, mourner, pagan, pastor, preacher, priest, priestess, Protestant, rabbi, saint, and sinner. After iterating definitions through both identities and settings, we factor analyzed the data. Two components dominated the results of factor analysis, corresponding to the Ecclesiastic and Divinity components discussed above.

The religion-related identities that loaded on the Ecclesiastic component were the same as in the pan-institutional analysis reported above, except for rabbi dropping off and saint coming on. Five settings—church, sermon, cathedral, wedding, mass—had large loadings on the component, and chapel had a small loading. Overall, the new analysis delineated ecclesiastical Christianity more clearly than the analysis without settings. (The definitions of Christmas, Easter, and Sunday School all refer to Christianity, but an abundance of secular details in their definitions weakened the loadings of these settings on the component. Similarly, the definition of funeral refers to religion but funeral loaded on neither component because of additional secular description in its definition.)

The *Divinity* component contained the same religion-related identities as in the pan-institutional analysis. The setting of prayer also loaded on the component, which helps to emphasize the importance of deities within this cluster.

Summary

When settings and the identities were analyzed together, factor analysis of meanings delineated institutional composition in terms of both people and kinds of places and moments.

Supplementary Analyses

To get more understanding of the semantic-factoring method we conducted many more analyses than can be reported here. For example, we factor analyzed un-iterated definitions (span-1), and found that factoring un-iterated meanings yields fragmentary definitions of institutions. We analyzed all 500 identities from Heise (2001) in several different ways, and found that identities of very high generality can strongly influence results. For example, definitions of some family, work, sexuality, and criminal identities make reference to female or woman, so when definitions are iterated through the concepts of female or woman, a femaleness institution emerges consisting of a mix of such identities. While such a result may be interesting, interest often is in less engulfing social institutions, in which case it may be better to leave general terms out of the analysis.

As noted when discussing Politics and Government, core identities must be included for each social institution being investigated. The 19 political identities we included in our analysis did not include enough core political identities to cause a political component to emerge. However, we were able to obtain political components in an auxiliary analysis of identities that included various types of politician. Similarly, Furre (2007) examined the direct semantic links of the identities that loaded on our two religion components, and added some identities that were not in our sample. He found that inclusion of "Christian" largely integrated the semantic network of the religious identities into a single cluster. Furre and Heise (2008) found that the Ecclesiastic component expanded to multiple religions when basic identities of Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, etc. were included in analyses.

Multivariate analysis of semantic networks requires artfulness in order to obtain sensible results. Selection of base identities for meaning iteration, and expanding meanings to different spans, adjusts the apparent content and boundaries of social institutions. Thus, semantic network analysis is like viewing a specimen with a microscope—the analysis needs to be focused, minor changes in focus reveal different features, and some modifications in analysis cause a loss of focus.

Validity Check

We assessed the reasonableness of our assignments of identities to social institutions by comparing the semantic-factoring results with

an external criterion—a classification of identities into institutional areas for use in a computer program that simulates social interaction (Schneider and Heise 1995). Assignments of identities to institutional categories of business, law, politics, education, medicine, religion, and family were made by Heise in the 1990s (with some institutionally ambiguous identities being assigned to an eighth category titled "lay"). Such judgments are mostly straightforward for native speakers of English, and this method of classifying identities into categories was validated by Schneider (1999). Henceforth we refer to the classification of identities into the seven institutional categories as "*Interact* codes," after the name of the computer simulation program that uses them.

Crucially, the *Interact* codes are completely independent of our current factor analyses, having been accomplished before the work in this chapter was conceived. Thus they provide an impartial basis for checking the factor analytic results.

The *Interact* codes deal with some traditional institutional domains—e.g., family—that partitioned into two or three correlated components with the semantic-factoring procedure. For purposes of this analysis, we view the components as subdomains of the traditional institutional areas, and we combine the subdomains before counting classification successes and failures.

We consider all of an identity's factor alignments in deciding whether that identity ended up aligned as predicted. If one factor loading for an identity is above 0.19 on a component predicted from the *Interact* codes, then we count that as a success, even if the identity has other factor loadings on other components. For example, *Interact* codes predict that pediatrician is in the institution of medicine, and we consider the prediction confirmed because it has a loading of 0.51 on the medicine component, notwithstanding a still higher factor loading for pediatrician on the childhood component.

Twenty of the 300 identities under consideration were classified as "lay" in the *Interact* codes, and these are excluded from the validity analysis. Of the 280 remaining identities in the analysis, the semantic-factoring procedure assigned 204 to the same social institution as *Interact* codes, giving an overall success rate of 73 percent. Were the semantic-factoring procedure producing purely random results, the success rate would be just 14 percent, so the semantic-factoring procedure catalogs identities associated with social institutions at least five times better than chance.

Nineteen identities were treated as errors because the *Interact* codes indicated that they were within an institution of politics and government,

but no component emerged corresponding to such a institution. As we showed in our auxiliary analysis, this source of error might vanish in an analysis with a more adequate representation of political identities.

Three errors arose because the semantic-factoring procedure assigned the identities solely to the sexuality component—a classification that could not be predicted because there was no parallel classification among the *Interact* codes. In the 1990s *Interact* coding, most sexuality identities were classified as "lay" and thereby they were excluded from the analysis. (Contemporary *Interact* codes do include a sexuality category—a spin-off of the work reported in this chapter.)

Twenty-four identities failed to fit predictions because the identities had no factor loading above 0.2 and thereby received no institutional classification from the semantic-factoring procedure, even though they had institutional assignments within the *Interact* codes. Some of these (e.g., capitalist, millionaire) perhaps align on components that we did not have represented in our analysis; some (e.g., born-again Christian) would align with a component when analyzing a larger sample of identities; some (e.g., convalescent) have keywords that should link them to a component but distracting concepts in their expanded definitions vitiated the relation.

Taking these special cases into account, the semantic-factoring procedure produced 15 blatantly wrong classifications of identities, giving an overall pernicious error rate of 5 percent. Arguably, some of these errors arise from the *Interact* codings rather than from misclassifications by the dictionary-factoring procedure. For example, schoolboy, schoolgirl, pupil, and truant ended up in the childhood component rather than on the education component where *Interact* codings suggested they would be; librarian ended up aligned with the work component rather than on the education component predicted by *Interact* codings.

Conclusions

The dictionary-factoring methodology that we introduced in this chapter provides a principled and reasonable method of identifying identities' alignments with social institutions and thereby for ascertaining which social institutions are functioning in a society. We analyzed the meanings of a large number of identities and found that confluences of meaning within the set of identities assembled an institution's constituent roles, including technical specialists, superordinates and subordinates, and deviant functionaries. At the same time, the procedure

partitioned roles of one institution from another. In two exploratory analyses the method also identified physical and temporal settings that are associated with specific institutions.

In addition, the methodology can identify incipient social institutions that are not yet fully formed—that is, clusters of identities that have not yet been labeled as an institution and embedded in establishments that sustain the institution's functions and protect its boundaries. For example, sexuality is not a traditional social institution. Yet our analyses showed a clear confluence of meanings for a variety of sexuality identities, suggesting a parallel between this area and traditional social institutions. Not yet a social institution, still an interaction order, the "sexual mosaic" (Foucault 1978, p. 47) awaits social recognition as a distinct social institution, splintered from the traditional institution of marriage and family (Castells 2004, p. 295), with functionaries dedicated to boundary maintenance and to promoting sexuality values.

The childhood component that we found also may represent a new institution cleaved from the traditional marriage and family institution. The childhood component involves consanguineous kin, but spreads out to non-kinship identities such as girl and boy, and includes as well identities for adults who are involved with children such as pediatrician and family man. Assuming that absorption in childhood characterizes this component, Santa Claus should be part of the cluster, and Santa Claus did indeed load highly on the childhood component in an analysis that we conducted of all 500 identities in the Heise (2001) corpus. Thus our analyses substantiate the relatively recent recognition of childhood as a social institution in which children are enterprising agents involved in identity work and regenerating childhood culture (Corsaro 1997).

The empirical analyses in this chapter relate to several theoretical propositions in chapter two.

Proposition 2.4 (institutions and semantic networks) proposes that relational meanings of identities in a social institution form a semantic network, and our analyses of dictionary definitions found this to be the case. Proposition 2.4 also posits that the semantic network of an institution encompasses the institution's paradigmatic behaviors, settings, and objects, and we found that component scores for words in identity definitions designated characteristic behaviors associated with each institution.

Our exploratory analyses of identity-plus-setting networks for the institutions of medicine and religion affirmed the association of settings with institutions that Proposition 2.4 posits. Determining that

settings enter into an institution's confluence of meanings buttresses an idea offered in Proposition 2.12 (cues elicit situation definitions), that physical–temporal settings contribute to definitions of situations.

The analyses in this chapter demonstrated that social structure is implicit in the meanings of identities, and therefore individuals who have learned the theory of people embedded in their language have an implicit awareness of their society's basic role relations and social institutions, as posited in Proposition 2.16 (socialization via language).

The Cultural Self

Identities, organized into cultural theories of people, provide the taken-for-granted reality of social life in a society. In this chapter, we consider how an individual uses identities to construct a self, and embodies identities in different situations to affirm the individual's self-sentiment.

Our approach to the self is semantic. We assume that an individual constructs his or her self largely by internalizing identity meanings from a society's culture. This idea is contained in Perinbanayagam's (2000, p. 25) statement that "the structures of society—caste, class, race, ethnicity, gender, clan, family, organizations, communities, religious orders, and nations—manifest themselves as symbolic experiences for the individual and are present in the selves of given individuals as identities that each recognizes and are given recognition by his or her others." Furthermore, as Holstein and Gubrium (2000) say, selves are "institutional projects" shaped by the vocabularies of institutions and organizations, with different institutions providing varying opportunities for self-expression.

Definitions and Clarifications

Following Mead (1934) and James (1890), symbolic interactionists view the self as consisting of two analytically distinct phases: the self-as-subject (the I) and the self-as-object (the me). However, different authors have employed different terms to refer to the objective aspect of self—for example, the "phenomenal self" (Combs and Snygg 1959), the "self-as-object" or "self-concept" (Rosenberg 1979); or simply the "self" (e.g., Owens 2003; Perinbanayagam 2000; Stone 1962; Stryker 1968, 1980).

Wiley (1994) adds complexity by introducing the "you" as an additional objectification of self, expanding Mead's I-me internal dialogue of the self to an I-me-you model. We return to Wiley's I-me-you model of the self later in this chapter, but until then, we will employ the term, "me," as the pronominal referent of all objectifications of self.

In our framework, the accumulation of all objectified past experiences and identities is the individual's *identity set*, as noted in chapter two. We call situational and biographical objectifications of self the *situational me's* and *biographical me's*, respectively. We employ the term, *persona*, to refer to that singular identity associated with a person's name.

Rosenberg (1979, p. 7) defines the self-concept as "the totality of the individual's thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object of evaluation." We parlay Rosenberg's reference to "thoughts and feelings" into a distinction between the cognitive and affective aspects of the self-concept. Our model of the self-process will propose that self-conceptualizations evoke self-sentiments, and individuals try to maintain their self-sentiments through identity choices, in a system of cybernetic feedback and control.

Our focus on self-sentiments sets us apart from the cognitive bias of the symbolic interactionist tradition. Our cybernetic model was anticipated by Mead but generally ignored by symbolic interactionists and other scholars embracing Mead's ideas. Among the exceptions was Buckley's (1967, p. 100) recasting of Mead in the language of modern systems theory: "Self-consciousness is a mechanism of internal feedback of the system's own states which may be mapped or compared with other information from the situation or from memory, permitting a selection from a repertoire of actions in a goal-oriented manner that takes one's own self and behavior explicitly into account." Shibutani (1968, p. 333) observed that the principle of negative feedback "appears over and over in the work of both Dewey and Mead," but "has been largely overlooked, perhaps because they failed to coin a striking term to designate it." Indeed, it was not until the development of affect control theory (Heise 1977, 1979; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) that Mead's cybernetic model of human thought and conduct became formalized.

Self versus Identity

The literature displays a lack of consensus with respect to the distinction between identity and self. Some authors use the two terms interchangeably, as in "me's … are one's social selves/identities" (Thoits

and Virshup 1997, p. 109), or "identity itself (the total self, if one pre-fers)" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 91). Others maintain that the two terms ought to be kept distinct. According to Stone's often-quoted argument, for instance, "identity establishes what and where the person is in social terms. It is not a substitute word for 'self.' Instead, when one has identity, he is situated—that is, cast in the shape of a social object by the acknowledgment of his participation or membership in social relations" (Stone 1962, p. 93).

Structural symbolic interactionists (e.g., Burke 1980; Stryker 1968, 1980) define identities as meanings attributed to the self, becom-ing constituents of the self-concept. For scholars adopting a semiotic approach, however, identities are not in themselves self-meanings but rather *signs that evoke self-meanings.* That is, identities are "indexes of the self," signifying the "powers, status, inclinations, and feelings—in short, the self—of the persons to whom they attach. In this view, an identity is not a constituent feature of the self but a semiotic tool for situated self making" (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996, p. 115, emphasis removed).

One of the best known advocates of the semiotic view of self, Perinbanayagam defines identities as the symbolic categories or signs through which the objectification of self takes place. "Such signs of objectification, however, are always elements of complex vocabularies, each of which is able to allow a minded organism to identify itself and be identified by others. This is identity" (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 83). Thus, from this perspective, "processes of identification are essentially exercises in classification … coded into the very language that we use" (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 88).

Also emphasizing the instrumental nature of identity categories in the objectification of self, Owens (2003, pp. 206–207, italics removed) argues that "the self is a process and organization born of self-reflection whereas identity is a tool (or in some cases perhaps a stratagem) by which individuals or groups categorize themselves and present them-selves to the world." Based on this distinction, he defines self as "an organized and interactive system of thoughts, feelings, identities, and Delameter motives that (1) is born of self-reflexivity and language, (2) people attribute to themselves, and (3) characterize specific human beings." And, following Michener and Delamater (1999), he defines identity as "categories people use to specify who they are and to locate themselves relative to other people."

Pulling together these various strands of thought, we define the *self* as the linguistic objectification of one's presence in the world; and an

identity as a cultural category of humans whose conscious realization contributes to the objectification of self.

Personal versus Social Identities

Identity can refer to a categorization that is applicable to one individual only. Thoits and Virshup (1997, p. 107) define personal identities as "self-descriptions referring to unique or highly specific details of biography and idiosyncratic experiences." Drawing upon Thoits and Virshup, along with McCall and Simmons (1966), Owens (2003, p. 215) defines personal identities as incorporating the "unique identifiers" of an individual, singular and idiosyncratic characteristics such as personal name, unique personal experiences, and biography. Emphasizing the biographical component of personal identity, Hewitt (2003, p. 111) writes that personal identity is dependent "on the person's construction and maintenance of an autobiography—a lifestory told to (and by) others in various contexts, and from time to time revised to fit changing experiences or preferences....something the person creates, owns, and is entitled to modify as he or she sees fit." In addition to biography, Hewitt (2003, pp. 110–111) emphasizes the "distinctive accomplishments and characteristics" of an individual in a particular identity— athlete or scientist, a dedicated worker or religious seeker, to cite his examples—providing him or her with a sense of "This is who I am- this is me!"

In contrast to personal identities, according to Gecas (2000, p. 105, note 1), social identities incorporate a sense of commonality with others "in the form of group memberships or categorical identifications" and are based on "the multiplicity of identities that individuals possess by virtue of their group memberships and role relationships." Hewitt (Hewitt 2003, p. 109) also states that social identities create a sense of community. Thoits and Virshup (1997, pp. 106–107) define social identities as "socially-constructed and socially meaningful categories that are accepted by individuals as descriptive of themselves or their group." They note that role-identity-theorists in sociological social psychology (e.g., McCall and Simmons 1966; Stryker 1980) focus on identities as "me's," while social identity theorists in psychological social psychology (e.g., Tajfel 1981; Turner et al. 1987) focus on the "we's" of collective-level identities. Our linguistic distinction between these two kinds of identities was developed in chapter three.

Gecas (2000, p. 105, note 1) argues that the bases for distinguishing between social identities and personal identities "are matters of degree rather than of kind, since social identities in their configuration result in 'unique' self-concepts and much of our personal biographies consist of experiences within our various social identities." The fuzzy conceptual boundary between the two kinds of identity is exemplified by Rosenberg's treatment of personal identity (what we call persona) as a type of social identity. That is, like other kinds of social identities, "personal identity is also a matter of social classification but involves classifying the individual into a category with one case … best expressed by assigning the individual a unique label, usually a name" (Rosenberg 1979, p. 11).

In this book, we are interested in identities, whether personal or social or collective, as internalized objectifications of self.

Structure versus Process

The me is the static, structural component of self; the I is the dynamic, processing component. One-sided emphasis on the I or the me components of self has led to a schism between the Chicago and Iowa (Meltzer and Petras 1972), or process and structure (MacKinnon 1994, p. 85), schools of symbolic interactionism, which parallels the divide between the interactionist versus sociological schools of role theory (MacKinnon 1994, p. 84).

Some authors have argued for treating the self as both structure and process, without relying on the I and me constructs of Mead and James. For example, Demo (1992, p. 322) asserts that we must measure the self as a dynamic structure that responds to situational stimuli, incorporates new elements, rearranges, adjusts, and stabilizes temporarily before encountering new stimuli and undergoing further revisions. Some preliminary research examining cross-situational stability in self-feelings supports the view that self-feelings may be represented by a moving baseline (Burke 2006). In a similar vein, Markus and Wurf (1987) state that the unifying premise of much research on the self is that the self-concept does not just reflect on-going behavior but instead mediates and regulates this behavior. In this sense the self-concept is active, forceful, and capable of change. It interprets and organizes self-relevant actions and experiences; it has motivational consequences, providing the incentives, standards, plans, rules, and scripts for behavior; and it adjusts in response to challenges from the social environment.

General versus Situational Aspects of Self

The idea that the individual possesses both global and situational meanings for his or her self is a hallmark of identity theories in symbolic interactionism. The idea is explicit in McCall and Simmons (1978) distinction between the "ideal self" and the "situational self," for example, as well as in Burke's (1980) distinction between "identities" (the stable, self-defining components of self-meanings) and "images" (the ephemeral, situational components of self-meanings). The idea also underlies the distinction in affect control theory (Heise 1979) between the "fundamental sentiments" for the situational identity of a person in social interaction and the "transient feelings" for the person produced by situational events (see MacKinnon 1994, p. 91).

Turner (1968, p. 94) distinguishes between "self-image," which refers to the individual's self picture at a given moment, and "self-conception," which refers to one's relatively enduring and stable "sense of 'the real me'." Similarly, Markus and associates (Markus and Nurius 1986; Markus and Wurf 1987) describe self-concept as a relatively stable universe of different self-conceptions, and the working self-concept as a temporary subset of situationally relevant self-conceptions, including core self-conceptions or self-schemas. Markus and Wurf (1987, p. 306) assert that "the working self-concept, or the self-concept of the moment, is best viewed as a continually active, shifting array of accessible self-knowledge." These analyses suggest that while self-concept may exhibit fluctuations from a baseline over short periods of time (e.g. one situation to the next), the basic core structure of self-concept remains fairly stable over longer periods of time.

Objectification

Drawing upon Mead's social psychology of the self, Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 72–73) describe the process of internalization as follows. One objectifies a part of one's self as the agent of an act, employing the cultural name of a role to do so. By identifying oneself as the performer of a role, the role becomes internalized as a self-apprehension or identity—a particular "me" in Mead's terms. One's "social self" develops from the accumulation and integration of particular role performances and identities. Although identifying momentarily with the part of self engaged in playing a specific role, one experiences some degree of psychological distance between this particular me and one's "whole self." Berger and Luckmann do not explicitly state that

the "self in its totality" involves not only the internalized objectifications of particular me's and their accumulation into a social self, but also the subjective responses of the individual to these objectifications. However, Mead called the individual's responses to self-objectifications the "I," and conceptualized the self as an internal conversation between the "I" and the "me," between the subject and his or her objectifications of self. The I represents the self as actor, responder, or knower; the me, the self as an object of action, response, or knowledge.

We adopt this process of internalization, along with the reflexiveness of self, as our first principle of a cultural theory of self:

5.1: Internalization

The internalization of social roles as particular identities takes place as actors objectify themselves as the agents of their actions, employing linguistic labels for their objectifications, and then respond to these objectifications of self.

Mead's concepts of mind and self are inextricably connected, so much so that human beings can be described alternatively as possessing a "minded self" or a "selved mind" (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 30). Like self, mind develops with the acquisition of language. "Out of language emerges the field of mind" according to Mead (1934, p. 133), and "there neither can be nor could have been any mind or thought without language" (1934, p. 192). And although the emergence of mind logically precedes the development of self as an object of reflective consciousness (Perinbanayagam 2000; Rosenberg 1979), thereafter mind and self develop in step with one another and with the acquisition of language. The inextricable connection between mind and self is captured further in Mead's well-known description of mind as "an internalized conversation of the individual with himself" (1934, p. 47), an internal dialogue between the subjective I and objective me of self "as if they were separate persons" (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 19)—a "curious duality" (Rosenberg 1979, p. 6) of the self.

Identity Set

An individual's identity set is the aggregate of all previously experienced identities that might be enacted again. Since identities are the cultural categories for linguistically objectifying oneself and others, the development of the identity set can be summarized as follows.

5.2: Composition of the Identity Set

> A person's identity set accrues from enactments of identities that
> are named with terms in the cultural theory of people of the indi-
> vidual's society. Any previously enacted identity that may be reen-
> acted is a part of the identity set.

The identity set contains everything—public and private, desired and
undesired, salient and unimportant. It comprises all past role experi-
ences and identities that have settled in memory as apprehensions of
self, even those that have been "forgotten" as long as redintegration is
possible for future enactments. The identity set is ever-evolving, incor-
porating newly acquired role-experiences and identities, and losing
identities that no longer can be deployed.

No research study has assessed the size of individuals' aggregations
of identities because of the difficulty of finding respondents willing
to commit hours to the task of sorting through labels for thousands
of identities and deciding which ones apply to the self. The authors
of this article did have the motivation and established the size of their
own identity sets at 771 in one case and 749 in the other.[1] The surpris-
ing closeness of the counts suggests that 700–800 identities per person
might be typical.

The probability of duplicate aggregates of identities is infinitesimal
when an individual acquires hundreds of identities from thousands
of identities provided by the culture. To illustrate, suppose that each
individual randomly acquires 700 identities from a cultural pool of
9,000. Then the number of individuals who could be defined without
repetition would be on the order of the number ten followed by one
thousand zeros (ten followed by one hundred zeros is a googol and is
larger than the number of elementary particles in the known universe).
The calculation indicates that individuality in aggregates of identities is
unbounded for all practical purposes.

As individuals' personally minted identities become more or
less widely recognized, they expand the pool of cultural identities.
Individuals' personas are instances of this process, being part of culture
on a local basis in most cases, and on a wider basis in cases of famous
people. Innovations in institutional identities start this way, too. The
general process is that novel performances or appearances by some indi-
vidual are objectified into components of the individual's identity set,
and displayed repeatedly as situational me's. These then diffuse into the
general culture via various media of communication, and are sanctioned

as identity options for other individuals. Even personas can follow this path, their close linkage to an originator notwithstanding, as demonstrated by the plethora of men taking the identity of (impersonating) Elvis Presley a few decades after his death. Individuals' identity sets contribute to the pool of cultural identities in another sense as well. Each cultural identity is created anew by the individual enacting it, and that is the basis of the reproduction of culture (Corsaro 2005). Thus, the pool of cultural identities is constituted by individuals' objectified performances and displays, and the pool is continually reconstituted by individuals performing and displaying identities, largely according to objectified cultural standards, though always with the possibility of individual innovation.

The identity set is not an object of consciousness, but rather is the agglomeration of available identities from which conscious representations of the self are constructed. We identify three such representations—biographical me's, the persona, and the situational me.

Biographical Me's

As Castells (2000a, p. 460) says, "We are embodied time, and so are our societies, made out of history." However, past events that are narrated to make a self (or a society) are drawn together creatively to account for the present. "Personal narrative is a way of using language or another symbolic system to imbue life events with a temporal and logical order, to demystify them and establish coherence across past, present, and as yet unrealized experience" (Ochs and Capps 2001, p. 2).

A biographical me refers to an individual's experience of self as the leading character of an ongoing life-story that integrates some memorable role experiences and identities into a personal narrative. In Perinbanayagam's (2000, p. 44) words, the "narrativity of acts" impart to "the selves implicated in them a narrativity of their own. The selves of given individuals come to be conceived with particular narrative identities. Each individual has a conception not only of his or her self in its situated aspect but as a moment in larger structures of time." For Holstein and Gubrium (2000, p. 169), "one's past—one's life history or biography—is itself constructed in the process of self-construction" as people engage in biographical work to bolster current identity claims.

A biographical me is constructed as a narrative integration of memorable elements in the individual's identity set.[2] Moreover, it can be

rewritten from time to time as one gains or loses identities, or antici-
pates claiming identities that have yet to be validated by others. When
individuals gain or lose identities that change their lives, they are moved
to tell a story to account for the changes and make sense of their new
status. Receiving a diploma or degree, obtaining a job or promotion,
marrying or becoming a parent, retiring or losing a job, being robbed
or arrested, and experiencing disease or surgery are examples of life
transformations that prompt reconstruction of a biographical me. On
experiencing such events the individual selects a few identities from the
hundreds in the identity set and weaves them into a sequence that leads
"inevitably" to the transformation.

While this kind of identity work is individual, it is not entirely pri-
vate. Because an individual has to consider which identities and narra-
tives, if presented, will not be challenged by others, the construction
of a biographical me is always conducted before an implicit, imagined
audience of particular and generalized others. Often, the identity work
involved in the construction of a biographical me is a manifestly col-
laborative enterprise as well. In this case, the individual engages in a
discourse with an audience, and the audience participates in the con-
struction of a biographical me, influencing the story (Gubrium and
Holstein 1995). Indeed, "collaborative reflection can destabilize a per-
son's prevailing interpretation of the self and others, leading the way for
alternative ways of remembering the past and inhabiting the present"
(Ochs and Capps 2001, p. 17).

Identity work involved in the construction of a biographical me
becomes a collaborative enterprise especially when social identi-
ties defining a group, subculture, or other collectivity are involved.
"Subcultural identity work" (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996)—the
creation of the signs, codes, rites of affirmation, and boundaries upon
which the existence and maintenance of group identities depend—
often entails the collective construction and interpretation of members'
biographies. In a study of a support group for transsexuals, for example,
Mason-Schrock (1996) reports how members were encouraged to tell
stories about their earliest childhood experiences of sexual discomfort
and how the collective reinterpretation of biography was employed to
render transsexual a morally accepted identity.

A biographical me is a selective construction from past situational
me's. While a situational me locates an individual in a particular situ-
ation and at a specific moment in time, a biographical me provides a
sense of continuity of self across situations and through time. In addi-
tion, a biographical me provides a sense of differentiation from the

selves of other people, since any two individuals rarely share exactly the same identity history.

Our distinction between identity sets and biographical me's acknowledges that not all cultural identities that compose an identity set are adopted in a life story. In Berger and Luckmann's (1966, p. 67) words, "only a small part of the totality of human experiences is retained in consciousness. The experiences that are so retained become sedimented, that is, they congeal in recollection as recognizable and memorable entities. Unless such sedimentation took place the individual could not make sense of his biography." Or, as Perinbanayagam (2000, p. 42) has put it, "it is in memory, it is as a remembered phenomenon, that the self can in fact exist, and it is as memories that a self is present and manifests itself in acts of an individual."

A different biographical me—a different story of self—is developed for each institutional context that is a key part of an individual's life. As Gubrium and Holstein (1995, p. 221) argue: "we can no longer properly devise analytic schemes or apply methodologies about patterned progression without attending to the ordinary and varied circumstances in which patterning is specified, negotiated, and assigned." For example, an individual's family story may emphasize relations with siblings, spouse, and children, while her work-world story emphasizes past jobs and accomplishments, and her recreational story relates teams, competitions, and medals won. A biographical story establishing the self as a player within an institution becomes increasingly desirable as one commits more time to that institution's settings. Essentially such a story reveals an institutional facet to an individual's persona.

We summarize this discussion of biographical me's in the following principle.

5.3: Biographical Me

Each person possesses one or more biographical me's—a narrative integration of situational me's and constituent identities from remembered experience, constructed alone and in collaboration with others, and providing continuity to the self and differentiation from others within a specific institutional context.

Biographical me's vary in amount of disclosure, explicitness of verbalization, and degree of elaboration. For example, one individual might treat her institutional story as a public vita establishing her bona fides, while another person maintains his institutional story in private, the

better to control its personal meanings. Some people recount their stories in speech only, while others commit their personal stories to print. Some individuals express their story in a few incomplete sentences, while others' stories take up whole books.

We turn now to the validation of a person's biographical me's. Berger and Luckmann's concept of symbolic universes suggests a mechanism pertaining to the ultimate validation of these more global apprehensions of self. A symbolic universe is "the matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively real meanings" (1966, p. 125) that integrates all experience under an all-embracing symbolic and universal, cosmological, and anthropological frame of reference. In modern, industrialized societies a plurality of institutional symbolic universes surround a shared core, the partial universes "coexisting in a state of mutual accommodation" (1966, p. 125).

Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 97, 100) argue that symbolic universes legitimate, not only the institutional order in a society, but also a person's overall "subjective identity" and "the subjective apprehension of biographical experience"—the persona and biographical me's in our terms. Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 100–101) argue that the validation of subjective identity by means of a symbolic universe is necessary because "subjective identity is a precarious entity," dependent upon the reflected appraisals of significant others and threatened by marginal subjective experiences such as dreams, fantasies, and delusions. As in the case of the institutional order, symbolic universes perform their legitimating function by ordering phenomena under a much larger and universal canopy of meaning. In the case of subjective identity, even "marginal" experiences such as dreams, fantasies, and delusions are "contained" by assigning them a position in a hierarchy of realities that attributes greater significance to the more palpable realities of everyday life—"the sphere to which all institutional conduct and roles belong."

A symbolic universe also orders and reconciles individual behavior in different institutional sectors of everyday life. For example, in a society where kinship is the predominant symbolic universe, to evict a tenant who is also a relative might be construed as "a violation of the divinely constituted order of the universe" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 99). In addition, the theory-of-people component of symbolic universes orders the phases of an individual's biography, through beliefs about natural stages in the development of a child into an adult. This enables a person to view himself or herself as participating in a natural sequence of events and behaving appropriately. "The 'correctness' of his life program is thus legitimated on the highest level of generality. As

the individual looks back upon his past life, his biography is intelligible to him in these terms. As he projects himself into the future, he may conceive of his biography as unfolding within a universe whose ultimate co-ordinates are known" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 100). In essence, the individual constructs a self-myth, "a conception of reality that posits the ongoing penetration of the world of everyday experience by sacred forces" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 110)—"sacred" in the sense of venerable rather than religious.

This discussion of the ultimate confirmation of biographical me's by appeal to a symbolic universe of meanings and values is summarized in the following elementary principle of self.

5.4: Confirmation of Biographical Me's

Biographical me's are legitimated ultimately by their integral position within the society's overarching symbolic universes.

Legitimation by symbolic universes applies to personas as well as to biographical me's. We turn to personas now.

Personas

Each person possesses a unique persona, that singular identity created by the individual and the individual's associates, the name for which is the name of the person (Dion 1983), or synonymously the person's nicknames and contextual labels (Harley 2001)—e.g., "John Smith," "Mary Jones," "stretch," "slim," "doc." In consistently identifying the same individual in different situations and at different times, the persona imparts a sense of continuity to one's self, as well as a sense of differentiation from the selves of others (Perinbanayagam 2000). It is the objectification of one's existence in the world as an embodied consciousness (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Perinbanayagam 2000).

Rosenberg (1979, p.9) noted that "The parts, elements, or components of the self-concept consist primarily of social identity elements, dispositions, and physical characteristics." Though we deal with personas rather than self-concepts, we parallel Rosenberg in viewing personas as constituted from biographical me's and self-assessments of physical features, material possessions, and dispositional traits. Physical characteristics (height, weight, facial appearance, etc.) are an important component and affect others' attributions about an individual's traits,

attitudes, and behavior (see Piliavin and Lepore 1995 for a review). Traits that have been attributed to the self explain trans-situational regularities in action. What prevents the cognitive system from becoming overloaded lies in the fact that identities, physical characteristics, and dispositions in the "phenomenal field of self," are neither arbitrarily ordered "items in a laundry list" nor randomly scattered "flotsam and jetsam on the cognitive beach" (Rosenberg 1979, p. 17). Instead, Rosenberg observes, the phenomenal self integrates all of these.

The meaning of a persona is constructed by its owner and the owner's immediate associates as they integrate the person with specific biographical happenings, physical features, and personality traits. Although a persona is a public objectification of self, it remains profoundly private as subjectively experienced by the individual. A person can experience and respond to his or her persona reflexively via the pronouns I, me, and you (addressed to self) and can activate it for personal happenings. Those who know a person well can also experience and respond to the person in terms of her or his persona.


Figure 5.1   Schematic Diagram of Individuals within a Cultural Theory of People

The concept of persona connects the cultural theory of self proposed in this chapter with the cultural theory of people presented in chapter two. A persona is the termination point for the logical chains of cultural identities that are present within an identity set, as shown schematically in figure 5.1. In particular, a persona implies all the identities that its owner has, in that the individual is an instance of each of those identities. Thus, one can itemize an individual's identities by going from his or her persona along paths of implication to more general identities. For example, Dwight Eisenhower was a Kansan, a general of the army, a university president, a president of the U.S.A., an author, a golfer, and so on, and these specific identities imply that he in addition was an American, a soldier, an educator, a politician, a communicator, a game player, et cetera.

Finally, the concept of persona is the nexus for the reciprocal relation between culture and self. That is, while culture provides identities for the construction of the identity set, from which situational me's, biographical me's, and ultimately a persona are derived, everyone contributes a persona back to culture. People create culture as they construct personas in everyday social interaction.[3] Of course, the personas of exemplary or outstanding individuals—an Einstein, Bach, Gandhi, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, or John F. Kennedy—constitute more ubiquitous cultural contributions lasting a longer time than the personas of most people.

Drawing these considerations together, we propose the following principle.

5.5: Persona

Each person possesses a persona associated with his or her name and nicknames, a single and singular identity emanating from biographical me's and incorporating the sense of being an embodied entity with distinct physical and psychological characteristics.

Situational Me's

A situational me is an individual's experience of self in a particular situation. The situation can range from short-lived encounters such as greeting a friend in passing to conditions of longer duration such as catching a plane, going on vacation, working toward a degree, having a family, or making a living. In each case, an individual defines

the situation in terms of an identity network and constructs a situational self by selecting institutionally appropriate identities from his or her identity set, or by adopting new identities that are not currently in the person's identity set (e.g., unemployed worker, after a person's first employment layoff). If more than one situation is at the forefront of consciousness at a given moment (e.g., catching a plane to make a living), then multiple identities (e.g., traveler and breadwinner) can become available in consciousness. Multiple identities also can arise when interacting with others with whom one has more than one social relationship (e.g., a person who is both one's co-worker and relative). "More often than not, perhaps, one faces situations in which more than one of his identities is pertinent" (Stryker 1968, p. 560).

Because we see the situational me as comprising what one can become in a situation—sometimes a single identity, sometimes several identities, our concept of the situational me is broader than what some authors call a "situated identity" (e.g., Hewitt 2003).

A situational me is constructed by selecting appropriate identities via an inner dialogue between the I and the me and between I and the you (addressed to self), to use the terms of Wiley's (1994) I-me-you model. Dialogue with others also is involved because definitions of situations have to be coordinated socially, obtaining agreement about the institutional context of a situation, about what identities are instrumental to an informal collective goal, or about what identities are being alter-cast from one individual to another (Weinstein and Deutschberger 1963).

We summarize the construction of a situational me in the following principle.

5.6: The Situational Me

A person constructs a situational me by selecting identities from his or her identity set, within the constraints of the operative identity network, or sometimes by adopting new identities imposed by situational demands or exigencies and not in the person's current identity set.

People materialize the identities of the situational me by effectuating the corresponding roles. We view role enactments not as rote performances of scripted behaviors, but rather as creative constructions adapted to immediate circumstances, in the manner discussed in detail by Heise (2007, Chapter 7). Role enactments also can involve

displaying an identity's "materials of identity" such as clothing and accessories (Perinbanayagam 2000). As "ego-extensions" (Rosenberg 1979), material and social objects confer identities on those possessing or associated with them (Perinbanayagam 2000). Indeed, as Stone (1962) argues, appearance may be as important as discourse in claiming and validating an identity in a situation. Whether through appearance, discourse, or behavior, "an individual casts himself or herself into a role and a character in the strictly dramaturgical or narrative significance of these terms" (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 105). And, to protect and sustain such situational presentations of self, people engage in "impression management," including "defensive practices" and the strategic use of space ("frontstage" and "backstage" regions) and its material contents ("props") (Goffman 1959).

An individual's self-definition requires that she or he defines others who are part of a situation in terms of cultural identities as well, and the others are expected to materialize their imputed identities. Just as people employ "defensive practices" to protect their own identity claims, they engage in "protective practices" to protect the identity claims of others. Indeed, the "moral character" of a definition of the situation compels people to accept each other's identity claims until belied by "performance disruptions" and "discrediting performances" (Goffman 1959).

These considerations lead to the following principle:

5.7: Identities and Roles

In social interaction situations, people vicariously experience others and reflexively experience themselves in terms of identities relevant to the focal events of the moment. They materialize these identities by enacting and displaying corresponding roles.

A situational me may contribute to an individual's identity set in two ways. First, a social circle can objectify an individual's innovations in behavior, appearance, and discourse, thereby minting a new identity that enters the individual's identity set for possible replay at a later time. Second, a definition of the situation may for the first time cast an individual into an identity from the pool of cultural identities, through identity claims made by the individual or by the individual's interaction partners (see Lofland 1969 on the mechanics of labeling an individual). A cultural identity once adopted enters the individual's identity set for possible readoption again. Identity claims that draw a new identity

from the pool of cultural identities are negotiated socially to make sure that an individual acquires cultural identities in an orderly fash-ion, reflecting the taxonomic hierarchies discussed in chapters two and three. This social processing ensures that each individual manifests the culture's theory of people.

On the other hand, a situational me often consists of identities drawn from the identity set, as one dons familiar identities for recurrent daily routines. In that sense an individual's identity set contributes to the individual's situational me. The identity work that is characteristic of the first occasion of casting an individual into a cultural identity is unnecessary on later occasions when the identity is retrieved from the individual's identity set.

We take as a basic premise that the identities of a situational me must be confirmed in one way or another for a situational me to remain socially and personally viable. According to affect control theory (Heise 1979; MacKinnon 1994; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988) and other iden-tity theories (e.g., Burke and Reitzes 1981, 1991; Stryker 1968, 1980), a person confirms identities by performing identity-appropriate actions or roles—the identity of teacher by teaching and advising; that of athlete, by participating in sports; and so on. Hence, the following principle.

5.8: Confirmation of Identities

A person realizes a situational me by confirming its constituent identities. A person confirms identities by enacting and displaying corresponding roles.

While role-enactment and display provide "observational data" for making inferences about situational me's and identities, the data must be interpreted before such inferences are made. Three mechanisms of interpretation mediate the effect of role-enactment and display on self-apprehensions: reflected appraisals, self-attributions, and social comparisons.[4]

The principle of reflected appraisals, epitomized in Cooley's (1902/1964) concept of the "looking-glass self," embodies the idea that the judgments of significant others are important in establishing self-conceptions. Rosenberg (1979) distinguishes among three related ideas contained in the principle of reflected appraisals: (1) direct reflections—shaping of the self-concept by the responses of others; (2) the perceived self—formation of self-concept by our perception

of others' attitudes; and (3) the generalized other—shaping of the self-concept by applying society's moral attitudes to the self. In comparison to direct reflections, the concept of the perceived self is derived from Cooley's emphasis on the imagined responses of others in reflected appraisals. Although his concept of "looking-glass self" is often interpreted in terms of direct reflections, Cooley (1902/1964, p. 152) stressed that the process involves "the imagination of our appearance to the other person and the imagination of his judgment of that appearance." Finally, the effect of the generalized other on self-concept is exemplified by the case of condemning oneself for an immoral act.

The mechanism of reflected appraisals, especially in the direct reflections sense, promotes a passive, oversocialized view of the human actor and his or her role in the construction of self (Gecas and Schwalbe 1983, p. 79). In contrast, the principle of self-attribution proposes that people draw conclusions about their dispositions—including abilities and competence, but also inner physiological and psychological states—by observing their own actions and their outcomes. The principle of self-attributions has its roots in self-perception theory (Bem 1967) and in general attribution theory (e.g., Kelley 1967)—see Rosenberg (1979) for a brief discussion. The principle of self-attributions suggests that a person can maintain self-assigned identities independent of the reflected appraisals of others. On the other hand, the freedom of self-attributions has definite limits. "In general, a reasonably good level of correspondence between others' views of us and our own is completely indispensable for adjustment to society. In situations where a gross and fundamental discrepancy exists, the person is considered simply psychotic" (Rosenberg 1979, p. 63). "Delusions are mental constructions so egocentric that they have no social currency" (Heise 1988, p. 270).

A view of the self as an active and creative agent in the formation and confirmation of identities and other apprehensions of self also underlies the principle of social comparisons. The idea has a long history in social psychology (see Rosenberg 1979; Singer 1981). Applied to the formation and confirmation of self-conceptions, the principle of social comparisons proposes that "people [actively] judge and evaluate themselves by comparing themselves to certain individuals, groups and social categories" (Rosenberg 1979, p. 68).

This discussion of the role of interpretation in the confirmation of identities and situational me's as self-apprehensions leads to the following principle.

The confirmation of situational identities and me's through role-enactment and display is mediated by the reflected appraisals of others, an individual's self-attributions, and social comparisons, or by a combination of these mechanisms.

Self-Sentiments

Identities are both cognitively and affectively experienced phenomena. "One's being gets defined [cognitively] ... by interpersonally and structurally embedded vocabularies that define the self. The claimed, presented, and acknowledged identities also become *felt* identities and it is as felt identities that they elicit commitment, loyalty, and passion" (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 123). In other words, "identities have both cognitive and affective meaning; people do not only *think* identities, they also *feel* them" (MacKinnon and Luke 2002, p. 305); "identification is an affective as well as a cognitive experience" (Hewitt 2003, p. 106).

These "feelings for identity" (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 123) are called identity sentiments in affect control theory. Here we extend that terminology to the notion of self-sentiments corresponding to the "self-feelings" tradition of Cooley and James (see Wiley 1994).

Classic work on self-sentiments focuses on self-esteem and self-efficacy. As defined by Rosenberg (1979, p. 31), self-esteem refers to "self-acceptance, self-respect, feelings of self-worth." In addition to feelings of self-evaluation, however, people experience feelings of powerfulness, agency, and control with respect to the relation between self and environment. Rosenberg (1979, p. 31) calls these self-feelings self-confidence, "feeling oneself to be an active agent in one's own life (rather than the object of external forces)." Mirowsky and Ross (2007, p. 1341) call this perceived control, and they point out that "The concept appears in a number of related forms with various names, including internal locus of control, mastery, instrumentalism, self-efficacy, and personal autonomy, and at the other end of the continuum, fatalism, helplessness, perceived helplessness, and perceived powerlessness." We use the term "self-efficacy" since this term is common in social psychology (Bandura 1977; Gecas 1982; Gecas and Burke 1995; Gecas and Schwalbe 1983; Tafarodi and Swann 1995).

In terms of the evaluation-potency-activity (EPA) structure of affective meaning employed in affect control theory (Heise 2007, Chapter 2), there is consensus among authors, including Rosenberg (1979), that

evaluation is the underlying dimension of self-esteem. There is less agreement about the dimensionality of self-efficacy in EPA terms, if indeed the issue is addressed at all by most authors. While Tafarodi and Swann (1995) explicitly identify self-efficacy with potency, other authors implicate the activity dimension, or a combination of activity and potency. For example, Franks and Marolla (1976, p. 326) define feelings of efficacious action ("inner self-esteem," in their terminology) as deriving "from the experience of self as an active agent—of making things actually happen and realizing one's intents in an impartial world. … feelings of one's own capacity, competence, and potency." Gecas and Schwalbe's (1983, p. 79) definition of self-efficacy ("efficacy-based self-esteem" in their terminology) as those feelings arising "from the sense of volition or causal agency and its consequences" emphasizes what they call the "active self," hence implicating the activity dimension of affective meaning. Viewing power as more of a property of relationships than of individuals, they do not refer explicitly to feelings of powerfulness in the phenomenological experience of self-efficacy, save for a brief discussion of its absence in relation to Marx's concept of alienation (Gecas and Schwalbe 1983, pp. 80–82).

One solution to this conceptual ambiguity would be to link self-efficacy primarily to potency, and to link the activity dimension of EPA meaning to another construct, which we might call self-activation—a concept associated with personal agency, the externalization of self through action, initiating rather than passive observing of events, and similar notions. In this regard, Gecas and Schwalbe (1983) deal with the "active self" in terms of both the subjective experience of agency and efficaciousness and its motivational implications ("effectance motivation"). Indeed, as they point out, there is a large corpus of work in psychological social psychology on the motivational implications of the "active self." This would yield a three-dimensional model of self-sentiments—self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-activation—roughly paralleling the EPA measurement model.

In this book, we measure self-sentiments with the evaluation, potency, and activity scales of the semantic differential (Osgood 1969; Osgood, May, and Miron 1975; Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957). In our next chapter we provide details regarding the measurement of self-sentiments along these dimensions and present some examples of self-sentiments among different kinds of people. The methodological clarity associated with these dimensions of feeling (e.g., see Heise 1969, 2001) circumvents the conceptual ambiguity associated with the concepts of self-esteem and self-efficacy. Another benefit of measuring

self-feelings on the dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity is that this approach undercuts complaints about constructs such as self-esteem and self-efficacy being culturally specific.[5] Osgood, May, and Miron (1975) demonstrated that the three dimensions are universal aspects of affective meaning, so if one accepts that individuals everywhere maintain feelings about the self, then the dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity are appropriate means for assessing those feelings.

Fundamental Self-Sentiment

The fundamental self-sentiment is the sentiment associated with an individual's persona, and it reflects beliefs about what identities are crucial in one's life as narrated in biographical me's and about what physical features, material possessions, and dispositional traits distinguish the self. Together these webs of belief about the self generate an overall self-feeling—the self-sentiment—from other sentiments that the beliefs assemble. That is, the self-sentiment is a composite sentiment distilling sentiments evoked by beliefs about which identities, physical accouterments, and psychological traits distinguish the self, with emphasis on recency. Its formation is reasonably described by the expectancy-value model (Ajzen 2001, p. 30): "Each belief [about an object] associates the object with a certain attribute, and a person's overall attitude toward an object is determined by the subjective values of the object's attributes in interaction with the strength of the associations." Kahneman and Miller (1986, p. 136) provided another relevant perspective, understanding that the relevant stimulus in this case is the self: "Each stimulus selectively recruits its own alternatives and is interpreted in a rich context of remembered and constructed representations of what it could have been, might have been, or should have been . . . . A norm is produced by aggregating the set of recruited representations."

The persona and fundamental self-sentiment change infrequently, providing a sense of self-continuity across time and institutional settings, as well as offering some protection against disruptive events that might affect the continuity of self-conceptualizations and sentiments. For example, an individual with high levels of self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-activation is more likely to interpret events in a way that protects these positive sentiments. By the same token, an individual with negative self-sentiments is more likely to engage in self-derogatory constructions that maintain negative self-sentiments. Nonetheless, the self-sentiment is subject to change. Revisions of biographical me's

can have dramatic impact on the self-sentiment, as, for instance, when a mother becomes a grandmother, or a corporation executive becomes a retiree, or an individual becomes a psychiatric patient (Kroska and Harkness 2006). Transformations in physical semblance also change the self-sentiment—gradual transformations of aging (accelerated during adolescence and old age), self-perpetrated modifications of body mass or cosmetic appearance, and ruinous injuries. Gaining or losing significant material possessions, such as a car or a house, can impact on one's self-sentiment. In addition, the life-long enterprise of recognizing one's unique psychological traits creates shifts in self-sentiment from time to time, especially in youth and early adulthood.

5.10: Formation of Self-Sentiments

Sentiments evoked by an individual's conceptualization of the self—as reflected in the individual's self-biographies and her or his reckoning of possessions, physical features, and psychological attributes—combine into a single fundamental feeling about the self: the self-sentiment. Major changes in conceptualization of the self change the self-sentiment.

Situational Self-Sentiment

Our model of self processes employs a second kind of self-sentiment besides fundamental self-sentiments, namely situational self-sentiments. A situational self-sentiment is a summary attitude toward self that emerges from experience in a particular situation. It is the sentiment answering the question, "What kind of person did this situation make me feel like?" When one is focusing on a single identity in the situation and social interaction proceeds smoothly, the situational self-sentiment corresponds to the sentiment attached to one's selected identity in the situation—that is, one ends up feeling like the kind of person that one was supposed to be. When disruptive events occur, the situational sentiment is inferred from those events, in answer to the question, "What kind of person must I be to have engaged in such actions," or "What kind of person must I be to have befitted such actions by others?" (This is the case of reidentification in affect control theory—see Heise 2002; 2007; MacKinnon 1994) A situational self-sentiment corresponds to the summary judgment at the termination of the situation, after any efforts at repairing disruptive events have had their effect. Thus the situational self-sentiment is the sentiment toward

self created in a situation as the situation ends and one begins orienting toward the next situation.

Ochs (1993, p. 288) proposed that speakers attempt to establish the social identities of themselves and others through verbally performing certain social *acts* and verbally displaying certain *stances*"; and identities always are "an inferential outcome of linguistically encoded acts and stances" (p. 295). She further claimed (Ibid.) that her framework "goes dead against sociolinguistic analyses that assume social identities as a priori givens." In our model, though, the situational identity always is inferred from behavior—from "acts and stances" in Ochs terms. On the other hand, in our model as opposed to Ochs' approach, some selected identity always shapes behavior, even if actions by others disturb the process.

Self Processes

Having presented the basic constructs in our theory of self, we now describe processes involved in maintaining a consistent self, and in adapting the self to changing conditions.

Motivation

According to the psychologist, Cofer (1972), human motivation consists of two components—response selection and mobilization of response, where cognition determines selection, and affect supplies the energy to mobilize an act. This is what Parsons and Shils (1951, p. 59, note 5) mean when they say that "it is through the cathexis of objects [investing them with affective significance] that energy or motivation in the technical sense, enters the system of the orientation to action." However, Parsons and Shils minimize the affective aspect by their emphasis on the "evaluative"—a term they use to refer to "the various processes by which an actor allocates his energy among the various actions with respect to various cathected objects in an attempt to optimize gratification" (Parsons and Shils 1951, p. 59). Evaluation involves selecting and organizing cognitive and cathectic orientations into plans for action—in short, "behavior-readying" processes (Wallace 1983, p. 90). Because the idea of personal will and effort is missing from Parsons and Shils' definition of evaluation, their evaluative mode of motivational orientation really refers to cognitive-rational processes antecedent to motivated action.

The idea that motivation involves both cognition and affect also can be found in Foote's classic article on identification as a basis for human motivation. Without identification—"the [cognitive] appropriation of and [affective] commitment to a particular identity or series of identities," Foote (1951, pp. 16–19) argues, organized social activity as epitomized in Mead's (1934) metaphor of the game would be "a sort of empty bottle of behavior and formal relations, without motive and incentive save for the undifferentiated physiological necessity to dispense energy and kill time." Only when both cognitive appropriation and affective commitment are present does identification become "the key which unlocks the physiological resources of the human organism, [and] releases the energy … to perform the indicated act."

Because Mead considered emotion as an individual rather than a social phenomenon, he failed to develop a social psychological theory of motivation (MacKinnon 1994). His cognitively biased social psychology can be said to account for the direction of human conduct (Shibutani 1968) but not its mobilization. Much the same criticism can be applied to Berger and Luckmann (1966) who draw heavily upon Mead for the social psychological aspects of their sociology of knowledge. Identity theorists who have followed in the footsteps of Mead (Burke 1980; Burke and Reitzes 1981, 1991; Stryker 1968, 1980; Stryker and Serpe 1994) also cannot account for motivation in human behavior without stepping outside Mead's cognitive orientation. This is exemplified by Stryker's (1968, p. 62) statement that "theoretical ideas deriving from George Herbert Mead have been properly criticized for their almost total emphasis on the cognitive components of man's experience." Stryker addresses this criticism by proposing hypotheses "that take into account … other ways [cathectic and conative] in which men characteristically respond to themselves, but to do so in a manner retaining the basic insights of Mead." We return to this point later in this book.

In most general terms, we approach the problem of motivation as a general human incentive to employ, deploy, and affirm cultural classifications and sentiments in everyday life (MacKinnon 1994). In the case of self, this means making the self object look, talk, act, and feel as it is supposed to, which is accomplished by selecting identities for role-enactment and display.

More specifically, our approach might be interpreted as a variation of the self-consistency motive (Lecky 1945; Owens and Serpe 2003; Rosenberg 1979), though that is supposed to deal more with cognitive classifications of self than with self-sentiments—self-image as opposed

to self-esteem, for example. As articulated by self-verification theory (Swann 1983, 1996; Swann, Griffin, Predmore, and Gaines 1987), the self-consistency motive proposes that people try to confirm established self-conceptions even when they are negative. With respect to the self, the proposition would be that one attempts to maintain situational-selves that are consistent with one's persona, or more particularly situational self-sentiments that are consistent with one's fundamental self-sentiment.

Affective Processes

When a situation first is being defined, an individual selects an identity for the self to maintain her or his self-sentiment, within institutional and relational constraints. The individual's persona would be the ideal identity, in that "being oneself" is maximally self-actualizing.[6] However, in most situations the individual cannot enact the persona because of institutional demands, so the individual seeks an institutionally appropriate identity with a sentiment similar to the self-sentiment, obtaining in this indirect way a sense of self-actualization while meeting institutional demands.

Selecting an identity whose sentiment is optimally consistent with the self-sentiment is the motivational principle of affect control applied to self-actualization, as opposed to the affect control of identity sentiments through behavior, as considered in presentations of affect control theory (e.g., MacKinnon, 1994; Heise, 2007). The affective maintenance of the self-sentiment is a higher level control process governing identity-selection, while the affective maintenance of a selected identity is a lower level control process governing behavior. In chapter eight, we show how the cybernetic theory of the self-process presented in this book merges with affect control theory to provide a single hierarchical cybernetic system of affect control connecting self to identities and then to situational actions that express these identities. For now, the cybernetic principle of affect control applied to identity selection and self-actualization is expressed in the following proposition.

5.11: Self-Actualization

Within the constraints of institutional context and requirements, a person selects identities from his or her identity set to construct a situational me that optimally maintains the fundamental self-sentiment.

Moore and Robinson (2006, p. 257) forwarded a similar idea with regard to choice of occupation, arguing that "individuals seek out positions in society that they believe will provide them with the identities that match their existing self-views." Our principle, however, is cross-institutional and linked specifically to the self-sentiment.

Maintaining one's fundamental self-sentiment is consistent with Simmons' (2001) analysis of "comfort with the self." According to Simmons, a person is comfortable with his or her self when experiencing neither highly positive nor highly negative self-emotions. People comfortable with themselves in supportive milieux, she argues, receive reflected appraisals indicating that no major changes are required. On the other hand, those feeling uncomfortable with themselves are cued that a change in self or situation is required if they wish to resolve this negative emotional state.

The individual manages experiences in the situation in order to maintain the selected situational identity, and ordinarily situational experiences confirm the identity, in which case the initially selected identity and the realized identity are the same. Sometimes, though, situational experiences engender a revised situational identity other than what one started with. Whichever the case, the sentiment associated with the realized situational identity is compared to the self-sentiment. If the two are close the identity enactment in the situation is self-actualizing, if the two diverge substantially then the identity enactment in the situation is inauthentic for the self. A self-actualizing identity leaves one unconstrained in selecting subsequent actualizing identities. However, an inauthentic identity motivates the individual to redeem the self with a subsequent identity that compensates for current inauthenticity, as proposed below.

According to Proposition 5.11, an individual attempts to actualize her or his self-sentiment, regardless of whether the sentiment is good or bad. An individual with a positive self-sentiment attempts to self-actualize with positively valued identities. An individual who lacks a positive valuation of the self will attempt to self-actualize with identities that lack positive valuation. An individual who sustains self-repugnance—someone who actually loathes the self—must actualize the self with identities that are disvalued. These observations lead to a corollary of the self-actualization proposition.

5.12: Self-Actualization through Deviance

Self-rejecting individuals actualize themselves by enacting deviant identities, and in general this implies that such individuals have to

engage in deviant behavior in order to confirm the identities that they choose.

In the next chapter we will consider sociopaths as an instance of individuals in industrialized societies who actualize their low self-esteem with deviant identities. In other kinds of societies a different general category might be relevant—e.g., practitioners of sorcery and witchcraft.

Recently Experienced Self

Adopting a situational identity that actualizes the self-sentiment is not always possible because an inauthentic identity may be forced on the individual by institutional constraints in available identities or by altercasting from a dominating interaction partner. We propose that individuals cumulate experience over several recent identity enactments when gauging the extent of their current inauthenticity. Experiencing a single identity that is not self-actualizing does not by itself mean that one is living inauthentically. For example, the identity of commuter may not be self-actualizing for an individual, but commuting creates no authenticity problem when tucked between family and work identities that are highly self-actualizing. Specifically, recent identities' deviations from the self-sentiment with regard to evaluation, potency, and activity summate into the recently experienced self-inauthenticity, and if the sum is close to zero on each dimension then the individual is self-actualizing overall. If the sum is different from zero, then the individual has some inauthenticity to redress, and the negative of the sum defines the ideal sentiment for the next identity to be adopted. That is, a redeeming identity should deviate from the self-sentiment to the same degree as the cumulation of recently experienced identities, but in the opposite direction.[7]

5.13: Counterbalancing Identities

Identities are yoked around the axis of an individual's self-sentiment, one identity presenting a solution to the existential problem posed by enacting other identities equally divergent from the self-sentiment, but in the opposite direction. No identities are privileged as purely redeeming, because an identity that is redeeming at one time can be a divergent identity at another time.

The self-sentiment's control of identity choices prevents unbridled enhancement of evaluation, potency, and activity (or self-esteem,

self-efficacy, and self-activation). For instance, after being over-valued, over-dominant, or over-active in a previous situation, a person might reaffirm his or her self-sentiment by seeking a deviant, powerless, or inactive identity in order to restore the lower levels of experienced evaluation, potency, or activity that the self-sentiment requires. Similarly, a person whose recently experienced self is too low relative to his or her self-sentiment subsequently will seek an especially valued, powerful, or busy compensatory identity

5.14: Inauthenticity and Recovery

An individual compares the cumulative sentiment for recently occupied identities with the fundamental self-sentiment to assess how true he or she is being to self. Inauthenticity is corrected by occupying compensatory identities.

This model of self-affirmation through counteracting identities leaves some issues to be resolved in future research. (1) How long are identities retained in the recently experienced self, and are recent ones weighted the same as earlier ones? (2) How far are entailments carried? For example, the professor identity implies academic, educator, professional, and human being; does affirmation of professor affirm the other identities as well? (3) Is the system prone to cycles? A divergent identity stops affecting the choice of new identities once counteracted by a redeeming identity, but when the original divergent identity drops out of the recently experienced self, then the redeeming identity becomes a divergent identity that needs counteraction, which could evoke a new enactment of the original divergent identity, forming a cycle. However, this would not happen if earlier identities have less weight than recent identities in the recently experienced self, or if individuals mollify a divergent identity by choosing a redeeming identity, say, half as extreme as the divergent identity. (4) Does inauthenticity create stress, or emotions of anxiety and depression, as hypothesized by Higgins (1987; 1989)?

Identity Salience

Identity theorists (Burke 1980; McCall and Simmons 1966, 1978; Stryker 1968, 1980) assume that an individual's identities are arranged hierarchically according to their importance for confirming and maintaining meanings attributed to the self. Different authors have employed

different terms to refer to this idea—"salience" (Burke 1980; Stryker 1968) or "prominence" (McCall and Simmons 1966) or "psychological centrality" (Rosenberg 1979). Although the definitions of these terms differ in their particulars (e.g., their relative emphasis on cognitive versus affective importance), they refer to essentially the same idea—that the hierarchical arrangement of identities is the major organizational principle underlying the structure of the self.

Like identity theorists, we define the salience of identities in terms of their relative importance to a person's self-meanings. However, our concept of salience is much more dynamic and situational than the structural concepts of identity theorists. We view the salience of identities as shifting with their potential for redeeming situational selves that disconfirm the fundamental self-sentiment. We also view salience hierarchies as varying with the situational availability of identities, particularly as a function of institutional setting. This contrasts sharply with the identity theory notion that identity salience is trans-situational in nature. In addition, our concept of identity salience relates to the confirmation of affective self-meanings, rather than solely to the cognitive self-meanings emphasized by identity theorists. (These generalizations apply in particular to Stryker and Burke, less so to McCall and Simmons, and hardly at all to Rosenberg.)

5.15: Identity Salience

At any moment, an individual's situationally available identities are organized into a salience hierarchy, in terms of their potential for actualizing the individual's self-sentiment.

Sometimes a person cannot assume the role associated with a salient identity. In this case, we posit that the individual may aspire to claim the identity in question. Lee (1998), for example, found that self-sentiments that are close to sentiments about a particular kind of scientist engender interest in becoming that kind of scientist. Also, we speculate that a salient identity may generate empathy with those who enact the identity.

5.16: Aspiration and Empathy

When an individual cannot legitimately claim a particular identity and assume the associated role that would confirm self-sentiments,

he or she may *aspire* to claim that identity, or may empathize with others who legitimately have the identity.

A person tries to maintain her or his self-sentiment across situations. If the experienced-self has been consistent with the self-sentiment, then the individual maintains standard self-actualizing salience hierarchies in each setting. However, an inconsistency increases the likelihood that redeeming identities will be sought in the near future. Thus an experienced inconsistency changes the salience hierarchy of identities in the immediate situation.

5.17: Dynamic Salience Hierarchies

An individual's salience hierarchy of identities within a given institution remains stable while the individual stays true to the self. Experienced inauthenticities cause compensatory rearrangement of the hierarchy so as to facilitate the individual's return to an affirmed self-sentiment.

As discussed above, changes in institutional context also change an individual's salience hierarchy. The identity of father, for instance, drops off the salience hierarchy as a man moves from the institutional context of family to that of work, while his occupational identity emerges. Identities from different institutions are not organized into a single, transituational hierarchy, as supposed by identity theorists such as Stryker (1968; 1980), because identities are generally segregated and not competitive with one another. When identities from different institutions (e.g., family and work) are roused simultaneously, the result typically is role conflict rather than sole attention to one identity or the other as the preferred or more salient identity.

5.18: Institutional Salience Hierarchies

Entering an institutional setting causes revision of an individual's salience hierarchy of identities, as institutionally inappropriate identities are suppressed subjectively and attention focuses on institutionally licensed identities.

An individual may move from one setting to another in order to get to a situation where identities at the top of the salience hierarchy are maximally propitious for reaffirming the self-sentiment.

Overview

Figure 5.2 portrays the self-process as a system of cybernetic feed-back and control, in which the individual tries to maintain optimal consistency between situational self-sentiments and the fundamental self-sentiment. The constructed and reconstructed situational me is the most specific and proximate objectification of self.

Employing terms from Powers' (1973) cybernetic theory of perception, the situational me sends a perceptual signal—the sentiment for the self's realized identity in the situation—to a comparator, where it is summed with other recent sentiments to form the recently experienced self and compared to a reference signal—the individual's


Figure 5.2   Summary of Self-Processes. Block Arrows can be Read as "contributes to"; Line Arrows Can Be Read as "Generates"

self-sentiment—to produce an error signal, an assessment of how much the recently experienced self diverges from the fundamental self-sentiment. The error signal mobilizes the next situational self. If the error is negligible, the individual has her or his standard identity salience hierarchy in the next institutional setting, and the individual will select a situational identity with a sentiment as close as possible to the fundamental self-sentiment. If the recently experienced self is inauthentic, the salience hierarchy in the next institutional setting will move compensating identities upward. If enacted, these identities would move the recently experienced self toward the self-sentiment.

The comparator is the locus of reflexive thought about the self, which subjectively corresponds to Wiley's (1994) I-me-you model of the semiotic self. Wiley's model, discussed more fully in chapter seven, combines Mead's notion of an internal dialogue between a present "I" and a past "me" with philosopher Charles Peirce's account of internal dialogue between a present "I" and a future "you." The me is the realization of an I that has already acted, and the you is the anticipation of an I that will eventually act. In our model the me of the recent past corresponds to the situational me. The subjective you corresponds to the persona—the qualitative expansion of the self-sentiment—which has its origin in an individual's biography and physicality and is available in the consciousness of the present as the most global objectification of self. The I compares the me (the situational me) to the you of the imminent future (the persona) and takes appropriate action, either maintaining the situational self or reconstructing it by selecting and enacting redeeming identities.

The notion of self as an internal conversation among pronominal references to oneself is a metaphor, and as McCall and Simmons (1978, p. 54) caution with respect to Mead's dialogical metaphor of the self, "metaphors are merely crutches...The 'me' is merely the organized cognitive frames of reference in terms of which the mind appraises and evaluates and monitors the ongoing thought and action of its own person, the 'I.'" Moreover the I-you-me pronoun structure of English is not shared in all languages. Thus, the important matters in examining self-processes are not pronouns but the constructs of an imminent future, an immediate present, and the recent past.

Figure 5.2 shows additional activities relating to the self outside the subjective aspects of self-process. A situational me ordinarily consists of one or more identities selected from a person's identity set. However, previously non-experienced cultural identities can be thrust into an individual's situational me as a result of alter-casting by peers, ritual

investitures, or compulsion by others with power to reward or punish. Such acquisitions are the main way that identities get added to the person's identity set. However, novel identity creations that emerge within an individual's situational me also add to the person's identity set, and these constructions can expand the body of cultural identities.

A biographical me draws identities from the individual's identity set—i.e., from past situational me's—providing a narrative integration of these identities that has causal coherence with a sense of inevitability. A persona is the gestalt representing the singularity of the person that emanates from biographical me's, along with beliefs about physical and psychological features. As an identity labeled with a person's name or nicknames, a persona is the termination point of the logical chains of identities that a person has acquired within his or her identity set; thus a persona has a position within the cultural theory of people. A persona's evaluation, potency, and activity associations provision the individual with a fundamental self-sentiment, which is affectively maintained through the selection of identities, the identities being affectively maintained through behavior.

Though our approach to affect is more specific than his, we end up with a conclusion similar to Kidder's (2006, p. 368): "The postmodern critique has exposed inherent problems with the formation of stable identities and meanings. However, despite such theorization of fragmentation and multiplication, in *real life* people do continue to function.... The nonreflexive acceptance of the group's norms anchored in emotionality promotes the maintenance of firm identities. In analyzing culture in this way, we can understand how people in the postmodern world still manage to forge meaningful lives."

In the next chapter, we illustrate and test with empirical data some of the self-processes presented in this chapter. Specifically, we show how different self-sentiments generate different identity preferences for a variety of social institutional settings; how identities that diverge from self-sentiments increase the salience of identities that can help the individual to reaffirm self-sentiments; and, finally, how culture and biography produce individual change and diversity.

As discussed in chapter eight, the theory of self presented in this book connects with affect control theory through the constructs of Selected Identity and Realized Identity in figure 5.2. Affect control theory focuses on the lower half of the control system, downward from Selected Identity and Realized Identity, while our new theory of self focuses on the higher level of the control system, upward from Selected Identity and Realized Identity. The mathematics of

our theory of self parallels the mathematics of affect control theory. However, affect control theory works with the algebra of minimizing squared differences—between transient feelings and fundamental cultural sentiments for the identities and behavior implicated in events. In our theory of self, we have found vector algebra to be an intuitively satisfying and mathematically elegant way to represent the minimization of self-inauthenticity in identity selection and the processes of self-actualization and self-redemption.

CHAPTER SIX

The Self's Identities

We have proposed that the self is anchored in an individual's self-sentiment, and actualized through identities that are selected to express and maintain the self-sentiment. This chapter analyzes empirical data in order to corroborate our theoretical proposals and to illustrate how the processes work.

First we analyze measurements of self-sentiments obtained in a variety of studies in the United States, Canada, and England in order to demonstrate that average self-sentiments vary by sex, nationality, era, and psychiatric status. Later in the chapter, we show that changes occur over the life course as well.

Next, using data from Canadian undergraduates we show that distances between identity sentiments and an individual's self-sentiment predict the individual's generally preferred identities. As a variation on this theme, we demonstrate that negative self-sentiments can account for deviant behavior, under the assumption that negative self-sentiments get actualized in deviant identities.

Then we consider variations in the selection of self-fulfilling identities by self-sentiments. We discuss how different identities are selected as individuals enter various institutional venues. Turning to inauthenticity and compensatory identities, we review an experiment showing homeostatic self processes such as those that we propose, and we discuss hypothetical examples of inauthenticity resolution. We also show how long term changes in character can arise from fluctuation in an individual's self-sentiment over the life course. Working from a study of historical change in Canadian sentiments, we show how culture-change can affect the self that is publicly displayed.

Before turning to these substantive matters, we delineate the measurement system underlying our quantitative analyses of self-sentiments and identity sentiments.

Sentiment Measures

As discussed in the previous chapter, we view self-esteem as self-evaluation, self-efficacy as an assessment of one's own potency, and we add a dimension of self-assertion that relates to the activity of self. Consequently we are able to use the culturally universal dimensions of Evaluation, Potency, and Activity (EPA) as a framework for analyses of selves.

Technology for measuring affective meanings in terms of the EPA dimensions was developed by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957), and the cross-cultural universality of the dimensions was established by Osgood, May, and Miron (1975). Heise reviewed the methodology (Heise 1969), improved the precision and efficiency of the measurement system (Heise 1978), and developed software for collecting data in computer classrooms (Heise 1982) and over the Internet (Heise 1997, 2001). A recent book (Heise 2010) examines the methodological framework in detail.

Figure 6.1 shows the kind of bi-polar graphic rating scale used to measure EPA dimensions in most of the studies we use in this chapter. Each end of the scale is anchored in multiple opposing adjectives defining the substance of the scale. Adverbs along the scale help raters interpret different rating positions. The adjectives in figure 6.1 are the ones currently used in English to define the scale for Activity ratings. Evaluation ratings are obtained by opposing the adjectives Good-Nice with Bad-Awful. Potency ratings are obtained with the adjectives Powerless-Little versus Powerful-Big.

Paper questionnaires used in the past offered nine rating positions positioned above the adverbial quantifiers, and individuals' ratings of a stimulus were coded with a metric obtained through successive-internals


Fast Noisy Lively ... infinitely extremely quite slightly neutral slightly quite extremely infinitely ... **Slow Quiet Lifeless**

Figure 6.1 A Bipolar Graphic Rating Scale for Measuring the Activity Dimension of Sentiments

scaling (see Heise 1978). A scale's middle position was coded zero, ratings at the bad, impotent, or inactive end were coded with negative numbers down to approximately −4, and ratings at the good, potent, or active end were coded with positive numbers up to approximately +4. Computerized scales used in contemporary research obtain ratings with a mouse-controlled pointer, and the pointer may be set to intermediate positions between the adverbial quantifiers; pointer positions are coded from −4.3 to +4.3.

The self-sentiments that we study are individuals' ratings of "myself" on scales such as those in figure 6.1. Identity sentiments are averaged ratings of stimuli such as "a mother" or "an athlete," obtained from a group of individuals who share a culture. Dictionaries of identities' affective meanings have been compiled in the United States, Canada, Northern Ireland, Germany, Japan, and the People's Republic of China. In this chapter we use data from five English language dictionaries:

1. United States: North Carolina, 1978 (Smith-Lovin and Heise 2006). Ratings of several thousand stimuli, including 721 identities, were gathered with paper questionnaires from 1,225 North Carolina undergraduates. The median numbers of raters for each identity were 25 females and 26 males.
2. United States: Indiana, 2003 (Francis and Heise 2006). Ratings of 1,500 stimuli, including 500 identities, were gathered over the Internet from 1,027 Indiana University undergraduates. The median numbers of raters for each identity were 34 females and 32 males.
3. Canada: Ontario, 1980–1986 (MacKinnon 2006). Data on several thousand stimuli, including 809 identities, were gathered with paper questionnaires from 6,794 Guelph, Ontario, undergraduates. The median numbers of raters for each identity were 29 females and 26 males.
4. Canada: Ontario, 2001–2003 (MacKinnon 2006). Data on several thousand stimuli, including 1,001 identities, were gathered from Guelph, Ontario, undergraduates using software for collecting data in a computer classroom. The median numbers of raters for each identity were 25 females and 25 males.
5. Northern Ireland 1977 (Willigan and Heise 2006). Data on 528 identities and 498 behaviors were gathered with paper questionnaires from 319 Belfast teenagers in Catholic high schools. Median numbers of raters for each stimulus were 12.5 females and 10.5 males.

We measure the similarity of identity sentiments and self-sentiments in terms of the three-dimensional Euclidean distance, *d*, between an identity EPA profile and the self-EPA profile. The distance is defined as follows:

$$d = \sqrt{\left(S_e - I_e\right)^2 + \left(S_p - I_p\right)^2 + \left(S_a - I_a\right)^2} \tag{6.1}$$

where *S* designates a self measurement, *I* designates an identity measurement, and subscripts specify EPA dimensions.

Self-Sentiments

Figure 6.2 shows self-sentiments measured on the EPA dimensions in a number of different studies.

EPA profiles for 1977 North Carolina female and male self-sentiments were obtained by Smith-Lovin and Heise (1988) as part of a dictionary project mentioned in the last section. Self-sentiments among 1994 Indiana undergraduates were obtained in a pilot study for work on gender ideology (Kroska 2001). EPA profiles for Canadian female and male self-sentiments in 2001 were collected by MacKinnon as part of a dictionary project mentioned in the last section. In all but Indiana, respondents were presented with the phrase "Myself as I really am" as the stimulus for ratings; in Indiana the stimulus was "I myself."

Figure 6.2   Mean Self Ratings on Evaluation (E), Potency (P), and Activity (A) by Several Types of Respondents

Description of Raters	E	P	A
North Carolina Female Undergraduates, 1977, N=25	1.58	0.28	1.34
	(0.77)	(1.18)	(1.07)
North Carolina Male Undergraduates, 1977, N=26	1.98	1.23	1.33
	(0.80)	(1.03)	(1.35)
Indiana Female Undergraduates, 1994, N=46	2.83	1.57	1.70
	(0.97)	(1.38)	(1.64)
Indiana Male Undergraduates, 1994, N=23	2.48	1.74	1.83
	(1.04)	(1.68)	(1.67)
Ontario Female Undergraduates, 2001, N=25	2.45	1.20	2.44
	(0.67)	(1.13)	(0.74)
Ontario Male Undergraduates, 2001, N=25	1.55	0.97	1.74
	(1.96)	(1.62)	(2.03)
British Female and Male Sociopaths, Circa 1962, N=20	−0.17	−0.70	1.30

Note: Standard deviations of ratings in parentheses, where available.

Table 6.1 shows an EPA profile for sociopaths' self-sentiment that we estimated from a graph presented in Marks (1966) showing average ratings of "myself" on eleven semantic differential scales by 10 female and 10 male psychopaths (an early term for sociopaths—Robins 1966, footnote 79). The raters were patients in a psychiatric hospital institutionalized for "repeated open aggression, violence, screaming, theft, or drug addiction" (Marks 1965, p. 31). We averaged ratings of good–bad, clean–dirty, and tasty–distasteful to obtain a single self-evaluation measure. Self-ratings of strong–weak serve as the Potency measure for the sociopaths, and self-ratings of active–passive assess Activity.

A first question is whether these self-sentiments are different from one another. It could be that the self is a concept with a widely shared meaning and connotation, as is the case with many cultural concepts. For example, Marks (1966) found that ratings of non-personalized concepts were essentially the same across all of the groups he studied—controls, obsessives, and sociopaths. Kroska (2001) found little correlation between individuals' gender ideology and their sentiments about gender-related concepts, in accord with "the long history of research showing that individuals in the same culture share meanings for most concepts" (p. 34).

In the cases of the U.S. and Canadian data, we have standard deviations of ratings of self on each EPA dimension, allowing us to compare means via Student's *t* tests. We used two-tail *t*-tests to determine whether female and male self-sentiments are significantly different at a given time within cultures, and whether a given sex's self-sentiments are significantly different for the time-separated measurements in the United States and across cultures for the measurements at 1994 and 2001. Results are as follows; mean differences other than those mentioned are non-significant.

- In 1977, North Carolina males rated themselves as significantly more potent than North Carolina females rated themselves, $p < .01$.
- In 2001, Ontario females rated themselves as nicer than Ontario males rated themselves, $p < .05$.
- Indiana females in 1994 rated themselves as nicer and as more potent than North Carolina females in 1977, $p < .01$.
- Ontario females in 2001 rated themselves as more active than Indiana females in 1994 rated themselves, $p < .05$.

In the 21 comparisons, five mean differences were found to be significant at the 0.05 level, whereas just one significant difference would be expected by chance.

We cannot compute *t*-tests for comparisons with the sociopath self-sentiments because we do not have standard deviations of the socio-paths' self ratings. However, Marks (1966) compared the sociopaths' self ratings with self ratings of non-psychiatric orthopedic patients—a control group that was matched to the sociopaths on age, sex, social class, education, and intelligence. Again reading from graphs in the Marks article, we estimate that the non-psychiatric patients had an average EPA self rating of 1.20, 1.30, 1.70, which is similar to the profile for Ontario male undergraduates. Marks (1966) determined that the socio-paths self-evaluation was significantly lower than the self-evaluation of the non-psychiatric patients, p < .001. Another study of psychiatric patients (Kroska and Harkness 2006) found significant differences in patients' self-sentiments as compared to the normal associates of the patients or college students.

Thus we do find statistically significant differences in self-sentiments between respondent groups differing by sex, cohort, nationality, and psychiatric status. On the average, an individual's self-sentiment is similar to self-sentiments of others having similar backgrounds and biographies, and different from self-sentiments of individuals with diverging backgrounds and biographies.

Identity Preferences

In this section we first present a study of Ontario undergraduates designed explicitly to examine the relationship between self-sentiments and hierarchies of identity salience. Second, we draw on archival sources in order to assess our proposition that deviance can actualize negative self-sentiments.

Undergraduates

MacKinnon in the late 1990s asked 96 students to provide 15 positive and 15 negative identities or composite identities that they use to describe themselves or others. After some preliminary coding to make sure that adjectives always were combined with "person" instead of variable nouns, the 2,792 usable identity tokens provided by respondents were sorted, and the frequency of each identity type was determined. Fifty-eight identities or composite identities were selected for further study on the basis of frequency, balance between simple and composite identities, and balance between positive and negative identities.[1]

Additional Ontario undergraduates (158 females and 19 males) rated the 58 identities on Evaluation, Potency, and Activity scales, and the sentiments associated with the identities were estimated by averaging the individuals' ratings, separately for females and males. The most negatively evaluated identity was violent-person, the most positively evaluated was caring-person. The least potent identity was follower for females and insecure-person for males; the most potent was popular-person for females and motivated-person for males. The least active identity was boring-person, and the most active was party-animal.

The same respondents also provided EPA ratings of "myself as I really am." We computed the distances from each individual's self-sentiment to the sex-appropriate sentiments of each of the 58 identities. The configurations of 58 distances were identical for respondents of the same sex who had identical self-sentiments, but numerous configurations were different because of individual differences in self-ratings. To illustrate, we computed the 14,706 correlations among the distance configurations of all 172 respondents, and found that 12 percent of these correlations were negative, and 20 percent were 0.40 or less—in other words, about a third of the correlations betokened differences in configurations.

The 172 respondents in addition rated the extent to which the identities "describe how you perceive yourself." For each of the 58 identities, respondents marked a seven-point rating scale, verbally anchored at the lower end by "does not describe me" and at the upper end by "describes me." Ratings on this self-description scale were coded with an assumed-interval metric ranging from 0 to 6.

Taking identities as the unit of analysis and analyzing each respondent separately, we correlated the distances of the respondent's self-sentiment from the 58 identities with the respondent's rating of the 58 identities on the self-description scale. In theory, this correlation should be negative. That is, an individual should rate identities close to that individual's self-sentiment as self-descriptive, and identities far from the self-sentiment as non-descriptive.

The correlation indeed was negative for 97 percent of the respondents.[2] The median value of correlations between distances and self-description ratings was −0.51, and the strength of the correlations was beyond −0.40 for 70 percent of the respondents, ranging out to −0.86. For a significance test, we calculated the binomial probability of getting 166 or more negative correlations out of 172 independent computations, under a null hypothesis that the chances of positive and

negative correlations are equal. This binomial probability is less than one in a quadrillion.

Since some respondents provided similar or identical self-ratings, we conducted K–Means cluster analyses of the female and male self-ratings, separating the self-sentiments into a number of disparate patterns. We extracted clusters until just one cluster was populated by a single case—a procedure that gave nine clusters for females, five for males. Within each cluster, we computed the average self-sentiment, the distance of the average self-sentiment to each identity sentiment, and the average rating of each identity on the Self-Description Scale. Then we correlated the average identity distances with the average self-description ratings of the identities. As before, the theoretical expectation is that the correlation is negative—that is, respondents in a cluster on average should rate identities close to their average self-sentiment as more self-descriptive than identities farther away. Thirteen of the 14 correlations indeed were negative, and the binomial probability of getting 13 or more negative correlations in 14 independent analyses is less than 0.001, if the chances of positive and negative correlations are equal. Thus, even with a more conservative methodology, we continue to find a significant inverse relation between distances of identity sentiments from a self-sentiment and ratings of the identities as descriptive of self.

Overall, these analyses show that the position of an individual's self-sentiment in the three-dimensional affective space predicts the individual's self-description in terms of various identities. The individual tends to favor identities whose sentiments are close to the individual's self-sentiment, and tends to reject identities whose sentiments are distant.

Sociopaths

Our Proposition 5.12 suggests that individuals who disvalue themselves should adopt identities that are negatively evaluated. Currently we lack data on identity choices of individuals with low self-esteem, so we examine this issue indirectly by ascertaining which identities are close to the middling self-sentiment of sociopaths, and then determining whether those identities account for activities that are characteristic of sociopaths.

Our analyses employ the average self-sentiment of English sociopaths, identity sentiments from Irish and Canadian respondents in the 1970s and 1980s, and behaviors of U.S. sociopaths during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Heise (2001) found substantial levels of agreements in

identity meanings across North American, European, and Asian cultures, and MacKinnon and Luke (2002) found a substantial amount of stability in identity meanings over a decade and a half. Thus we believe that the mixed cultures and eras contain a common core. At worst, the agglomeration introduces errors that reduce the chance of finding definitive results.

The EPA profile for the self-sentiment of sociopaths in Table 6.1 is based on self-ratings by British sociopaths in the 1960s—females and males combined—and we use this same profile for both sexes. Identity ratings were acquired in other Commonwealth countries in roughly the same period, namely, 1975 Irish measurements of identities and 1981 Canadian measurements. Our analyses involving female selves are based on average ratings of identities by females, with male identities such as brother culled from results. Similarly, analyses involving males are based on average ratings of identities by males, with female identities culled from results.

The outcome occurrences we examine are behaviors of sociopaths as recorded in Lee Robins' (1966) classic study comparing the activities of 94 sociopaths with the activities of other kinds of psychiatric patients and of control subjects without behavior problems. We attempt to relate the distinctive behavior of sociopaths to their possible identity choices. For example, Robins reports that 26 percent of sociopaths were found to lie, as compared with 11 percent of other patients (1966, Table 13.1). From the standpoint of our theory, a propensity for lying suggests that the identity of liar is fairly accessible to sociopaths. The 1975 Irish sentiment about liar was 2.1 units from the sociopath self-sentiment for females, and 1.8 units away for males. By comparison, sentiments about the identity of expert were 3.6 and 3.2 units from the sociopath self-sentiment for females and males, respectively. Thus an identity that accounts for lying was closer to the sociopathic self-sentiment than an identity that could account for veracity in statements.

For practical purposes, we adopt a distance of 1.75 from self-sentiment to identity sentiment as a criterion for determining which identities are most relevant for affirming one's self-sentiment; we call these sustaining identities. This cut-off yields 229 sustaining identities for sociopaths using female data, and 269 sustaining identities for males. These counts constitute 20 percent and 24 percent respectively of the 1,132 distinct identities in the combined Irish and 1981 Canadian studies. Since the cutoff of 1.75 is arbitrary, we also discuss some results where distances are in the range 1.76 to 2.00, referring to these cases

as "moderately close" to the sociopath self-sentiment; and also some distances in the range 2.01 to 2.50, referring to the identities in these cases as "reachable" for sociopaths.

Our presentation follows Robins' (1966) organization of sociopathic behavior into thirteen different factors, except we do not deal with Robins' analysis of mortality, military service, or disciplinary problems in military service since our datasets do not include identities relevant to those categories.

Health. Robins found that sociopaths had unusual numbers of injuries, accidents, and hospitalizations (Robins 1966, p. 92). The health problems do not show up in sociopaths' predicted identity choices. The identities related to medical treatment in our databases—cripple, disabled person, invalid, outpatient, patient, shut-in—were too passive and positively evaluated to be relevant to the sociopathic self-sentiment.

Mobility. Sociopaths "often moved in and out of their native city, [and] they have also moved frequently from house to house within the city" (Robins 1966, pp. 93–94). A number of sustaining identities for sociopaths were related to itinerancy: boarder, exile, gypsy, migrant, passenger, roomer, runaway, tenant, plus straggler, stranger, and waif for females, and envoy, itinerant, lodger, newcomer, and wayfarer for males. The occupational identity of flight attendant as sustaining for males also may be relevant.

Unemployment. "Only 58% of the sociopathic men were holding full-time jobs, and 8 percent had part-time employment. A fifth could not hold jobs because they were institutionalized" (1966, p. 95). Three sustaining identities for sociopaths might be related to their 16 percent unemployment rate—debtor, shirker, and scavenger. Identities relating to deviant work such as felon, gambler, and prostitute were within sociopathic identity circuits (as discussed below), and these, too, might be a factor in official unemployment. Notwithstanding high rates of unemployment, two-thirds of the sociopaths in Robins' (1966) study were employed to a degree, and that fits with some conventional work identities being sustaining for sociopaths: cashier, employee, receptionist, salesclerk, secretary, and typist, plus bank teller, file clerk, salesgirl, stenographer, and worker for females, and attendant, auto mechanic, decorator, floorwalker, miner, professional, statistician, telephone operator, victualler, and welder for males.

Employment Idiosyncrasies. Sociopaths held jobs longer "in which they had little supervision, such as being self-employed, an 'outside' salesman, a truck driver, or a service man who works away from the office. . . . A quarter of them reported their longest job as a truck driver,

cab driver, repair man, or construction worker, somewhat more than any other group....[They] also more often reported as their longest job, jobs associated with drinking or jobs which sometimes serve as fronts for illegal activities: bartenders, waiters and waitresses, entertainers, manicurists, bellhops, carnival workers" (Robins (1966, p. 99). Our analyses found a number of low-supervision jobs as being at least moderately close to sociopaths' self-sentiment, including some that Robins specifically mentions: bootblack, caddie, construction laborer, garbage collector, gas station attendant, real estate agent, and street musician, plus jack of all trades, mason, photographer, saleslady, and TV repairman for females; and fortune teller, insurance agent, newsboy, parking attendant, strike breaker, and taxi driver for males. Additional sustaining identities name jobs that are alcohol related or that allow contact with the underworld or demiworld, again including some that Robins specifically cites: bellhop, gambler, mouthpiece, and rookie cop, plus barmaid, dishwasher, gold digger, informant, pawnbroker, policewoman, and waitress for females, and abortionist, actor, bellboy, busboy, prison screw, reporter, singer, sleuth, and waiter for males. Robins (1966, p. 101) notes that sociopaths have a high rate of dependency on welfare programs and charity. This could be related to the identities of spendthrift and squatter being sustaining for sociopaths, as well as parasite for females and sponger for males.

Marital Problems. Robins (1966, p. 105) reports that "78% of the first marriages of the sociopathic group had ended in divorce and 54% of those remarried had already had a second divorce....In the sociopathic group, divorce was much more common, repeated divorces were more common, and failure to remarry after divorce was more common....22% of the sociopathic group were known to have deserted their spouses; 28% to have been unfaithful, 20% to have placed children outside their own homes, 7% to have been cited in Juvenile Court as neglecting their children, 22% of the men to have failed to support, and 12% of the men to have beaten their wives or children." Sociopaths' high divorce rate corresponds to the presence of divorcée in the set of sustaining identities for female sociopaths. The databases do not contain the equivalent male identity, divorcé. In the case of females, the sustaining identity of shrew relates to sociopaths' high levels of family violence and neglect; for males, the identity of brute is beyond the sustaining boundary but still moderately close to the sociopath self-sentiment. The sociopaths' high rate of marital infidelity is reflected to some degree by the fact that the identities of adulteress and adulterer were reachable for sociopaths.

Sexuality. Sociopaths engage in much illicit sexual activity, according to Robins (1966, p. 105). "In interview more than half (56%) of the sociopathic group reported promiscuity. More than half of the sociopathic women (57%) had been prostitutes. One-third of the sociopathic women had lived for some time with a man to whom they were not married. Eleven per cent of the men diagnosed sociopathic personality were known to have had homosexual experiences as adults." Our analyses revealed a number of sexual identities sustaining female sociopaths: bisexual, dike, homosexual, lesbian, pervert, pickup, sexpot, swinger, vamp, and wench. Several strata of prostitution roles and other sexual-work identities also were sustaining for the females: call girl, concubine, courtesan, hooker, mistress, porno star, prostitute, streetwalker, topless dancer, whore. Male sociopaths could be sustained by the identities of bisexual, fag, fairy, fruit, heterosexual, homo, homosexual, pervert, queer, and swinger; and also by the sex-worker identities of gigolo and porno star.

sex-worker

Lawbreaking, incarceration. Robins (1966, pp. 110–112) found that sociopaths had extensive problems with the law: 94 percent had non-traffic arrests as adults, and 80 percent of the arrestees spent at least one night in jail, while three-quarters were incarcerated for at least a year. At a given time, about 15 percent were in prison or jail, awaiting trial, or on parole. Many sustaining identities of criminality and culpability correspond to the high arrest rate of sociopaths: accomplice, defendant, fugitive, imposter, look-out, offender, speeder, spy, and suspect, plus collaborator, culprit, desperado, felon, perjurer, and stool pigeon for females, and accused, confederate, conspirator, decoy, informer, intruder, law-breaker, subversive, terrorist, trespasser, and villain for males. The high rate of incarceration for sociopaths is reflected by sustaining incarceration identities: captive, inmate, internee, political prisoner, prisoner, remand prisoner, plus lifer for females, and convict for males.

Alcohol Use. Robins (1966, pp. 113–114) noted that "Sixty-two per cent of those diagnosed sociopathic personality had had medical problems with alcohol, had been arrested or fired because of drinking, had been threatened with or suffered divorce because of their drinking, or were in serious financial trouble because of drinking....An additional 14% of the sociopathic group, while showing no evidence for...severe social or medical complications of drinking, did report chronic heavy drinking..., periodic 'benders,' family complaints about their drinking not serious enough to threaten divorce, or a personal opinion that they chronically drank too much." The identities of lush and drunk

were sustaining for male sociopaths. For females, the lush identity was moderately close to the sociopath self-sentiment.

Drug Use. "Ten per cent of the sociopathic group…had been or were currently addicted to drugs, and an additional 5% claimed to have experimented with taking drugs without becoming addicted " (Robins 1966, p. 115). The identity of pothead was sustaining for both female and male sociopaths. For males, the identities of drug addict and fiend also were sustaining. In the case of females, drug addict and fiend were moderately close to the sociopath self-sentiment.

Social Participation. Robins (1966, pp.115–117) reported that "only 21% of the sociopathic group reported keeping in reasonably close touch with all living members of their immediate family, as compared with 60% of both the no disease and control groups…. Three-quarters of those who were neither institutionalized nor transient at time of follow-up reported no social contacts with their neighbors at all, as compared with 35% of the no disease group and 33% of the control subjects…. Control subjects describe their social activities as consisting primarily of visiting in the homes of friends and relatives. For the uninstitutionalized sociopathic group, only 21% report such visiting as the chief form their social life takes. One-fifth of the sociopathic group claim they have no social contacts at all, and one-sixth seek social contacts primarily in bars. The remainder tend to spend time with friends in activities which minimize the need for communication—hunting, fishing, going to movies (22%)." We found some family identities were sustaining for sociopaths—granddaughter, niece, sibling, sister-in-law, stepdaughter, stepsister (females); brother-in-law, cousin, fiancé, grandson, nephew, sibling, son, son-in-law, stepson (males). The neighbor identity was a reachable identity for both sexes. The identity of caller was sustaining for sociopaths, and the identity of visitor was moderately close to their self-sentiment. The identities of guest and houseguest were reachable. Stranger and outsider were sustaining identities for sociopaths. Being an outcast was reachable, and being a wallflower was reachable for males but not females. With regard to companionship, sidekick was sustaining for sociopaths. With regard to the hunting and fishing mentioned by Robins, the identity of hunter was sustaining for males, but fisherman was beyond the distance limits that we are using.

Psychiatric Symptoms. Robins (1966, pp. 118–119) reported that a third of the sociopaths had a high level of neurotic and somatic symptoms. Our analyses reveal that for both females and males, the identities of lunatic, paranoid, and psychotic could be sustaining and the identity of psychopath

was reachable. Neurotic was a self-actualizing identity for females, and was sustaining for males. Madman was sustaining for males.

Evaluation. The above paragraphs link identities that are close to the sociopathic self-sentiment with Robins (1966) description of sociopaths' behaviors. Overall, we found that sociopathic activities align with 55 percent of the 229 sustaining identities for female sociopaths and with 50 percent of the 269 sustaining identities for male sociopaths. Our proposition that identities close to sociopaths' average self-sentiment should account for behaviors known to characterize sociopaths was successful in interpreting eight of eleven areas of sociopathic behavior: mobility, employment, marital relations, sexuality, lawbreaking-incarceration, alcohol use, drug use, and psychiatric symptoms.

Results were ambiguous in the area of unemployment. Some identities relating to unemployment were sustaining for sociopaths but other such identities were not. Meanwhile the fact that the majority of sociopaths were employed was reflected in the finding that a variety of conventional jobs were in their ambits.

Only the results regarding sociopaths' health and social participation contradict our general hypothesis. In the case of health, sick-role identities were not in the sociopaths' ambits. We believe that sociopaths' risky living and deficient health regimens gain them medical-treatment identities inadvertently, rather than in the course of intentionally maintaining self-meanings. In the case of social participation, we found some family and comradeship identities within their reach, in contrast to the social isolation of sociopaths in real life. A possible explanation is that their real-life social isolation was inflicted rather than chosen. According to our analyses, sociopaths could self-actualize in annoying informal identities such as chatterbox and kook, and their sustaining identities contained numerous disagreeable characters such as ass, bone-head, braggart, crackpot, fool, idiot, jackass, klutz, nitwit, and sore-head. Interspersing performances of such disagreeable identities within family and companion interactions might have led others to ostracize the sociopaths, eventually culminating in their social isolation.

Overall, our linking of sociopaths' predicted identities with their behaviors supports the idea that a negative self-sentiment gets expressed in deviant identities. Such processes might be involved even in extreme deviance. Castells (2000b: 210) noted that young killers in the world of organized crime are characterized by fatalism, negativism, hopelessness, and meaningless—attributes that suggest very negative self-sentiments. We examined the possible linkage between negative self-sentiments and extreme deviance in the following study.

Infamous criminal Henry Lucas killed his mother, his sweetheart, and some unknown number of other people before his natural death in a Texas prison in 2001. We inferred Lucas' self-sentiment from a snippet of his autobiographical statements, recorded and transcribed by Norris (1988, pp. 107–108). We averaged the EPA profiles for identities Lucas attributed to himself, such as thief and runaway, along with the profiles of identities we inferred with a computer program (Heise 1995) for his self-reported events, such as hating strangers and being whipped by his mother. Our estimate of Lucas' self-sentiment (EPA: –1.38, 0.29, 1.13) is close to identities of habitual criminality in the legal realm, and it collects a range of sexual identities that amount to polymorphous perversity. With regard to informal identities, this self-sentiment assembles derogatory labels, vernacular references to psychopathology, and a variety of vicious characters. The Lucas self-sentiment is close to several identities related to interpersonal violence—cutthroat, gunman, and mugger.

We then examined biographies of Lucas (Newton 1990; Wikipedia 2005; Court TV 2005), other than the Norris writings that provided the data for computing Lucas' self-sentiment, and judged which of the identities theoretically sustaining Lucas' estimated self-sentiment were mentioned explicitly in a biography or were implied because behavior exemplifying the identity was mentioned. Overall, 46 percent of the 135 predicted identities actually appear or are intimated in accounts of Lucas' life. For a comparison, we counted how many of the same identities appear or are intimated in a biography of a U.S. president of the same era, Richard Nixon (Wikipedia 2005). Notwithstanding Nixon's ignominy as an impeached president, only 19 percent of the identities emerge in his biography, and most of those derive from our loose interpretations of Nixon's political contentiousness. Thus the identities retrieved with Lucas' estimated self-sentiment are more than twice as likely to describe Lucas than a public official of the same era, even an iniquitous one.

We conclude that individuals who disvalue themselves extremely, yet maintain a sense of moderate potency and activation, might realize themselves in identities of extreme deviance and violence.[3]

Transformations of Self

Now we turn to the dynamic part of our theory of self, first considering short-term shifts in identity preferences, and then turning to

long-term changes due to changes in self-sentiments. We use the following special terms.

Actualizing Identities. Identities with affective meanings that are nearly the same as an individual's self-sentiment can serve as surrogates of the individual's persona. Such identities allow the individual to maintain the meaning of the self behaviorally even though performing a cultural role, and theoretically individuals prefer such actualizing identities over alternatives when given a choice. Operationally, in the EPA space, we treat identities within a radius of 0.75 from the self-sentiment as actualizing.

Sustaining Identities. Lacking identities that can actualize the self-sentiment, the individual prefers identities at an intermediary distance from the self-sentiment. Adopting an identity that diverges modestly from the self-sentiment corroborates the self, even though it also engenders inauthenticity. The inauthenticity can be mitigated by next selecting an identity divergent in the opposite direction, counterbalancing the prior divergence and sustaining the self-sentiment cumulatively. Operationally, we treat identities within a distance of 1.75 from the self-sentiment as being readily available for this kind of self-corroboration.

Institutional Adaptations

According to our theory, an individual shifts identity preferences in different institutions. Currently we do not have empirical data on individuals' identity preferences when moving between institutional settings, so we examine the issue through computer simulations grounded in empirical measurements of self-sentiments and identity sentiments. Our goal is exegetic, to show in concrete terms how a given self-sentiment can get expressed through differing identities in different institutions.

We determined which identities might be self-actualizing for typical female and male Canadian undergraduates in 2001, using the average self-sentiments in Table 6.1 as center points for the self-actualization radii. The following discussion examines how these identities distribute into different social institutions.

The average self-sentiment of Canadian female undergraduates was so positive on the Evaluation and Activity dimensions that identities in law, politics, education, medicine, and religion were too remote to afford self-actualization. The only self-actualizing identity in the work

world we found was lifeguard, an impractical choice for most individuals. Self-actualization was possible in family life (sister, babysitter) and sexuality (girlfriend). In addition, some informal identities were self-actualizing, related to friendship (buddy) and spontaneity (comedian and free spirit).

The more moderate self-sentiment of the male undergraduates provided more choices for self-actualization. The males theoretically could actualize themselves in the jobs of video jockey, barkeeper, or bartender. The identities of activist and winner were self-actualizing in the political realm. Being a student, a prodigy, or a whiz kid were routes for self-actualization within education. Several family identities were self-actualizing—brother, son, sibling, and bachelor. The realm of sexuality offered self-actualization through the intimacy identities of intimate, mate, and boyfriend. Informal identities actualizing the average self-sentiment of the males related to friendship (pal and kindred spirit), spontaneity (extrovert, free spirit, and maverick), and durability (survivor).

Moving between institutional settings would have shifted identities as follows, as the individuals sought self-actualization. The females might have relished enacting the sister role or role of babysitter when home with their family. However, in the sexuality world of dating, enthusiasm would be transferred to the role of girlfriend. The young women should have eluded other institutional settings, since other institutions offered them scant opportunities for self-actualization, but when required to participate they should have preferred the informal aspects of the situation, where they could self-actualize by showing themselves to be comedians and free spirits.

The males, able to self-actualize in more institutions, could have shifted identities more by moving between institutional settings. Going from work to school, their enthusiasm would turn from tending bar to the student identity and those educational roles in which they excelled. At home with their family they could relish their identities of son and brother. They could take to the streets at political rallies committed to being an activist and winner. In the evening with a beloved, the identities of boyfriend and intimate would outweigh all others. These young men would try to avoid involvement in the institutions of law, medicine, or religion in which they had no self-actualizing identities, but when required to participate they could relish informal moments where they could show their spontaneity or their potential as a friend.

Inauthenticity Adaptations

According to Propositions 5.15 and 5.17, occupying an inauthentic identity disposes the individual to occupy a compensating identity at a later time in order to correct the distorted representation of the self.

This kind of homeostatic maintenance of the self was demonstrated in a series of experiments by Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009). These researchers had subjects write stories about themselves indicating how positive modifiers (e.g., caring, generous, fair, and kind), negative modifiers (e.g., disloyal, greedy, mean, and selfish), or neutral inanimate objects (e.g., book, keys, and house) related to their own life. In the final phase of the experiment, the subjects were asked to promise a small donation to a charity of their choice as a way of increasing their social awareness, and the amount promised was recorded as a dependent variable.

Subjects who related themselves to positive attributes subsequently promised relatively little money to their favorite charity, compared to either the subjects in the negative attribute condition or the subjects who related to neutral objects. Meanwhile, subjects who related themselves to negative attributes subsequently promised relatively large sums of money to their favorite charity compared to subjects in both of the other groups. Specifically, subjects in the positive group promised an average of $1.07, those in the negative group promised an average of $5.30, and those in the neutral group promised an average of $2.71, and these differences were statistically significant. We interpret these results as showing that subjects who were inauthentically over-evaluated chose to display themselves in negative ways, and subjects who were inauthentically under-evaluated chose to display themselves in positive ways

In a second experiment subjects were told to write stories about someone they knew, rather than about themselves. In this case, incorporating positive attributes or negative attributes into the stories did not affect donations. Thus, "the effects were present only when the self-concept was activated" (Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin 2009, p. 525).

A third experiment changed the dependent variable. After writing their stories, subjects participated in a social simulation in which they managed a manufacturing plant, and had to decide what levels of pollutants that the plant would release. Subjects in the positive attributes group chose to release significantly more pollutants than those in the other two groups, and those in the negative attributes group chose

to release significantly less pollutants than those in the other groups. Moreover, those in the positive attributes group were more likely to see the manager's job as running the plant profitably, whereas those in the negative attributes group more often saw the manager's job as involving environmental responsibility.

Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009) framed the hypotheses for their study in terms of morality. "If moral cleansing is used as a means to compensate when moral self-worth is below some standard, then compensation might also occur, in the form of amoral or immoral behavior, when moral self-worth is above an ideal level…For example, people might not feel the need to donate blood or volunteer if they have already established their reputation as a moral person. This type of response can be thought of as moral licensing. People may be licensed to refrain from good behavior when they have accrued a surplus of moral currency."

In our terms, those who related themselves to positive attributes participated in positively evaluated composite identities vicariously, and those who related their personal stories to negative attributes took on disagreeable identities vicariously.[4] These overly positive or overly negative conditions created inauthenticities that had to be repaired by subsequently using a redeeming identity to correct the distorted representation of self. As the subjects enacted the role of a relatively positive or relatively negative redeeming identity, they generated behavior that Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009) identified as moral or immoral.

Our general focus in this book is more on role-identities than on composite identities formed from attributes. No study is available to demonstrate the process of compensation for inauthenticities in this case, but we can examine the issue as we did in the matter of identity shifts between institutions, through computer simulations grounded in empirical measurements of self-sentiments and identity sentiments among Canadian undergraduates in 2001. For expository purposes, we assume that inauthentic identities and the corresponding redeeming identities generally are sustaining identities.

Sustaining occupations for females occurred in the arts (e.g., musician, photographer, and actor) and in service industries (e.g., child daycare worker, schoolteacher, or beautician). In addition, athlete and astronaut were forms of work that could sustain the women's selves, even though not practical for many. Education, though not an arena for self-actualization, did provide sustaining identities to the women (e.g., student, roommate, and graduate student). Apart from available

self-actualizing identities, daughter, cousin, and wife could serve as sustaining identities in the family; virgin, sweetheart, and intimate within sexuality; and hostess, party animal, and fan among informal identities. Activist and winner could be sustaining identities for females in the political realm. The institutions of law and religion offered no actualizing or sustaining identities, so presumably these institutions were of very little interest to the women.

A multitude of sustaining work-related roles were available to the males—77 in our analyses. Except for some gendered identities, sustaining occupations for males included all of the arts and service related jobs that were available to the females. In addition, the males had options in police work (e.g., bodyguard and Mountie), health care (e.g., physiotherapist and veterinarian), and non-medical professions (e.g., computer programmer and YMCA director). The males also could have sustained themselves in laboring identities (e.g., fireman and carpenter) or in sexual work (porno star). The institution of law provided some sustaining identities for the males—being a witness or a deputy, and on the deviant side, a desperado. Politics also offered some sustaining identities (e.g., underdog and guerilla). The males could have sustained themselves in education with multiple identities at both the undergraduate and graduate-student levels. Two peripheral identities in medicine (blood donor and organ donor) could have sustained the males occasionally. Religion provided them with the unconventional sustaining identities of Wiccan or agnostic. The family offered the males sustaining identities such as nephew and husband. The area of sexuality offered sustaining identities varying from blind date to truelove. As with the females, sustaining informal identities included many related to friendship and sociability; other informal identities for the males related to masculinity (e.g., he-man and gent), unconventionality (e.g., daredevil and nonconformist), avocations (e.g., gamer and gourmet), or to being entertaining (e.g., clown and wit).

According to our theory, enacting an identity that diverges from the self-sentiment should motivate a person to seek another inauthentic identity that diverges in the opposite direction, so that the cumulative experienced self confirms the self-sentiment. Jobs are a quintessential source of inauthenticity, and in this section we examine predicted reactions to some work identities.

The bartender identity was self-actualizing for males, but for females bartender was a sustaining identity that made the self seem insufficiently good, potent, and active. However, this divergence could have

been counterbalanced satisfactorily by adopting the self-actualizing identity of free spirit. Thus female bartenders could have redeemed their performances in a work role that was beneath them by featuring their free-spirit identity, and indeed they might have displayed a free spirit in conjunction with their bartending.

For females, the job of flight attendant is similar to bartender, except insufficiently potent rather than insufficiently active. It, too, could have been counterbalanced satisfactorily with the identity of free spirit. For males, the flight attendant role expressed their goodness and activity correctly, but was much too impotent. Male flight attendants would have needed to turn to the identities of he-man or athlete to undo their job-derived inauthenticity.

Being a musician in a symphony orchestra affirmed females' evaluation and potency, though it failed to rise to the high activation level of the female self-sentiment. Thus, females could have turned to this job as a sustaining identity that would be counterbalanced by an identity more active than their self-sentiment. However, in practice, the job would have caused chronic inauthenticity because the females had no identities more active than their self-sentiment to function as redeemers. For males, the classical-musician identity would have been sustaining if paired with active and extremely potent identities, such as positions in hockey (e.g., forward, winger, goalie). Thus males could have manifested their selves in the role of classical musician, providing they recreated in hockey games regularly.

How could the males have affirmed their selves while adopting one of the renegade political identities such as guerilla or spy (which they rated as evaluatively neutral)? Two identities—sweetheart and lover—were possible counterbalances. Males who turned to the renegade roles might have bound themselves to deep and intimate relationships for redemption. The axis between perfidy and intimacy can be interpreted from the opposite direction as well. Participation in a deep, intimate relationship would produce a sense of inauthentic niceness in these undergraduate males, calling for counterbalancing by one or another form of duplicity, such as the deviant political identities or identities such as pickup or advertising executive.

Some axes of divergence and redemption provided a self-realization impasse. Self-attributed activation was so high for both females and males that they could find no identities to redeem major inauthenticities of passivity. The example of orchestral musician was given above for females. For males, this kind of problem arose for identities such as veterinarian and husband. Females had another

impracticable axis, caused by their extremely positive self-evaluations. In principle, they could take the job of model, or perform the identity of party animal. However, no overly good identities were available to them for counterbalancing these roles' inauthentic low levels of goodness.

Summarizing, we employed simulation analyses to illustrate our proposition regarding institutional salience hierarchies, that a self-sentiment selects different self-actualizing identities in different institutions. Identities in different institutions are not organized into a single salience hierarchy. Ordinarily they are segregated and uncompetitive with one another, but if two identities from different institutions are roused simultaneously, the result typically is role conflict rather than sole attention to one or the other as the preferred identity.

We reviewed a published experiment that demonstrated homeostatic self-processes, with individuals acting exceptionally nice as a response to an overly negative identification, and acting exceptionally inconsiderate as a response to an overly positive identification.

Additional simulation analyses illustrated the principle of transient salience hierarchies which proposes that an individual's identity salience hierarchy is stable only so long as the individual is self-actualizing. Problems of inauthenticity cause some identities to wane in salience while other identities become prominent.

Our simulation analyses revealed some asymmetric axes of divergence and redemption, in which one side is populated with identities but the opposite side has none. Identities on the populated side might be tried by individuals, but doing so leads to unresolved inauthenticity. Sometimes individuals are obliged to occupy such identities repeatedly, which should precipitate a strategy of change in the self-sentiment or in the sentiments attached to problematic identities. For example, an individual caught in such a predicament might revise the self-biography in order to obtain a more fitting self-sentiment, or might enter a subculture where the obligatory identity is fulfilling, or where redeeming identities are available.

The different analytic results for females and males demonstrated that salience hierarchies within an institution differ for individuals with different self-sentiments. Generally speaking, individuals with different self-evaluations prefer identities of differing status; individuals with different assessments of self-potency prefer identities with different power; and individuals with different senses of self-activation prefer identities with different agential potential. Consequently, all of the roles in an institution might be peopled on a voluntary basis by groups

of individuals with diverse self-sentiments. However, if the required diversity is lacking, power systems of coercion or incentive must be applied in order to force some individuals into inauthentic identities.

When none of an institution's identities has potential for fulfilling an individual's self, the individual has little cause to seek out the institution's settings, and should have little commitment to social relations related to that institution. When an individual's self is close to identities in an institution, the individual should gravitate to the institution's settings as excellent locales for actualizing the self, and the individual should have high commitment to associations with others in their institutional roles. Institutional commitment understood this way is very similar to the "interactive commitment" defined by Owens and Serpe (2003, p. 89).

Long-term Changes

Identities that actualize a self, identities that cause inauthenticity, and identities that redeem a self-divergence depend both on an individual's self-sentiment and on the individual's sentiments about identities. In this section we consider how an individual's expressed character can change over long periods of time because of life course changes in the self-sentiment, and because of cultural shifts in sentiments.

Self-Sentiment Change

Progress through institutional careers and through the life course might result in gains and relinquishments of identities and of material and biological prerogatives that affect one's self-sentiment. For instance, Elliot's (1996) analysis of 3,076 respondents in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth revealed that women's self-esteem improves with employment in interesting jobs at high pay and after marriage, and their self-esteem declines with parenthood or with becoming a welfare recipient. In response to changes in identities, possessions and bodily states, individuals might reconstruct their life stories and self-concepts—individually, collaboratively, or with the guidance of a therapist—thereby producing a new self-sentiment.

Evidence indicates that self-sentiments vary in some regular patterns over the life course. Demo (1992, pp. 317–318) reviewed available research and found that "self-esteem peaks in the late adult years (roughly 65–75), until physical and cognitive deterioration associated with failing health,

less flexibility, limited social interaction and role-identities, precipitates negative thoughts and feelings about the self." A later study of more than 300,000 individuals contacted via the Internet showed self-esteem ebbing during the teen years, with improvement thereafter peaking between ages 65 and 70, then a plunge to low levels (Robins et al. 2002).

A longitudinal study by Schafer and Keith (1999) found significant decline in self-esteem a bit earlier, among 98 Midwest U.S. couples who were in their mid to late 50s at a second measurement made 13 years after a first measurement. The Schafer and Keith study is of particular interest because it permits an Evaluation measurement (by averaging ratings on a "likeable" scale and a "friendly" scale) and a Potency measurement (averaging "capable" and "confident" scales). At the earlier time husbands had an average self rating of 1.95 on Evaluation and of 1.92 on Potency; 13 years later these average self ratings by husbands declined to 1.52 and 1.46. Wives' self ratings declined too, but less so, and just on Evaluation.

A longitudinal study of "perceived control" conducted by Mirowsky and Ross (2007) found that this manifestation of self-potency rises steadily until the mid- or late work life, and then declines, with increasing steepness at later ages. "Increasing prevalence and severity of physical impairment is a prime mediator. Threatening chronic diseases, reduced economic opportunities, the death of partners, and shortening time horizons also may contribute" (Mirowsky and Ross 2007, p. 1377). Perceived control rises higher and to a later age in more recent cohorts and for those with more education. However, Mirowsky and Ross found a different pattern among individuals with no more than a high school education: those individuals experienced decline in perceived control after adolescence, abated only by some slight gains during the early years of retirement.

Rossi and Rossi (1990, pp. 56–61) tracked self-ratings on three attributes over the adult years. Their *expressivity* scale combined self-ratings of being affectionate, wanting to please others, being expressive of deep feelings, and being eager to help others. Their *dominance* scale combined self-ratings of being competitive, ambitious, aggressive, and wanting to be in charge. Their *drive* scale combined self-ratings of being energetic, hard-working, and having high libido. Assuming that these three measures correlate with the Evaluation, Potency, and Activity dimensions of the self-sentiment, respectively, we obtain another view of life course changes in the self-sentiment. The expressivity measure was high throughout the adult years, more so for females than for males. The dominance measure declined over

the life span for females, but stayed high among males. The drive measure declined regularly throughout the adult years, for both females and males.

To summarize, on the evaluative dimension feelings about self seem to be most positive in the middle adult years, and least positive in adolescence and old age. A sense of self-potency attains a high level in late adolescence and increases until middle age for the well-educated—perhaps especially for males, while declining throughout the work life for those with little education—perhaps especially for females. Old age brings declines in self-potency for all groups. The one study charting life-long changes in self-attributed activity indicated steady decline from youth to old age.

The typical changes in self-sentiment over the life course theoretically produce shifts in the identities that are self-fulfilling at each age. For illustrative analyses, we focus on middle-class patterns of change, and draw identities for each life-course self-sentiment from the 2001 Ontario dictionary, retaining those that are sustaining with both male and female measurements. Lacking empirical measurements of EPA changes in self-sentiments over the life course, we estimated probable profiles, for females and males combined, from the figures in Table 1, from the Schafer and Keith (1999) study and the other studies reviewed above, and from Canadian profiles for the age identities of adolescent, adult, middle-aged person, and old-timer.

Adolescents (EPA self-sentiment of 0.5, –1.0, 2.5). An adolescent self-sentiment can be expressed in the service jobs of busboy, fast-food-server, and salesgirl. The youths might also aspire to being a waiter, waitress, or flight attendant. They can find self-expression in school roles such as pupil, cheerleader, freshman, and sophomore. In the family, grandchild, nepotic, stepchild, and in-law roles are most attractive. Their expansive sexual interests allow self-expression in identities such as blind date and dancer, in offbeat identities such as bisexual and sexpot, and in aspirations to work as a sexual performer. Informal interests and avocations might be expressed in identities of lad, lass, youth, boy scout or girl scout on the one hand, and groupie and party animal on the other.

Young adults (EPA self-sentiment of 2.0, 1.1, 2.1). Self-expressive jobs for a young adult include computer programmer, public relations worker, reporter, waitperson, and professional athlete. In the academic world they can find fulfillment in the identities of student, athlete, or teacher. Politics can engage them as an activist or pro-choicer. Medical jobs of nursing and physiotherapy are self-expressive. In the

figure 6.2

family their sibling and offspring identities are salient, and also spousal identities when appropriate. Sexually, the identities of boyfriend, girl-friend, intimate, and sweetheart are fulfilling. Informal identities such as gal and he-man, daredevil, kindred-spirit, and party-animal can be self-expressive. We found no religious identities with which the young adults might identify.

Middle-aged adults (EPA self-sentiment of 2.0, 2.0, 0.0). Professional and supervisory jobs are self-expressive for this type. Middle-aged selves can be fulfilled by being a teacher or a school official, and lacking that they empathize with people in those education roles. Similarly in the medical world, doctor, nurse, and hospital roles can provide fulfill-ing work, and empathy flows to individuals with such identities. Being the backer of a politician or holding local political office are fulfilling roles in the political realm. With regard to religion, middle-aged indi-viduals identify as members of their faith and empathize with religious leaders. In the family, spousal, parental, and avuncular identities are self-expressive, as is the identity of breadwinner. Conventional sexual-ity is fulfilling—being a heterosexual and enacting the sexual aspects of spousal identities. Informal identities of advisor and confidant are self-expressive, and so too are identities such as scoutmaster, host, and philanthropist.

Elders (EPA self-sentiment of 1.5, 1.0, −2.0). Many jobs lose their expressive value for elders, though they still can fulfill themselves in some work roles such as author, banker, farmer, or funeral-director. In politics they identify as citizens, and the identities of alderman or mayor can be fulfilling. In education fulfillment comes from the alumnus identity, and from empathy with professors. Medical inter-ests focus on psychiatric workers and handlers of cadavers (perhaps related to the popularity of crime-investigation dramas). In the world of religion, being a church-deacon is fulfilling, and ministers, priests, or rabbis garner empathy. Grandparent identities dominate family life, and in informal situations the identities of old-timer, philan-thropist, and sophisticate are self-expressive. No sexual identities are self-fulfilling.

Aged adults (EPA self-sentiment of 0.5, −0.5, −2.0). If still working the aged can be fulfilled in lesser-status and low-effort jobs such as bookkeeper, elevator-operator, jeweler, or sewing-machine-operator. Their empathy goes to low-status high-effort workers such as long-shoreman, factory worker, or miner. They retain a prominent citizen identity in politics. In education their interests are largely reduced to being a bookworm, and empathizing with library workers. Medically,

a disabled identity can be self-expressive for them, and cadaver workers continue to be a focus of empathic interest. In religion, membership in a faith still may be fulfilling, but the key self-expressive identity is mourner. Widow or widower becomes the central family identity. Puritan is the prominent sexual identity. Among their self-fulfilling informal identities are crony and homebody.

Thus, changes in self-sentiments and shifts in associated identities theoretically produce transformations of an individual's character over the life course. The results of our illustrative analyses sketch what seems to be a normative path in the middle class, but individuals vary depending on personal perturbations in self-sentiments. Also, the normative path most likely varies in different social classes, and by race and ethnicity as well (Sewell and Heise 2007).

Cultural Change

Two individuals with identical self-sentiments could utilize very different self-actualizations and sustaining identities if they have contrasting sentiments about some identities because of different cultural environments. For example, Smith-Lovin and Douglass (1992) found that evaluations of gay identities were positive in a congregation of southern U.S. gay evangelicals but negative among southern Unitarians. Thus, adopting a gay identity would have actualized high self-esteem among southern gay evangelicals, but not among southern Unitarians. In general, two individuals with identical self-sentiments but different sentiments about identities differ in salience hierarchies, in self-actualization, and in sources of inauthenticity.

Some cultural identity sentiments change as decades pass, and such changes move identities toward or away from an individual's self-sentiment, changing the likelihood that the individual will adopt certain identities. For example, Nagel (1996) argued that a sharp increase in the U.S. Native American population—from 523,591 in 1960 to 1,878,285 in 1990—resulted from a change in the identity of Indian from an object of stigma and oppression to a basis of pride and solidarity, partly as a result of changes in federal Indian policy, but mainly because of the Red-Power movement that burgeoned after the 1969 occupation of Alcatraz Island in San Francisco bay. "Red Power activism put forth an image of American Indians as victorious rather than victimized, confronting an oppressive federal bureaucracy, demanding redress of long-standing grievances, challenging images of Indians as powerless casualties of history, redefining 'red,' 'native,' and 'tribal' as valued

statuses imbued with moral and spiritual significance. This transformation in the meaning and worth of 'Indian' was a primary reason for dramatic increases in American Indian self-identification during the 1970s and 1980s" (Nagel 1996, p. 140).

Castells (2004: 144) presented an example of how inauthenticity can lead to development of new identities. "For those Muslim elites living in contact with the global, dominant networks, the choice was between becoming culturally Western or being downgraded in their social and cultural status. This was particularly poignant for the young generation whose members were technologically and intellectually very modern, yet found no meaning for their lives in values that were strange to their experience. An experience that was demeaned as oriental." Denied authentic identities within global society for their positive self-sentiments, these elite individuals linked with the impoverished, dispossessed Muslim masses to nurture a new Islamic fundamentalist identity, and thereby "they could alter the course of history, by opposing to the global networks of wealth and technology, the global networks of belief and terror."

MacKinnon and Luke (2002) demonstrated cultural changes in some identity sentiments in a study of EPA sentiments in Canada. In 1995 they remeasured sentiments for 102 identities considered in their 1981 study of Canadian sentiments, with Ontario university students providing the EPA ratings at both times. MacKinnon and Luke (2002, p. 311) reported that "1981 values explain between 78% to 80% of the variance of 1995 EPA values for males and between 75% to 84% for females. Thus...cultural sentiments for social identities are relatively stable over time. On the other hand, the fact that between 16% to 25% of the variance of 1995 EPA values remains unexplained suggests that important changes in collective attitudes for social identities have taken place between our two surveys."

MacKinnon and Luke (2002) found the following changes occurring in Canada over a decade and a half.

- Some work identities increased in evaluation and declined in potency.
- Legal identities declined in evaluation, potency, and activity on the whole.
- Political identities lost respect.
- Medical identities went up in evaluation.
- Religious identities declined in evaluation and potency.

the (? since Luke wasn't in on the earlier study)

- Family identities tended to decline in evaluation and potency and increase in activity.
- Sexuality identities increased in evaluation.

These summaries permit some inferences about how sentiment shifts might have related to self processes in Canada over the last decades of the 20th century. We focus on females because their average self-sentiment is positioned at very positive values on Evaluation, Potency, and Activity (Table 6.1), making it easy to relate their self-sentiment to changes in identity sentiments. Our generalizations apply to women who maintained highly positive sentiments throughout the period of study.

- The attractiveness of business identities would have changed little. Higher evaluation would have made jobs more fulfilling, but this benefit would have been canceled by lowered potency.
- The attractiveness of family identities would have declined. The increasing activity of family identities would have made them more attractive, but that effect is more than compensated by family identities' loss of goodness and potency.
- The Canadian females would have been increasingly alienated from the legal world, from politics, and from religion. Identities in all of these areas drifted away from the females' self-sentiment.
- Canadian females would have become more attracted to, or less alienated from, identities in the medical world and sexuality identities.

This illustrative analysis shows that individuals' self-realizations can change as meanings of identities change in a culture, even when self-sentiments remain the same. In this way, cultural shifts can produce widespread transformations in individual character.

Summary

This chapter introduced analyses of self based on the dimensions of Evaluation, Potency, and Activity (EPA). When applied to the self, the EPA dimensions register notions of self-worth, self-efficacy, and self-initiative. Two major benefits accrue from substituting the EPA dimensions for traditional measures of self-esteem and self-efficacy.

First, the three dimensional EPA structure constitutes a cross-cultural framework that can be applied far beyond the North American data that we used in this chapter (Heise 2010, Chapter 2). The EPA system for assessing affect has been validated in more than two dozen societies and in languages spanning ten different language families (Osgood, May and Miron 1975, Table 5.2), in what arguably was the largest and most meticulous cross-cultural study ever conducted. In each culture bipolar adjective rating scales were created via word-association methods rather than by translations, indigenes used the scales to rate universal concepts, and the ratings were statistically analyzed to determine their emic dimensionality as well as the pan-cultural parallelism of dimensions. In this way it was ascertained that Evaluation, Potency, and Activity are universal aspects of human response.

Second, EPA measurements on bipolar graphic scales constitute a generalized method of assessing feelings about any object. The crucial implication for studies of self is that the EPA measurement system provides a uniform metric for measuring both individuals' self-sentiments and the cultural sentiments that are associated with various identities. Thereby, our theory of self can be operationalized by plotting an individual's self-sentiment as a point in the three-dimensional EPA space, and then computing distances to other constructs represented in the space in order to define with quantitative precision such notions as self-actualization and inauthenticity.

We reported results related to self-sentiments both from published studies and from analyses that were reported here for the first time, and found that average self-sentiments vary in groups distinguished by sex, age, cohort, nationality, and psychiatric status. This finding accords with our claims in Proposition 5.10 that individuals maintain a fundamental feeling about self and that this sentiment adapts to variations in self-conceptualization.

We measured the distances between identity sentiments and undergraduates' self-sentiments to see if those distances predicted the identities that undergraduates used to describe themselves. We found significant negative correlations between the distances and respondents' ratings of how self-descriptive each identity was. Overall, individuals thought the most self-descriptive identities were those whose sentiments best matched the individuals' self-sentiments, providing empirical support for Proposition 5.11 in our theory of self—the self-actualization principle.

We calculated which identities were closest to the average self-sentiment of sociopaths, and then determined that identities close to

that self-sentiment accounted for nearly all of the reported activities of sociopaths. In addition, we reported a case study of an infamous murderer wherein we induced the individual's self-sentiment from his autobiographical statements—as warranted by our Proposition 5.10, and then showed that the inferred self-sentiment predicted the identities that were mentioned explicitly in biographies of the criminal. These analyses offer evidence for Proposition 5.12 in our theory of self, which argues that individuals with negative self-sentiments maintain those self-sentiments by adopting deviant identities and engaging in deviant behavior.

We performed several explicatory analyses to show how a self-sentiment assembles a set of identities that the individual can use for self-actualization, with different elements arising in different social institutions, as asserted in Proposition 5.18. Review of a published experiment, and further explicatory analyses, also portrayed how an individual can use inauthentic identities to sustain the self, redeeming one kind of inauthenticity with an opposite kind, as claimed in Propositions 5.13, 5.16, and 5.17.

Some analyses in this chapter expanded our basic formulation of the theory in chapter five. In our explicatory analyses, we found that counterbalancing identities might not be available for some obligatory roles, and we hypothesized that such a predicament could lead to changes in self-sentiments. We showed that changes in the self-sentiment over the life course can change the sets of identities that are self-actualizing for an individual, accounting for changes in character with aging. In addition, we showed that gradual cultural changes in the affective meanings of identities can change the sets of identities that are actualizing or sustaining for individuals with particular self-sentiments, which might account for some intergenerational differences in character between a society's cohorts.

The empirical studies in this chapter failed to touch on components of our theory of self that are related to the formation of self and the expression of self in specific situations—Propositions 5.1 through 5.9. Thus these will be important topics to consider in future studies.

Theories of Identities and Selves

Comparison of our theory of self and identities with related theories highlights the distinctiveness of our approach, as well as emphasizing continuities between our work and others'. In this chapter we compare and contrast our theory with seven others: the social psychology of Mead (1934), three theories exemplifying the structure school within symbolic interactionism—McCall and Simmons (1966; 1978), Stryker (1968; 1980), and Burke (e.g., 1980; 1991), two theories representing the process school of symbolic interactionism—Perinbanayagam (2000) and Wiley (1994), and two identity theories from psychology—social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel 1969, 1970) and self-categorization theory (Turner 1985; Turner et al. 1987). In each case we summarize the prior theory, then compare it to ours, especially with regard to whether the prior theory takes affect as well as cognition into account; how it explains human motivation; whether it incorporates cybernetic and semiotic perspectives; and how it explains the integration and stability of self. We conclude the chapter with a cursory discussion of two additional theories from psychology that focus on self-consistency—Swann's self-verification theory (1983, 1996; Swann et al. 1987) and Higgins' self-discrepancy theory (1987, 1989)—and a more extensive discussion of a theory of self-regulation of behavior that is not embedded in an explicit theory of the self—Bandura's (1991) social cognitive theory of self-regulation.

Mead

George Herbert Mead's social psychology cannot be adequately under-stood without considering his cybernetic thinking (Buckley 1967;

MacKinnon 1994; Shibutani 1968). His concept of the reflexive self presupposes a reflective mind and consciousness, making possible the delayed response to stimuli and the contemplation, selection, and rehearsal of action that characterizes purposive human behavior. To capture the reflexive nature of human thought and conduct, Mead employed the "act"—a functional, goal-directed, and time-bounded segment of behavior—as his unit of analysis. Because of its anticipatory and adjustive nature, the act is not a simple linear progression, but rather a process of negative feedback and control. In Mead's words, "there is . . . an influence of the later act on the earlier act. The later process which is to go on has already been initiated and that later process has its influence on the earlier process . . . the thing we are going to do is playing back on what we are doing now" (1934, pp. 72–73). Mead's concept of the act, in conjunction with his related concepts of mind and self, explains purposive behavior without invoking a mystical teleology. In Mead's words, "the statement of the act includes the goal to which the act moves . . . a natural teleology in harmony with a mechanical statement" (1934, p. 6). As discussed in Chapter 5, Mead anticipated the cybernetic control principle of modern systems theory long before the term was invented.

Mead applied the principle of cybernetic control exclusively to the processing of cognitive information. His emphasis on cognition and his exclusion of affect resulted from his objective to build a genuinely social psychology, one that could not be reduced to individual or general psychology. To accomplish this objective, he constructed his social psychology on the bedrock of language, which has an inherently social character because significant symbols evoke the same cognitive response or meaning in the communicator as in the recipient. Mead believed that the affective overtones of language and the communication of affective states lack this symmetry of response, so he excluded emotion from his social psychology and defined all his constructs, including mind and self, in cognitive terms (see MacKinnon 1994 for detailed discussion of this point).

Mead viewed the self as integrated because the self is a microcosm of the larger society. "The unity and structure of the complete self reflects the unity and structure of the social process as a whole; and each of the elementary selves of which it is composed reflects the unity and structure of one of the various aspects of that process in which the individual is implicated" (Mead 1934, p. 144). By implication, the stability of individual selves is also a function of the stability of society itself.

Social constitution of self is compatible with individuality, according to Mead, because each individual "reflects in its organized structure the behavior pattern of that process as a whole … from its own particular and unique standpoint within that process" (1934, p. 201). Thus, he did not see any inherent contradiction between individual agency and autonomy and institutionalized power and constraint (see 1934, p. 262). Nor did Mead ignore social conflict and social change (see 1934, pp. 303–304). Rather, he emphasized the functions of social conflict and the evolutionary nature of social change (see 1934, pp. 305–306), decades before Coser's classic book on this topic (1956). In addition, he focused on conflict between individuals or groups, rather than between individuals and the larger society. In the latter, as in the former, conflict resolution and social change takes place through the agency of individuals with reflective consciousness constructing rational acts (see 1934, pp. 308–311). And although he recognized the diversity of interests in modern industrialized societies that can engender conflict and change, his analysis of the relation between individual and society, between social institutions and individual selves, leans in the direction of utopian consensus. Mead's answer to the Hobbesian problem of order (Parsons 1937) is that social integration is based on a consensus of cognitive meanings rather than social constraint.

Discussion

As discussed in Chapter 5, both cognition and affect are required for an adequate theory of human motivation: cognition provides direction to an act; affect is required to energize or mobilize it. Thus, Mead failed to develop a theory of human motivation because he dismissed affect from his social psychology. Our theory of self vitalizes Mead's self-theory by focusing on the affective aspect of self and self-confirming choices, applying the principle of cybernetic control to self-sentiments rather than self-conceptions. From the perspective of our theory, self-conceptions mobilize self-confirming identities and identity confirming actions only indirectly through the self-sentiments that they evoke. Then, confirming self-sentiments requires cognitive processing that confirms self-conceptions. A person's simultaneous cognitive and affective processing accounts for both the direction and energizing of human conduct.

We adopt Mead's view that the organization of self-conceptions is influenced by the organization of society itself. In fact, our semantic studies of taxonomic careers and of social institutions show that

structures of identity meanings that are internalized by individuals are isomorphic to social structures. Nevertheless, we locate the integration and stability of self in self-sentiments more than in self-conceptions. Self-sentiments have only a few basic dimensions and are stable across situations and institutional contexts, allowing them to be an efficient guidance system for the self. Though Mead proposed that the social differentiation and the diversity of interests in modern industrial societies is reflected in the individuality of self, he did not anticipate that rapid growth in social diversity and structural complexity would come to be interpreted negatively as a fragmentation of self by modern and counter-enlightenment scholars. Our proposal of self-actualization via different identities in different institutions and our focus on the unifying force and stability of self-sentiments enables us to avoid the counter-enlightenment trap of dismissing the self because of its increasing cognitive complexity.

McCall and Simmons

George McCall and Jerry Simmons' (1966; 1978) concept of "role-identity"—"the character and the role that an individual devises for himself as an occupant of a particular social position … his imaginative view of himself … as an occupant of that position" (McCall and Simmons 1978, p. 65) emphasizes that identities are likely to be role-specific. However, in contrast to the classic view of a "social role" as a unit of social structure (e.g., Parsons 1951), or as a set of cultural expectations for an incumbent of a social position (Gross, Mason, and McEachern 1958), McCall and Simmons emphasize the situationally improvised nature of an identity and its corresponding role. This emphasis is embedded in their concept of the "interactive role"—a combination of the conventional and the idiosyncratic, cultural expectations and individual personality. And because specific other persons and institutional contexts are built into the contents of role identities, "the content of a given role-identity continually changes as alters and institutions enter and pass out of the person's life stream" (1978, p. 67). As social classifications, role-identities provide a basis for interpreting and assessing the meaning of a situation; as implicit plans of action, role-identities allow vicarious performances of a role before committing to overt action; and as imaginative views of oneself in social positions, role-identities serve as personal criteria for assessing one's thoughts and actions.

Because the imaginative views of oneself in social situations tend to be idealized and exaggerated, role-identities are often challenged by the realities of social life and have to be continually legitimated. Identity legitimation occurs when, as an internal audience, one perceives that one's conduct is consistent with the imaginative view of oneself in a social position. However, identity legitimation also requires the social support of external audiences. Because of generally imperfect performances and demanding audiences, role-identities are seldom perfectly legitimated, resulting in "some tension between the fostered reality of one's identity and discrepant impressions garnered from the external world" (1978, p. 72). The reduction of this tension becomes an important part of human motivation. Additional motivation arises because "the individual himself wishes to *enact* his roles, to fulfill his imaginings, to live according to his role-identities. . . . *to be and to do* as he imagines himself being and doing in a particular social position" (1978, p. 72).

McCall and Simmons identify a number of "mechanisms of legitimation" for dealing with the discrepancy between role-identities and role-support from the various audiences witnessing an individual's role performances, including the individual's selective perception of his or her own actions, and the selective interpretation of the response of an external audience to these actions. The failure of these mechanisms results in self-derogation and a sense of unworthiness, leaving a person feeling miserable and anguished, particularly if the role-identity in question happens to be important to his or her overall self-conception.

McCall and Simmons recognize that each person has many role-identities, mutually influencing one another and organized into a more or less systematic whole. They advance two principles to account for the organization of self, one trans-situational, the other situationally bound. The first proposes that identities are arranged in a hierarchy of "prominence." Conceptualized as "loosely patterned" and "plastic" (1978, p. 74), prominent role-identities "afford persisting priorities and dispositions that lend continuity of direction to the person's life" (1978, p. 84). The determinants of prominence include the degree of support afforded the identity by self and others, the material investment of resources in that identity, and the intrinsic and extrinsic gratification derived from its enactment. However, the commitment to an identity—the extent to which a person has staked self-esteem upon validating a particular identity—is "paramount among … determinants of prominence" (1978, p. 75). In turn, prominence affects conduct, with

performances of prominent identities more likely than performances of less prominent ones.

However, prominence is not the only personal determinant of conduct. The actual performances enacted in a situation depend as well on a "very fluid hierarchy of identities" they refer to as "salience." While prominence refers to the "ideal self"—identities that are of primary importance to a person's idealized self-image and overall self-esteem, the referent of salience is the "situational self"—the role-identities a person actually tries to work into an interactional encounter (1978, p. 84). The determinants of an identity's location in the salience hierarchy include its location in the prominence hierarchy, the person's need for support for the identity and for the intrinsic and extrinsic gratification derived from its enactment, and the perceived opportunities for profitable performance of the role-identity in the situation. Drawing upon exchange theory, McCall and Simmons argue that in contrast to the stability of the prominence hierarchy, the salience hierarchy shifts with the rewards obtained in an encounter on each of the determinants of salience specified above, with the exception of prominence, which is not affected by a single encounter. Thus, prominence is predictive of long-term behavior while salience is predictive of short-term behavior.

Drawing upon the dramaturgical metaphor, McCall and Simmons distinguish further between the "situational self" and "character." While "the situational self constitutes merely the person's own preferences as to the set of role-identities he will enact in a given situation … his character—being a social object—represents the subset that is actually interactively negotiated and ratified for him in the situation by all the participants" (1978, p. 84). As a social object, a character can become a "persona" if repeatedly assigned to the person in encounters with specific others. Applying the dramaturgical metaphor to Mead's I-me model of the self, McCall and Simmons associate the self as actor with the I; the self as audience with the me; and they treat identities as a third analytical aspect of the self, the self as character.

Discussion

Despite the absence of the exchange metaphor and the limited use of the dramaturgical metaphor in the theory of self and identities proposed in this book, our theory is fairly consistent with McCall and Simmons' version of identity theory. Indeed, the McCall and Simmons book was a major inspiration for affect control theory (Heise 1979), which in turn

has inspired the theory of self proposed in this book. The blending of the structure and process schools of symbolic interactionism by McCall and Simmons resonates with our theory. In addition, their emphasis on the reflexive nature of the self as an internal dialogue squares with our conceptualization of self and our model of the self-process.

Also consistent with our approach, there is an underlying current of affirmative counter-enlightenment thought in McCall and Simmons' work. This includes an emphasis on constructionism—the construction of social reality *a la* Berger and Luckmann (1966), and the construction of self as a social object, a product of social acts. They emphasize constructionism without sacrificing the idea of an organized and stable self at the center of one's social existence and phenomenological experience. Their view of the prominence hierarchy as somewhat "plastic" or "loosely patterned," of salience hierarchies as situationally fluid and variable, and their recognition that the contents of identities vary with particular others and institutional settings, all accord with the emphasis of this book on the institutional and temporal variability of identity salience.

There are a number of differences between the McCall and Simmons theory and our theory of identities and self. As observed above, we do not emphasize the dramaturgical metaphor and the exchange metaphor is absent in our theory. A more important difference, their theory of self is mostly a cognitive one while ours is formulated in terms of the affective associations evoked by cognitions of self—their focus is on self-conceptions while ours is on self-sentiments (though their concept of prominence incorporates self-esteem, an affective dimension of self). A second important difference between the theories lies in the absence of cybernetic thinking in their work. However, their distinction between identity prominence and salience makes their version of identity theory fairly dynamic, and their emphasis on reflexiveness as the essence of selfhood lies just around the corner from cybernetic thinking. Finally, we locate the organization and stability of self in the self-sentiments attached to an individual's persona, rather than to identity prominence or salience per se. According to our theory, particular identities become salient according to their potential for maintaining or restoring self-sentiments within a given institutional setting.

Stryker

Embracing Mead's idea that the structure of self reflects social structure, Sheldon Stryker proposes that "in a world in which societies are

highly differentiated, the selves that are produced will be equivalently differentiated" (1987, p. 91). This raises the issue of the integration and stability of self, which Stryker addresses by proposing that identities are arranged in a hierarchy of salience (1968; 1980). He initially defined identity salience as "the probability ... of a given identity being invoked in a variety of situations" (Stryker 1968, p. 560), but later redefined the concept as "the readiness to act out an identity as a consequence of the identity's properties as a cognitive structure" (Stryker and Serpe 1994, p. 17). Connecting the two definitions, he argues that since "identity schemas ... are cognitive bases for arriving at definitions of situations in which persons find themselves ... the person is more likely to define situations in ways that involve one identity rather than another, and so is more likely to act out that identity in or across situations" (Stryker and Serpe 1994, p. 18). From this perspective, identity salience becomes a personality variable carried by persons from one situation to another.

In addition to providing organization to the self, Stryker (1968) proposes that identity salience affects behavioral choice, particularly in structurally complex situations where a number of identities become candidates for invocation. This proposition, he argues, implies the motivational significance of identities in human behavior. He proposes further that identity salience is affected by commitment, which he defines as the "costs" entailed in foregoing relations based upon the particular identity (1968, p. 560). Elaborating this concept, he identifies two dimensions of commitment—extensivity, the number of relationships predicated upon a particular identity, and intensivity, later called affective commitment—"the intensity of affect associated with relationships foregone, given the loss of a role and associated identity" (Stryker and Serpe 1994, p. 27). Gathering these concepts together, he proposes that commitment to identities affects identity salience which, in turn, affects behavioral choice.

Stryker (1968) flirted with the notion of "affective salience," the ranking of identities in terms of the feeling or affect associated with them, in his discussion of cognitive, cathectic (affective), and conative modalities of the reflexive response to self (MacKinnon 1994; Nuttbrock and Freudiger 1991). That is, while he defines identities as "cognitive categories in terms of which individuals respond to themselves," he proposes that "the more a given identity is invested with a positive cathectic [affective] response" or "the more a given identity is perceived as instrumental to 'wants,' the higher will be that identity in the salience hierarchy" (1968, p. 562).

Stryker explicitly declined to pursue conceptual work on the affective (and conative) modalities of self-response in his major codification of the theory (Stryker 1980, p. 60, note 16). However, he maps out in a later paper (Stryker 1987) theoretical ways in which affective concepts might be incorporated. Then in a subsequent paper (Stryker and Serpe 1994), he distances his concept of identity salience from McCall and Simmons' (1966; 1978) concept of identity prominence, as well as from Rosenberg's (1979) concept of psychological centrality, because both concepts stress the self-attributed, affective importance of identities to the organization of self. That article does concede, though, that identity theory should incorporate psychological centrality in addition to identity salience as a hierarchical component of self-structure affecting behavioral choice (Stryker and Serpe 1994, p. 33). Thus, Stryker comes full circle to acknowledging the importance of affect in the organization of self.

Discussion

Stryker defines the "hierarchy of salience" as "a rank ordering of probabilities" (1968, p. 560). However, Stryker employs indirect or proxy measures of salience because of the difficulty of measuring the probability of invoking an identity, and of getting subjects to rank-order perhaps hundreds of identities in terms of their probability of invocation. In one study, for instance, salience is measured by asking subjects what they would tell others about themselves when meeting for the first time in four situations (Stryker and Serpe 1994, p. 26). The article acknowledges that this measure accords only partially with the rationale for incorporating identity salience rather than psychological centrality as a key variable in identity theory. Stryker and his associates end up studying a handful of identities, rather than the relative salience of the many hundreds of identities contained in any person's repertoire of identities. In contrast, as reported in Chapter 6, our theory of identities and self provides a method for computing salience hierarchies in terms of distances between identity sentiments and the self-sentiment.

Beyond the measurement issue, identity salience in our approach differs from Stryker's in two major respects. First, identity salience in our approach varies by institution. That is, identities become available in consciousness for possible enactment according to the situation or institutional setting in which people find themselves. We come to work and our occupational identity becomes salient; we return home and our identities as husband, wife, father, or mother become

salient; and so on. In contrast, Stryker proposes a single hierarchy of identity saliencies that is an aspect of an individual's personality and that therefore is trans-institutional and trans-situational. However, the difference between our approach and Stryker's is not quite as large as it seems at first. Our construct of biographical me's recognizes that some identities are more significant than others for an individual. Nevertheless, those identities are components of stories maintained within institutions, and only their effects on the self-sentiment have trans-institutional and trans-situational implications. Meanwhile, Stryker (1968, p. 560) acknowledges that "the invocation of an identity—i.e., the perception of an identity as relevant to a particular interaction—may be purely situational" in some cases and that "to the degree that situations are structurally isolated, the hierarchy of salience in which identities exist within the self is irrelevant to the prediction of behavior." In addition, he contemplates the possibility "that salience interacts with situations to affect the threshold of invocation of an identity."

Second, we propose that the salience of identities changes, not only with institutional setting, but also with recent experiences of inauthenticity. According to our theory of self, an individual constructs a situational me by selecting one or more institutionally appropriate identities from his or her identity set; compares the situational self-sentiments evoked by the situational me to the self-sentiment; and controls any divergence between the two by selecting and implementing compensatory identities. The salience hierarchy remains stable as long as the individual can enact self-actualizing identities, but when the self-sentiment is threatened by recent enactments of inauthentic identities, the salience of compensating identities increases. Such fluctuation in saliencies is not part of Stryker's system since the salience hierarchy is a constant aspect of personality.

Stryker proposes that identity salience is significantly determined by the social structural variable of identity commitment—the personal costs of forgoing social relationships predicated upon a particular identity. In our model, the sources of identity salience are diverse, but a counterfactual cost of losing an identity nowhere enters into our approach. Rather we see saliencies as being a function of: current positioning in an institutional context; the individual's recent enactments of imposed, non-optimal identities; the individual's self-sentiment which in turn depends on the individual's personal history as codified in biographical selves, possessions, and psychological traits; and socialization

and personal experiences that have produced specific sentiments for the identities in the individual's identity set.

In addition to a different view of identity salience, the theory of identities and self proposed in this book differs from Stryker's identity theory in at least six ways. First, it focuses on the affective meaning of identities and self-sentiments, while Stryker's identity theory mainly restricts itself to the cognitive meaning of identities and self-perceptions. Thus, the comparison we made above with the cognitive social psychology of Mead applies here as well, including our assertion that there can be no motivation without affect, that while the cognitive meanings of identities as self-conceptions provide direction to human behavior, they do not energize it. Second, our theory is much more dynamic than Stryker's in proposing cybernetic control of the self process. While Stryker considered the notion of feedback loops in contemplating the relation among society, self, and interaction, he opted for a linear non-reciprocal model (Stryker 1980, pp. 79–80). Third, we incorporate the "I" aspect of self explicitly in our cybernetic control model of the self-process. Consistent with the structural school of symbolic interactionism, Stryker focuses on the "me" aspect, and at one point reduces the novelty and creativity of the "I" to the playing off of one identity against the other (Stryker 1980, p. 60, note 15). Fourth, Stryker focuses on identities associated with roles derived from the social structure of a society, while we extend the concept of identities to broad social and psychological bases of identification. Fifth, Stryker does not make the distinction we do among the identity set, situational me, biographical me, possessions, traits, and persona as analytically distinct objectifications of self. Finally, whereas we ground self processes in the individual's institutional ambits, institutional venues do not play a direct role in Stryker's theory of self.

Burke

Peter Burke's initial foray into identity theory focused on the measurement of identities—a set of meanings applied to the self in a particular social role or situation (Burke 1980; Burke and Tully 1977). However, his 1980 article contained an early statement of what later came to be called identity control theory (ICT). Applying Powers' (1973) cybernetic control theory, ICT proposes that the activation of an identity establishes a feedback loop. The goal of the identity control process is

to match the environmental or situational inputs (perceptions of self-relevant meanings) to internal standards (identity meanings). What is controlled is the input—reflected appraisals, which amounts to perceptions of others' activities, and this control is achieved by implementing appropriate behavior. According to this model, neither the input meanings nor the identity standards by themselves cause behavior; instead, behavior is a product of a comparison between the two (Burke 1991; Burke and Reitzes 1991).

A later extension of ICT (Freese and Burke 1994) adds the meanings of signs to identity meanings and situational perceptions. According to this extended model, the identity standard controls not only symbolic meanings through social interaction but also sign meanings through the manipulation of resources associated with a particular role; and matching input perceptions and identity standards in the ICT model involves the control of both kinds of self-relevant meanings. The incorporation of sign meanings and the control of resources into the identity control model enables ICT to deal with issues of network exchange theory (Burke 1997).

Identity control theory contains a theory of emotions. While earlier work focused on the negative emotions resulting from the failure to verify identities through the identity control process (Burke 1991), later work extended the scope of ICT to deal with the positive emotions resulting from self-verification. The specific emotions experienced depends on the type of identity standard and on the kind of identity involved in the self-verification process (Burke and Stets 1999). With respect to the first condition, a discrepancy of actual perceptions from an *ideal* identity standard will result in depression, while a discrepancy from an *ought* identity standard will produce distress (Higgins 1989). With respect to the second condition, successful verification of *role-based* identities will enhance feelings of self-efficacy; verification of *group-based* identities, feelings of self-esteem (Burke and Stets 1999, p. 33); and verification of *person-identities* (the meanings one attributes to oneself as a unique individual), feelings of authenticity (Burke 2004).

ICT also contains a theory of motivation (Burke 1980). While earlier work (e.g., Burke and Reitzes 1991) locates the motivation for identity-confirming behavior in identity salience and commitment, as defined by Stryker (1980), later work (e.g., Stets and Burke 2000) deals with motivation in terms of self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-consistency, and self-regulation motives derived from other literatures in social psychology.

Burke accounts for the integration and stability of self by adopting the principle of organization proposed by Stryker (1968; 1980)—that

identities are organized in a hierarchy of salience, where "identities at the top of the hierarchy act to organize and order identities lower in the hierarchy" (Burke 1980, p. 19). Although not stated as such by Burke, identities contribute to the stability of self in an even more fundamental way than their organization in a hierarchy of salience. Because discrepancies between identity meanings and situational self-perceptions are generally controlled by changing behavior rather than identity meanings, identities themselves are slow to change (Burke 1991).

Burke extends the idea of salience hierarchy in more recent discussions of person identities (Burke 2004; Stets and Burke 1996)—those "based on culturally recognized qualities, traits, and expectations for an individual that are internalized, become part of the individual's person identity, and serve as standards guiding the verification process...the meanings and expectations that constitute not only the person's essence or core, but also all meanings that define who the person is as a person" (Burke 2004, p. 9). In comparison to role identities and social identities, a person identity is relevant and remains activated across roles, groups, and situations. Because of the high salience and commitment of a person identity, Burke suggests that "it may operate like a master identity and that it may be higher in the control hierarchy than social or role identities" (Burke 2004, p. 10).

Identity change occurs, Burke argues, when congruence between identity standards and situational self-perceptions cannot be achieved by changing behaviors (outputs in the ICT model) and situational self-perceptions (inputs). The identity is itself the output of a higher-order control process with its own standard, the more global set of meanings contained in a person identity as defined above. According to Burke, the conditions for identity change are the same as for the experience of distress—highly disruptive situations (e.g., POW and concentration camps) or the accumulation of incongruence between situational self perceptions and identity meanings over some period of time (e.g., a series of events preceding a mid-life crisis). In their study of changes in the gender identities of newly married couples, Burke and Cast (1997) suggest two mechanisms leading to changes in an identity standard: the acquisition of new roles (e.g., parent) and role-taking (e.g., imagining the identity standard of one's spouse).

Discussion

Because Burke explains the integration and stability of self in terms of identity salience, what we have said above in comparing our theory of

self with Stryker's identity theory applies here as well. That is, we locate the organization and stability of self, not in identity salience per se, but in an individual's self-sentiment and in the individual's motivation to confirm the self-sentiment by enacting self-actualizing identities.

In contrast to the system presented in Chapter 5, ICT does not constitute a theory of the self-process, but rather a theory of identity processes at a lower level of cybernetic control. Burke's more recent theory of identity change (Burke 1991; Burke and Cast 1997) proposes that identity change takes place at a higher order of cybernetic control than behavior processes, but this theory of identity change—comparable to affect control theory's approach to reidentification (Heise 2006, 1979, 2007; MacKinnon 1994)—changes the current identity to accommodate current experience, rather than selecting a new identity to actualize the self better.

In Burke's theory the individual controls perceptions of the situational reflections of identity enactment, and thus Burke applies Powers' cybernetic control theory to the cognitive meanings of an identity. Consequently the problem of motivation applies to Burke's theory as well as to Mead's and Stryker's. That is, while "cold" cognitions of identity meanings direct behavior, they cannot energize it; the meanings of identities motivate only via the affective associations they evoke. Burke's ICT does not provide an adequate theory of motivation at the level of identities, let alone at the level of self. "By rejecting the EPA structure of the semantic differential in favor of more content-specific and cognitive dimensions of meaning, Burke discards the dynamic principle of affect. And having done so, his model cannot account for the motivational significance of identities" (MacKinnon 1994, pp. 92–93). As a result, general motives such as self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-consistency must be patched into ICT, departing from his earlier explanation of motivation in terms of identity salience and commitment. A discussion of this point by Stets and Burke (Stets and Burke 2000, pp. 232–233) fails to reconcile these two views of motivation. In contrast, by dealing explicitly with identity sentiments, our theory of the self-process provides a theory of human motivation at the level of self.

Burke's theory of emotions adds further ambiguity to his theory of motivation. ICT views emotions as consequences of the identity-control process, yet Burke and Stets (1999, p. 349) propose that "emotions, in turn, help to motivate the process of self-verification." This departs from the other explanations of motivation in terms of identity salience and commitment, and in terms of self-esteem, self-efficacy, and so on.

Like Stryker, Burke does not really measure identity salience as conceptually defined by his theory. That is, instead of dealing with multiple identities and measures of their relative salience or likelihood of invocation across situations, Burke and his associates study one identity at a time (e.g., college student) in a single institutional setting, employing crude proxy measures of that identity's salience in that setting. Thus, they fail to deal with the problem of multiple identities—how the individual selects an identity to enact in a situation from situationally available identities, or from the hundreds of identities in any individual's repertoire of identities. Moreover, the Burke-Stryker approach to identity salience ignores the valid point of affirmative counter-enlightenment writings concerning fluctuation of identities as self-conceptions. In contrast, our theory of self contains a genuine identity theory that shows how identities are selected in a situation, allowing for institutional variation and for shifts generated by recent experiences of inauthenticity.

Perinbanayagam

Influenced principally by Kenneth Burke, Robert Sidharthan Perinbanayagam (2000) proposes a semiotic interpretation of Mead's social psychology. The objectification of self necessarily entails the operation of semiotic processes, according to Perinbanayagam, because the names and words individuals use to identify self and other "need to be articulated as signs and read as signs." Such "signs of identity" are employed in four rhetorical modes: reflexively, to identify an individual to himself; addressively, to identify the other; and referentially and answerably, respectively, to refer to and answer the other. The rhetorical use of identity signs takes place in what Perinbanayagam calls "acts of identity"—"deliberate moves made by an individual to classify himself or herself, or an other, in culturally given categories" (2000, p. 87). And "once the self has been identified in this manner, the particular signs of identification become a meaning for the self and are used to achieve his or her presence in the world through these vocabularies" (2000, p. 87). This process enables an individual to claim both a continuity of self over time and a differentiation from the selves of others. In effect, Perinbanayagam views identification as a process of classification. By identifying objects in the world, including oneself and others, classification enables one to organize and to make sense of one's perceptions and to communicate them to others.

Drawing from Mead and philosopher Charles Peirce, Perinbanayagam locates the presence of self in an individual's acts, singular and voluntary moves made by conscious agents accountable for the moves or to whom the acts can be attributed by self or other. Human acts are not only "the means by which an individual seeks to influence the world around him or her," they are also used to "announce his or her own presence in the world" (2000, p. 7). Actions become self-apprehensions or identities by identifying with and classifying oneself as the agent of these actions.[1]

Human acts are both pragmatic and dialogical—pragmatic because they involve an individual's adjustment, not only to the physical environment of inanimate objects, but also to the social environment of other individuals and their actions; dialogical because they are addressed to and answered by both self and other. Dialogical acts are realized through discursiveness. "Human individuals are inescapably discursive creatures. ... as minded organisms they engage in discursive activity in their inner forums ... as social organisms they engage in discursive interaction with others" (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 7).

Because of its intimate connection with action, Perinbanayagam suggests that "the self is not so much immanent in consciousness as it is present, overtly or covertly, in the acts that the individual prosecutes" (2000, p. 8). However, this does not mean that the self ceases to exist between an individual's acts; rather, the self continues to exist as the sedimented consequential meanings of past acts embodied in identities and stored in memory. "This is his or her self. ... The remembered self is really the collected, stored, and practicalized meanings of earlier acts [embodied in identities]" (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 24).

As a consequence of the continuity of self provided by the memory of past acts and identities, a human being exists as "a phenomenon that can be *named, addressed, and described* and therefore, for all practical and social purposes, it *exists*...even if such exercises are achieved in culturally provided vocabularies [of identities]" (Perinbanayagam 2000, p. 9).

Perinbanayagam's semiotic analysis of the self also implicitly contains an explanation of the organization of self that can be extracted from his treatment of the logical structure of human action in conjunction with the intimate connection between action and self. Because human actors are reflective agents with a capacity for both memory and anticipation, human acts are generally interconnected as "units in a plot and elements of a narrative" (2000, p. 43). In other words, human action possesses an inherent narrative logic. And since the presence of self

lies in an individual's identification with his or her acts, according to Perinbanayagam, the narrativity of action imparts to the selves of actors a narrativity of their own in the form of narrative identities. Now, if the structure of human action conceived as narrative is provided by a plot, as Perinbanayagam asserts, then so too is the structure of the self. That is, the principle of organization implicit in Perinbanayagam's analysis of the self is the structure of action itself—the plot of a narrative. The integration of self is provided by the particular plots or stories contained in an individual's biography.

Discussion

Our theory of self resonates with Perinbanayagam's semiotic theory in the mutual emphasis on Mead's social psychology, the personal agency of the individual, the distinction between identities and self, the role of language in their development, the intimate connection between categorization and identification, a view of identity as the product of both inner and outer dialogues, the situational and biographical aspects of identity, and the role of emotions in identity processes. In addition, Perinbanayagam argues, as we do in this book, for a centered and essential self, contrary to radical counter-enlightenment critiques proclaiming its demise. The self emerges from action, according to Perinbanayagam; is present in an individual's identification with his or her acts; derives its continuity from the sedimented meanings of past acts embodied in identities and stored in memory; and draws its organization from the organization of action itself—the underlying structure or plot of a narrative. His ideas on the continuity and integration of self have informed our concept of biographical me's as narrative integrations of past situational me's and identities from remembered experience, an ongoing life story in which the individual is the leading character.

Turning to differences between Perinbanayagam's work and our theory of self and identities, we have added persona and personal possessions and traits to multiple biographical me's in our model of the self. These sundry aspects of self-conception unite in producing a single self-sentiment that is the affective association of the unitary self. Our theory of the self focuses on affective meanings, and we locate the organization and stability of self in the self-sentiment. Although Perinbanayagam addresses "identity feelings," he focuses on self-conceptions rather than self-sentiments, providing a cognitive explanation of the continuity and integration of self.

Perinbanayagam's theory of self diverges most notably from ours in containing no reference to the self as a system of cybernetic feedback and control, which is essential to our theory and, indeed, to Mead's social psychology (MacKinnon 1994). However, an emphasis on the reflexiveness of self, an important theme in Perinbanayagam's treatise, is close to cybernetic thinking, as observed above in our discussion of McCall and Simmons.

Wiley

Norbert Wiley (1994) distinguishes between self and identities to counter the dismissal of the concept of self by counter-enlightenment writers. Self is to identities, he argues, as structure is to content. And while the content of self—identities and their meanings—vary across cultures, the structure of the self is cross-culturally universal—a derivative of the view that all human beings are rational, symbolic, abstract, and linguistic creatures. Wiley calls this universal structure the *semiotic self*, a synthesis of the I–you model of self derived from Peirce with the well-known I–me model of Mead.

Wiley identifies three semiotic levels within the self: individual signs (e.g., thoughts); systematic complexes of signs (e.g., identities and self-concepts), "and the capacity for semiosis, anchored in the I-you-me semiotic structure" of the self (1994, p. 15). Although more general than individual signs, identities are less general than the self; they are "historically specific and 'housed' in the I-you-me semiotic structure of the self" (1994, p. 14).

Wiley argues that both Peirce and Mead were dyadic or dialogical in their theories of self. Mead (1934) defined mind, thinking, or thought as an internal conversation between the I of the present and the me of the past. For Peirce the internal dialogue of thought takes place between a present I and a future you. Thus, Wiley's I-me-you triadic model adds the "third leg" to each theory of self, "giving Peirce the 'me' he needed to complete his structural triad [of self] and Mead the 'you' he needed to complete his" (1994, p. 83). Like Peirce's sign-object-interpretant semiotic triad of thought, Wiley's I-me-you semiotic triad of self is dynamic, depicting the self as a continual process of self-interpretation, in which "the agent or I of the present interprets the history or me of the past to and with the you of the future" (1994, p. 15). In other words, the self-process is "a kind of reality construction" (1994, p. 15) in which the I defines and redefines the situation

in consultation, so to speak, with the past me and the future you. However, according to Wiley, the I consults the me and the you in different ways. That is, while the I speaks directly to the you, like an interpersonal dialogue between two free-standing individuals, the I speaks only indirectly or reflexively to the me *via* the you. In these terms, Mead recognized only the conversation between the I and an indirect reflexive object, the me; Peirce, only the conversation between the I and a direct object, the you.

In terms of physical–objective time, Mead's me is ontologically in the past, although logically timeless as a member of the reflexive dyad of the I-me or subject-object. In contrast, Peirce's you is ontologically and logically in the future, because the object status of the you *vis-à-vis* the I is direct and linear rather than reflexive. In terms of the temporal relation of the me and the you to the I, the me was once an I, while the you will eventually become one, "as the self moves down the time" (1994, p. 14) and "the you slides, temporally, into the place of the I" (1994, p. 50). In other words, "Peirce's you marks the temporal approach and entry into the I," while "Mead's me marks the exit" (1994, p. 43).

Mead's I-me model of the self-process contains a reflexive blind spot while Peirce's I-you model does not. That is, although the I can see the me, the I is cognitively unavailable to itself as an object of consciousness. In Mead's words, "the self-conscious, actual self in social intercourse is the objective 'me' or 'me's' with the process of response continually going on and implying a fictitious 'I' always out of sight of himself" (Mead 1912/1964, p. 141). In contrast, the I and you are cognitively available to each other because the I-you relationship is direct rather than reflexive.

The I, me, and you differ in terms of freedom and determinism. As the agent of action, the I is spontaneous and free; as the object of the I's action, the me is determined and unfree. "The me was free when it, or part of it, was an I. But it had its moment of choice and it then became congealed into the inactive, unchangeable past" (1994, p. 46). The freedom of the I lies in its "power to construct cognitive reality, to redefine situations," and this cognitive power "is the actual mechanism by which the I can break with the me" (1994, p. 51). Because the I is in the reflexive blind spot of the self-process, hence cognitively unavailable to itself, it cannot observe itself defining the situation or making choices. Thus, "the I is free, not only because of its underlying cognitive freedom but also because of secrecy" (1994, p. 47).

In comparison to the inaction and determinism of the me, the you will eventually act as it moves down the time-line from the future

to the present to become the I. It is in this sense that the you can be described as "the incipient point of action" (1994, p. 48). Therefore, in contrast to the asymmetrical relation between the I and the me in terms of freedom and determinism, "the I-you relation … is between two free agents, the former free now, and the latter in a moment" (1994, p. 50). And this "mutual freedom" or "quasi-negotiative" relation between the I and you, according to Wiley, multiplies the uncertainty of the outcome and probably affects the cognitive definitions constructed by the I (1994, pp. 50–51).

Wiley also compares the I, me, and you in terms of their relation to Mead's generalized other. Mead coupled the me with the generalized other and moral conformity. Citing Peirce's description of the you as "that critical self that one is trying to persuade" a "loosely compacted person" (1994, p. 51), or **"**one's better and deeper self**"** (1994, p. 48), Wiley argues that there also is an affinity between Peirce's you and Mead's generalized other. Wiley argues that the "internalized otherness" of Mead's generalized other is "a reflexing lever or looping device," accounting for the internal reflexivity of Mead's concept of self, and that "Peirce's you, which is also a reflexive lever or pathway, takes some of the looping burden off Mead's generalized other" (1994, p. 51). Although the you and the me are both connected to the generalized other, however, there is a critical difference between the two phases of self. In "the felt or 'specious' present, … the you is already merging with the I … anticipating the moment when it will no longer be the 'critical self,' but the responsible, acting self. This anticipatory freedom distinguishes the you from the me and makes the former's attachment to the generalized other a matter of diminishing commitment" (1994, p. 52).

Wiley also adds the element of **"**visitors**"** to the I-me-you internal conversation to take into account the role of specific others. Temporary visitors may come and go in the internal conversation, he argues, while permanent visitors (e.g., early-life others such as parents) are continually available for explicit conversation. Finally, Wiley admits the unconscious as a player in the internal conversation of the self, allowing that consciousness is a continuum with intermediate preconscious or semiconscious states.

While thus far Wiley's semiotic theory of the self is quite straightforward, he adds additional layers of complexity to address the blind spot in human reflexivity (the inaccessibility of the I to itself) and to assign a speaking role to the me and you in the internal conversation of the self. We do not discuss these complexities in this brief review. However, we

must discuss the two most important concepts in his theory of self—reflexivity and solidarity.

Defining reflexivity as "looping through the other and back to the self in a social manner, even if the 'other' is internalized as a Peircean you or a [Meadian] generalized other" (1994, p. 113), Wiley contends that this property of self is "more sharply etched" (1994, p. 82) in his synthesis of Peirce and Mead than in their separate theories. Distinguishing between *order* (first and second) and *level* (intra- and interpersonal) Wiley distinguishes among four modes of reflexivity, which we define as we encounter them in the remaining discussion. Wiley laments that so many uses of the concept of reflexivity by other theorists are either upwardly (1994, Chapter 7) or downwardly reductive (1994, Chapter 8) of human nature, resulting in the elimination of the concept of self. Upwardly deductive theories, according to Wiley, include interactional (e.g., Blumer, Wittgenstein, Lacan), social organizational (e.g., Durkheim), and cultural (e.g., Foucault and Derrida) types; downwardly deductive ones, cybernetics, artificial intelligence, and the various "biologisms" (molecular biology, neurophysiology, sociobiology). As an example of his criticism of upward reductionist theories, he dismisses the claim of the linguistic reductionism of counter-enlightenment thought that humans are nothing more than signs, a product of language and culture because this would reduce people to "little bubbles of culture" (1994, p. 219), and is incompatible with human agency, autonomy, freedom, and morality. As an example of downward reductionist theories, he argues that cybernetics cannot explain the reflexivity of human beings because such theories employ pre-semiotic forms of reflexivity. We limit our attention here to the alleged downward reductionism of cybernetics because of its obvious relevance to our theory of the self-process.

As the basis for his critique of cybernetics as downward reduction, Wiley draws upon Niklas Luhmann (1982), who delineates six independent levels of self-creating systems (mechanical, organic, psychological, interactional, organizational, and societal). Wiley criticizes Luhmann's cybernetic theory for his explicit exclusion of the concept of subject or self from his psychological system and his mechanical-organic view of reflexivity that uses "a weak, sub-human variety of reflexivity to explain the much stronger, human kind … the capacity of humans to be meta to themselves" (1994, p. 204). Mechanical artifacts such as thermostats and computers cannot reflect upon or monitor themselves, Wiley argues, because their reflexivity is imposed from without. And although the reflexivity of animals is internal and not

imposed by humans, it contains the blind spot of artifact reflexivity. That is, an animal can see, hear, or touch itself, but the sensing organ cannot sense itself.

In contrast to artifactual and organic systems, Wiley contends that the self possesses complete reflexivity because the "reflecting organ" of the I can see the entire self at the first-order of reflexivity (ordinary thought). And although the I cannot see itself at the first-order, the entire self can be the object of reflexivity at the second-order level of reflexivity (thought about thought), where the blind spot is moved outside the reflecting organism—"the self-reflecting organism can see all of itself … at the meta perch [of the I] from which it views itself" (1994, p. 205). Mechanical and organismic systems lack this capacity because the blind spot remains within the system.

Thus far, we have discussed the reflexivity of Wiley's semiotic self in strictly cognitive terms. However, as Wiley observes, "it is possible for the self to reflect on and relate to itself emotionally too" (1994, p. 104). This brings us to his concept of solidarity. Derived from Durkheim, Wiley applies the term to the internal solidarity of self, which he identifies with the "self-feelings" concept of James and Cooley, and later Denzin (1984); Giddens' (1991) concept of ontological trust; and so on. In contrast to Mead's "more bloodless cognitive reflexivity," James and Cooley proposed theories of self based on "emotional reflexivity" (1994, p. 110). Wiley argues that cognitive and emotional theories of the self are partially correct and complementary, that "the self is constituted in a cognitively reflexive manner, but in addition it is powered by a kind of emotion, itself also reflexive" (1994, p. 114). In this regard, he contends that "the James–Cooley self-feeling, particularly at its core, is not an emotion in the ordinary sense but rather an energy or force (or 'proto-emotion'), similar to Durkheim's semiotic solidarity. The force created at the inner layer is strong enough to hold and contain the outer layers" (1994, p. 111).

In order for meaning to have any energy or force, Wiley argues, there must be some degree of solidarity or "mutual recognition" (the emotional counterpart of mutual cognition or meaning) among various parts of the self. Following Hegel, he attributes the mutual recognition among the various aspects of self to the mutual recognition between the self and one or more intimate others. Finally, he draws upon Collins' (1989) idea of the "strong drive for solidarity," derived from Durkheim (1915/1965), to assert that solidarity is also implicated in second-order intra-personal and interpersonal reflexiveness (thought about thought and conversation about conversations, respectively). In

this case, solidarity functions as a goal rather than a force, a final rather than an efficient cause. This is manifested in the "repair work" that takes place at either the intra-personal level—soothing and reassuring oneself after a failure or disappointment, or the interpersonal level—explaining what one meant to say to someone inadvertently offended.

Discussion

Our model of the self-process parallels Wiley's model of the semiotic self, though our model portrays the self as a system of cybernetic feedback and control, in which the person tries to maintain optimal consistency between situational and fundamental self-sentiments. Situational me's in our model are equivalent to the me in Wiley's I-me-you model of the self, while the persona—viewed as a goal of the self-actualizing cybernetic self-process: the quest to "be oneself"—functions as Wiley's concept of the you. As an objectification of self or me, the persona is located in the present, but as a self-actualizing goal of the self-process system it has a future reference like Wiley's you. Thus our model describes an I-me-you process, wherein the I compares the me of the recent past (the situational me) to the you of the imminent future (the persona) and takes appropriate action, either selecting self-actualizing identities for the future or identities that correct current inauthenticity.

Our affective model parallels Wiley's attempt to deal with the emotional aspect of self by introducing the concepts of "internal solidarity" and "emotional reflexivity" to his otherwise cognitive model of the self. Like Wiley, we distinguish between the general experience of affect versus the specific emotions, and identify affect as the source of the "energy" or "force" that mobilizes self-actualizing behavior. For us, however, it is not simply affect but its control that is the basic motivational principle of human behavior (MacKinnon 1994, Chapter 3). At the level of self, affect control takes the form of selecting and enacting situational identities that affirm the fundamental self-sentiment. Thus, our cybernetic, affect control model of the self-process formalizes Wiley's concept of emotional reflexivity, where the "repair work" he associates with maintaining the internal solidarity of the self is functionally equivalent to the process of correcting inauthenticity.

We reject, like Wiley, the upward or linguistic reductionism of counter-enlightenment thought. Nor do we subscribe to the downward reductionism Wiley attributes to cybernetic theories of the self. To be sure, some cybernetic theories or models of the self may be too mechanistic to capture the complete reflexivity of human beings, as

Wiley argues, but our affect control model of the self-process is not among them. We assume, like Wiley, that the me of the recent past (the situational self) and the you of the imminent future (the persona) are cognitively available to the I at the first-order of reflexivity (ordinary thought), and that the inaccessibility of the I to itself leaves a blind spot at this level of reflexivity. At the same time, we maintain that our cybernetic control model of the self-process can accommodate the second-order (thought about thought) or complete human reflexivity described by Wiley, providing a scientific parallel to his humanistic account of the self-process

Nor are cybernetic control and humanistic accounts of the self-process necessarily contradictory. As Powers has eloquently addressed the issue, "there *is* mechanism in behavior—but it is not the mechanism the behaviorists have in mind, for it is capable of having inner purposes in the full humanistic sense. ... The factor distinguishing man from animal or machine is visible in the model only as a ghost, through its transcendent effects on the model itself. Is that the Soul of which I speak? The Atman? The Awareness? Of course it is. It is myself, yourself. But I have not been forced by this theory to conclude that this factor, this self, has to be treated either with tact or with reverence. It is a perfectly natural part of the totality we call a human being" (Powers 1973, p. x).

Wiley's rejection of cybernetic theories of the self as inadequate models of human reflexivity can be traced to his reliance on a single source for his treatment of cybernetics—the work of Niklas Luhmann (1982). However, Luhmann is too vulnerable a target because, as acknowledged by Wiley, he ignores the concept of self. Inexplicably, Wiley does not cite the work of William Powers (1973), who has had the most influence on cybernetic theories of the self in sociological social psychology (McClelland and Fararo 2006), nor does he cite the theories most influenced by Powers' work, including affect control theory (Heise 1979) and identity control theory (Burke 1991; Burke and Reitzes 1991). Moreover, Wiley does not consider that Mead's concept of reflexiveness is virtually identical to what we now call cybernetic control systems (Buckley 1967; MacKinnon 1994; Shibutani 1968).

In conclusion, our cybernetic model of the self-process, like Wiley's model, is semiotic, temporal, and dialogical—semiotic, because it incorporates Wiley's I-me-you triadic structure of the self; temporal, because each cycle in this cybernetic model assumes a present I, a past me, and a future you; and dialogical, because the model represents the self-process as an I-me-you internal conversation. As discussed

in Chapter 5, however, we must keep in mind that the image of self as an internal conversation among various pronominal references to oneself—whether I- me (Mead) or I-me-you (Wiley)—is a metaphor. Drawing upon McCall and Simmons (1978, p. 54), the me and the you are no more than pronominal labels for cognitive frames of reference in terms of which the mind monitors, evaluates, and anticipates the thoughts, feelings, and actions of its own person, the I.

Tajfel and Turner

Our consideration of prior theories of identities and self concludes with two affiliated identity theories from psychological social psychology—Henri Tajfel's social identity theory (e.g., 1969; 1970) and John Turner's self-categorization theory (1985; Turner et al. 1987).

Social identity theory is "specifically directed at the explanation of intergroup discrimination (in the absence of conflicts of interest) and its central psychological hypothesis is motivational (or cognitive-motivational)—that individuals seek to differentiate their own groups positively from others to achieve a positive social identity" (Turner et al. 1987, p. 42). The theory proposes that people use social categories or attributes (gender, ethnicity, and so on) describing groups to which they feel they belong to identify themselves and others; and that these social identities become important components of self-concept, motivating group comparisons and behavior that favor the in-group and hence the self. As a consequence, in-group and out-group perception becomes stereotypic and intergroup behavior becomes competitive, discriminatory, and prejudicial.

In contrast to social identity theory, s*elf-categorization theory* focuses on "the explanation not of a specific kind of group behavior but of how individuals are able to act as a group at all. The basic hypothesis is a cognitive (or social-cognitive) elaboration of the nature of social identity as a higher order level of abstraction in the perception of self and others" (Turner et al. 1987, p. 42). Specifically, the theory focuses on the cognitive processes of social comparisons, categorization, and identification with a group to explain intra-group behavior, complementing social identity theory's cognitive-motivational explanation of intergroup behavior (the need for in-group distinctiveness and the enhancement of self-esteem). Self-categorization theory draws heavily from cognitive psychology to elaborate self-categorization and identity processes; and although it has its roots in social identity theory, it is a

more general theory subsuming social identity theory as a derivative (Turner et al. 1987).

In order to render a situation meaningful, the theory argues, people employ the cognitively most available and best-fitting categories—human, social, or personal (Turner et al. 1987)—explaining the similarities and differences among people present. And when *social* self-categorizations become salient and active in a situation, they produce intra-group behavior such as cohesion, attraction, conformity, and cooperation (Turner et al. 1994). Such intra-group phenomena are made possible through *depersonalization*—a cognitive process effecting a change in identity from unique individual to group member that brings individual perception and behavior into line with group prototypes— fuzzy sets that circumscribe and highlight distinguishing features of group membership.

The psychological identity theories of Tajfel and Turner differ from the sociological identity theories of Stryker, McCall and Simmons, and Burke in a number of distinctive ways (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995; Stets and Burke 2000; Thoits and Virshup 1997) that are important in comparing psychological identity theories and the theory of self and identities proposed in this book.

To begin, psychological identity theory focuses on collective identities based on membership in social categories or groups, while sociological identity theories emphasize identities based on social roles within social institutions and organizations. The two kinds of identity result in different kinds of self-conceptions and psychological states, provide different functions for the self, and have different social consequences (Thoits and Virshup 1997). Collective identities evoke "we" states, the merging of individual psychology with the group, while role-identities evoke "me" states, the merging of individual psychology with the role in relation to particular role-partners. Collectivity-based identities provide the individual with a sense of psychological affiliation within groups and collective competition and/or conflict with out-groups, while role-based identities provide a sense of possessing a meaningful self that becomes validated by successful role performance.

Thoits and Virshup (1997) observe that most social interaction occurs in role relationships rather than those based on membership in broad social categories. In addition, they argue that sociodemographic categories (as well as other social types and personality traits) are attributes carried by individuals from one situation to another, while social roles are situationally specific to particular institutions and organizations. They propose that both sociodemographic categories and social roles

can be the basis of either individual identities engendering "me" states or collective identities producing "we" states. For example, a female may identify herself as a woman or she may identify with other women; being a nurse may define "who I am" or "who we are." Moreover, according to Thoits and Virshup (1997), collective identities permeate role identities, in the sense that most social roles are age-specific, "gendered," "classed," and so on, raising the issue of multiple identities (role, collective, or both). In this regard, they suggest that there are two ways in which multiple identities might combine: (1) by modifying one another as adjectival modifiers (e.g., "young doctor"); and (2) by merging or fusing, where the meaning and behavioral consequences may reside in the combination itself (e.g., "student activist" or "we African women").

Self-categorization theory challenges the meaningfulness or necessity of conceptualizing the self as a relatively fixed mental structure or a set of constructs stored in memory. Instead, it views the self as "a flexible, constructive process of judgment and meaningful inference in which varying self-categories are created to fit the perceiver's relationship to social reality" (Turner et al. 1994, p. 458). This implies that identities are ephemeral phenomena assembled anew in the presence of relevant situational stimuli (Thoits and Virshup 1997).

The emphasis of self-categorization theory on intra-individual behavioral and psychological processes contrasts with the emphasis of sociological identity theories on inter-individual processes in the development and activation of identities (Thoits and Virshup 1997). With collectivity-based identities, an individual does not have to interact with other members of the group; with role-based identities, interdependent behavior and mutual legitimation and support are required for the development and maintenance of identities (McCall and Simmons 1978; Stets and Burke 2000).

Psychological identity theory merges identity salience and activation, while sociological identity theory distinguishes between the two concepts (Stets and Burke 2000). When an identity or other cognitive representation of self becomes "salient," according to self-categorization theory, it is "activated, cognitively prepotent, operative." Psychological identity theory views salience as "a function of an interaction between the characteristics of the perceiver and the situation" (Turner et al. 1987, p. 44) or, expressed differently, between cognitive accessibility and comparative and normative fit (Oakes 1987). This contrasts with Stryker's and Burke's view of salience as a personality variable expressing itself across situations independent of situational cues (Stryker and

Serpe 1994), leading to the criticism that sociological identity theory views identity as a static concept, and the self as organized by a hierarchy of "chronic salience" (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995, p. 265).

Finally, psychological and sociological identity theories differ in how they perceive the motivational component of identity processes (Stets and Burke 2000). Tajfel's social identity theory emphasizes the enhancement of self-esteem motive in intergroup processes, while Turner's self-categorization theory downplays the importance of this motive in favor of self-knowledge, self-consistency, self-efficacy, uncertainty reduction, and self-regulation. As discussed in Chapter 5 of this book, sociological identity theories have traditionally emphasized the self-esteem and self-efficacy motives. However, as Stets and Burke (2000) point out, more recent extensions have added self-consistency and self-regulation to the list of motives. In this regard, Stets and Burke (2000) propose that either group-based or identity-based identities may be motivated by any of these four motives.

Discussion

The theory of identities and self proposed in this book pertains to social roles—occupational, familial, religious, medical, educational, deviant, criminal justice, and so on—as well as to sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity), social characteristics (e.g., rich, poor), personality traits and attributes (e.g., intelligent, aggressive) and affective moods (e.g., happy, angry) that are represented either as identity nouns or as attribution adjectives. Thus, our theory encompasses both the sociological focus on role identities and the psychological focus on collective identities. Specifically, our theory assumes that either role identities or collective identities may serve as self-actualizing identities, and as redeeming identities when recent experiences have produced inauthenticity relative to one's self-sentiment.

We agree with Thoits and Virshup (1997) that the confusion regarding the relation between role and collective identities can be resolved within each identity tradition by recognizing that social roles and sociodemographic characteristics can be the basis of either individual or collective identities. The additional insight of Thoits and Virshup (1997) that collective identities are trans-situational while role-identities are situationally specific is a critical distinction in Chapter 3 of this book where we show that collective identities can modify a role-identity (e.g., a female doctor; an African-American politician, a Mexican worker). Although usually expressed as nouns denoting sets of people, collective

identities suggest an overriding feature that distinguishes among sub-
sets of individuals with the same role identity (e.g., a Mexican worker
as opposed to other workers).

Turner's conceptualization of the self as a flexible, constructive pro-
cess of cognitive judgment and inference rather than an organized set of
constructs stored in memory resonates with the counter-enlightenment
emphasis on constructionism and its rejection of the concept of the self
as a stable and unified subject at the center of human consciousness
and action. In contrast, we have devoted much of this book to show-
ing how our model addresses the counter-enlightenment rejection of
the self and to demonstrating how the affective self remains stable for
lengthy periods of time and across institutional settings.

Like the identity theories of McCall and Simmons, Stryker, and
Burke, the theory proposed in this book assumes the critical impor-
tance of interpersonal behavioral and psychological processes in the
genesis and maintenance of identities and the self. In contrast to the
exclusive focus of psychological identity theories of Tajfel and Turner
on intra-personal processes, we assume that social interactional set-
tings are the little workshops in which both role and collective iden-
tities are constructed. From this perspective, collective identities and
group processes do not emerge from the forsaking of personal iden-
tity and uniqueness implied by the concept of depersonalization, but
rather from a history of interactional events in which individuals adopt,
or adapt, the cognitive and affective meanings of a group. Like other
identity theories, we identify role taking and internalization rather
than social comparison and depersonalization as the bases of identity
enactments. In other words, we view identity processes as collaborative
rather than individual, thereby avoiding psychological reductionism.
In contrast, the reliance of psychological identity theory on individual
cognitive psychology for the derivation of their concepts brings them
perilously close to "the jagged rocks of psychological reductionism"
(Hogg, Terry, and White 1995, p. 264).

In contrast to the cognitive theories of Tajfel and Turner, as well as
those of Stryker and Burke, our theory proposes that identity and self
processes are conducted principally along affective lines. That is, peo-
ple confirm identities by confirming identity sentiments, and actualize
selves by selecting and validating identities that confirm self-sentiments.
Self-verification along cognitive lines (e.g., self-consistency) is achieved
in the process, but for us this is the product rather than the engine that
drives identity-confirmation and self-actualization. As argued previ-
ously, self-conceptualizations provide direction to identity-processes

and self-verification, but they cannot energize these processes. In contrast to psychological identity theories, our theory proposes that a person selects and enacts identities to produce a situational me that optimally maintains the individual's self-sentiment, within the constraints of institutional context and interpersonal requirements. This is the motivational principle of affect control applied to self.

Like other identity theories, our theory distinguishes between identity salience and activation, while aligning with psychological identity theories in viewing identity salience as a situational variable. Like other identity theories, we acknowledge that, at any given moment, an individual's situationally available identities are organized into a salience hierarchy according to their potential for actualizing and proclaiming the individual's self-sentiment, but final selection depends on social processes. On the other hand, we argue that the salience of identities shifts across institutional settings and with their potential for redeeming recent inauthenticities. Thus, our dynamic and situational concept of identity salience is consistent with the situational view of identity salience advanced by psychological identity theorists.

Finally, although psychological identity theories adopt a dynamic view of identity processes, they do not employ cybernetic control principles, and thereby they miss the basis of unity and stability in the self that we emphasize in our theory.

Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, we established the distinctiveness of the theory of self and identity proposed in this book and identified continuities and discontinuities with other theories. We summarize these theoretical discussions as follows.

Cognition versus Affect. Although our theory incorporates both the cognitive and affective modes of self-response, it emphasizes self-sentiments over self-conceptions. This locates the theory closer to the self-feelings theories of James and Cooley than the bloodless self-cognitions approach of Mead. It also sets our theory apart from the cognitive identity theories of Stryker and Burke, less so from McCall and Simmons. While Perinbanayagam explicitly discusses the relation between emotion and identities, his overall theory emphasizes self-conceptions rather than self-sentiments. Of all the theories considered in this chapter, Wiley comes closest to ours by advancing the idea that the self is both cognitively and affectively constituted and reflexive. His

concept of self-feelings coincides with our concept of self-sentiments, and his theory of emotional reflexivity resonates with our cybernetic control model of the self-process. Finally, psychological identity theories—Tajfel's and Turner's—rely heavily on cognitive psychology for the derivation of their concepts and virtually ignore affect.

Motivation. By incorporating both self-sentiments and self-conceptions, our theory of self and identity explains both the energizing and direction of behavior. In contrast, Mead can account for only the direction of behavior because he excluded self-sentiments from his social psychology. This limitation also applies to the cognitive identity theories of Stryker and Burke, and again somewhat less so for McCall and Simmons, who explain motivation in terms of the motive to enact cognitively salient identities. Despite his extensive discussion of the relation between identity and emotion, Perinbanayagam fails to articulate an explicit theory of motivation based on this connection. Wiley's proposal that the cognitively constituted self is powered by self-feeling comes closest to our self-sentiment theory of motivation. For us, however, it is not self-sentiment by itself that motivates self-actualizing action, but rather the control of situational self-sentiments in order to confirm the self-sentiment and avoid experiences of inauthenticity. Thus, our cybernetic control model of the self-process operationalizes Wiley's concept of emotional reflexivity, and his idea of maintaining the internal solidarity of the self through repair work is functionally equivalent to correcting experiences of inauthenticity in our theory of self. As for social identity and self-categorization theories, Tajfel emphasizes the motive of enhancing self-esteem in explaining intergroup processes, while Turner de-emphasizes this motive in favor of self-knowledge, self-consistency, self-efficacy, uncertainty reduction, and self-regulation, all of which are viewed in cognitive terms. Again, as with the multiple motives explanation of Burke's later work, these motives cannot account for energizing behavior unless they refer to self-feelings as well as self-cognitions.

Cybernetic Control. Our theory of the self-process vitalizes Mead's cognitive social psychology by applying his cybernetic thinking to self-sentiments. Although the cybernetic control perspective is absent from the identity theories of Stryker and McCall and Simmons, it is a defining feature of Burke's identity control theory. His identity control theory, however, applies cybernetic control principles exclusively to the cognitive meanings of identities and identity standards rather than to self-sentiments. Moreover, his identity control model remains at a lower level of cybernetic control than our model of the

self-process. Perinbanayagam's theory of self contains no reference to cybernetic feedback and control, despite its emphasis on the reflexive self. And Wiley dismisses cybernetic theories as inadequate explanations of human reflexivity because such theories are, in his opinion, based on pre-semiotic forms of reflexivity. Unfortunately, Wiley does not consider the cybernetic control theory of Powers (1973) that has been incorporated into affect control theory, Burke's identity control theory, and the cybernetic model of the self proposed in this book. Finally, cybernetic control principles are absent in the psychological identity theories of Tajfel and Turner.

Unity and Stability of Self. While we accept Mead's view that the unity and stability of the self reflects the unity and stability of the society itself, we apply this idea directly to self-sentiments and only indirectly to self-conceptions. Stryker and Burke account for the integration and continuity of self by supposing that identities are hierarchically organized according to their cognitive salience as self-conceptions and by viewing this salience hierarchy as a stable, trans-situational aspect of personality. McCall and Simmons explain the unity and stability of self in terms of two hierarchical organizations of identities: one based on the trans-situational hierarchy of prominence related to the ideal self; the other, the situationally bound principle of salience related to the situational self. In contrast to Stryker, Burke, and McCall and Simmons, we attribute the unity and stability of self to the unifying and stabilizing force of the self-sentiment rather than to the hierarchical organization of identity salience or prominence. Moreover, we view identity salience differently. For us an identity becomes salient according to institutional context and the potential for actualizing the self-sentiment—either directly or by resolving a recent experience of inauthenticity. Although the idea of cybernetic control of inauthenticity is absent in McCall and Simmons' work, the idea of institutional variation in identity salience can be inferred from their description of the prominence and salience hierarchies and their recognition that the content of identities varies with institutional context. And, like us, McCall and Simmons adopt a constructionist perspective while maintaining the idea of an integrated and stable self. Perinbanayagam attributes the integration of self to the narrative organization of an individual's actions, and the continuity of self to the sedimented meanings of past acts embodied in identities and stored in memory. Although his ideas have enhanced our understanding of the narrative objectification and integration of self, our theory also includes the concept of persona representing the structural objectification and integration of self. Moreover, we locate the organization

and continuity of self in the individual's motivation to confirm and reaffirm the self-sentiment associated with his or her persona, rather than the persona itself as a global self-conception. Wiley explains the internal solidarity of self and, by implication, its continuity as well, to the energy or force provided by emotion. Of all the theories considered in this chapter, Wiley's comes closest to our explanation of the unity and stability of self. Finally, the issue of the unity and stability of self becomes a moot point for the psychological identity theories of Tajfel and Turner because the concept of self is not important for either theory.

Semiotic Perspective. The theory of self and identity proposed in this book adopts a semiotic perspective, emphasizing both the semantics and structure of meaning. A semiotic perspective is absent in the structural identity theories of Stryker, Burke, and McCall and Simmons, as well as the psychological identity theories of Tajfel and Turner. While Perinbanayagam emphasizes semantics and the rhetorical use of signs in the genesis and maintenance of self, Wiley's I-me-you model focuses on the semiotic structure of the self. While we have drawn extensively upon Perinbanayagam's work to articulate various aspects of our theory of identities and self, we have incorporated Wiley's I-me-you semiotic structure of the self explicitly into our cybernetic model of the self-process.

In summary, this chapter establishes the distinctiveness of our theory of identities and self by comparing it with a selection of other theories along five major axes: whether the theory takes affect (self-sentiments) as well as cognition (self-conceptions) into account, how it explains human motivation, how it explains the unity and stability of self, and whether it incorporates both cybernetic control and semiotic perspectives. An issue raised in the introductory chapter of this book—the viability of the construct of self in our era of social fragmentation and disarray—has not been addressed in this chapter, but will be discussed extensively in our final chapter.

Although we have selected a wide range of theories with which to compare the theory of identities and self proposed in this book, our selection has not been exhaustive of other relevant theories. For example, there are a number of psychological theories of self that are based on maintaining consistency of self-conceptions or minimizing discrepancy between self-conceptions and some baseline or standard. This includes Swann's self-verification theory (1983, 1996; Swann et al. 1987) and Higgins' (1987, 1989) self-discrepancy theory. As discussed in Chapter 5 and earlier in this chapter, self-verification theory

proposes that people try to confirm established self-conceptions even when they are negative. As discussed earlier in this chapter, self-discrepancy theory addresses the emotional consequences of failing to self-verify—distress when the discrepancy is between the *actual* self and the *ought* self, and depression when the discrepancy is between the *actual* self and the *ideal* self. However, both self-verification and self-discrepancy theories deal with the cognitive consistency of self-conceptions while our theory of self focuses on the consistency of self-sentiments.

We conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of a theory of self-regulation that is not explicitly embedded in a theory of self— Bandura's (1991) social cognitive theory of self-regulation. Since most human behavior is purposeful, Bandura argues, it is regulated by "forethought"—a focus on the future that is manifested in the formation of beliefs about what can be accomplished, the anticipation of consequences, the setting of goals, and the planning of courses of action likely to produce desired results. Self-regulation is accomplished through self-monitoring of one's behavior, including its determinants and effects; judgments of one's performance relative to personal standards and environmental circumstances; and affective self-reactions to one's actions. Bandura also includes the mechanism of *self-efficacy* in his account of self-regulation because of it critical role in personal agency.

Bandura's social cognitive theory focuses on the role of self-regulation in mobilizing and directing behavior, especially performance achievement and moral conduct, while our theory of self deals with self-regulation in the maintenance of self-sentiments. In contrast to our focus on self, Bandura's concern with the construct is limited to specifying self as the locus of regulated behavior. Our theory of self and self-regulation lies at a higher level of analysis than Bandura's social cognitive theory of self-regulated behavior. As discussed in Chapter 5, our theory focuses on the confirmation of self through identity-selection, a higher level of cybernetic control than the confirmation of identities through behavior. Moreover, we deal with human motivation at both the level of self-confirming identities and the level of identity-confirming behavior, while Bandura deals with motivation at only the level of behavior. Finally, we deal with self-efficacy (along with self-esteem and self-activation) as an important component of self-sentiments to be confirmed through identity selection, while Bandura focuses more directly on the effect of self-efficacy on cognition, affect, motivation, and action.

However, the most striking comparison between the role of self-regulation in our theory of self and Bandura's social cognitive theory of self-regulation concerns the adequacy of a negative feedback model of self-regulated behavior. Because negative feedback control systems are based on the principle of discrepancy reduction, Bandura concludes that people would do nothing when performance matches an internal standard. "A regulatory process in which matching a standard begets inertness," he argues, "does not characterize human self-motivation. Such a feedback control system would produce circular action that leads nowhere (1991, p. 259)." Although Bandura acknowledges that comparative feedback is essential in the regulation of motivation, he argues that people raise their level of motivation by setting goals before they engage in behavior and receive any feedback. In particular, those with high levels of self-efficacy set higher standards for themselves, and surpassing a standard is more likely to raise than lower aspirations for subsequent performance. In short, Bandura proposes a "a dual control process" (1991, p. 260) of self-regulated motivation and behavior, wherein an initial stage of discrepancy *production* and *proactive* control involving performance aspirations and goals is followed by a period of discrepancy *reduction* and *reactive* control that keeps human purposive behavior on track.

Our emphasis on discrepancy reduction and reactive control stems from our theoretical conviction that the affective self is a relative stable phenomenon. Therefore, discrepancy production and proactive control may play a greater role in self-regulated *behavior*, than in the construction and maintenance of *self-sentiments*. Having said this, our theory of self recognizes explicitly that self-sentiments can and do change with changes in self-conceptions. As discussed extensively in chapters five and six, changes in self-conceptions and self-sentiments occur as a consequence of episodic life events and one's trajectory through the life-course—the acquisition and loss of identities and material possessions, for example, or changes in bodily appearance through aging, injury, or design. This implies that people can *actively* change self-sentiments—current levels of self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-activation—by acquiring new identities, changing bodily appearance, improving economic security, and so on. Although our theory of self focuses on the maintenance of self-sentiments through discrepancy reduction and reactive control, it recognizes that people can effect a change in self-sentiments through aspiration and goal-setting. But once set in motion, discrepancy reduction and reactive control keep this process on track.

relatively

Theories of Norms and Institutions

Social norms and normative deviance are not direct topics of investigation in this book, but the self system we propose does impinge on these matters. In this chapter we first show how our self model merges with affect control theory—a framework that does focus on normative matters—to provide a single multi-level cybernetic system regarding affect control in social relations. Second, we show that this cybernetic model, when applied to the topic of deviance, organizes, simplifies, and resolves incongruities in the complex hypotheses that have been derived in a kindred approach from psychology. In the final part of this chapter, we review prior theoretical statements regarding social institutions that have influenced our own formulation, and point out how our approach to social institutions differs from predecessors.

Affect Control Theory

In this book we have barely considered the linkage between identities and roles (as portrayed in figure 1.1) because we already have devoted several decades of attention to this topic in our previous work on affect control theory (e.g., see Heise 1979; 2007; MacKinnon 1994). Now, we consider how that earlier work relates to the theories of self and of social institutions presented in this book.

Heise (2007, pp. 3–4) summarized affect control theory in terms of four overall ideas. First, every individual creates events to confirm the individual's sentiments about the identities of self and others in the current situation. Second, emotions reflect an individual's sentiment about self identities and the kinds of validations or invalidations experienced

at the moment. Third, if actions don't work to maintain an individual's sentiments, then the individual reconceptualizes the identities of others or of self. Fourth, in the process of building events to confirm sentiments, individuals perform social roles that operate the basic institutions of society.

Of course, the theory is far more specific than this. MacKinnon (1994) formalized the theory's structure in 24 propositions, and connected the theory to the writings of George Herbert Mead and other symbolic interactionists. Heise (2007) devoted ten chapters to expounding affect control theory, eight chapters to the theory's mathematical model, a chapter to reviewing the scores of publications on affect control theory, and a chapter to the computer program for conducting simulations based on the theory. Smith-Lovin and Heise (1988) presented multiple chapters dealing with empirical estimation of model parameters and tests of hypotheses. Rather than attempt to review all this detail, we focus here only on how the theory's cybernetic model represents social interaction. Figure 8.1 presents a diagram that facilitates this discussion. As we examine processes implied by the diagram, the letters along arrows help to pinpoint our focus.

Affect control theory does not specify how identities are chosen in a situation, just that each individual defines the situation on entering a scene, and in the process assigns identities to self and others. The activation of each identity retrieves its meaning for use in the situation—affective meaning in particular, measured along the dimensions of Evaluation, Potency, and Activity that we described in chapter six.

Having settled on an identity for self, the individual uses the affective meaning of that *Selected Identity* to choose an institutionally relevant *Role Behavior.* More precisely, the individual chooses an interaction partner and a behavior that best maintains affective meanings of the selected identity, of the other's identity, and of the chosen behavior (plus the meaning of the setting, if it is salient). At the initiation of social activity, situational impressions of the individual are not different from the selected identity, so *Deflection* is non-existent, and arrows *a-b* in figure 8.1 simply signify the process of selecting from memory a role behavior that best affirms the sentiments for the actor, behavior, and object person.

Arrow *c* indicates that the individual's intended action of performing the role behavior on the chosen other may contribute to *Interpersonal Activities* in the setting. Psychologically, the intended action begins immediately, but the intended action must contend with others'

Figure 8.1 A Model of Social Psychological Processes Explained by Affect Control Theory

intended actions for realization, so occurrence may be a function of factors such as turn-taking rules, status deference, and negotiations about whose action best contributes to meaning maintenance in the collectivity.

Often an actor's intended action corresponds to expectations of other interactants. For example, a doctor medicating a patient generally performs the preferred action of both doctor and patient. Sometimes, though, an individual performs an action that is unexpected for other interactants because they have a different definition of the situation or because they maintain different affective meanings. In this case, action that maintains meaning for one individual creates disruption of meanings for others. The diagram shows such *Conflict* being introduced into social activity via arrow *d*.

The individual forms temporary impressions from the interpersonal event that occurs. Specifically, the occurring event generates transient affective meanings of the event's actor, behavior, object, and setting. These transient affective meanings, designated by the term *Impression* in figure 8.1, vary along the same dimensions as sentiments. The production of transient affective meanings is represented by arrow *e* on the diagram.

Each individual judges the appropriateness of interpersonal activity by assessing the extent to which the last event deflected temporary affective meanings from fundamental affective meanings. The overall deflection determines how strange and stressful the event is. In figure 8.1, arrow *f-g* and arrow *a* mutually impinge on *Deflection* to indicate that a specific deflection arises as transient impressions of the individual with the selected identity are compared to the identity sentiment. Deflections of the affective meanings associated with interactants then determine the event that the individual needs to construct next in order to reaffirm fundamental identity meanings. For example, an identity meaning that has been threatened by overly gratifying events will be involved in less gratifying behavior in the future. Arrow *b* indicates that deflection assessments give rise to new role behaviors.

Though not shown on the diagram, emotions arise during the comparison of impressions with sentiments, so the *Deflection* variable actually could be labeled *Deflection and Emotion*. Emotions allow individuals to experience viscerally the way that temporary impressions of self relate to sentiments about the self's identity.

Typically the cycle of role behaviors and assessments of impressions created by situational events continues until the defined situation terminates. Whenever an individual's selected identity is threatened by events, both that individual and other interactants create restorative events to reconfirm the meaning of the threatened identity. However, sometimes interpersonal activity produces inferences about the *Realized Identity*—the identity that actually has been manifested in the setting—via arrow *h*. Affect control theory proposes that this is especially likely when unresolvable deflections persist because of conflicts. In this case, the individual might redefine the situation by inferring the kind of institutionally valid identity that would explain the individual's participation in the latest event. For example, an individual observing himself behave very good, very potent, and lively toward a vulnerable person in an informal situation might infer that his identity must be good, very potent, and active, (e.g., a hero, or a brave person). The inferred identity can replace the original *Selected Identity*, via arrow *i*, in order to have

a reference identity that generates lower deflections, given the events that are occurring in the situation. Affect control theory does not specify precisely when redefinitions of the situation occur and whether they are accomplished by redefining the actor in the last event, the object person, or both. Consensual redefinitions of the situation presumably require interpersonal negotiations.

Comparison

The relation between affect control theory and our model of self and identity becomes evident by comparing figure 8.1 with figure 5.2. The processes represented in figure 8.1 pertain to the *Situational Me* and to *Situational Experiences* in figure 5.2. Thus, affect control theory expounds on the part of our model of self and identity that concerns situational processes, providing details that are glossed over in this book. Indeed, affect control theory, which relates to identities and roles, interlocks with our system relating to identities and self through the variables *Selected Identity* and *Realized Identity*. Affect control theory focuses on the bottom level of the control system, downward from *Selected Identity* and *Realized Identity*. The theory of identities and selves presented in this book focuses on the higher level of the control system, upward from *Selected Identity* and *Realized Identity*. Together they specify a hierarchical cybernetic system connecting individuals' selves to identities, and then to situational actions that express those identities.

Affect control theory treats *Selected Identity* as an input, decided during the definition of the situation. Our work in this book clarifies the decision process to a degree, proposing that an individual selects from her or his identity set an identity that corresponds to the institutional setting, and moreover prefers an identity that actualizes the self-sentiment or that redeems recent divergences from the self-sentiment. Both theories acknowledge that negotiation with other interactants is part of identity selection, but neither theory formulates this process.

Affect control theory deals with *Realized Identity* in the special case of reidentification, where the inferred identity for someone is different than the original selected identity for that person. However, interpersonal relations in a situation are presumed to be operating without reference to the self as a higher level of control, even when reidentifications occur, so deflection-minimizing reidentifications of interactants operate much like deflection-minimizing interpretations of others' behaviors (Nelson 2006). However, the theory in this book is concerned with realized identities as abductions from interpersonal

activity, formed at the termination of each situation and compared with the self-sentiment in order to assess self-authenticity. Whether the realized identity is the same or different from the initially selected identity does not influence its involvement in assessing authenticity of self.

Both theories relate to social institutions, but institutions have been a tangential consideration in affect control theory. The original statement of affect control theory (Heise 1979) talked of behaviors being constrained by psychological "projection rules," and then acknowledged that projection rules reflect social institutions. Institutional relevance was understood as a factor in selecting identities during a definition of the situation, but not in reselecting identities during reidentification. In fact, even a recent exposition (Heise 2002) talked about reidentification at the level of logical relations between interactants' identities rather than in terms of institutions.

The theoretical and empirical work on institutions reported in this book clarifies that, not only must role behaviors be selected from the set of behaviors that are meaningful for the situationally relevant institution, but also both selected and confirmed identities must be institutionally sensible. In addition, individuals are committed to institutions in which they actualize their selves, and they relocate to those institutions when no other factors such as schedules, plans, or exigency constrain their movement. On the other hand, inauthenticity in one institution might instigate movement to another institution where the individual can find a compensating identity, even if that institution ordinarily is avoided as being non–fulfilling.

Finally, this book presents a cognitive theory of self that is centered in cultural identities. We examined thousands of familiar identities provided by the English language, and examined how those identities are organized taxonomically and institutionally. We proposed that cultural structuring of identities transports into an individual's identity set and serves important psychological functions for the individual. These matters were not in the purview of affect control theory.

Self and Deviance

According to Proposition 5.12 in chapter five, actualizing a negative self-sentiment should lead to adoption of deviant identities and thereupon to deviant behavior. Our studies of sociopathy in chapter six offered some support for this idea. In this chapter we compare our

approach to deviance with the approach of Howard Kaplan (2001), which is somewhat analogous to our own in that it attempts to link deviance to levels of self-esteem. (We eschew consideration of other perspectives on deviance because they are too numerous to be surveyed in this book).

Kaplan proposed that under various conditions either deviant or conforming behavior can causally connect to either high or low self-esteem.

Self-rejection is positively related to deviant behavior because of a self-esteem motive—"the personal need to maximize the experience of positive self-attitudes and to minimize the experience of self-rejecting attitudes" (Kaplan 1980, p. 8). This motivation becomes intense for individuals experiencing low self-esteem, driving them to act in ways that will lead to success and approval from others rather than to failure and rejection. However, the fact that they presently have low self-esteem implies that their past actions led to failure and rejection, so they expect that more action in the conventional world will lead to more failure and rejection (Kaplan 2001, p. 381). Thereby they are led to engage in deviant actions within social worlds where deviant actions are approved.

Conditions supporting this sequence of causation are as follows: the individuals define deviant actions as valued; the self-rejecting individuals perceive conformity with the normative order as more threatening than contravening the normative order; the individuals believe that deviant actions are likely to have self-enhancing consequences; and alienation from the conventional world facilitates adopting deviant solutions to one's self-esteem problems.

Self-rejection is negatively related to deviant behavior and positively related to conformity because of a need to conform to group standards. Self-rejecting individuals are "motivated to behave so as to evoke positive responses from the group members and to approximate standards held by these individuals. After all, if the person were not motivated to so behave, the perceived failure to evoke positive responses and approximate group standards would not be associated with derogatory self-attitudes" (2001, p. 386). Individuals with low self-esteem are distant from group standards and therefore in need of more conformity. The other side of this relation is the tendency of high self-esteem individuals to engage in more deviant action (2001, p. 388). Self-esteeming individuals generally perform actions that they and their groups value, regardless of condemnation of those behaviors in yet other groups.

Conditions for this causation include: self-rejecting individuals need the approval of others in order to be motivated to avoid deviant actions (2001, p. 388); they have internalized normative standards to the point that they "disvalue those behaviors that the membership group labels as deviant" (2001, p. 387); the person's "inability to forestall self-devaluing experiences or foster self-enhancing outcomes…influences self-perceptions of being ineffective, powerless, or lacking in control over his or her own destiny. The person thus ceases to engage in purposive behavior"—"deviant or otherwise" (2001, p. 387); and the self-rejecting individuals attribute their failures to lack of effort rather than lack of ability, thereby producing guilt, which can "eventuate in future improvement in performance" (2001, p. 388).

Kaplan (2001, p. 389) suggests several means by which deviant actions can raise self-esteem. First, the deviance can cause one to be separated from deprecations because a deviant individual spends more time with deviant peers, is incarcerated, or is otherwise excluded from interacting with conventional others. Second, deviance can be self-enhancing by being viewed as a successful assault on the groups and standards that have induced one's self-derogation. Third, deviant behavior can induct self-rejecting individuals into groups where their deviant actions are endorsed or where standards are more easily attainable, and that acceptance improves self-esteem. Fourth, "deviant activities may give the individual a new sense of power or control over her environment that leads the person to think of herself as a more effective individual" (Kaplan 2001, p. 389).

Conditions for deviance having positive effects on self-esteem include: "deviance is defined as an acceptable response and can be justified in the context of positive reference groups" (2001, p. 390); "the person's relationship with conventional socializing agents is attenuated"; the person has lost motivation to conform through "severe and prolonged failure and rejection in conventional membership groups" (2001, p. 390); deviant actions provide immediate gratification— an immediate positive reinforcing effect (2001, p. 390); individuals have pathologically low levels of self-esteem (2001, pp. 392–393).

Deviant action can lower self-esteem when it leads to social derogation of the actor within membership groups. The effect is exacerbated when deviant actors have internalized group standards that lead them to disapprove of their own behavior. The conditions for deviance lowering self-esteem are that the actions are disapproved within

the deviant actor's membership groups and individually by the deviant actor (Kaplan 2001, p. 394).

Discussion

Our approach to deviance connects to Kaplan's frameworks in several ways. First, we analyze propensity for deviance in terms of an individual's self-sentiment, and one of the three dimensions of self-sentiment is self-evaluation, which is equivalent to the self-esteem that is central in Kaplan's theorizing. Second, our framework accounts for each of the relations between self-esteem and deviance that Kaplan considers, and factors that we consider to be important mediators of effects are among those noted by Kaplan. In particular, affect control—including its extension to self processes—applies in subcultures that reverse the affective meanings of some behaviors and identities (e.g., see Chapter 4 in Heise 2007). Our approach deals in the same manner as Kaplan's in these cases: identities and behaviors that are positively evaluated in a deviant group are self-actualizing for group members with positive self-evaluations, even if the identities and behaviors are condemned outside the group.

However, there also are major differences between Kaplan's approach and ours.

Kaplan's primary motivational principle is self-enhancement. The primary motivational principle in our approach is that people want to perceive a reality that manifests their basic understandings, and with regard to affective meanings in particular, they seek to experience feelings that confirm their fundamental sentiments. Everyone has the same unidirectional drive to enhance themselves in Kaplan's approach, whereas in our cybernetic approach individuals seek to achieve many different states, depending on their self-sentiments and the reality-based feelings that they are experiencing at the moment. In Kaplan's approach disapproved actions necessarily have an involute relation to self-enhancement, whereas in our approach both approved and disapproved actions can be self-actualizing: valued identities and approved actions actualize positive self-sentiments, stigmatized identities with their disapproved actions actualize negative self-sentiments.

Many people do want to improve their situational self-evaluations, but that is because the majority of individuals maintain fundamentally positive self-evaluations, while individuals who maintain negative self-evaluations are fewer. Thus statistically most people act as if

they are trying to self-enhance, because they are trying to actualize fundamentally positive selves.

Kaplan is led to postulate an extra motive—a need to conform—to account for approved behavior in some circumstances. In contrast, we propose that individuals with positive self-sentiments try to adopt valued identities which they affirm through approved behavior; however, when faced with evaluative inauthenticity in a negative direction—a recently experienced self that is less good than the fundamental self-sentiment—the same motive to manifest the fundamental self-sentiment triggers compensatory processes comparable to those postulated by Kaplan for explaining how low self-esteem lessens deviance and generates more approved behavior.

Kaplan does not discuss how individuals deal with evaluative inauthenticity in a positive direction—that is, having a recently experienced self that is too good relative to one's self-sentiment—because he assumes that everyone is trying to maximize positive self-evaluation. In our perspective, inauthenticity of this kind is common for individuals whose fundamental self-evaluations are non-positive, and for them such inauthenticity can cause enactment of vicious identities, with profound social consequences, as we indicated in our exposition in chapter six on sociopathy. Thus, Kaplan missed one way that increases in self-esteem can produce deviance, because he does not distinguish between fundamental and transient self-esteem and because he postulates a uni-directional self-enhancement motive.

We deal with three dimensions of self-feeling rather than just the one dimension of self-esteem on which Kaplan focuses. Thus, whereas Kaplan has to appropriate a concept of powerlessness to explain inhibition of deviant impulses, we have the concept as an integral part of our theory. Indeed, the potency and activity dimensions of self-feeling suggest considerably more variations in deviance than Kaplan offers. For example, a disvalued self that is potent and active gets actualized in brutal identities such as gangster or mugger; high activity and low potency leads to identities such as delinquent and prostitute; a low activity and high potency disvalued self actualizes in identities such as repo-man (repossessor) or miser; and low activity and low potency in withdrawal identities such as beggar or wino.

In our view, situational identities that an individual experiences sometimes get incorporated into biographical me's, and situational experiences sometimes adjust the personal traits that are attributed to self, or add or eliminate personal possessions. Then the biographies, self-attributed traits, and possessions modify the self-sentiment. This

model of self-sentiment formation foregoes some psychological pro-
cesses that Kaplan proposes. The two approaches do align in giving
importance to social labeling processes, but neither our approach nor
Kaplan's offers much information about the conditions under which a
label "takes" and is adopted as a basis for fundamental self-assessment,
this being a matter for other research programs (e.g., Lofland 1969).

Perspectives on Institutions

Figure 1.1 depicts social institutions as primary elements of macro-
sociological structure, formed through the conjunction of semantic
systems and organizational activities. The semantic systems are linked
to identity labels, the collective performances are linked to inter-
personal activities, and since identities and interpersonal activities
conjoin into roles, social institutions are composed of roles at a more
micro level.

We propose that social institutions develop as interpersonal activities
integrate and routinize into collective performances, a semantic system
develops reflecting the complex of roles, and then some individuals per-
ceive the confluence of meanings in the semantic system and concoct
the institution as a functional entity to be sustained and defended. We
argue that definitions of situations are accomplished largely by deter-
mining which institution's cues predominate at a given time and place,
allowing identities to be selected from that institution's identity set.

In chapter four we demonstrated that multivariate analysis of seman-
tic networks can demarcate the identities that are associated with differ-
ent social institutions. The method also identified incipient institutions
that are not yet fully established. In addition we showed that mean-
ings of settings are part of the semantic confluences associated with
institutions.

In this section we compare our approach to social institutions with
some prior writings on the topic. As will be seen, our framework
employs some ideas offered by previous theorists, but also is distinctive
from past approaches.

Mead. Athens (2005) argues that George Herbert Mead posits an
institutional view of social structure. "According to him, institutions
are the primary basis on which a human community is organized,
and they are what distinguish an organized community from a dis-
organized mass of individuals" (Athens 2005, p. 319). Athens argues
that Mead's writings on social organization, though vague, offer an

incipient evolutionary theory of institutions beginning with family and leading to science—all of the developments being dependent on prior institutionalization of language.

Mead (1934, p. 261) himself expounded on institutions as follows. "If we assert our rights, we are calling for a definite response . . . which everyone should, and perhaps will, give. . . . There are, then, whole series of such common responses in the community in which we live, and such responses are what we term 'institutions.' The institution represents a common response on the part of all members of the community to a particular situation. This common response . . . varies with the character of the individual. In the case of theft the response of the sheriff is different from that of the attorney-general, from that of the judge and the jurors, and so forth. . . . There is a common response in varied forms. And these variations, as illustrated in the different officials, have an organization which gives unity to the variety of the responses." Substituting the idea of identity for "common response in varied forms" yields an extrapolation of Mead's conception of social institutions that presages our own formulation. A social institution comprises an organized set of identities operative in situations where some kind of rights are invoked.

Mead (1934, p. 262) proposed that institutions are fundamental for the development of individual selves: "Without social institutions of some sort, without the organized social attitudes and activities by which social institutions are constituted, there could be no fully mature individual selves or personalities at all; for the individuals involved in the general social life-process of which social institutions are organized manifestations can develop and possess fully mature selves or personalities only in so far as each one of them reflects or prehends in his individual experience these organized social attitudes and activities which social institutions embody or represent." Given our extrapolation of Mead's conception of social institutions, we interpret this passage in part as saying that an individual's maturation involves introjecting institutional identities into the self—an idea presaging some aspects of our model of self in chapter five. Combining this interpretation with Mead's additional statement that "an institution is, after all, nothing but an organization of attitudes which we all carry in us" (Mead 1934, p. 211), we think that we are in a Meadian tradition with our notion that individuals understand institutions by absorbing their culture's theory of people.

Thus we see our theory of institutions, and also our theory of self, as extensions of Mead's, even though we employ the contemporary

terminology of identities, and we delineate institutions via empirical analyses of meanings rather than by trying to fathom domains of rights. This is in the spirit of Athens' comment (2005, p. 320): "Mead may be at least partly forgiven for not providing us with a more precise and fully developed analysis of society because it was reasonable for him to presume that once he pointed us in the correct direction, we would finish the job for him."

Parsons. Talcott Parsons defined social institution as "a complex of institutionalized role integrates which is of strategic structural significance in the social system in question" (Parsons 1951, p. 39). He noted that there are "empirical clusterings" of integrated roles, four of which are especially important—"those 1) of kinship, control of sex relations and socialization, 2) of the organization of instrumental achievement roles and stratification [occupations and work], 3) of the relation between power, force and territoriality [the state], and 4) of the relation of the paramount integration of value-orientations to cognitive orientations and certain problems of personality adjustment in 'religion'" (Parsons 1951, p. 152). He also examined medical practice as an institutional pattern (Parsons 1951, p. 454).

Parsons' view of institutions as complexes of culturally given relationships accords with our emphasis on institutions as culturally given interaction worlds. Parsons and Shils' (1951, p. 192) notion of collectivity boundaries defined in terms of sets of roles betokens our methodology for distinguishing institutions, though their concern was with boundaries of collectivities of individuals rather than of institutions as such. Our approach befits Parsons' view on semiotics—"the high elaboration of human action systems is not possible without relatively stable symbolic systems where meaning is not predominately contingent on highly particularized situations" (Parsons 1951, p. 11). Moreover, his approach to what we call identities previews our notion of cultural theories of people—"*Persons* constitute one invariant point of reference [for cognitive orientations]. . . . This sector of the cognitive orientation system of a culture may be called its *conception of human nature*" (Parsons and Shils 1951, p. 168).

Nevertheless, we part ways with Parsons on some matters. Parsons felt that the key institutions of society could be delineated via functional analysis. We are averse to sociological analysis conducted via pure reasoning based on "societal needs" established by fiat. Indeed, the methodology we present in chapter four amounts to a strategy of empirical analysis that can be substituted for functional analysis when trying to delineate and differentiate social institutions.

Parsons proposed that " the fundamental dynamic theorem of sociology" requires that individuals must internalize common value patterns (Parsons 1951, p. 42), so that "the sanctions which express the role-expectations of the other actors will tend to reinforce his own need-dispositions" (Parsons and Shils 1951, p. 191). Superficially, our emphasis on shared meanings would seem to parallel Parsons' position. However, rather than treating homogeneity as a theoretical assumption, we depend on empirical evidence that individuals share meanings and sentiments about concepts. Simultaneously we hold—again on the basis of empirical evidence—that some meanings and sentiments vary widely across times and subcultures. In our prior work on affect control theory, we allowed that individuals may interact with each other notwithstanding discordant meanings, though in doing so they lock themselves into conflicts, where one individual's success in maintaining personal meanings is the other's loss. The same kind of thing happens with regard to self and identities: an individual may broadcast her self-sentiment by performing a particular identity, but others who understand that identity in a different way will develop a different notion of her than she has of herself; and then the parties will struggle to impose their own views on others.

Berger and Luckmann. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's (1966) phenomenological approach to social institutions concentrates on the micro-sociological. They see institutionalization occurring when habitualized actions get linked to types of actors. Specifically, roles emerge in the form of typified performances associated with types of actors, and become fully institutionalized when these classifications are passed on to successive generations. Thus Berger and Luckmann reduce the concept of institution to normative performances by actors with specific identities; and institutionalization, to the establishment of these patterns. Institutions manifest themselves in actual experience through the repetitive performance of roles.

However, Berger and Luckmann acknowledge that roles are not the only representations of institutions. For example, linguistic objectifications of institutions also represent institutions and make them present in experience, as do physical objects and settings imbued with symbolic meaning. Their point is simply that "all these representations become 'dead' (that is, bereft of subjective reality) unless they are ongoingly 'brought to life' in actual human conduct. The representation of an institution in and by roles is thus the representation par excellence, on which all other representations are dependent" (1966, p. 75).

Despite the acknowledged influence of Durkheim and Marx, Berger and Luckmann say little about social institutions as macro-level units of social organization, being more interested in the subjective experience of the institutional world (Ritzer 1988). In contrast, our approach extracts large-scale social complexes from the cultural meanings of identities, and employs institutions so found in order to understand some of individuals' predicaments in the modern world.

Bourdieu. We profess a view of society somewhat similar to Pierre Bourdieu's. However, in Bourdieu's sociology, self is replaced by *habitus*: "the durable and transposable systems of schemata or perception, appreciation, and action that result from the institution of the social in the body (or in biological individuals)" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, pp. 126–127). Bourdieu replaces the notion of institutional worlds with his concept of field, "a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 97). He points out that "in highly differentiated societies, the social cosmos is made up of a number of such relatively autonomous social microcosms. . . . For instance, the artistic field, or the religious field, or the economic field" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, pp. 97–98).

Bourdieu chiefly is concerned with ongoing processes in fields, especially with struggles aimed at preserving or transforming the configuration of forces within the field. Accordingly, he develops reasoning tools adapted to this focus, such as species of capital and a game metaphor for social engagement. A field is an arena of constant struggle within the rules of the space (when the rules themselves are not in contention) "to appropriate the specific products at stake in the game. Those who dominate in a given field are in a position to make it function to their advantage but they must always contend with the resistance, the claims, the contention, 'political' or otherwise, of the dominated" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 102).

We view the differences between Bourdieu's theorizing about fields and our theorizing about institutional worlds as related predominately to a difference in focus. We concentrate on the relatively stable cultural contents of social institutions, working with the ideas and issues represented on the left side of figure 1.1. Bourdieu concentrates on production, reproduction, and change in institutional worlds, thereby focusing on issues represented on the right side of figure 1.1. The two approaches are complementary.

Bourdieu contrasted his orientation with that of systems theory. "The coherence that may be observed in a given state of the field, its apparent orientation toward a common function . . . are born of conflict and

competition, not of some kind of immanent self-development of the structure. A...field does not have parts, components. Every subfield has its own logic, rules and regularities" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, pp. 103–104). We believe that this overlooks the fact that social activity often is easily comprehensible, either because it is routinized or because we can intuit seemingly novel events affectively; and in such stable circumstances, ideas from systems theory—such as homeostasis and equilibrium—are powerful means for understanding what has happened and what will happen next. Moreover, when social life is stable, cybernetics applies not only to the system as a whole but to its components as well (Marken 1992; Powers 1973), the components being roles in the case of institutions.

This is not to deny that social activity always involves creativity, agency, and conflict—these factors always are present. However, the complexity and indeterminateness associated with these concepts can be glossed in stable circumstances, and the essence of what is happening can be represented concisely in systemic models. Systemic models lose applicability when social activity moves outside the domain of the stable into restructurings that change the nature of the system. Comprehending what is happening during restructurings requires focusing on creativity, agency, and conflict, as Bourdieu professes.

Fararo and Skvoretz. Thomas Fararo and John Skvoretz (1984, p. 122) ground their theory of institutions in the maxim that "An institution is a design for social action." A design combines actor-types, actions, and relevant circumstances, by linking actors in particular circumstances to actions. Such a design becomes an established order when representatives of the actor types view each other and the situation in terms of the design, and all operate in terms of the design's action prescriptions. An established order becomes an institution when invoked by multiple cohorts of actors.

Fararo and Skvoretz (1984) refer to actor-action links as productions, and much of their work on institutions focuses on developing and applying a formal language for describing productions. They represent a production as an if-then rule: e.g., *if* a waitress in a restaurant perceives that a customer's food is prepared but unserved, *then* her responsibility is to serve the food to the customer. Their formal language translates such conditional statements into succinct, precise symbolic representations. An empirical study of a restaurant provided a substantial application of the language (Axten and Fararo 1977; Axten and Skvoretz 1980).

Production rules explode in number if they deal too much with specifics, so the approach has been to state the rules fairly abstractly.

Theoretically, institutional grammars could unfold abstract actions into a series of particular actions, just as a linguistic transformational grammar unfolds a kernel sentence into a surface sentence. However, the production-system approach to institutions does not provide top-down generativity (Skvoretz and Fararo 1984, p. 216), and moreover the approach posits that sometimes processing is governed by "heuristic search rather than institutionalized action" (Fararo 1987, p. 161). In contrast, we have delineated institutions in terms of identities, which can be associated with expected actions via affect control theory.

The Fararo–Skvoretz theory aggregates productions in various ways. A "rolegram" consists of prioritized productions for a specific actor type interacting with another specific actor type. A compound rolegram consist of rolegrams for all of the partners in an actor's set of role partners. A unit–institution consists of a shared symbol system for interpreting relevant circumstances, and of interactively coupled rolegrams, where one actor's productions create action circumstances for another actor. Despite these and other forms of aggregation, the topic of institutional worlds is left unexplored, beyond brief mention of "spaces for social action" (Fararo and Skvoretz 1984, p. 122) and "institutional tiers" (Fararo and Butts 1999, p. 45). Our emphasis on institutional identities and definitions of situations leads directly to analyses of spaces for social action.

Balzer. Wolfgang Balzer (1990) presents a general description of institutions that is similar to that of Fararo, Skvoretz, and Axten, but with some added features. According to Balzer, an institution consists of groups that engage in various types of actions, individuals with intentions (or lack of intentions) to perform various actions, power relations in which one individual's action causes another individual to perform an action even if the other had no intention of doing so originally, and a superstructure that individuals internalize more or less homogeneously. Regarding the superstructure: "groups, action types, and the characteristic function [that relates groups and actions], after a while get represented in the mental frames built up in the individuals, they get internalized and often even explicitly represented by terms in the language spoken by these individuals. All structures thus built up, whether conceptual or not, we subsume under the label of *superstructures*" (Balzer 1990, p. 9). Thus a superstructure consists of language and meanings.

Balzer claims his framework applies wholesale. "The theory is intended to apply to social systems of various size and from various historical periods of occurrence, like the grocer's shop next door, all

grocery shops in a certain area, factories of different size..., political institutions of various degrees of comprehensiveness..., as well as structures comprising almost all the population of a certain area, like the feudal 13th or 16th century France" (Balzer 1990, p. 1). However, his only empirical example is expository and superficial, focusing on medieval Europe, with a system consisting of three groups—nobles, peasants, and intermediates (priests, teachers, servants)—and nine action types—hunting, exercising, ordering, working, fighting, serving, sending, reading, and transmitting.

Our figure 1.1 parallels Balzer's framework in viewing an institution as the conjunction of a semantic system (superstructure) and collective activity (actions specific to groups and reflecting power relations between groups). Identities in our system roughly correspond to groups in Balzer's system, though in Balzer's framework identities would be part of the superstructure, while groups are sets of acting individuals. By comparison, our approach stresses meanings more, postulating that an institution's quintessence is to be found semiotically, in the semantic network linking identities, actions, settings, and objects.

Discussion

Our concern in this book is with social institutions as macrosociological structures, as social worlds in which role-identity constellations have a unifying motif. This aligns us most with Mead, Parsons, and Bourdieu of the authors discussed above. However, our framework for analyzing institutions is more detailed than Mead's, we work with interconnected meanings where Mead focuses on rights, and we draw out the pragmatic implications of institutions for individuals defining situations whereas Mead focused mainly on behavior that occurs once institutional situations are defined. In the case of Parsons, our conception of institution is largely tailored to his definition, but our approach of delineating institutions via the meanings of role-identities is far removed from his structural-functional analysis. Like Bourdieu, we see institutions as worlds of social interaction, but our basic motivational principle governing interaction concerns maintenance of the objectified-meanings on the left side of figure 1.1, whereas Bourdieu, being more concerned with embodied processes, sees fields as arenas for contests of supremacy.

We see institutions as grounded in meanings just as Berger and Luckmann do, but they nearly ignore the large scale social structures that we find emerging from networks of meanings. Our emphasis on

convergences of meanings parallels the superstructures that Balzer postulates as a component of institutions. However, Balzer views a superstructure as an eventual legitimation of an institution that already is working in all other respects, whereas we believe that meaning convergence, while arising from ongoing processes, is discovered by individuals who then go on to complete institutionalization by organizing meta-roles devoted to sustaining the institution and protecting its boundaries (Gieryn 1999).

Our development of an empirical methodology for studying large scale institutions is unique. Assuredly, innumerable empirical studies have elucidated institutionalized actions and organizations, yet no prior study provides a principled, empirically based method for distinguishing the parts of macro social structure and for delineating the contents of each part. Fararo and Skvoretz do provide a systematic framework for observing institutional activities, but their focus is on specific types of organizations, such as a restaurant.

Recapitulation

In defining situations, individuals combine personal desires with recognition of an institutional complex, and both matters are focal topics in this book. Our theory of self specifies that an individual is attracted to identities that actualize the individual's self-sentiment, or that correct a recent inauthenticity. Meanwhile the setting—as perceived and as conversationally constructed—introduces a governing social institution (or interaction order) that constrains available identities. The final definition of a situation combines the assembly of individuals' personal needs with the discerned structural context. Thus, by elucidating self processes and the subjective representation of social institutions, work in this book bridges a lacuna in affect control theory, helping to explain how situations are defined.

Affect control theory effectively specifies how an individual will behave after adopting a deviant identity, but offers few clues as to why an individual would adopt a deviant identity. The self theory presented in this book illuminates that matter by proposing that an individual seeks to enact identities that surrogate the individual's persona—a principle that governs adoption of both normal and deviant identities. Most people have positive self-sentiments—high self-esteem in particular—and so their identity preferences are conventional and supportive of social order. However, a few individuals with self-repugnance have to

actualize themselves in debased identities, and they do so irrespective of the undesirable emotional and social consequences that they suffer. Beyond the basic process of self-actualization, we hypothesize that overly favorable inauthenticity can lead even self-valuing individuals into deviance forays. Thus our cybernetic theory of self combined with affect control theory provides a single model to account for a variety of deviance issues, as opposed to the multiple motives and processes employed by Kaplan (2001).

With regard to social institutions, this book focuses on institutions as elements of macro social structure that partition society into disparate worlds of interaction—a partitioning that is crucial for understanding how an individual moves fluidly among numerous unrelated identities. We find that these largest units of social structure are implicit in the cultural meanings that individuals internalize. An important implication of this is that individuals have subjective access to macro social structure—they implicitly understand the major functional arenas of society—and thereby they are able to adapt their formulations of situations and their situational behavior in appropriate ways as they move through social time and space.

Social Reality and Human Subjectivity

Continental European philosophers such as Foucault, Derrida, Leotard, [Lyotard] and Baudrillard proposed an alternative view of social reality and human subjectivity, replacing Enlightenment beliefs in rationality, synthesis, determinism, and essentialism with counter-enlightenment beliefs in irrationality, antithesis, indeterminacy, and constructionism. This late-twentieth-century indictment of beliefs in the reality of social phenomena and theories of self and identity provided a warrant for our efforts in this book to rejuvenate self and identity theory, expanded to consider social institutions, and to introduce some novel kinds of empirical explorations into these domains.

We begin the concluding chapter of this book by expanding the brief discussion in chapter one of counter-enlightenment ideas about the nature of social reality and human subjectivity, followed by a discussion of the reaction of interactionist scholars to these ideas. Against this background, we consider the extent to which the theory of identities, selves, and social institutions proposed in this book has successfully addressed issues raised by counter-enlightenment ideas. We consider first the issue of constructionism, arguing that Berger and Luckmann's classic treatise on the topic provides a sociological basis for the position we have adopted in this book with respect to social reality. We then revisit the issue of the fragmentation of self, with which we introduced this book, and discuss how our theory accounts for the coherence and stability of self in an institutionally complex and seemingly ephemeral world. We close this chapter with a retrospective summary and some forward-looking suggestions for additional research and analysis.

Social Reality and Human Subjectivity

Continental European philosophers of the late-twentieth-century inverted Enlightenment beliefs concerning social reality and individual subjectivity, proposing a radical form of constructionism that dismisses both everyday and scientific views of social reality, and a view of human subjectivity that challenges the essentialist idea of a core and stable self that had dominated social psychology for most of the past century.

Foucault, for example, proposed that historically bounded discourse, mediated by representational systems such as language, visual representations, and cultural practices produces knowledge. Foucault also proposed that we can understand discourses only in relation to other discourses, so that the validity or truth value of any discourse cannot be evaluated by reference to some objective world external to discourse. Rather than "drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scienticity or truth, and that which falls under some other category," Foucault argues, we should turn our attention to "seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false" (1984, p. 60). For Foucault, the truth value of any discourse reduces to its acceptance in particular historical circumstances. Grand or meta-narratives—all-encompassing world views and explanatory accounts of the natural, cultural, or metaphysical worlds of human experience, including political ideologies, religious beliefs, even science itself—are products of historically specific discourse, hence equally valid. Foucault also proposed that the self (or subject in his terms), like knowledge in general, is a product of discourse and representational systems in specific historical contexts, and emerges through the relationship between power and knowledge. To be a subject is to be subjected, and ideas such as an autonomous, unified, and rational subject are simply the effects of subjection processes. Specific individuals are irrelevant in accounting for knowledge, discourses, objects, etc. (Foucault 1984, p. 59), though individual thought can exceed the knowledge and power from which it emerges, providing an ethics to guide individual resistance to complete subjection (Foucault 1985, 1988).

Jacques Derrida (1976) likened all human experience to a text that can be interpreted or deconstructed. Deconstructing a text involves the search for inconsistent and paradoxical instances of conceptual distinctions, leading to an infinite regress of a "play of differences" or

alternative interpretations. For Derrida (1981), "there is no outside text" (1976, p. 158) because a text encompasses the difference between inside and outside. Thus, there **is** no deeper or authentic self to be discovered; only subject-referent texts to be deconstructed, and the notion of a stable self is impossible because the interpretations of subject-referent texts are constantly changing.

Jean-Francois Leotard (1984) characterized the "postmodern" era as an "incredulity towards meta-narratives" (1984: xxiv), where science replaces narrative knowledge, including the meta-narratives of philosophy. For Leotard, "The derealization of the world [in postmodern times] means the disintegration of narrative into 'clouds' of linguistic combinations and collisions among innumerable language games.... The loss of a continuous meta-narrative breaks the subject into heterogeneous moments of subjectivity that do not cohere into an identity" (Aylesworth 2005, p. 8).

According to Jean Baudrillard (1981, 1985), the technological mediation of experience in modern times has obscured the distinction between representation and reality, so that what is claimed as real is only image, illusion, or simulacrum—a network of signs and images without an external referent. Because signs no longer represent things but other signs, people live in a hyperreality, unable to distinguish between reality and representation. This condition of hyperreality extends to the individual's subjectivity. Modern consumer society has transformed every object, including the subject, into a sign of itself, a representation without an external referent. Thus people assure themselves of their social worth, if not their own reality, through obsessive consumption, constructing their subjectivities out of the symbolic value of consumer objects.

Notwithstanding some convergence among Continental European philosophers regarding social reality and human subjectivity, there also is substantial diversity among Continental scholars and among those who embraced and extended their ideas under the rubric of postmodernism. Here, we rely on Rosenau's account of this diversity.

Rosenau (1992, p. 15) distinguishes between two kinds of postmodernists: skeptical and affirmative. For skeptical postmodernists, "the post-modern age is one of fragmentation, disintegration, malaise, meaninglessness, a vagueness or even absence of moral parameters and societal chaos.... this is the dark side of post-modernism, the post-modernism of despair, the post-modernism that speaks of the immediacy of death, the demise of the subject, the end of the author, the impossibility of truth, and the abrogation of the Order of Representation.... If, as the

sceptics claim there is no truth, then all that is left is play, the play of words and meaning."

Although affirmative postmodernists are also critical of modernity, they view the postmodern era in more optimistic terms. Affirmative postmodernists also call for a return of the subject, albeit a decentered, emergent subject, a nonidentity, who rejects grand explanations while accepting some dimensions of humanism (Rosenau 1992, p. 57). Exemplifying the attempt of affirmative postmodernists to deal with the problem of the subject and subjectivity, Hall (1996) proposes that we must account for subjective self-constitution by understanding how individuals identify with the positions to which they are summoned through discourse, and how they perform and stylize their positions in accord with, and in opposition to, the rules with which they regulate themselves (1996, pp.13–14).

In contrast to affirmative postmodernists, who introduce the subject in revised form, skeptical postmodernists dismiss the subject altogether, proposing the postmodern individual as an alternative. The postmodern individual lacks a strong and stable personal identity. "S/he is rather the disintegrating patch-work of a persona, with a disparate personality and a potentially confused identity" (Rosenau 1992, p. 55). The postmodern individual makes no claim to self-consciousness, is not the author of caring relationships, does not want to assume agency or responsibility, and is not accountable for his or her actions or the outcomes of events. Nor does the postmodern individual subscribe to humanism or any other ideology, nor make or subscribe to truth-claims of any kind. In fact, "S/he will be so independent of all identifiable truth-seeking perspectives that s/he is in short, no subject at all!" (Rosenau 1992, p. 53).

Despite its anti-subject stance, postmodernism has had to come to terms with the subject because of the inconceivability of a subjectless social science. As Rosenau points out, "although the death of the subject may be feasible in the humanities, the absence of the subject makes the very concept of social science tenuous" (1992, p. 42), so that "it is hardly surprising that enthusiasm for a subject-absent social science has not been unanimous" (1992, p. 52). Thus, postmodernists have been compelled to take a second look at the concept of the subject. From the point of view of interactionists, however, this second look is unsatisfactory. For example, Hall's assertion that "identities are . . . [only] points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us" (1996, p. 6) disengages identities from a stable core of self and falls far short of the interactionist concept of self as an integrated, stable, and agentic entity.

Epitomizing the influence of "postmodern" ideas on sociological thought, Denzin (1988) dismisses the interactionist theory of self promoted by George Herbert Mead, Herbert Blumer, and Robert Sidharthan Perinbanayagam as the "fallacy of the self as the center of interaction" (1988, p. 67). For Denzin, the self merely refers to the phenomenological flow of lived experience, not to an internal, invariant structure of a person. Deconstructing the concept of self, he concludes that Mead's (1934) "I" and "me" amount to mere pronouns, linguistic conventions with no basis in substantive reality. And since "the pronominal status of the self, as given in the I and the me is inherently in flux," these concepts "cannot be taken to be referents of stable, internal structures of the self" (1988, p. 74). Instead, the I and the me are no more than indexical terms by which people reference taken-for-granted meanings in interaction. The I "stands for nothing more than a subject who thinks thoughts that he thinks he determines, when in fact language determines the thoughts that are thought and the words that are spoken," while the me refers to an "inauthentic self," one that "has assumed its selfhood in the terms given to it by others" (1988, p. 68).

Denzin replaces the interactionist construct of self with "being" or "being-in-the-world" as the master concept structuring the interpretive-interactional process. The self is a part of language and except as it enters interaction in the pronominal forms of I and me, it lies outside immediate experience. Thus, it is not a person's supposed self that shapes the direction experience takes, but simply the individual's presence in the situation, in conjunction with the structures of discourse. The self is "a 'gloss' for the biographical subjectivity of the person. Pivotal, key meanings of the person are poured into the container called self" (1988, p. 69). Because these personal meanings are provided by the codes and ideologies of the social structure, however, their reality does not reside in the person. And despite the fact that a person claims ownership of his or her experience through possessive pronominal forms of the self (my, mine), the subject remains a fictive extension of social reality.

Denzin accepts that the signs of the self mirror internal experience that a person claims as his or her own, but he maintains that the essence of these reflections lies "in the signs that are reflected back to the self by the speaking subject located in the social situation" (1988, p. 71). Adopting Baudrillard's notion of a political economy of signs that transforms every object into a sign of itself, Denzin argues that the subject in post-capitalist times "forges his subjectivity out of this commodity structure of signs and objects. His subjectivity circulates within

the political economy of objects and signs he has attached himself to, including those in his social relationships" (1988, p. 72).

Denzin's view of a person's presence in the world also incorporates desire, a mode of consciousness that "is experienced...as a hungering lack of self-realization in the interactional situation" (1988, p. 75). Because desire can be fulfilled only through the physical presence and intentions of others, this mode of consciousness draws the person into the interactional world of others. Desire, Denzin argues, "references the deep, universal human experiences of love, hate, despair, respect, guilt, and shame, insanity, madness, and violence" (1988, p. 76). The general theory of self proposed by Mead, Blumer, and Perinbanayagam does not adequately address the matter of desire, resulting in "an empty, situational view of human experience" (1988, p. 75).

Finally, Denzin attacks the basic premises and methods of interactionist social psychology. Ontologically, he dismisses the assumption of "the fully present subject who could reveal the inner workings of his or her mind to another"; epistemologically, he dismisses the assumption of "an observer with a method who could somehow prevail upon this subject to reveal her inner experience to the kindly knowing scientist" (1991, pp. 67–68). There are no subjects "out there" who can reveal themselves to social scientists or be revealed by them; there are only texts. An implication of Derrida's contention that meaning is never fully present in language is that people are never fully present even to themselves and certainly not to others. Consequently, ethnographic researchers cannot accurately represent the presence of research subjects. In the words of Dawson and Prus (1993, p. 157), "this is the real radical edge of the postmodernist challenge to traditional interactionist ethnography, with its assumption not only of intersubjectivity (i.e., the successful communication of subjects) but, of course, the autonomous existence and accessibility of subjects."

Interactionists' Reactions

The counter-enlightenment ideas of Continental European philosophers threaten basic premises of social science, and interactionist social psychology in particular. The threatened premises are: (a) the ontological assumption of an empirical reality external to discourse and textual representation—however fluid, shifting, and phenomenological this reality may be; (b) the assumption of a core, stable, and autonomous self at the center of a person's phenomenological experience of this

empirical reality; and (c) the epistemological assumption that one can access the phenomenological world of research subjects via conventional social science methods. In this section, we discuss the reactions of interactionists to the counter-enlightenment ideas of Continental European philosophers.

Some interactionists view the counter-enlightenment ideas advanced by Continental European philosophers as belated and weak versions of themes advocated by Mead and other pragmatists decades earlier (e.g., Dawson and Prus 1993, 1995; Maines 1996; Perinbanayagam 2000). Beyond this, interactionists have reacted with varying mixtures of rejection and endorsement of counter-enlightenment ideas.

Perinbanayagam (2000, p. 29) agrees with Foucault that knowledge, power, and historical context play an important part in the constitution of self as an object, but denies that the implications for the subjectivity of the individual are as singular, definitive, and invariant as Foucault claims. Between subject-constituting discourse and individual action, Perinbanayagam writes, "there is the interregnum of a self-indicating and discursive mind . . . from which one is able to make choices and act. In this interregnum the mind is able to integrate various discourses and arrive at a synthesis which is the self" (2000, p. 32). And once language and the discourses by which a self is constituted are acquired, "the discursive organism is able to generate a range of discursive acts and give presence in one moment or another to one type of self or another. In the moment of acting . . . an individual acts as an agent who is conscious of his or her self—fashioned though it may be by various regimes of power and knowledge" (2000, p. 30).

With regard to the infinite regress of interpretations implied by Derrida's "play of differences," Perinbanayagam (2000, p. 36) pulls together arguments in the pragmatist philosophies of Mead and Peirce, and argues that in practical affairs the self is a concept that summarizes and collects the habitual "play" of interpretations that have gone before, and is understood as such by the individual and others. Such interpretations must be habitually repetitive, Perinbanayagam argues, else individuals would become victim to a "semantic paralysis" (2000, p. 38), unable to act and cope in the practical world.

Also merging the pragmatism of Mead and Peirce, Norbert Wiley (1994), argues that postmodernist views on the illusory nature of the self are a consequence of failing to distinguish between self and identity. Extending Mead's concept of reflexivity, Wiley conceptualizes the self as a semiotic process of interpretation, with identities

as social products of the self–process. From this perspective, the self is a defining and universal property of human beings but specific identities are not.

Interactionists reaffirm a belief in what Blumer (1969, p. 22) has called "the obdurate character of the social world." As John Hewitt (2003, p. 28) states, "the empirical world is not merely a social construction founded on discourse. Problems do not disappear when we try to think them away. . . . There is, in other words, an obdurate, resisting empirical world that does not roll over and play dead in the face of human constructions of it." Along the same lines, Kathryn Woodward writes that "in foregrounding culture in order to counter economic determinism, the material and the economic disappear from the explanatory framework [of postmodernist / poststructuralist writers], although they clearly do not disappear from people's lives" (2002, p. 166). And Dawson and Prus (1995) argue that human activity encounters a resistant world; and however multiple, ambiguous, and shifting this world might be, people act toward it as if something "out there" exists, resisting their actions. Moreover, people revise the meaning of objects in response to this resistant world, "an environment of action which cannot be controlled simply by language, discourse, and related human conceptual developments" (1995, p. 112).

In contrast, some interactionists judge postmodernist views to have sufficient merit to warrant an attempt to reconcile these views with interactionist thought.

Peter Callero (2003) argues that there is an emerging sociological understanding of the self that combines elements of the "new scholarship" of postmodernism with conventional understandings of symbolic interactionism: the emphasis by interactionists on reflexivity, the emphasis by postmodernists on power, and the emphasis by both on the construction of self. While the principle of reflexivity "provides a pragmatic foundation for understanding agency and political action missing from much of the new scholarship," Callero writes, "the significance of power in shaping the self . . . offers an important corrective to the traditional orientations associated with Mead, Goffman, and symbolic interactionism" (2003, p. 117).

Addressing the hyperreality of postmodern life propounded by Baudrillard, James Holstein and Jaber Gubrium (2000) ask how the self of Mead and symbolic interactionists can be salvaged while retaining the characteristics of decenteredness and diversity of meaning attributed to the self by postmodernists. "We believe we can tether the rampant and ubiquitous 'playfulness' of the hyperreal," they argue, "by

turning to the interpretive practices of everyday life, in particular the ordinary work of constructing and reflexively managing who and what we are" (2000, p. 68). Holstein and Gubrium derive from Lyotard the idea that the self in postmodern times is a local, empirically based one "grounded in the concrete discursive locations of self-construction, in the various places of everyday life where subjectivity is addressed and its meaning assembled and assigned" (2000, p. 69). Thereby they arrive at a conceptualization of the self that incorporates postmodernist concerns without falling into the hyperreality trap set by Baudrillard: "The self, then, is a particular set of sited language games whose rules discursively construct the semblance of a more or less unified subjectivity centered in experience" (2000, p. 70). An individual constructs self in the process of communicating it, and applying personal pronouns to individual action, thought, and sentiment signals the shared understanding that an experiential entity called the self is under construction. Thus conceived, the self is "as real as its ordinary production and by-products. Its authenticities are situated and plural—locally articulated, locally recognized, and locally accountable." While this positive transformation of the postmodernist view of the self reaffirms the ontological reality of the empirical social self of Mead and interactionists, it is cast in new terms. "The word self…becomes a representational horizon for presence and personal agency. It exists in experience to the degree that it can be accountably communicated within an interpretive community." (2000, p. 71)

Institutional context is central to Holstein and Gubrium's concept of the self. "In today's world of proliferating sites and scenes of identity work," they write, "the self is increasingly an institutional project" (2000, p. 12). However, by institution, Holstein and Gubrium mean local settings that confront individuals in their everyday lives, rather than abstract institutions like the economy, polity, or family. Such institutional settings provide the narrative resources, the vocabularies and discourses, for self-construction, either constraining the narrative construction of self (e.g., a classroom or courtroom) or facilitating it (e.g., job and news interviews). "Always crafted to the circumstances at hand, the stock of salient, accountable resources provided by settings, communities, organizations, or institutions comprises self-defining images and vocabularies that are realized in locally storied selves" (2000, p. 162). Local discourses do not generate selves deterministically, however, since individuals "exercise interpretive discretion, mediated by the complex combinations of meaning that competing professional and institutional affiliations might offer" (2000, p. 167).

Constructionism: Berger and Luckmann

An especially relevant interactionist treatise—Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's (1966) *The Social Construction of Reality*—appeared at about the same time that the counter-enlightenment ideas of Continental European philosophers began to emerge. Fundamental ideas in Berger and Luckmann's treatise coincide with central themes of these counter-enlightenment philosophers, but in much less radical form. This includes constructionism—the defining principle in the Berger and Luckmann treatise; an emphasis on language in the construction of that which confronts humans as reality; and, though less explicitly, the structural relations of knowledge and power in the constitution of the self.

In contrast to the radical constructionism of Continental philosophers, Berger and Luckmann propose a weaker and more scientifically acceptable version of constructionism. Berger and Luckmann define reality "as a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being independent of our own volition (we cannot 'wish them away')," and knowledge "as the certainty that phenomena are real and that they possess specific characteristics" (1966, p. 1). However, they do not take a philosophical stand on whether there exists an external world beyond consciousness. "We can never apprehend some putative substratum of consciousness as such," they argue "only consciousness of something or other. This is so regardless of whether the object of consciousness is experienced as belonging to an external physical world or apprehended as an element of an inward subjective reality" (1966, p. 20). In other words, they neither endorse nor dismiss the existence of an external world; they simply sidestep the issue. This is a consequence of their phenomenological analysis of subjective experiences, which "refrains from any causal or genetic hypotheses, as well as from assertions about the ontological status of the phenomena analyzed" (Ibid.). It is in this sense that that we consider Berger and Luckmann as advancing a weaker form of constructionism; they do not deny the existence of an external world, they simply suspend the issue in "phenomenological brackets" (Ibid.).

According to Berger and Luckmann, the world confronting human beings as objective reality is socially constructed, with a dialectical relationship between producers (human beings) and product (the social world). Consisting of three analytically distinct moments—externalization, "objectivation," and internalization—the dialectical model proposes, respectively, that "Society is a social product. Society is an

objective reality. Man is a social product" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 61). Externalization refers to the self-externalizing activities of individual actors. Objectivation refers to "the process by which the externalized products of human activity attain the character of objectivity" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 60), primarily through language, thereby becoming socially available as elements of a common world. Internalization refers to the process "by which the objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization" (1966, p. 61).

At the highest level of generality and abstraction, the externalized products of human activity give rise to the construction of symbolic universes. Symbolic universes are all-embracing cosmological and anthropological frames of reference that integrate all sectors of the institutional order in a general frame of reference: "all human social experience can…be conceived of as taking place within it….; the entire historic society and the entire biography of the individual are seen as events taking place within this universe" (1966, p. 96). Industrial societies have "a shared core universe of meaning, taken-for-granted as such, and different partial universes coexisting in a state of mutual accommodation" (1966, p. 125).

Once objectified as cultural knowledge, a symbolic universe takes on a life of its own, much like the meta-narratives referred to by Continental philosophers. Symbolic universes, and the institutional order they legitimate, are external to the individual members of a society and exert coercive power on their activities. Symbolic universes provide ultimate meaning and legitimation, not only to the institutional order of a society, but also to the biographies and identities of its members. Thus, Berger and Luckmann's concept of symbolic universes reverberates to some extent with the view of knowledge and the role of knowledge-power relations in the constitution of the subject proposed by Continental philosophers.

While Berger and Luckmann's work foreshadows some central themes in the work of Continental European philosophers, there are two important differences. First, in contrast to the reduction of the individual to a mere subject of discourse, Berger and Luckmann view the individual as a locus of personal agency and reflexiveness. This is exemplified in their location of the origin of symbolic universes in the self-externalizing activities of human beings. For Berger and Luckmann, externalization is an anthropological necessity stemming from the biological limitations of the human organism. "Human being is impossible in a closed sphere of quiescent interiority. Human being

must ongoingly externalize itself in activity. . . . The inherent instability of the human organism makes it imperative that man himself provide a stable environment for his conduct" (1966, p. 52). And, "as man externalizes himself, he constructs the world into which he externalizes himself" (1966, p. 104).

The second major way in which Berger and Luckmann differ from counter-enlightenment ideas is in acknowledging that individuals can and do resist the knowledge-based power of social institutions and develop rival universes of meaning. Thus the tenure of symbolic universes never is secure, and "the confrontation of alternative symbolic universes implies a problem of power—which of the conflicting definitions of reality will be 'made to stick' in the society" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, pp.108–109). The validity of one symbolic universe over another cannot be settled through empirical demonstration, they argue, and the abstract arguments of experts may convince one person but not another. Therefore, socially structured power governs the competition between competing symbolic universes. Experts of rival symbolic universes attempt to suppress the competition, even to the point of persuading authorities to employ armed coercion to silence a challenging universe.

To some extent we have adopted Berger and Luckmann's ground-breaking treatise on the social construction of reality as a meta-theoretical frame for our book. Besides advocating a constructionist approach to cultural knowledge, Berger and Luckmann incorporate fundamental assumptions of interactionist social psychology concerning the reflexivity, rationality, and agency of self, without ignoring the relation between knowledge and power and the role of knowledge-power relations in the constitution of the self. Their view that social reality and individual selves are social constructions made possible by language is a conceptual cornerstone of our book, informing our approach to cultural theories of people, social institutions, and cultural selves.

Self-Fragmentation Revisited

Continental European philosophers of the late twentieth century viewed the notion of self as emerging from discourses involving signifiers of individuality, and they proposed that concepts of self transmute as such discourses move from one situation to another. In this book we have taken this position seriously and proposed a complex cognitive self involving identity sets, institutional biographies, personal

features and material possessions, and notions of personal traits, plus a collaboratively produced persona that serves as the center of the self-conception and carries a sentiment reflecting the overall contents of the self-conception. Biographies in a self-conception are institutionally specific because individuals have to tell their stories largely in terms of identities that are situationally relevant, so necessarily talk about self varies as an individual moves between institutions. On the other hand, we conjecture that self-biographies within institutions are fairly stable, changing only as inexorable facts require addition or deletion of some identities.

Continental European philosophers argued that the lack of unified and stable selves among contemporary individuals is evident in the fact that individuals present themselves in numerous temporary, independent, sometimes contradictory identities (as nicely characterized by the fictional Dr. Hyde in chapter one's epigraph). The fragmentation of self is attributed to the fragmentation of the "postmodern" social world. Our position is that the cognitive meaning of self indeed has become increasingly fragmented in recent times because of an increase in the complexity of social life and the number of available domains for self-conceptualization. According to Berger and Luckmann (1966, p.171–173), the greater availability of counter definitions of reality and identities in modern industrialized societies enhances the possibility of individualism, which opens up the question of "Who am I?" as the individual is torn between discrepant worlds and identities or searches for the elusive true or authentic self beneath the surface.

However, self-fragmentation is not an inevitable consequence of social fragmentation. As Giddens has argued, "A person may make use of diversity in order to create a distinctive self-identity which positively incorporates elements from different settings into an integrated narrative" (Giddens 1991, p. 190). And, according to Holstein and Gubrium (2000, pp. 10–11), "an eminently practical and socially variegated self, artfully and deliberately built up in various shapes and dimensions as a basis for dealing with the circumstances in which it is located" is what is required in this "postmodern" era of social complexity. Yet these arguments fall short of providing an answer to the critical theoretical problem challenging the concept of self today: the identification of a principle that can account for the unity and constancy of self in the "postmodern" era of institutional diversity and social disarray that pulls the individual in multiple directions. For example, Holstein and Gubrium (2000, pp. 70–71) seem to give up on the idea of a unified and stable self when they state that the self "no longer references an experientially

constant entity, a central presence or presences." The closest they come to identifying a unifying principle of self lies in their statement that its status "as a practical discursive accomplishment…could include the accomplishment of a sense of central presence in our lives." While we agree with many aspects of Holstein and Gubrium's theory of self, their reference to a vague, second-order "sense of central presence in our lives" remains an unsatisfactory answer to the problem of the unity and constancy of self.

According to our theory of self, the principle of organization providing unity and stability to the self lies in the unifying and stabilizing force of an individual's self-sentiment. We contend that the self-sentiment distils the affective essence of the individual's complex self-conception, and that the motivation to maintain one's self-sentiment provides the basis for the stability of self and for its unity. Individuals maintain a coherent self by selecting identities that confirm their self-sentiments, or compensatory identities that reaffirm them, even though such identity selections can be capricious and inconsistent as the individuals move between social worlds.

The theory proposes that the self-sentiment is relatively stable over time and across institutional contexts, even while embracing the ideas that the self-sentiment changes between the various "ages" of the life cycle, and that structural demands require an individual to confirm different identity sentiments in different settings. Allowing for changes in the self-sentiment and for changes in the identities that are available in various specific situations, the individual affirms the self-sentiment by enacting identities whose sentiments best express the self-sentiment. Therein lays the authenticity of being. And when inauthentic identities are experienced, people select and try to enact compensatory identities to reestablish their selves.

The motivation to maintain one's self-sentiment provides the basis, not only for the stability of self, but also for its unity or integration. The fragmentation of self that has consumed the attention of modernity and "postmodernist" scholars occurs mainly along cognitive rather than affective lines. Undoubtedly, the cognitive fragmentation of self causes some degree of personal angst as an individual tries to coordinate demands in diverse institutions—demands that are often conflicting. However, the structure of the self-sentiment remains dimensionally simple and constant in the three axes of affective meaning—evaluation, potency, and activity (or self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-assertiveness). So few dimensions preclude fragmentation of self-sentiments, allowing people to achieve personal integration and to experience a

unity of being as they actualize their self-sentiments through identity enactments.

Therefore, in contrast to the rejection of a centered and stable self by Continental European scholars and by social scientists who subscribe to their ideas, we view the self as constructed by a physiologically located, centered, and reflective human mind operating within a social field of other human minds—an intersubjectivity made possible by language and communication. The sedimentation and integration of experience give rise to a relatively stable and unified self-conception and self-sentiment. However, the self is also a reflexive, cybernetic process that operates on situational self-perceptions and the self-sentiment as an individual moves through the institutional sites of everyday social life and the trajectories of daily routines, modifying the individual's global self-concept and self-sentiment throughout the life-cycle.

Conclusion

Continental European philosophers of the late twentieth century have argued that social phenomena are constructed in historically bounded discourses, and since discourses are conducted via words, the social phenomena that the discourses create are products of words. We have taken this reasoning much further than a casual reading of Continental philosophical arguments might suggest. In this book we searched for important social phenomena in word meanings, and found them! We found sociological segmentation and career paths in taxonomic relations among identity words, we found social institutions in the relational meanings of identity words, and we analyzed self-actualization and inauthenticity in terms of the affective meanings of identity words. While we personally do not accept the position of Continental European scholars that society is nothing more than verbiage, we are astonished at how much social science is hidden within word meanings, waiting to be uncovered.

We anticipate that the theory of identities, selves, and social institutions proposed in this book will stimulate future research. For example, the model of the self-process presented in chapter five allows one to make specific predictions about identity selection in the wake of recent experiences of self-actualizing or inauthentic identities—those confirming or disconfirming fundamental the self-sentiment of esteem, efficacy, and activation. One could test model predictions with carefully designed experiments or by correlating model predictions with

responses from a survey of hypothetical vignettes. Another possibility for future research involves our view of identity salience as a dynamic construct. According to our model of the self-process, identity salience hierarchies are adjusted dynamically in response to recent inauthentici-ties and current institutional setting. This proposition could be tested empirically with experimental or correlational studies of the extent to which identity salience changes with institutional site and with the degree to which the self-sentiment is confirmed in a situation.

Our frameworks for studying identities and institutions may lead to other kinds of research. Existing WordNet resources can be used to conduct identity censuses for a number of different languages, and the results would permit cross-cultural comparisons of the number and kinds of distinguishable characters in different societies. The notion that collective identities are denoted by words that can act either as nouns or modifiers needs to be examined in languages other than English to see if such linguistic flexibility is universal for collective identities; if not, investigations can focus on whether there are comparable principles characterizing collective identities in other languages. Our procedures for extracting social institutions from semantic networks can be applied more broadly in English with a variety of dictionary sources in order to delineate the basic institutions of English-speaking societies. The same procedures applied in other languages should provide results of interest for each society separately and for comparing the different societies. Delineation of institutions from semantic network analysis may also be of interest in historical studies of past societies in which dictionaries were compiled.

In conclusion, we see our theory as one text among many discourses regarding the development and social actions of individuals. We see no inherent problem with this because we believe that every intel-lectual area benefits from multiple perspectives (as in the continuing importance of both Newtonian and quantum perspectives in physics). However, we believe that when alternate theories focus on an issue of current importance among scholars, the theories' relative authority can be evaluated in terms of how adequately they address and explain the issue. Being scientists, we find logical coherence and empirical ground-ing to be convincing aspects of discourse in developing this evaluation. Our hope is that our work is evaluated positively by other social scien-tists who apply those standards.

NOTES

One   Introduction

1. Commentators often group the ideas of these philosophers under the rubric of postmodernism, a term introduced by Leotard in his 1979 book, *La Condition Postmodern*. However, because neither Derrida nor others such as Foucault and Baudrillard use the term postmodernism to describe their own work, because many scholars refer to these French philosophers (especially Foucault and Derrida) as post-structuralists, and because the term postmodernism is so loosely applied, we eschew the terms postmodernism and post-structuralism, except when citing other authors who use the terms. Instead, we employ the term counter-enlightenment to refer to whatever communality exists in the diverse and complex ideas of Continental philosophers such as Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, and Lyotard. The term refers to movements countering the rationalism, universalism, and empiricism associated with the Enlightenment. Counter-enlightenment ideas also can be found in the works of critical theorists and feminists.

2. We discuss these theories extensively in chapter seven along with other theories of identities and self, including those of McCall and Simmons (1978), Perinbanayagam (2000), and Wiley (1994).

3. Other interactionist theories of identities and selves have addressed one or more of these issues. As discussed in chapter seven, McCall and Simmons' (1978) views that the self is a social construction, that identity salience is situationally fluid and variable, and that the contents of identities vary with particular others and institutional settings, resonate with some of these themes. And, the theories of self proposed by Perinbanayagam (2000) and Wiley (1994) are explicitly semiotic.

4. Ironically, dictionaries vary widely in their definitions of semiotic. We base our usage on *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (Gove 1961): "a general philosophical theory of signs and symbols that deals esp. with their function in both artificially constructed and natural languages and comprises the three branches of syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics."

Two   Cultural Theories of People

1. Castells (2000a, p. 22) uses the word identity approximately as we use the word self, as is common among some authors when referring to self-related processes and meanings—see chapter five.

Three   Identities in Standard English

1. Tallies were computed after removing 1,316 person names from the WordNet corpus. Some of the labels are homonyms; e.g., boy as a youthful male person, and boy as an offensive term for a Black man. This tally includes homonyms across concepts, but ignores repetitions of labels within each concept. Ignoring repetitions of any kind including homonyms leaves 7,883 different labels. Words not appearing in the British National Corpus (Leech, Rayson, and Wilson 2001) were retained during computations.
2. See D'Andrade's (1995, Chapter 5) extensive discussion of differences between folk biological taxonomies and scientific biological taxonomies.

Four   Language and Social Institutions

1. Technical procedures for meaning expansions were as follows (drawing terminology from Rosen 1988, pp. 279–315, p. 386). Let **M** be the adjacency matrix representing relations between concepts as given in dictionary definitions. The order of **M** is *N*, which equals the number of basis identities (*p*) plus the number of adjunct concepts occurring in definitions (*q*). Basis identities are represented in the first *p* rows and columns; adjunct concepts in the remaining *q* rows and columns. Cells in the first *p* columns of **M** consist of ones when dictionary definitions relate the column identities to row concepts and zeros otherwise. We treat the adjunct concepts as undefined primitives, and therefore cells in the last *q* columns of **M** consist only of zeros, except for ones in the diagonal.

   The adjacency matrix **M** is the span-1 expansion of meaning. The span-*r* expansion is the *r*-th Boolean power of **M**. If the span-(*r*+1) expansion is identical to the span-*r* expansion, then the span-*r* expansion represents the transitive closure of **M**.

   We wrote a Pascal program to obtain the Boolean powers of adjacency matricies representing dictionary definitions and to write out the *N* by *p* zero-one matrix of connections, for use in factor analyses.
2. We measured confluence of meanings with the phi coefficient (product-moment correlation), but confluence might be measured alternatively by the proportion of referenced concepts that each pair of identities share—the coefficient of Jaccard (Sneath and Sokal 1973, p. 131).
3. A rule of thumb for deciding how many components to interpret employs the graph of rank-ordered eigenvalues: components whose eigenvalues appear to the left of a sudden drop may be useful, and components whose eigenvalues appear to the right of the drop are less useful (Van de Geer 1971, p. 147).

   The graph of eigenvalues for our 300 identities indicated a large first component, representing numerous marriage and family identities. Next, the graph of eigenvalues indicated that first three components are notably larger than the rest: after rotation, one corresponds to the family identities, another clusters marriage-related identities, and the third clusters medicine-related identities.

   The next drop-off in eigenvalues suggests that nine components might be interpretable, and then another drop suggests that 12 components might be interpretable. The 12-component solution allowed clearer interpretations than the nine-component solution, so the 12-component solution is the one that we present here. We used the equamax method to rotate the 12 components to a maximally interpretable structure.
4. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: sister, mother, parent, father, grandparent, grandfather, grandmother, half-sister, step-sister, little-sister, first born, brother, big sister, sibling, little brother, illegitimate child, orphan, foster child, big brother, great-grandfather, great-grandmother, foster-mother, step-father, foster-father, step-mother,

niece, brother-in-law, nephew, uncle, aunt, sister-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law, step-parent, baby-sitter, half-brother, step-brother, cousin, matriarch, deadbeat dad, relative; *less than 0.5*: baby, son-in-law, family man, child, son, daughter, daughter-in-law, grandchild, best man, child molester, grandson, granddaughter, step-daughter, step-child, step-son, house husband, homemaker, infant, truant, schoolgirl, schoolboy, pupil, pediatrician, schoolteacher, abortionist.

5. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: daughter, son, child, grandchild, granddaughter, grandson, child molester, infant, schoolboy, schoolgirl, pupil, truant, baby, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, step-son, step-child, step-daughter, schoolteacher, homemaker, family man, house husband, pediatrician, abortionist, tutor; *less than 0.5*: father, parent, mother, father-in-law, mother-in-law, first born, grandmother, grandfather, step-mother, grandparent, step-parent, brother, sister, step-father, step-brother, little brother, little-sister, step-sister, half-sister, nephew, brother-in-law, niece, sister-in-law, illegitimate child, orphan, baby-sitter, half-brother, big brother, aunt, uncle, big sister, sibling, foster child, great-grandmother, great-grandfather, foster-father, foster-mother, cousin, matriarch, deadbeat dad, relative.

6. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: wife, husband, spouse, ex-wife, ex-husband, widower, adulterer, widow, adulteress, divorcée, honeymooner, hussy, slut, bridegroom, bachelor, mistress, bride; *less than 0.5*: fiancé, fiancée, spinster, divorce lawyer, step-son, step-child, step-daughter, newlywed, nymphomaniac, daughter-in-law, skirt chaser, prostitute, house husband, bridesmaid, divorcé, bisexual, son-in-law, family man, father-in-law, mother-in-law, step-parent, gigolo, step-brother, sister-in-law, half-brother, lady-killer, nephew, brother-in-law, niece, uncle, aunt, whore, cousin, best man, flirt, step-mother, step-father, relative, call girl.

7. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: homosexual, gay, queer, bisexual, lesbian, lady-killer, dyke, prostitute, heterosexual, nymphomaniac, flirt, whore, lecher; *less than 0.5*: hooker, mistress, gigolo, rapist, stud, call girl, pimp, intimate, swinger, sadist, pickup, adulterer, tease, voyeur, adulteress, slut, masochist, hussy, gynecologist, skirt chaser.

8. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: physician, surgeon, sawbones, nurse, psychiatrist, shrink, registered nurse, quack, head nurse, practical nurse, doctor, patient, probationer, gynecologist, pediatrician; *less than 0.5*: abortionist, trainee, invalid, instructor.

9. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: student, university student, undergraduate, graduate student, coed, student teacher, grind, intern, lecturer, tutor; *less than 0.5*: alumnus, dropout, professor, schoolteacher, teacher, scholar.

10. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: clergyman, priest, priestess, minister, preacher, evangelist, leader, pastor, strike-leader, rabbi; *less than 0.5*: demagogue, yes-man, matriarch, executive, principal, protestant, subordinate, businessman, catholic, businesswoman.

11. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: god, pagan, atheist, devil, agnostic, devil worshiper; *less than 0.5*: Jew, foe, enemy, rabbi.

12. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: worker, skilled worker, employer, temporary worker, employee, work mate, co-worker, boss, clockwatcher, strike-breaker, foreman, secretary, do-nothing, workman; *less than 0.5*: girl-friday, office boy, receptionist, union member, loafer, manager, colleague, laborer, retiree, apprentice, small businessman, manageress, scientist, malingerer, assistant, unemployed person, instructor, librarian.

13. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: customer, saleslady, salesman, salesclerk, server, hooker, call girl, pimp; *less than 0.5*: shoplifter, shopkeeper, waitress, waiter, merchant, purchaser, shopper, shop clerk, taxpayer, employer, employee, gigolo.

14. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: lawyer, attorney, defense attorney, prosecuting attorney, public defender, mouth-piece, district attorney, divorce lawyer; *less than 0.5*: defendant, criminal, crook, stool-pigeon, judge, foreman, felon, sheriff.

15. Identities loading on the component—*0.5 or more*: police officer, cop, detective, state trooper, patrolman, plainclothesman, nark; *less than 0.5*: probationer, vigilante, teammate, catholic, stool-pigeon, relative, insider, informer, businesswoman, enemy, best man, citizen, foe, fiancée, professor, protestant.

Five   The Cultural Self

1. Instructions sent in an email from one author to the other: "The attached file named 'Ultimate Who Am I' is a listing of all the identities in English—about 9,000. The task is to go through and delete the ones that don't apply to you. Then you use your word processor to count the ones that are left. I've done this but won't say how many I ended up with to prevent biasing your count. I can mention a few things I discovered though. 1. This task takes a long time—hours. 2. It is interesting, both sociologically and personally. 3. At least in my case, it was too intimate in places for me to want to share it. That's why I'm asking you to do this and get your own count. 4. I ended up dropping labels I used to have but don't anymore (like "kid") but otherwise I was pretty inclusive."

2. As a subjectively experienced phenomenon, the biographical me is not to be confused with objectively viewed biography. A biographical me is much more selective than a biography. So too is an identity set. For example, the identity "kid" is part of an adult's biography but not part of his or her current identity set, therefore unavailable for the construction of a biographical me.

3. With the rise of the Internet and multi-user domains, people are also able to construct and negotiate their personae online, raising the issue of the relationship between "virtual" and "real" selves (Turkle 1995). See Cerulo (1997) for a concise discussion of the effect of new communication technologies on identity.

4. These are three of four principles identified by Rosenberg (1979) for understanding the development of self-concept, which we have borrowed to organize our discussion of identity-confirmation (see also Owens 2003). A fourth principle, psychological centrality, pertains to the structure or organization of self, which we develop elsewhere in this chapter.

5. For instance, Hewitt (1998) proposes that self-esteem is a self-referential mood characteristic of late-twentieth-century American society. He dismisses the idea that self-esteem is a universal attribute, in favor of the idea that it is one way among others that people label their experience of moods in order to understand themselves. "If there is something real about self-esteem," he concludes (p. 142), "it is in the capacity of this word to label universal human somatic and psychological responses to success and failure in culturally appropriate ways. It is the latest word for happiness in a culture where happiness is important."

6. We borrow the term "self-actualizing" from clinical psychologist Carl Rogers (1961), notwithstanding Rogers' disregard for identity processes and homeostasis.

7. Heise (2007, Chapter 16) presents a mathematical formulation of this cybernetic process. In brief, the EPA space is recentered at an individual's self-sentiment, and cultural identities are viewed as vectors branching outward in the directions of more—or less—goodness, power, and activity. The vectors for recently experienced identities are summed into a composite vector, and the ideal next identity is defined as the negative of the composite vector.

Six   The Self's Identities

1. Activist, arrogant person, assertive person, athlete, attractive person, boring person, boyfriend/girlfriend, brain, caring person, cheater, competitive person, compulsive person,

computer wizard, confident person, creative person, critical person, depressed person, dork, drinker, employee, extrovert, failure, follower, forgetful person, friend, funny person, hard-working person, honest person, insecure person, introvert, jealous person, lazy person, loser, lover, messy person, moody person, motivated person, nerd, optimist, organized person, overweight person, party animal, perfectionist, pessimist, physically fit person, popular person, procrastinator, roommate, sarcastic person, selfish person, sensitive person, smoker, stressed person, student, talented person, violent person, wannabe, and whiner.

2. Six individuals had positive correlations, ranging from 0.01 to 0.36. All rated themselves as neutral or negative on Potency, being among the 35 percent of respondents who did so. Four of the six evaluated themselves as neutral, constituting two-thirds of the respondents who rated themselves neutral on Evaluation. A possible explanation for these anomalies is that participation in the experiment created inauthenticity for respondents with non-positive self-sentiments, leading to compensatory salience hierarchies, as postulated in Proposition 5.17.

3. Sociopaths also differ from normal individuals in their neural processing of affective meanings (Williamson, Harpur, and Hare 1991).

4. As Gollwitzer et al. (2009) showed, vicarious participation in roles has effects similar to actual participation when the vicarious participation is socially acknowledged—e.g., by an experimenter reading the amounts of the subjects' donations.

Seven   Theories of Identities and Selves

1. Here we are dealing essentially with the use of signs in "identity work." Influenced by Perinbanayagam, Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock (1996) argue for a wider view of semiotics and identity work that extends beyond talk or discourse to include any way people use signs to signify and objectify their selves, including both complex acts extending over time (e.g., choices of sports activities and political alignments).

Delete "both" (or add something besides complex acts).

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