CS848 Oblivious RAM

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Data encryption to achieve privacy?



Encryption is **not** sufficient for data privacy



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[1] https://truecostofhealthcare.org/pharmas-50-best-sellers/

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Workload independence to protect against these attacks by hiding...



how old it is (when it was last accessed)

whether the same data is being accessed

access pattern (skewed vs. uniform)

whether the access is a read or a write

Random accesses ensures workload independence



Goal: Oblivious Access

Translate each logical access to a sequence of random-looking accesses

OBLIVIOUS RAM (ORAM)

Initially proposed by [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, JACM'96]

ORAM provides workload independence

- Clients wish to outsource data to an untrusted cloud storage
- Honest-But-Curious cloud can control & observe network & cloud storage
- Keep the data and access pattern private



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Typical (but not all) ORAM architecture





A practical and famous solution

• Path ORAM: an extremely simple oblivious RAM protocol [Stefanov et al. CCS'13]

1000 ft overview of ORAM (PathORAM^[1])

Step 1. Read path

Step 2. Shuffle and Write path



[1] E. Stefanov, et al. "Path ORAM: an extremely simple oblivious RAM protocol." Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC. 2013.

Path ORAM [Stefanov et al. CCS'13]



Pos Map

Proxy
Stash

Storage is organized as a binary tree

Every access to a random path Items randomly re-assigned after every access

Path ORAM [Stefanov et al. CCS'13]



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Proxy final formula Storage is organized as a binary tree

Every access to a random path Items randomly re-assigned after every access

Possible to outsource position map recursively But need many rounds of communication



Proxy □ Stash a→3 □ Pos Map

Read/Write block a

1) Read path

- Fetch associated path
- Read/Modify block
- Assign block to a new random path in position map
- Move all read blocks to stash



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3) Write-back

• Re-encrypt w/ fresh randomness

- Steps to access block **B**:
 - 1. Fetch path P containing block B from Server
 - 2. Update requested block *B* (if write)
 - 3. Answer Client Request
 - 4. Assign block **B** to random path
 - 5. Flush path P
 - 6. Writeback to server

Server	
Proxy	Stash PositionMap b1:p5 b2:p10
Sequential)	

Clients

Does PathORAM provide workload independence?

Say a client requested block b stored in path p. From an adversary's perspective

- Which data is accessed?

 One of the Z*logN objects accessed
- When was b last accessed? → Only knows when p was last accessed, not when b was last accessed
- Did 2 subsequent requests access b? → Only knows two random paths p and p' being accessed in subsequent requests
- Access pattern (uniform or skewed)? → Observes accesses to random paths
- Is b read or written? \rightarrow Each path is read and then written with fresh encryption

Yes! PathORAM provides workload independence!

ORAM – Security

- Let A = {(op₁, bid₁, val₁), ... (opm, bidm, valm)} represent a sequence of accesses op_i ∈ {read, write}, bid_i is the block identifier, and val_i is either updated value writes or null for reads
- An ORAM scheme is secure if given two such sequences A₀ and A₁ and the system executed A_i, the adversary cannot guess which sequence was executed with probability >> 1/2

ORAM - Security

GAME	b ← { 0 , 1 }
ORAM	



ORAM - Security





ORAM - Security





ORAM - Security





ORAM - Security



 $op_0(Read(a)) \quad op_1(Read(a))$



ORAM - Security



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ORAM - Security



Two observations on PathORAM

- Bandwidth overhead: 2*Z*logN → Depends on Z
- The *online* rounds of communication b/w client and server: 2 rounds
 - Even for read reqs, need an online write step
- Can these two limitations be improved?

RingORAM [Ren et al. Usenix Security'15]

Goals:

1. Eliminate the ORAM bandwidth's dependence on Z

How? Read exactly one block per bucket along the path

2. Reduce online communication rounds to 1

How? Only read path for each client request, buffer writes, and write path back in an offline step



Each bucket stores at most Z real blocks and at least S dummy blocks





Proxy □ Stash a→3 □ Pos Map

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Every access to a random path reads only one block per bucket





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Bucket metadata stores info on
1. *count:* how many times is this bucket accessed
2. *valid:* which of the *Z+S* blocks are not yet accessed
3. *addr:* ids of real blocks in a bucket

Note: Bucket metadata actually stored at server





1) Read path

For each bucket in path

- From *valid* and *addr*, either read real block or a valid dummy block
- Invalidate the read block in *valid*
- Increment count



Proxy □ Stash a→3 Pos Map

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Proxy Stash a -> 1 Pos Map

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2) Evict

- After A read paths, in a deterministic order pick the next path to evict
- For each bucket, read all remaining valid real blocks (if < Z, read dummy) to *stash*
- Write each bucket from *stash* and reset all metadata





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3) Early reshuffle

- If a bucket is accessed *s* times, read all valid real blocks, permute, and write back
- Reset metadata for the bucket

Security arguments for Ring ORAM

- 1. Read path leaks no information
 - For each access, a random path is read
 - For each bucket, a random offset is read
- 2. Evict path leaks no information
 - Every A accesses, a deterministically chosen path is read
 - Each bucket reads Z blocks
 - Path written back
- 3. Early shuffle leaks no information
 - After S accesses to a bucket, Z blocks are read
 - Bucket is written back

Limitations of Path and Ring ORAM

- Both are sequential
 - TaoStore by Sahin et al. S&P'16 [Jan 25th]
- They both require a proxy to be practical
 - ConcurORAM by Chakraborti et al. NDSS'19 [Jan 30th]
- They do not support transactions or complex queries
 - Obladi by Crooks et al. OSDI'18 [Feb 1st]
 - ObliDB by Eskandarian et al. VLDB'19 [Mar 12th]
- Neither is fault tolerant
 - QuORAM by Maiyya et al. Usenix Security'22 [Feb 6th]
- Neither is scalable
 - ObliviStore by Stefanova et al. S&P'13 (not reading)
 - Snoopy by Dauterman et al. SOSP'21 [Mar 14th]

Conclusion

- Access patterns leak information
- Need workload independence
- Databases using ORAM ensure workload independence
- PathORAM: a highly efficient tree-based ORAM
 - Simple abstraction & easy to implement
- RingORAM: optimizes PathORAM by reducing online bandwidth cost