# Carmen's Core Concepts (Math 135)

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Week 9 Part 1 - RSA

Carmen Bruni Carmen's Core Concepts (Math 135)



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Suppose Alice and Bob want to share a message but there is an eavesdropper (Eve) watching their communications.



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 Alice then makes the pair (e, p) public and computes her private key d satisfying

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 and  $ed \equiv 1 \mod p-1$ 

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To send a message M to Alice, an integer between 0 and p - 1 inclusive, Bob computes a ciphertext (encrypted message) C satisfying

$$0 \leq C < p$$
 and  $C \equiv M^e \mod p$ .

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
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• Alice then computes  $R \equiv C^d \mod p$  with  $0 \le R < p$ .

#### Exponentiation Ciphers Diagram



## Exponentiation Ciphers Main Proposition

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**Proposition:**  $R \equiv M \mod p$ . **Proof:** If  $p \mid M$ , then all of M, C and R are 0 and the claim follows. So we assume that  $p \nmid M$ . Recall that  $ed \equiv 1 \mod p - 1$ and so we have that there exists an integer k such that ed = 1 + k(p - 1). Using this, we have

$$R \equiv C^{d} \mod p$$
  

$$\equiv (M^{e})^{d} \mod p \quad \text{by definition of } C$$
  

$$\equiv M^{ed} \mod p$$
  

$$\equiv M \mod p \quad \text{Corollary to } F\ell T \text{ since } ed \equiv 1 \mod p - 1.$$

as required **Corollary:** R = M

The good news is that this scheme works. However, Eve can compute d just as easily as Alice! Eve knows p, hence knows p-1 and can use the Euclidean algorithm to compute d just like Alice. This means our scheme is not secure. To rectify this problem, we include information about two primes.



• Alice chooses two (large) distinct primes *p* and *q*, computes n = pq and selects any *e* satisfying

1 < e < (p-1)(q-1) and gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1



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again which can be done quickly using the Euclidean Algorithm (Alice knows p and q and hence knows (p-1)(q-1)).



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 To send a message *M* to Alice, an integer between 0 and *n*−1 inclusive, Bob computes a ciphertext *C* satisfying

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• Alice then makes the pair (*e*, *n*) public and compute her private key *d* satisfying


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 Bob then sends C to Alice. Alice then computes R ≡ C<sup>d</sup> mod pq with 0 ≤ R < pq.</li>



#### RSA Main Theorem

**Proposition:** R = M.

**Proof:** Since  $ed \equiv 1 \mod (p-1)(q-1)$ , transitivity of divisibility tells us that

 $ed \equiv 1 \mod p-1$  and  $ed \equiv 1 \mod q-1$ .

Since gcd(ed, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1, GCD Prime Factorization tells us that gcd(ed, p-1) = 1 and that gcd(ed, q-1) = 1. Next, as  $C \equiv M^e \mod pq$ , Splitting the Modulus states that

 $C \equiv M^e \mod p$  and  $C \equiv M^e \mod q$ 

Similarly, by Splitting the Modulus, we have

 $R \equiv C^d \mod p$  and  $R \equiv C^d \mod q$ .

By the previous proposition applied twice, we have that

$$R \equiv M \mod p$$
 and  $R \equiv M \mod q$ .

**Proposition:** R = M. **Proof:** (Continued) By the previous proposition applied twice, we have that

 $R \equiv M \mod p$  and  $R \equiv M \mod q$ .

Now, an application of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (or Splitting the Modulus), valid since p and q are distinct, gives us that  $R \equiv M \mod pq$ . Recalling that  $0 \leq R, M < pq$ , we see that R = M.

## Security and Food for Thought

- Is this scheme more secure? Can Eve compute d? If Eve can compute (p 1)(q 1) then Eve could break RSA. To compute this value given only n (which recall is pq), Eve would need to factor n. Factoring n is hard. Eve could also break RSA if she could solve the problem of computing M given M<sup>e</sup> mod n.
- Let  $\varphi$  be the Euler Phi Function. Note  $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$ when n = pq is a product of distinct primes.
- How does Alice choose primes p and q?
- What if Eve wasn't just a passive eavesdropper? What if Eve could change the public key information before it reaches Bob? (This involves using certificates).
- What are some advantages of RSA? (Believed to be secure, uses the same hardware for encryption and decryption, computations can be done quickly).

## An Example

Let 
$$p = 2$$
,  $q = 11$  and  $e = 3$ 

- **Or Example 1** Compute  $n, \phi(n)$  and d.
- **2** Compute  $C \equiv M^e \mod n$  when M = 8.
- **3** Compute  $R \equiv C^d \mod n$  when C = 6.

## An Example

Let 
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- Compute  $n, \phi(n)$  and d.
- **2** Compute  $C \equiv M^e \mod n$  when M = 8.
- **3** Compute  $R \equiv C^d \mod n$  when C = 6.

#### Solution:

• Note n = 22,  $\phi(n) = (2 - 1)(11 - 1) = 10$  and  $3d \equiv 1$ mod 10. Multiplying by 7 gives  $d \equiv 7 \mod 10$ . Hence d = 7.

Ø Note that

$$C \equiv M^e \equiv 8^3 \mod 22$$
$$\equiv 8 \cdot 64 \mod 22$$
$$\equiv 8 \cdot (-2) \mod 22$$
$$\equiv -16 \mod 22$$
$$\equiv 6 \mod 22$$

## An Example Finished

Let p = 2, q = 11 and e = 3

- **1** Compute *n*,  $\phi(n)$  and *d*. (*n* = 22,  $\phi(n) = 10$ , *d* = 7)
- 2 Compute  $C \equiv M^e \mod n$  when M = 8 (C = 6).

**③** Compute  $R \equiv C^d \mod n$  when C = 6.

## An Example Finished

Let p = 2, q = 11 and e = 3

- Compute *n*,  $\phi(n)$  and *d*. (*n* = 22,  $\phi(n) = 10$ , *d* = 7)
- 2 Compute  $C \equiv M^e \mod n$  when M = 8 (C = 6).

• Compute  $R \equiv C^d \mod n$  when C = 6.

**Solution:** (of last part) The quick way to solve this is to recall the RSA theorem and hence M = 8. The long way is to do the following:

$$R \equiv C^{d} \equiv 6^{7} \mod 22$$
  

$$\equiv 6 \cdot (6^{3})^{2} \equiv 6 \cdot (216)^{2} \mod 22$$
  

$$\equiv 6 \cdot (-4)^{2} \equiv 6 \cdot 16 \mod 22$$
  

$$\equiv 6 \cdot (-6) \equiv -36 \mod 22$$
  

$$\equiv 8 \mod 22$$