CS489/698 Privacy, Cryptography, Network and Data Security

Blockchain

Spring 2024, Monday/Wednesday 11:30am-12:50pm

An overview of blockchain design

What is a blockchain?

• A blockchain is ... a chain of blocks!

$$\mathsf{Block} \ 1 \longrightarrow \mathsf{Block} \ 2 \longrightarrow \cdots \longrightarrow \mathsf{Block} \ \mathsf{N}$$


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
- What does chaining mean here?
 - Linked list? Some cryptographic construct?
- What goes into these blocks?
 - Anything? A fixed format? What makes a block valid?
- Who can put up a block?
 - A single entity? A group of people? Anyone with Internet access?
- How to ensure a same view of the chain?
 - Centralized? Distributed? How to resolve a dispute?

A basic chaining scheme




- Each block contains a cryptographic hash of the previous block
- Each block depends on the previous one

A basic chaining scheme



- Each block is split into two parts:
 - A *header* that contains at least two critical values:
 - A **cryptographic hash** of the previous block header
 - A cryptographic hash of the current block payload
 - A *payload* that contains application-specific information


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
Q: Why is this a better chaining scheme?


What goes into the payload?





- Anything! Depending on how you plan to use this blockchain.
 - Bitcoin blockchain: ledger
 - Ethereum blockchain: state machine


Payload example: a ledger





















- Imagine Alice goes to Bob's Pizzeria and orders a pizza, she has the following payment options:
 - Cash, debit card, credit card, e-transfer (e.g., Interac®)
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
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
Consensus: Proof-of-work

How hard is it to alter this chain?




• This is the chain Alice shows Bob w.r.t her payment to Bob.


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
• It is not hard at all for Alice to revert this payment to Bob!



Let's increase the difficulty




• Bob decides to make it harder for Alice to alter her payment




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Mining for a valid hash




Mining for a valid hash



Q: What is the chance of finding a valid N assuming an m-bit hash?


Mining for a valid hash




Q: What is the chance of finding a valid N assuming an m-bit hash?

A: $\frac{2^{m-k}}{2^m}$, a larger $k \Rightarrow$ a higher difficulty of finding N


Expect 2^k hash operations to find a valid N




• Surgical change: Alice re-mines block *N* and finds a new nonce such that the block header hash remains unchanged




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


• Deterrent: This is extremely hard for a cryptographic hash function that has preimage resistance and second-preimage resistance.




• Change-and-cut: Alice re-mines the nonce for block *N* and stops







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
• Deterrent: Longer chains are preferred over shorter chains.



• Partial chain re-mining: Alice re-mines all the nonces since block N



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 Deterrent: If there are L blocks between and including block N and the chain head, Alice is expected to perform L × 2^k hash operations to build-up an equally competitive chain assuming the difficulty level k does not change.

The 51% attack

- There is a catch in the deterrent:
 - Alice needs to mine slower than the rest of the participants combined

$$\mathsf{P}: \cdots \to \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}^{+1} \to \cdots \to \mathbb{N}^{+/2}$$

$$A: \cdots \longrightarrow \mathbb{N} \longrightarrow \mathbb{N}^{+1} \longrightarrow \cdots \longrightarrow \mathbb{N}^{+/}$$

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
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- \rightarrow i.e., the public chain needs to grow faster than Alice's chain
- \rightarrow If Alice mines faster, she eventually gets to rewrite history

Confirmation level


• Recall that when we show a proof of payment, we need a few extra blocks after the block that hosts the ledger entry.



Q: Why do we need these extra blocks, even when:


- 1. Alice does not control over 50% computational power?
- 2. Everyone else is honest and cooperative?

How does data get into the block?




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Back to confirmation level



Back to confirmation level



- To trigger a **fork**, Alice could:
 - Send two transactions in a short time window
 - Send two transactions to separate halves of the network
 - Pre-mine one block and only reveal it after the first transaction is sent to the network

Drawbacks of Proof-of-work consensus

• Speed of confirmation

- E.g., a Bitcoin transaction takes on average 10 minutes to confirm
- Even worse, it is advised to wait for 6 confirmations, i.e., an hour

• Vulnerable to 51% attacks


- In 2014, mining pool Ghash.io obtained 51% hash rate in Bitcoin
- Bitcoin Gold was hit by such attacks twice in 2018 and 2020

• Energy consumption

- Hashing itself is not useful
- These operations are repeated across the fleet of nodes


Consensus: Proof-of-stake

Block production as election





- In a proof-of-work scheme:
 - The chance of which node is elected to propose a new block is proportional to its hashing power
 - Collisions are allowed and are resolved by the longest chain rule


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



- In a proof-of-stake scheme:
 - The chance of which node is elected to propose a new block is proportional to its staked value
 - Collisions are not allowed by design, only the leader creates a block




















Catching lies

- If a validator node gets caught lying, its stake is burned!
- Other nodes may catch a fraudulent block by comparing it with the transaction that Alice intended to perform
 - $\circ~$ e.g., by checking Ethereum's "mempool"
- This works as long as the attacker does not control a majority of stake in the system

The 51% attack on PoS

- **Q**: What if the attacker controls \geq 50% of staked resources?
- A: The attacker can prove fraudulent transactions.

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• Q: Is the 51% attack less likely in PoS compared with PoW?


The 51% attack on PoS

- **Q**: What if the attacker controls \geq 50% of staked resources?
- A: The attacker can prove fraudulent transactions.

- **Q:** Is the 51% attack less likely in PoS compared with PoW?
- A: Yes, because in PoS, the attacker loses the weapon to future attacks, i.e., all the stake are gone, and is not easily recoverable!


Hard fork as a recovery of a 51% attack

• To recover from a 51% attack, the only solution is to hard fork the blockchain in order to invalidate the fraudulent transactions added by the attackers.



Hard fork as a recovery of a 51% attack

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- NOTE: The forked chain can be shorter than the previous chain!
 - A higher level of social coordination is required


Hard fork as a recovery of a 51% attack

• In **PoS**, we do a hard fork to invalidate fraudulent transactions AND wipe out the attacker who controls \geq 50% of the staked resources.

 In PoW, the hard fork can only invalidate transaction WHILE the ≥ 50% computational power is still controlled by the attacker

Chain validation


- If Alice shows Bob, the Pizzeria owner, the following blockchain, why would Bob accept it? Why would Bob believe that:
 - It is hard for Alice to produce such a chain of blocks
 - There does not exist a better chain of blocks as of now



• With PoS, forging a blockchain would be easy!

Chain validation


• This turns out to be an extremely complicated problem!



- *S* Signature of the proposer of this block
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
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
Q: What are the issues with this scheme?

• Alice has some small stake (e.g., 1%) and can be elected as a block proposer:




• In one of her turn as a block proposer, Alice triggers a fork in the chain with an attempt to double-spend.

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
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
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
- When its Alice's turn again, she only append a block to the chain that is more favorable to her. The other chain dies as a result.
- This is sometimes called the 1% attack.

- Solution? There is no common solution. Different PoS chains adopt different mechanisms.
- The Slash protocol (Ethereum PoS candidate) has two rules:
 - Penalize those who "equivocated" on a given block, i.e., voted on two different versions of it.
 - Penalize those who voted on the wrong block, regardless of whether they double-voted.


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- Solution? In short, there are no simple solutions.
 - Casper (Ethereum's PoS protocol) depends on trusted nodes to broadcast the correct block hash.
 - Peercoin, broadcasts the hash of the "legitimate" chain on a daily basis.
 - Extremely complicated solutions have been proposed e.g., Ouroboros Genesis.