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## FlowLens: Enabling Efficient Traffic Analysis for Security Applications Using Programmable Switches









# Performance Breakthroughs with Programmable Switches

- Line-speed packet processing at Tbps
- Fully programmable in the P4 language
- Recent focus of HW manufacturers







New opportunities for network security









### Securing High-Speed Networks

### Programmable switches are used to:

- Obfuscate Network Topologies [NetHide, SEC'18]
- Filter spoofed IP traffic [NetHCF, ICNP'19]
- Mitigate DDoS attacks [Poseidon, NDSS'20]
- Thwart network covert channels [NetWarden, SEC'20]

Line-speed packet processing Highly efficient

Fine-tuned for specific application domain










## There are Other Prominent ML-based Security Applications







Website Fingerprinting



IoT Behavioral Analysis



**Detection of Covert Channels** 



Packet lengths

Packets inter-arrival time

ML-based classifier

Generic approach towards detecting multiple attacks









# Collecting Packet Distributions in Programmable Switches is Hard

- Stateful memory is severely limited
  - ~100 MB SRAM
  - No memory for storing many flows
- Packets must be processed at line speed (< a few tens of ns)</li>
  - Limited number of operations
  - Reduced [domain-specific] instruction set

It does not seem feasible to obtain packet distributions in programmable switches at scale









## **Research Question**

 Can we collect packet distributions within programmable switches?

**Efficient** 

**Generic** 











## Solutions for Collecting Packet Distributions Have a Few Drawbacks



**Large Bandwidth Costs** 





Netwarden, USENIX SEC'20

Efficient

**Application-tailored** 









### Contributions

## FlowLens: a flow classification system for generic ML-based security applications

- Flow markers: Compact representation of packet distributions in prog. switches
- Flow marker accumulator: Implementation of flow marker collection in switching hardware
- Automatic profiling: Application-tailored configuration of flow markers
- Evaluation: Tested in 3 different security tasks

**Efficient** 


Generic












### FlowLens Architecture





- Scale # of measured flows
- Ensure network visibility

### Coordinated Operation

Multiple ML applications










## How can we Compress Packet Distributions Efficiently?

- Produce flow markers with two operators
  - Quantization
  - Truncation













## How to Automatically Choose Quant/Trunc Parameters?

- Large configuration space
  - Quantization x Truncation
- Leverage Bayesian Optimization
- Automatic Profiler with three criteria
  - Smaller marker for target accuracy
  - Best accuracy given a size constraint
  - Compromise between marker size and accuracy

Saves many hours of testing sub-optimal configurations










## How are Flow Markers Collected in the Switch?

- Programmable packet parsing
- Leverage match-action tables
  - Arranged in stages
  - Match some packet field
  - Change packet headers or metadata












### How are Flow Markers Collected in the Switch?

#### Flow Marker Accumulator

- Simple per-stage operations
- Offload complex operations (control plane) 0



### **Evaluation**

- Scalability in three use cases
  - Covert Channel Detection
  - Website Fingerprinting
  - Botnet Detection
- Performance of FlowLens's profiler
- Resources consumption
  - CPU usage (control plane)
  - ASIC usage (data plane)









### **Scalability Gains Overview**

- Scalability in three use cases
  - Covert Channel Detection



- Website Fingerprinting
- Botnet Detection

Use Case	Scaling (# flows)	Performance Loss
Covert Channels	150x	-3% accuracy
Website Fingerprinting	32x	-2% accuracy
Botnet Detection	34x	-3% recall -2% precision

Check the paper for our comprehensive evaluation!










## FlowLens Scales the Amount of Inspected Flows and Retains Acc.

- Covert Channel Detection [Barradas et al.]
  - Legitimate / Modified Skype flows
  - Packet lengths + XGBoost

#### 16x increase in measured flows



Full information = 3000B

Detection: 96% accuracy



Quant (QL=4) = **188B Detection: 92% accuracy** 










## FlowLens Scales the Amount of Inspected Flows and Retains Acc.

- Covert Channel Detection [Barradas et al.]
  - Legitimate / Modified Skype flows
  - Packet lengths + XGBoost

#### 150x increase in measured flows



Full information = 3000B

Detection: 96% accuracy



Quant (QL=4) + Trunc (top-10) = **20B Detection: 93% accuracy** 









## FlowLens' Profiler Finds Good Quant. / Trunc. Parameters

- Automatic profiling (Covert Channel):
  - 48 valid parameter combinations
  - Set max exploration of 10 combinations

Rank (accuracy-wise)	Combination
#1	(QL = 2, Top-n = all) = 0.960
#2	(QL = 3, Top-n = 50) = 0.951
#3	(QL = 0, Top-n = 30) = 0.947
Output	(QL = 3, Top-n = 10) = 0.944



Optimize for a reasonable Size vs Accuracy trade-off









## FlowLens Imposes a Small Overhead on the Switch

#### CPU usage (ML component):

- Botnet detection (our largest model)
- 140MB out of 32GB RAM
- 5.6MB storage
- ~200 μs per prediction

### ASIC usage (Flow Marker Accumulator):

Computational		Memory		
eMatch xBar	Gateway	VLIW	ТСАМ	SRAM
8.46%	5.21%	3.39%	0.00%	38.54%

Supports flow classification in the control plane

Supports the concurrent execution of other forwarding behaviors









### **Conclusions**

- FlowLens: First traffic analysis system for generic
   ML-based security applications in prog. switches
- Collects compressed packet distributions, ensuring:
  - Classification accuracy
  - Small memory footprint
- Classifies flows directly on the switch
  - Saves communication, compute, and storage costs

#### Our code is available!

https://github.com/dmbb/flowlens



https://web.ist.utl.pt/diogo.barradas







